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Epistemology of resistance pdf

Accolades foreword: Insensitivity and Blindness Introduction. Resistance, democratic sensitivities, and the cultivation of disruption. Importance of differing opinions and need for aesthetic interaction B. Resistance, confusion and multiperspectivalism C. Overview 1. Active Ignorance, Epistemic Associates, and Epistemic Friction 1.1. Active ignorance and epistemic vice in Privileged 1.2. The virtues of light and epistemic are the repressed 1.3. Resistance, epistemic responsibility, and regulatory principles of epistemic friction chapter 2. Resistance like Epistemic Vice and Epistemic Virtue 2.1. The excess of the Epistemic Authority and the resulting insensitivity 2.1.1. Epistemic Justice interactive, comparative and contrasting 2.1.2. Differentiation, systematic injustice, and social imaginary 2.2. The Vice avoids epistemic friction, Hermeneuticalal injustice, and the problem of meta-blindness. 2.3. Pursuit of openness: Epistemic friction and epistemic counterpoints to meta-blindness 3. Imposed silences and common hermeneutical liability 3.1. Silences and communicative approach to epistemic injustice 3.2. Communicative pluralism and hermeneutic injustice 3.3. Hermeneutical responsibility for multiple publicity 4. Epistemic liability and culpable ignorance 4.1. Responsible Agency, knowledge/ignorance, and social injustice 4.2. In the circumstances of oppression, betrayal of one's responsibilities: social context, connectedness and sinful ignorance 4.2.A. Pig Heads, Burning Crosses and 4.2.B. The social class of cognitive laziness 4.2.C. Blindness differences 4.2.D. Blindness in social relational and relevance Dilemma 4.3. Overlapping insensitivity, culture-blaming, and rape against Third World Women chapter 5. Meta-Clarity, Epistemic Heroes, and everyday struggle toward Epistemic Justice 5.1. Live up to a responsibility under the conditions of oppression: Meta-Light 5.2. Promoting clarity and social change 5.3. Echo: Chained Action, Epistemic Heroes, and Social Networks 5.3.1. Row Juana Inés de la Cruz: Epistemic Courage, Critical Imagination and Epistemic Friction 5.3.2. Rosa Parks: Counter-Performance, Chained Agency, and Social Networks Chapter 6. Resilient imagination and radical solidarity 6.1. Pluralist communities of resistance 6.2. Normative pluralism and radical solidarity 6.3. Epistemic friction and insurgent genealogies 6.4. Guerrilla Pluralism, Counter-Memories, and Epistemologies of Ignorance 6.5. Resistant imaginations: Towards kaleidoscopic social sensitivity 6.6. Conclusion: Network Solidarity Coda References 1The new book by José Medina offers an inspiring exploration of how recent discussions about epistemic ignorance can be made work to expose and condemn new forms of repression. José Medina combined this task with four different traditions: American pragmatism, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and feminist and racial studies. This original blend of different traditions gives the book its distinctive flavor and takes into account its originality. 2A way to read this text is to see it as a book on political philosophy rooted in tradition is not an ideal theory and is therefore committed to widespread concern about social issues. This concern was expressed explicitly in epistemic tonicity. Medina actually tries to develop some of the epistemological assumptions that he believes are based on and perpetuate forms of social oppression. Put in a nutshell, the idea is to unfold the epistemic sources and obstacles to the normative dynamics in which oppression arises, reproduced, disputed and ultimately overcome. To achieve its goal, Medina relies on the concept of aesthetic injustice, which she recently introduced in Miranda Fricker's philosophical debate to define her own concept of epistemic resistance. Based on the assumption that there is clearly an epistemic kind of injustice and that oppression has a distinctive Epistemic dimension, Medina defends the idea that we need to explore the typical epistemic resources that social actors can rely on to confront the forms of social oppression that affect them. 3By epistemic resistance, the author means the use of our epistemic resources and abilities to undermine and change repressive normative structures and the complacent cognitive-affective functioning that sustains these structures (3). Aesthetic opposition is clearly a political act, as it is against injustices embedded in social relations. This model of resistance was introduced with the explicit aim of overcoming standard dualism between consensual models and agonist models by relying on what Medina takes for a broader understanding of democratic life based on communication commitment. 4The political meaning of resistance developed by this book comes from a second source, which is a controversial concept of democracy. Relying on the works of Elizabeth Anderson and Iris M. Young, Medina assumes a model of democracy based on the concept of resistance, not consensus. His main idea is that in democratic societies, given their commitment to free and equal epistemic participation, it is in their prima facie interest and duty to detect and correct the systematic inequalities in the epistemic agency that different members of society can enjoy and the inequalities associated with them The obligation to combat aesthetic injustices therefore stems from the earlier adoption of an epistemic justification for democracy. The debate between democracy and epistemic epistemic epistemic and political mechanisms that sustain it. 5Here should see the first element of interest in pragmatists, since Medina, after Anderson, considers Dewey's experimental account of the epistemic powers of democracy as the best instance of the resistance model, since - both of them claim - the central role Dewey assigns to debate and dissent as the central virtue of democracy. According to both scientists, compared to other models, Dewey's is the only model in which it is different from epistemically productive. The importance of epistemic resistance must therefore be seen in the context of the epistemic justification of democracy: democracy is the only system that makes conflict epistemic productive. As a result, democracy can attach positive value to diversity, interaction and dynamism: this is because we want to take advantage of productive disagreements, recognise and take advantage of heterogeneous knowledge of different agents. 6 Starting with these broad assumptions Medina sets out two normative requirements that inform understanding of democracy and to pave the way for his analysis of epistemic oppression and resistance. The first requirement is the requirement of expressibility: it demands that different groups, which may be included in a social organisation, be given the opportunity to unite with public expression skills in order to express their shared experiences and perspectives. Expressibility requires creating space and opportunities for group formation. The second requirement is the need for responsiveness, according to which the social and epistemic conditions of communication and interaction are such that public expressions can be adequately accommodated by the public and society as a whole (9). The study of epistemic injustices looked at how these minimum requirements could be thoomened, as well as the negative effects on democratic life that these failures can have. 7Medina focuses on two specific forms of oppression, which are designed for racial and gender inequality, to which Medina attaches a specific epistemic importance. Indeed, in the context of sexual and racial oppression, there are cognitive-affective deficits that represent certain forms of epistemic insensitivity: the inability to listen and learn from others, the inability to question one's perspective and process epistemic friction, which has an effect from significantly different perspectives (17–8). For Medina, however, this lack of knowledge is self-knowledge (about who I am as an agent) and lack of social knowledge (social inequalities, asymmetry and the situation of oppression). Here the political importance of the analysis of social oppression and inequality, which has been Conditions. 8The book describes these general theoretical assumptions in detail. First, it defines the accepted basic epistemological terminology (chs. 1 and 2). He then uses these concepts to explore the different epistemic dimensions of social experience, with a particular emphasis on the moral and political consequences of the epistemic dimensions of silence and ignorance (chs. 3 and 4). Then develop a theoretical model of epistemic resistance to current forms of social oppression (chs. 5 and 6). One of the central thesis is that the book protects that mutual together with the impact of the epistemic and the political. This thesis has two main consequences. The first is the assignment of moral and political meaning to epistemic states, as in the case of the claim that the agent has a moral responsibility for their ignorance. The second consequence is the symmetrical emphasis on the epistemic dimension of morality and politics, exemplifies by the idea that morality and politics are rooted in specific epistemic virtues, among which Medina emphasized metalucidity. 9 From the epistemic perspective adopted by Medina, inequality is the enemy of knowledge. As a result, social injustice and aesthetic injustice are the two faces of the same medal. In a nutshell, the argument argues that oppression produces inequality; inequality results in aesthetic injustice, and eskinemic injustice impoverishes our democratic lives. According to Medina, although the clearly asymmetrical, aesthetic consequences of oppression affect both oppressors and oppressed, though not in the same way. This point is strategic to Medina's argument because one conclusion she wants to bring home is that epistemic oppression harms oppressors as well, causing damage that studies suggest feminism and racial theory may be conceptual specific forms of ignorance and epistemic vices. Among the vices that privileged groups are likely to contract are Medina lists with epistemic arrogance, epistemic laziness, and a close mindset. They are epistemic vices because they affect one's ability to learn from others and facts; the ability to self-correction and that they are open to imitation by others (31). Symmetrically, Medina identifies three epistemic virtues that are usually associated with social experience produced by oppression: humility, curiosity/diligence, and openness. Medina clearly emphasises that virtues and sins are not the attributes of social groups, but correlations of experience. The end result of the analysis is that marginalized people have privileged access to social knowledge, as they tend to develop subversive clarity (defined as the sum of the three epistemic virtues), likely to detect and overcome blind spots and new the light that enriches social cognition (45). People belonging to oppressed groups are likely to gain meta-clarity, the capacity to see the limitations as dominant ways. [...] This meta-light has critical and subversive potential: it provides insight into the workings of perspectives, which allows us to redraw our cognitive maps, redraw our experiences, and rethink our approach methods to others (47). 10These are the theoretical foundations for the analysis of the aesthetic dimension of social life on which Medina relies on resistance as a moral and political virtue. Resistance is a positive epistemic function because it ensures friction, and friction is essential to ensure the alignment of our beliefs and attitudes and reality. Our resilience to the social systems, vision and perceptions we receive, as well as to the combined habits, is therefore being turned into a propeller of social change. And since in the final case we are all responsible for his way of knowledge, this claim provides the starting point for the whole normative argument Medina develops to defend the idea that agents should be considered morally responsible for their beliefs and epistemic virtues, which in turn means the idea of moral and political culpability of ignorance. 11 To explain The Strategy of Medina, we must introduce an additional specification: relying on authors such as Shannon Sullivan and Charles Mills, Medina emphasizes the tacit and often unconscious dimension of virtues. In this respect, it introduces the concept of active ignorance precisely in order to identify a form of ignorance that protects itself through psychological and socio-political protection mechanisms. It also reveals how social imaginings contribute to preserving social ignorance by defining the utterable and acceptable and what is not space. What is socially thought-provoking affects the epistemic authenticity of the subject, as it tends to predetermine the discursive space in which it will orient. Another concept introduced to describe the epistemic dimension of social oppression is meta-blindness. Meta-blindness is blindness to your own blindness, which so agrees to strengthen blindness. The difference between blindness and metavasity serves specific critical purposes, such as criticism of racially blind politics. 12 The distinction between blindness and metavadity also serves as a detailed analysis of silencing as a social process through which oppression is created and sustained. Following Miranda Fricker's analysis of hermeneutic justice that it is evolving and expanding significantly, Medina insists on the social dimension of this particular form of epistemic ignorance. Medina is adopting a pluralistic approach to aesthetic according to which society interpretative communities so that injustices affect individuals according to the community to which they belong. Social silences and hermeneutic deficiencies are wrongly described if they are uniformly based on an entire social environment, rather than on the specific way of life of certain people imminating certain people (90). The purpose of the long discussion of the Frickers thesis is precisely to provide an analysis of aesthetic injustices that take into account social circumstances. This is an important and original contribution medina brings to the debate about nature's epistemic injustices. 13 This is indeed because he can show that epistemic injustices are a social foundation that Medina can derive from normative conclusions in his analysis. In particular, drawing on the analyses developed by Iris M. Young and Larry May, Medina introduces the idea of shared responsibility for our epistemic weaknesses: communities share a shared responsibility to do everything in their power to facilitate everyone's ability to participate in reporting and reporting expression exercises (109). The tasks are proportionate to the degree of marginalisation of the groups we connect with, so responsibility should be defined in relation to and positioning: whether individuals and groups correspond to their hermeneutic tasks should be assessed taking into account forms of mutual positioning, relonity and responsiveness (or lack thereof), which these themes and groups show relative to each other. 14 The normative requirement established by medina by analyzing the social causes of epistemic oppression is expressed through the thesis of cognitive minima, which opens ch. four. The cognitive minimum states that responsible agency requires that one be minimally informed about one's mind and life, the social world and the particular other with whom one interacts, and the empirical reality one encounters (127). If one recognises then that self-awareness can only be achieved in the absence of systematic distortions and cultivated forms of blindness and ignorance, there is a normative argument in support of affirmative measures to remove epistemic ignorance. Medina's idea is that aesthetic ignorance puts agents in states with reduced autonomy. This applies to the oppressed as well as the oppressors. Systematic injustices create irresponsible agents because they tend not to know themselves, others and the world (131). 15 Because of the interdevelope of knowledge and responsibility, Medina reveals at length the thesis of duty, regarded as the reverse of the moral transgression of ignorance. Medina argues that there are specific forms of ignorance that cannot be forgiven, therefore, identification of precise forms of responsibilities: agents, trainers, communities. In view of Medina's contextualism, the extent of the agent's obligation to know is limited by the social and cultural horizon of his experience. Medina sets out three criteria that can be used to prioritize our obligations to know what we can rely on, to order our obligations on the basis of relevance criteria. The three criteria are: (a) the objective of prioritising others by proximity, taking into account as a guide the idea of sharing resources and/or social spaces, the definition of co-participants in social areas; (b) the maxim of openness and vigilance when we always try to learn more about others; and (c) a maxim of shared responsibility between the community and individuals in determining relevance. These maxims are proposed as guidelines that make it easier for individuals and communities to verify the aacy of their perceptions. 13 This is indeed because the most constructive part of the argument, in which Medina introduces his political vision of epistemevny resistance as the sum of strategies aimed at confronting and combating forms of social consolidated habits. However, friction raises awareness, which in turn favors the concept of meta-clarity, which identifies what he describes as the epistemic heroes whose daily struggles contribute to restoring epistemic justice. This is the chapter where Medina deals most intensively with the idea of the emancipation role of the oppressed, based on the epistemic virtues they develop to survive the many forms of social and aesthetic oppression. In particular, Medina relies on postcolonial and feminist thought to emphasize the epistemic distortion that arises when racial images of the oppressed circulate in the social body: racial others no longer perceive their own identity, but rather the effect of boomerang perceptions (Spelman): white perceives race as other just the image he himself created, projected onto the other, and got back. Epistemically, the experience of invisibility shows that agents are affected by that social perception fallible: since they see things others don't, they realize that they are always more visible than what they see: they therefore develop an attitude that is always looking for more, forever more, based on the experience that there can be more than what they see (192). Meta clarity is an indispensable attitude for those who live under the conditions of oppression if they want to keep epistemic responsibility. The oppressed are epistemically favored because the experience produces a clash of different perspectives on what W.E.B. Du Bois called dual consciousness. Dual consciousness can bring with it the need to switch between visions and thus gain critical capacity. but de cognitive dissonance. Here, Medina relies on Linda Alcoff's project, which uses a transformative and restorative approach to white identity: white people need to learn to accept the socio-historical genesa of their biased identity in order to transform it. The point is that discrimination and oppression are rooted in deep habits that are difficult to undo. As a result, long learning and transformation processes are needed. We need to look at how subjects can reconstruct their perspectives and learn how to dwell in them in new ways, so that they can recreate their positionality and relational affiliation in a racist social environment (220). The general argument we already know is that transformation requires friction and resistance to disrupt consolidated habits. However, friction raises awareness, which in turn favors the transformation of habits. Because identities are socially shaped, the processes of personal transformation are essentially social. 17 In order to make sense of the internal social dimension of these processes Medina relies on John Dewey's theory of publicity and G.H. Mead's theory of generalize other: the following Dewey Medina notes that the social network becomes an organized social group or movement [...] when and because members communicate with each other and make their problems' interests and goals clear (226). Mead is invoked shortly after to defend the situation of epistemic perspectivism: the epistemic friction produced by the interaction of heterogeneous positions can bring critical awareness in several ways to detect and point in the direction of change, the melioration of our perceptural attitudes and habits. Both references should be interpreted as meaning that pragmatist epistemology attaches a central role to friction as a distinctive feature of human experience. For Medina, as well as for pragmatists, friction is the starting point for changing habits. Friction can disrupt existing habits and promote the formation of new ones. 18Three pragmatism Medina draws the idea that social transformation requires a transformation of the social imagination. Imagination is key because it participates and is therefore closer to action than reason. In addition, the imagination is positioned: it affects our relationship with the world and others. Thirdly, after Dewey Medina, he emphasizes the experimental and creative role of imagination: in the dramatic imagination, we look at the living of possible scenarios that relate to forms of social positionality and relationality, demanding moral and political reactions (256). Therefore, the idea that interaction with social image may favor processes of imaginative resistance. In fact, imagination has different moral and epistemic counterpoint to each other. Therefore, by comparing and comparing their imaginative resistances, people can become sensitive to other imagined and living worlds of potential experiences (256). 19 The medina also prefers fantasy because it works on the surface of the individual and society: while individuals always imagine relying on materials forged by social relationships. An additional element of Medina draws on pragmatism is to develop the theory of this resistant imagination of James's pluralism: imagination allows us to make meaningful lives for others. In this sense, imaginative pragmatism is the custom of always seeing an alternative to see things in perspective. Medina relies on James against what he presents as a peircean and meadian concept of consensus pluralism to defend a more agonizing view of pluralism, in which conflict is at the same time productive and never resolved. Pragmatically, it sees the agreement as a temporary and fundamental achievement: in social life and in political practice, unification is only researched on issues of action, not on the truth: the possibilities of eskinchemic friction and resistance are qualifying and limited for the sake of consensus and unification, but also for coordination and cooperation (283). A pragmatic understanding of pluralism is radicalised by relying on the foucauldian concept of power to introduce the concept of guerrilla pluralism, in which epistememic friction is now seen merely as a form of resistance to oppression. They're looking for friction for their own good. The aim is not to increase knowledge, but to resist power. Guerrilla pluralism does not seek to resolve conflicts, it seeks energy. Medina goes to great lengths to describe and compare these competing views of pluralism, proposing the end of a combination of both that praises Foucault's disruptive power and James' creative potential. In summary, medina, relying on the cultivation of epistemic virtues, proposes a normative account of how social oppression can be opposed and reduced by condemning forms of culpable ignorance that have not yet been recognized and supporting the new resistance imaginary. 20 All in all, José Medina wrote an original book that masterfully combines continental and American traditions and deals with important topics in today's social and political philosophy, showing why we should pay more attention to the epistemic dimension of our daily interactions. In this way, the volume offers a new and fresh interpretation of the foucauldian adage that knowledge is power, in which the creative and limiting forces that shape our daily lives bring the focus to the shared responsibility on which social life is built. Built-in.