




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Hume enquiry concerning human understanding pdf

Philosophical book by David Hume Not to be confused with An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding AuthorDavid HumeLanguageEnglishSubjectPhilosophyPublication date1748Preceded byA Treatise of Human Nature Followed by An enquiry Concerning Human Understanding at Wikisource David Hume by Allan Ramsay (1766) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is a book by Scottish hampirist philosopher David Hume, published in English in 1748. [1] It was a revision of an earlier effort, Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in London in 1739-40. Hume was disappointed by the reception of the Treaty, which fell to the press,[2] as he put it, and so he tried to spread his more developed ideas to the public by writing a shorter and more polemical work. The end product of his factions was the investigation. The inquiry has given up much of the material of the Treaty in favour of clarifying and emphasising its most important aspects. For example, Hume's views on personal identity do not appear. However, more vital proposals are maintained, such as Hume's argument for the role of habit in a theory of knowledge. This book proved very influential, both in the years that would follow immediately and today. Immanuel Kant points to it as the book that woke him up from his self-described dogmatic sleep. [3] The survey is widely considered a classic of modern philosophical literature. Summary The subject of the survey proceeds with a series of incremental steps, separated into chapters that logically follow one another. After exposing his epistemology, Hume explains how to apply his principles to specific topics. Empirical epistemology 1. Among the different philosophical species In the first section of the survey, Hume provides a rough introduction to philosophy as a whole. For Hume, philosophy can be divided into two general parts: natural philosophy and the philosophy of human nature (or, as he calls it, moral philosophy). The latter investigates both actions and thoughts. He points out in this section, as a warning, that philosophers with nuanced thoughts will probably be sidelined in favour of those whose conclusions correspond more intuitively to public opinion. However, he insists, precision helps art and craftsmanship of all kinds, including the craft of philosophy. 2. Of the origin of Next ideas, Hume discusses the distinction between impressions and ideas. By impressions, he means sensations, while by ideas he means memories and imaginings. According to Hume, the difference between the two is that ideas are less lively than impressions. For example, the idea of the taste of an orange is far inferior to the impression (or sensation) of eating it One. Writing within the tradition of empiricism, he argues that that are the source of all ideas. Hume accepts that ideas can be the product of a mere feeling or imagination that works in combination with sensation. [4] According to Hume, the creative faculty makes use of (at least) four mental operations that produce imaginings for sense impressions. These operations are compounding (or adding an idea about another, like a horn on a horse to create a unicorn); transpose (or replace one part of one thing with the side from another, as with the body of a man on a horse to make a centaur); increase (as in the case of a giant, the size of which has been increased); and decreasing (as for Lilliputian, whose size has decreased). (Hume 1974:317) In a later chapter, he also mentions mixing, separation, and division operations. (Hume 1974:340) Fig. 1. The Missing Shade of Blue However, Hume admits that there is an objection to his account: the problem with The Missing Shade of Blue. In this thought experiment, he asks us to imagine a man who has experienced every shade of blue except one (see Fig. 1). He predicts that this man will be able to guess the color of this particular shade of blue, despite never having experienced it. This seems to pose a serious problem for empirical accounting, although Hume shelves it as an exceptional case by stating that one can experience a new idea that in turn derives from combinations of previous impressions. (Hume 1974:319) 3. Of the association of ideas in this chapter, Hume discusses how thoughts tend to arrive in sequences, as in thought trains. Explain that there are at least three types of associations between ideas: similarity, contiguity in space-time, and cause and effect. He argues that there must be a universal principle which must take into account the different types of connections that exist between ideas. However, he does not immediately show what this principle might be. (Hume 1974:320-321) 4. Skeptical doubts about the operations of the cartel (in two parts) In the first part, Hume discusses how the objects of the investigation are reports of ideas or facts of fact, which is roughly the distinction between analytical and synthetic propositions. The first, says the reader, is demonstrated by the demonstration, while the second is given through experience. (Hume 1974:322) In explaining how things are entirely a product of experience, he rejects the idea that they can be ostic through a priori reasoning. For Hume, each effect only arbitrarily follows its cause: they are completely distinct from each other. (Hume 1974:324) In the second part, Hume investigates how one can rightly believe that experience produces conclusions about the world: When asked, what is the nature of all our reasoning regarding reality? The correct seems to be, to be, are based on the relationship between cause and effect. When we once again ask ourselves: what is the basis of all our reasoning and conclusions on this report? can be answered in a word, experience. But if we continue to sift through our humor, and ask, What is the foundation of all the conclusions of the experience? this implies a new demand, which can be more difficult to solve and apply. (Hume 1974:328) He shows that a satisfactory argument for the validity of the experience cannot be based either on proof (since it does not imply any contradiction that the course of nature can change) or on experience (since it would be a circular argument). (Hume 1974:330-332) Here he describes what would become known as the induction problem. 5. Skeptical solution of these doubts (in two parts) For Hume, let's assume that experience tells us something about the world because of habit or custom, which human nature forces us to take seriously. This is also, presumably, the principle that organizes the connections between ideas. In fact, one of the many famous passages of the investigation is on the subject of the incorrigibility of human custom. In Section XII, Of Academic or Skeptical Philosophy, Hume will say: The great subverter of Pirrhonism or the excessive principles of skepticism is action, employment and the occupations of common life. These principles can flourish and triumph in schools; where it is, in fact, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shadows, and by the presence of true objects, which implement our passions and feelings, they are put in opposition to the most powerful principles of our nature, vanish like smoke and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals. (Hume 1974:425) In the second part, he gives an account of the beliefs. Explain that the difference between belief and fiction is that the former produces a certain feeling of trust that the latter does not produce. (Hume 1974:340) 6. Probability This short chapter begins with the notions of probability and case. For him, probability means a higher probability of occurrence and leads to a higher degree of subjective expectation in the viewer. By chance, it means all those particular and understandable events that the viewer considers possible in accordance with the viewer's experience. However, further experience takes on these equal opportunities and forces the imagination to observe that certain possibilities arise more frequently than others. These gentle forces on the imagination cause the viewer to have strong beliefs in the results. This effect can be understood as another case of habit or habit by gaining past experience and using it to predict the future. (Hume 1974:346-348) Applied epistemology 1. of the necessary connection (in two parts) Nicolas Malebranche, one of hume hume's philosophical By necessary connection, Hume means the power or strength that necessarily binds one idea to another. He rejects the idea that any sensible quality is necessarily combined, as this would mean that we might know something before the experience. Unlike his predecessors, Berkeley and Locke, Hume rejects the idea that willpower or impulses can be inferred to necessarily connect to the actions they produce through a certain sense of the power of will. Reason it. 1. if we knew the nature of this power, then the mind-body division would seem totally unstitial to us; 2. if we had immediate knowledge of this mysterious power, then we would be able to intuitively explain why we can control certain parts of our body (for example, our hands or tongues), and not others (for example, the liver or heart); 3. We do not have an immediate knowledge of the powers that allow a will pulse to create an action (for example, of the muscles, nerves and animal spirits that are the immediate cause of an action). (Hume 1974:353-354) He produces similar arguments against the idea that we have knowledge of these powers as they only affect the mind. (Hume 1974:355-356) He also argues briefly against the idea that the causes are mere occasions of the will of some gods, a vision associated with the philosopher Nicolas Malebranche. (Hume 1974:356-359) After giving up these alternative explanations, he identifies the source of our knowledge of the necessary connections as deriving from the observation of a constant conjunction of certain impressions in many cases. In this way, people know the need through a strict custom or habit, and not from any immediate knowledge of the powers of the will. (Hume 1974:361) 2. Freedom and necessity (in two parts) Here Hume addresses the question of how freedom can be reconciled with metaphysical necessity (otherwise known as the compatibilist formulation of free will). Hume considers that all disputes in this area were only verbal arguments, i.e. arguments based on the lack of prior agreement on definitions. He shows for the first time that it is clear that most events are deterministic, but human actions are more controversial. However, he thinks that these also occur out of necessity since an external observer can see the same regularity that he would do in a purely physical system. To demonstrate the compatibility of necessity and freedom, Hume defines freedom as the ability to act on the basis of one's will, such as the will of actions, but not of will. It then shows (quite briefly) how determinism and free will are compatible notions and have bad consequences on ethics or moral life. 3. Due to animals (comparable to humans) Hume insists that the conclusions of the investigation will be very powerful if it can be shown that they apply to animals and not just humans. He believed that animals able to deduce the relationship between cause and effect in the same way that humans do: through learned expectations. (Hume 1974:384) Also note that this inferential ability that animals have is not through reason, but only custom. Hume concludes that there is an innate faculty of instincts that both beasts and humans share, namely the ability to reason experimentally (through custom). However, he admits, humans and animals differ in mental faculties in several ways, including: differences in memory and attention, inferential abilities, ability to make deductions in a long chain, ability to grasp ideas more or less clearly, the human ability to worry about combining unrelated circumstances, wise prudence that stops generalizations, the ability of a greater inner library of analogies with which to reason , the ability to detach and scrap one's prejudices, and the ability to converse through language (and thus gain from the experience of other people's testimonies). (Hume 1974:385, note 17.) 4. Of miracles (in two parts) Main article: Of miracles The next topic that Hume strives to cure is that of the reliability of human witness and the role that witness plays a role in epistemology. This was not an idle concern for Hume. Depending on its outcome, the entire treatment would give the epistemologist a certain degree of certainty in the treatment of miracles. True to his empirical thesis, Hume tells the reader that although testimony has some strength, it is never as powerful as direct proof of the senses. Having said that, he gives some reasons why we may have a basis for trust in people's testimony: because a) human memory can be relatively tenacious; and b) because people are inclined to tell the truth, and are ashamed to say falsehoods. Needless to say, these reasons are reliable only to the extent that they conform to experience. (Hume 1974:389) And there are a number of reasons to be skeptical about human testimony, even based on experience. (c) the speaker has no integrity, d) the speaker is too hesitant or bold, or c) the speaker is known to have reasons to lie, then the epistemologist has reason to be sceptical about the speaker's remarks. (Hume 1974:390) There is one last criterion that Hume thinks gives us a mandate to doubt a given testimony, namely f) if the propositions communicated are miraculous. Hume understands a miracle to be any event that contradicts the laws of nature. He argues that the laws of nature have behind them an overwhelming body of evidence, and are so well to everyone's experience, that any deviation from those laws is necessarily at a counter-match. (Hume 1974:391-392) Moreover, it emphasizes that talking about the miraculous has no superficial validity, for four four First, he explains that throughout history there has never been a miracle that has been attested by a large group of disinterested experts. Secondly, he notes that humans delight in a sense of wonder, and this gives a criminal the opportunity to manipulate others. Thirdly, he thinks that those who cling to the miraculous have tended to barbarism. Finally, since testimonies tend to conflict with each other when it comes to the miraculous, that is, the religious miracle of one man can be contradicted by the miracle of another man, any testimony relating to the fantastic is self-redeeming. (Hume 1974:393-398) However, Hume worries about warning that historians are generally reliable with confidence, as long as their fact reports are extensive and uniform. However, it seems to suggest that historians are fallible in interpreting facts as the rest of humanity. So, if every historian were to claim that there was a solar eclipse in the year 1600, then although at first we might naively consider that as a violation of natural laws, we would have come to accept it as a fact. But if every historian were to claim that Queen Elizabeth was observed walking around happy and healthy after her funeral, and then interpreted her as having been resurrected from the dead, then we would have reason to appeal to natural laws to challenge their interpretation. (Hume 1974:400-402) 5. Of a particular providence and a future state Hume continues its application of epistemology to theology through a long discussion about heaven and hell. The weight of this chapter presumably narrates the opinions, not of Hume, but of one of Hume's anonymous friends, who presents them again in a speech imagined by the philosopher Epicurus. His friend argues that although it is possible to trace a cause from an effect, it is not possible to deduce effects not to see from such a traced cause. The friend insists, therefore, that although we could postulate that there is a first cause behind all things - God - we cannot deduce anything about the afterlife, because we know nothing about the afterlife from experience, and we cannot deduce it from the existence of God. (Hume 1974:408) Hume offers his friend an objection: if we see an unfinished building, then we cannot infer that it was created by humans with certain intentions and that it will be finished in the future? His friend agrees, but indicates that there is a relevant analysis that we cannot pretend to know the content of God's mind, while we can know the designs of other humans. Hume seems essentially persuaded by his friend's reasoning. (Hume 1974:412-414) 6. Of academic or sceptical philosophy (in three parts) The first section of the last chapter is well organized scheme of various skeptical arguments. The treatment includes the topics of atheism, Cartesian skepticism, light skepticism, and and criticism of empiricism. Hume shows that even light skepticism leads to crushing doubts about the world that - while in the end they are philosophically justifiable - can only be fought through non-philosophical adherence to custom or habit. He finishes the section with his reservations about Cartesian and Lockean epistemologies. In the second section he returns to the subject of harsh scepticism and denounces it sharply. Because here is the main and most confused objection to excessive scepticism, which no lasting good can ever derive from it; while it remains in all its strength and vigour. We just have to ask such a sceptic, what is its meaning? And what do you propose with all this curious research? He's immediately at a loss, and he doesn't know what to answer... a Pyrrhic cannot expect, that his philosophy will have no constant influence on the mind: or if he did, that his influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must recognize, if he recognizes something, that all human life must die, if its principles prevail universally and constantly. (Hume 1974:426) It concludes the volume by fixing once and for all the limits of knowledge. When we come across libraries, convinced by these principles, what chaos should we do? If we take any volume into our hands; of the scholastic deity or metaphysics, for example; let's ask ourselves: does it contain any abstract reasoning about quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning about reality and existence? No. Then commit it to the flames: because it can contain nothing but sophisms and illusions. [5] Criticism and rejoinder The criteria hume lists in his examination of the validity of human testimony are approximately supported in modern social psychology, under the heading of the paradigm of persuasion to communication. Supporting literature includes: the work of social impact theory, which partly discusses persuasion through the number of people engaged in influence; as well as studies done on the relative influence of the communicator's credibility in the different types of persuasion; and the rapporteur's reliability tests. Personalized viewing of learning can in many ways be compared to association psychology. This point of view has been the subject of strong criticism in the research of the 20th century. However, the tests on the subject were somewhat divided. Tests on some animals such as cats have concluded that they have no faculty to enable their minds to understand the cause and effect. However, it has been shown that some animals, such as chimpanzees, have been able to generate creative action plans to achieve their goals, and therefore would seem to have a causal intuition that transcends mere custom. References ^ See Hume, David (1748). Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1 ed.). London: A. Millar. Accessed 28 June June via Google Books ^ Hume, David (1776). My Own Life, Appendix A of Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume, University of Texas Press, 1954. ^ I. Kant Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics ^ Nella terminologia di Locke, questa era nota come la divisione tra idee di senso semplici e complesse. ^ Hume, D., Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals Ristampato dall'edizione del 1777, Third Edition, L. A. Selby-Bigge (a cura di), Clarendon Press, Oxford, Setta XII, Parte III, p.165. ^ Wolfgang Kohler. (1925). La mentalità delle scimmie. New York: Harcourt. Citato da: Passer, Michael et al. 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