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## Plato's republic pdf book 2

Socrates believes that he has responded appropriately to Thrasymachus and is through a discussion with justice, but others are not satisfied with the conclusion they have reached. Glaucon, one of Socrates' young companions, explains what they would like him to do. Glaucon argues that all goods can be divided into three classes: what we want only because of their consequences, such as physical education and medical treatment; things that we desire only for their own joy; and, the highest class, what we desire, both for our own and for what we receive from them, such as knowledge, vision, and health. What Glaucon and The Rest would like Socrates to prove is that justice is not only desirable, but that it belongs to top-notch desirable things: those who want both for their own good and their consequences. Glaucon points out that most people have class justice among the first group. They see justice as a necessary evil, which we allow ourselves to suffer in order to avoid the greater evil that would struck us if we were away with it. Justice stems from human weakness and vulnerability. Since we can all suffer from each other's injustices, we make a social contract by agreeing to be just one another. We are suffering only because of the burden of justice, because we know that without it we will suffer worse. Justice is not something practiced on their own, but something one engages in out of fear and weakness. To emphasize your point, Glaucon turns to a thought experiment. Referring to the legend of the ring of gyges, he asks us to imagine that the right person is given a ring, which makes him invisible. Having this ring, a person can behave wrongly without fear of retaliation. No one can deny, Glaucon claims, that even the most only person would behave wrongly if he had this ring. He would enjoy all his materialistic, power-hungry, and erotic lustful calls. This tale proves that people are only because they are afraid of punishment for injustice. Nothing is just because justice is in itself desirable. Glaucon finishes his speech by trying to show that not only do people want to be wrong, not only, but also rational to do so. A completely wrong life, he argues, is more enjoyable than a completely just life. In making this statement, he draws two detailed portraits of a just and wrong person. A completely wrong man who inc whole his promptings is honored and rewarded with wealth. Quite just a man, on the other hand, is scorned and miserable. His brother, Adeimantus, breaks and supports Glaucon's arguments by arguing that no one praises justice for his own good, but only for the reward it allows you to take advantage of both this life and the afterlife. He reiterates Glaucon's request that it would be desirable in the absence of any external remuneration: that justice should be for their own, such as joy, health and knowledge. Analysis: Book II, 357a-368c Coming on the heels of thrasymachus attacks on justice I, points to the fact that Glaucon and Adeimantus raise the idea of social contract theory of justice and justice as a currency that buys rewards in the afterlife to reinforce the challenge faced by Socrates to prove the value of justice. With a few ideas of justice already discredited, why does Plato further complicate the problem before Socrates has the ability to describe his ideas about justice? [357a] Socrates When I said this, I thought I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be just a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always a fearless enterprising spirit of everything, wouldn't in this case recognize Thrasymachus's abandonment1 in his case, but said, Socrates, is your desire seemingly persuaded us [357b] or really persuaded us that it would be without exception better to be just than wrong? Really, I said, if the choice rested with me. Well, then you don't do what you want. Because to tell me: do you agree that is the kind of good2 that we would like to have, not out of desire for it after the impact, but to congratulate him for your own sake? As such, joy and such pleasures are harmless3 and will not receive anything from them to save and enjoy afterwards. [357c] I recognize that kind, said I. Again kind that we love both for our own good and for its consequences.4, for example, understanding.5 sight, and health76 On these assumptions we welcome for both reasons. yes, I said. And can you notice the third form of goodness by which to get exercise and cure when sick and the art of treatment and money making in general? For them, we would say that they are working and painful, but useful, and because of their own [357d], we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits they receive. Why so, I said, I have to admit to this third grade as well. But what of him? Which of these classes do you place justice? he said. [358a] In my opinion, I said, He belongs to the fairest class, whom a man who must be happy must love both for his or her results. But the crowd, he said, doesn't think so, but that it belongs to a toilsome class of things that need to be practiced for reward and reputation for opinion, but that in itself must be shunned as suffering. I know I said that there is a general opinion and Thrasymachus has for some time been disparaging it as such and praising injustice. But I seem to be a little slow to learn. Come now, [358b] said, Hear what I also have to say and see if you agree with me. For Thrasymachus I seem to give it to you too soon, as if was a snake7 that you were impressed with, but I am not yet satisfied with the evidence that has been offered about justice and injustice. For what I desire to hear, what is each of them and what potency and effect it has and live in the soul itself.8 but reject their rewards and consequences. This, then, is what I propose to do with your consent. I will update the [358c] Thrasymachus argument and first of all indicate what people say is the nature and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practice it is reluctant to do so, because it is something necessary9, not as good; and thirdly, that they have compelling reasons to act in this way, for the life of a false man is much better than the life of the righteous man, as they say; even though I, Socrates, don't believe it. But I am stabbed when my ears are dimmed by Thrasymachus and countless other arguments.10 In any case of justice, [358d] prove that this is better than injustice. I have never heard of any arguments as I want to hear. I want to hear justice encomium and by itself. And I think I'm most likely to get that out of you. For what reason I have set myself up glorifying the life of injustice, and so speaking will give you an example of how I want to hear from you, in turn, the praise of injustice and justice. Consider whether my offer you like. No one can please me more. I said; [358e] for what theme would make sense for a man, and it's nice to have and hear discourse over and over again? This is great, he said; and now listen to what I said will be the first topic - the nature and origin of justice. By nature.11 they say that committing injustice is good and to suffer this is evil, but that the excess of evil being hurt is greater than the excess of good doing wrong. So when people are wrong and are each other and taste a bit, those who don't have the power [359a] to avoid one and take the other down that it is their profit that compact with each other neither commit nor suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of laws and covenants between men, and that they designate the order of law as lawful and just, and that it is the gap that is best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst which must be false and be unsealed to take revenge. Justice, they tell us, is halfway between the two, is accepted and confirmed, [359b] not as a real good, but as a thing honored because of the lack of strength to do injustice, because anyone who had the power to do so and was actually a man never disagrees with anything either wrong or be wrong, for he would be mad. The nature of justice is therefore the same as this, Socrates, and are the conditions under which it originates, according to the theory. But as far as the second point is concerned, that those who do so reluctantly and out of power are reluctant to commit injustice, we will probably come together that if we uphold a premise like this, if we give everyone a fair and wrong license and the power to do whatever it pleases, then with them imagination and see his desire for action. Then we have to catch the right man in the same act, who performs the same behavior as the wrong man for the self-superiority that each creature, by nature, seeks as good, even though, according to the convention12, it is forcibly directed to pay honor for equality13 License, which, as I mean, would be almost one that would arise assuming that they had power [359d], which people say when they came to their ancestors Gygesan.14 They relate to them. , that he was a shepherd serving ruler at the time Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and earthquake the land opened and chasm appeared in the place where he was pastures; and they say that he saw and marveled, and went into the bead; and the story goes that he saw other miracles there and a hollow bronze horse with small doors, and that he peeped and saw the corpse inside as it seemed, more than mortal stature. [359e] and that there was nothing but a gold ring on his hand, which he rose and went out. And when the shepherds held their usual meeting to report the flock to the king every month, he also participated in wearing the ring. So when he sat there, it's likely that he turned the ring bushing into himself, in the inner arm, and when it happened, they said that he had become invisible15 [360a] to those who sat next to him and they talked about him as not and that he was surprised and again fumbling with a turned ring outwards and so became visible. He observed that he was experimenting with the ring to see if he had this virtue, and he found that the result was that when he turned inward, he became invisible, and when he was visible outwards; and upon learning of this, he immediately ruled things to become one of the messengers [360b] who went unto the king, and when he came there he seduced the wife of the king and, with her help, laid upon the king, killed him, and obsessed his kingdom. If now there should be two such rings, and only a man should put on one and the wrong other, no one can be found, seemingly, from such adamantine16 mood, that persevere in justice and endure to refrain from the property of others, not to touch them, although he can with impunity take what he wanted even from the market. [360c] and enter the house and lie , with whom he is satisfied, and to kill and lose out of the bonds and act in all other things among mankind as a god equal.17 And thus he would do otherwise from another man, but both shall seek the same course. And yet this is great evidence, it can be said that no one is alone in his will, but only from restraint, believing that justice is not his personal good, as much as every man, when he thinks he himself has the power to do badly, is doing wrong. [360d] Because there is much more profit for him personally injustice than justice is what everyone thinks and feels for sure, as a proponent of this theory will sustain. Because if someone who got such a license through his grasp should refuse to do any wrong or put his hands on other possessions, he would be considered the most pathetic18 and a big fool of anyone who pointed out him in .19 even though they would praise him20 against each other's faces, deceiving each other because of their fear of suffering injustice. So much for this matter. [360e] But come to a decision21 between our two kinds of life, if we separate the most completely correct and most completely wrong person, we will be able to decide correctly, but if not, not. How then, do you need to make this separation? So: we must not take away anything of our injustice from the wrong man or his justice from the righteous, but assume the perfection of everyone in the way of our own conduct. First of all, the wrong person must act as a clever craftsman, for to a first-rate pilot or doctor, for example, believes that the difference between impossibilities22 and the possibilities of his art [361a] and trying one and allowing others to go; and then, also, if it happens on a trip, it is equal to correct your mistake. In addition, the wrong man, who is rightly trying to injustice, must be considered a avoidable detection if he is to be completely wrong, and we must treat someone who is caught as bungler.23 Because the height of injustice24 seems only without it. Totally wrong man, then we have to attribute perfect injustice and nothing to stand, but we must allow him, while making the greatest injustice, to secure himself the greatest reputation for justice; [361b] and if it happens with the journey, 25 we must acknowledge to him the power to correct his mistakes with his ability to speak convincingly if any of his transgressions ignite, and when force is needed, to use force because of his masculine spirit and energy and the provision of his friends and money; and when we have created the wrong man of this character, our theory must establish the right man at his side—a simple and noble man who does not want to look but be good in the phrase of Aeschylus. Then we have to take away from him it would seem.26 For if he is to be believed only [361c] he will have honor and gifts because of this respect. In such a case, we cannot be sure whether it is solely for the sake of justice or gifts and honors. So we must take him away from everything but justice and make his state contrary to his imaginary colleague.27 While not looking at it, he must have a reputation for the greatest justice that he can be a test for justice, not softening because of the wrong reputation and its consequences. But let him keep his course unchanged even before death, [361d], it seems that his whole life is wrong, although it is right that yes, both men reach the limit, one of injustice, justice the other, we can make a decision which of the two is happier. Bless me, my dear Glaucon, said I would have strenuously you polish off each of your two men for the prize if it was a statue competition.28 In my ability, he replied: And if there are two natures, it becomes an easy thing for you to fancy, revealing the sort of life that awaits every kind of fairy tale. Then we have to say this; and even if my language is a bit rude and cruel,29 you can't believe Socrates that I'm so speaking, but those who praise injustice over justice. What they will say is this: that such is his disposition only a man will have to endure eyelashes, rack, chains, [362a] mark iron in his eyes, and finally, after every suffering limb, he will be crucified.30 and thus learn his lesson that may not be, but it seems that's what we must want. And Aeschylus31 saying was, it seems, much more correct applied to the wrong man. Because it is simply true, they say that the wrong person, how to seek, who clings to reality, truth, not to regulate his life according to opinion, wants not to look, but to be wrong, to exploit the deep gutters of his mind [362b] The fruits of advice from which grow there are shaken, Aesch. Seven 592-594first office and rule in the state for the justice of his reputation, then wife from any family he chooses, and give his children marriage to whom he likes, relationships and partnerships with who he will be, and the advantage of all these deals and profits for himself, because he has no squeamishness about what he wants, relationships and partnerships with which he will be, and the advantage of all these deals and profits for himself, because he has no squeamishness about what he wants, the relationships and partnerships with which he will be, and the superiority and profit of all these deals for himself, because he has no squeamishness about committing injustice; and so they say that if he enters lawsuits, public or private, he wins and gets his opponents better, and, get better,32 is rich and benefit his friends [362c] and hurts his enemies33, and he duly and wonderfully sacrifices gods, and de distributes viciuous offerings to the gods34, and he serves and pays court35 to the people whom he prefers, and to the gods much better than a righteous man, that he may reasonably expect that the favor of heaven36 shall also fall, and to him, not to the right. So much better they say Socrates, is a life that is ready for the wrong man of gods and people than the one who is waiting. When Glaucon Glaucon so speaking, I had a mind [362d] to make some response to it, but his brother Adeimantus said: You really don't think Socrates, that statement of the case is exhaustive? Why, what else? I said. The most important thing, he said, was not mentioned. Then, said I, as the proverb must do, Let the brother help the man in '37 and so if Glaucon misses any word or deed, you come to his aid. Although in my turn, what he has already said is enough to overthrow me and [362e] incapacitated me for coming to the rescue of justice. Nonsense, he said, but listen to this point. We need to lay out the arguments and language of the opposing party, about those who value justice well and have injustice, if what I've figured out is that what I've figured out is that what I've figured out is that it is glaucon meaning to be clearer, parents, when they turn to the urges of their sons, and all those who have others in their charge.38 [363a] calls to be alone, praising justice itself, but the good reputation with the humanity that accumulates from him, the goal that they have against us is that it seems only a man can get out of the reputation of office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucon only listed as coming to an insight from his good name. However, those people are paying attention to this topic of reputation. For, cast in good condition with the gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which the gods confirm that the gods give to pious men, even as worthy Hesiod and Homer declare, [363b] the one whom the gods make oaks to be true: Acorns on top of branches and bee swarms on their middle suitcases, and he tells how the flocks of wool-bearing sheep are loaded and weighed in soft , and he tells how flocks of wool-bearing sheep are loaded and confirmed with soft wool. Hes. WD 232f. and many other blessings similar to these; and so does another poet: Even when the good king, who rules the high gods at bay, upholds justice and law, and the black earth gives him his foison [363c] Barley and Wheat, and his trees are loaded and weighted with honest fruits, the magnifying comes to his flocks and the ocean snorts with fish. Hom. Od. 19.109And Musaeus and his son39 have 40 more sustainable songs41 than the blessings that the gods give to the righteous. For they lead them to Hades' house in their fairy tale and organize a symposium of saints42, where, standing on wreaths in wreaths, [363d] they now cherish time with wine, as if the truest lovers of virtue were endlessly drunk. And others further expand the reward of virtue from the gods. Because they say that children43 a pious and sworn man and his race will never succeed afterwards. Such and such are their praise of justice. But they are insurmountable and wrong they are buried in mud44 hado's house and forced to bring them siele.45 and while they still live, [363e] they bring them into a bad reputation, and all the sufferings that Glaucon has described as exhaling only those people who are believed to be wrong, they say of the wrong, but they have nothing more to say.46 Such is the praise and distrust of righteousness and wrongness. Also, consider, Socrates, another language about justice and injustice [364a], which is employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord repeat that sobriety and righteousness are just and honorable, to be sure, but unpleasant and difficult, and licentiousness and injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are just opinions and conventions shameful. They say that injustice pays better than justice, for the most part, and they don't scruple into felicitate bad men who are wealthy or have other kinds of power to do them in honor of public and private, and dishonor [364b] and disregard those who are in any way weak or poor, even admitting that they are better men than others. But the strangest of all these languages is that they say about gods47 and virtue, as is the case that the gods themselves attribute many evils and evil lives of good people, but their opposites are many; and begging priests48 and soothsayers to go to the doors of rich people and make them believe that they are through sacrifice and incision have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods49 that can disperse and heal pleasant festivals [364c] but misdeed man and his ancestors, and that if a man wants to harm the enemy, at a slight cost he will be given injured only and equally wrongly, since they are masters of spells and bite50 That limit the gods to serve in your end. And for all these words they refer to poets as witnesses, because of the lightness and abundance of the vice, citing: Evil-doing many man will find a quest; [364d] Smooth is the way and it is next at hand and is easy to enter; But the gods in the path of virtue put sweat on the first step, Hes. WD 287-289and some long and uphill road. And others cite Homer as a witness to the gods beguiling people because he also said, The gods themselves are moved by prayers, and the people fall victim with soothing vows. [364e] And incense and libation turn their will to pray when they committed themselves and committed transgressions. Hom. II. 9497And they produce musaeus and Orpheus books bushel51, The descendants of the moon and flies, as they confirm, and in these books they use their ritual, and make not only ordinary men, but claim that there really is forgiveness for sins and cleansing deity injustices, using sacrifices and pleasant sports52 of life, [365a] and that there are also special ordinances which they call the features that present us from the present of us from the in that other world, while terrible things await those who ignore sacrifice. What, Socrates, we believe, are all such expressions of respect in which people and gods have virtue and vice upon souls that hear them, the souls of young people who quickly know and can flitting as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and to infer from them [365b] the whole character and the way in which man would be the best in life? Such a young man53 will most likely put himself in question to Pindar asking: Is it justice or crooked deception that I'm a bigger tower will scale and thus live my life out of fenced and protected security? Pindar. Fr. The consequences of mine are only, unless I also seem to have no assets,54 they say, but liabilities, labor and total loss; but if I am wrong and have acquired a reputation for justice in godly life is promised. Then [365c] because it is seemingly Simonides, Fr. 76 Bergk, and Eur. Orest. 236 As the wise men show me that the master is a reality and is the ruler of happiness, then I have to dedicate myself without reserve. On the front and show55 I have to draw a virtue about myself in the shadow line, but trail behind me the most sage Archilochus fox.56 shifty and bent profit. No, it contradicted, it's not easy wrong-door always lie to hide.57 Than any other big thing facile, [365d] we will answer. But still, if we hope to be happy, we have to go down the road at which our arguments point to traces. For the purpose of lying hidden we will organize societies and political clubs.58 and there are teachers cajolery59 who convey the art of the People's Assembly and courtroom. So that part of persuasion, partly by force, we will attract under the influence of impunity. But against the gods, it can be said, neither the secret nor the force can be used. Well, if there are no gods, or they will not care about human beings, [365e] we also do not need to take care of our observation to emerge.60 If they exist and respect, we know and hear them only from such discourses and from the poets who described their origin. However, the same institutions tell us that the gods can be persuaded and sown from their course by sacrificing and soothing vows and devotion. We have to believe in them both or none. And if we want to believe in them, what needs to be done is to make injustice and sacrifice [366a] from the fruits of our transgression.61 For if we are true, it is true, gods will not be spoken, but we will defer the profits of our injustice; but if we are wrong, we will win that profit, and, by importing our prayers, when we commit and commit misdeed, we will persuade them and avoid the Scots. Yes, he will be opposed, but we will be judged below our wrong acts here, we or the children of our children. No, my dear sir, our counting friend62 will



have done this from you in general, because i had to spare you from your words alone. But the more I trust you, the more I am at a loss to what to do about this. I don't know how I can come to the rescue. Because I doubt your ability because you did not accept the arguments by which I thought I had proved against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Also once again I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. Because I'm afraid that [368c] it would actually be insane to stand blankly when justice is reviled and be weak-hearted, not to defend it until one holds a breath and can pronounce his voice. The best thing, then, is to help her as best I can. Glaucon, then, and the rest of me besought me by all means to come to the rescue, not to abandon the argument, but to seek that investigation into every kind and truth of the investigation their respective advantages. Then I said how I thought: The study we have in the company is not easy, but [368d] requires an enthusiastic vision of how I look. So, since we are not intelligent individuals, I think we should use the search method that we should use if we, without a very enthusiastic vision, were forbidden to read small letters from afar, and then someone noticed that the same letters exist elsewhere higher and on a larger surface. We had to account for this success, I fancy being allowed to read these letters for the first time, and examine smaller ones if they are the same. That's all, said Adeimantus; [368e] any analogy you detect about justice? I'll tell you, I said, There's one person's justice, we say, and I think also from all over the city. Of course, he said. Isn't the city bigger<sup>75</sup> than the man? It is bigger, he said. Then, perhaps, there would be more justice for a larger object and easier to detain. If you like it, then, [369a] let us first look for your quality states, and then just examine it as well as the individual, looking for greater similarity to less form. I think that is a good offer, he said. If, then, I said, our argument should follow the origin of state<sup>76</sup>, we should also see the origin of justice and injustice in it. It could be, he said. And if this is done, can we expect to find it easier what we are looking for? [369b] Much more. Do we try, then, and go through it? I like this is not a slight task. Then reflect. We reflected, <sup>77</sup> said Adeimantus; continue and not give up. The origin of the city, then, said I, in my opinion, is to find the fact that we are not multi-sufficient for our own needs.<sup>78</sup> But each of us lacks many things. Do you think that any other principle determines the state? No one else, he said. As a result, [369c] then one person who called to another for one service and another, we, being in need of many things, gather much into one place where we live as partners and helpers, and together we give the name of the city or state to this dwelling, do we? By all means. And the exchange between one person and another is to give if it happens, and taking it because everyone thinks it would be better for themselves. Course. Come on, then, let us create a city from the beginning, our theory. His real creator seems to be our needs. Obviously, [369d] Now the first and chief of our needs is the food supply of existence and life. <sup>79</sup> Confidently. The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing. That's it. Tell me, then, said I, how our city will suffice to provide all these things. Will it not be farmer for one, and builder, and then again weaver? And do we add to it the cobblestones and some other purveyor body needs? Course. It is necessary for a minimum city, then, to consist of four or [369e] five men. Apparently. What's that, then? Will each of them contribute to their work for the common use of all? I mean, the farmer who is alone, provide food four times and spend four times time and throw it at food production and share it with others, or he doesn't have to be thought of for them and provide a fourth part of [370a] food to himself during the quarter time and recruit the other three quarters, one from home supply, the other garment, the other shoe, and not have to worry with other people But for yourself, is it your business? <sup>80</sup> And Adeimantus said: But perhaps, Socrates, the former path is easier. It wouldn't be. Zeus, to be quite strange, I said: For now, when you mention it, it happens to me that, first of all, our few natures are not [370b] all similar, but different. One person is naturally equipped for one task and another another. You don't think so? I know. Again, is one person better off working on many tasks or one in one? One by one, he said. And, in addition to the fact I fancy, it is obvious that if one allows you to slip in the right season, a favorable moment for any task, the work is spoiled. Obvious. This, I think, is because the business can't wait for a worker's spare time, but the worker needs [370c] to participate as his main business, not as a job. He really has. The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and easier when one person performs one task by their nature, at the right time, and in leisure time from other professions. By all means. Then, In Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens to deliver what we have said. It seems to the farmer that he will not be his plow if he is good, [370d] neither his cultivator, nor his other agricultural implements, nor the builder, who also needs a lot; and similar weaver and cobblestones. True. Carpenters, then, and blacksmiths and many similar artisans, linking themselves to our village, will significantly increase it significantly. Course. However, it still wouldn't be very large, even if we were to add to them neat herds and shepherds and other diners, [370e] so that farmers could have cattle plural.<sup>81</sup> and builders bulls used with farmers for transport, and weavers and stonemasons of fur and roasters for it. It wouldn't be a small city, either, if it had it all. But further, I said, it is virtually impossible to identify a city in a region where it will not import. That is. There will still be a need, then, from those who will bring from another city what is needed. It's going to be there. And again, if our servant comes out empty-handed, without taking with him any things that are needed by those [371a] from which they buy what they themselves require, he will come back empty-handed, will he not? I think so. Then the production of their home must not only be enough for themselves, but also the quality and quantity to meet the needs of those they need. She has. So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen. Yes, more. And also from other ministries that have to export and import goods. It's traders, aren't they? So. Then we will also need traders. Confidently. And if trade is carried out by sea, [371b] we will need a number of others who are an expert in maritime business. Quite a lot. But again, in the city itself, how will they share their work products with each other? It was the very purpose of our association and the establishment of the state. Obviously, he said, buying and selling. The market location, then, and money as a sign<sup>82</sup> exchange goal will result in this. [371c] By all means. If then, a farmer or any other artisan taking his products to the market does not overpower at the same time with those who want to exchange with him, he sits idle in the market and lose time from his job? In no way, he said, but there are people who see this need and dedicate themselves for this service to well-ruled cities they are usually the ones who are the weakest <sup>83</sup> bodies and those who are useless to any other task. They have to wait for agoras [371d] and exchange money for goods with those who want to sell, and goods for money with as much desire to buy. This is needed, then, I said, creating a shop class in our city. Isn't the name of the shops we give to those who, planted in agoras, serve us to buy and sell, and we call those who roam from city to city merchants? Course. In addition, there are other servants who, in the minds [371e], are not fully worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of the body is sufficient to be lubricated, so they are, by selling the use of this force and calling for price wages, to be designated, I think, wage earners, aren't they? Course. Wages for earners, then, seem to be a supplement that helps fill the state. <sup>84</sup> I think so. Has our city, then Adeimantus, achieved its full growth and it is over? Perhaps. Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with what voters we have discussed, it is to the state? [372a] I can't imagine Socrates, he said, unless it would be when it comes to the same voters to have each other. Perhaps this is a good offer, I said; we need to examine it, not detain it. First of all, let us look at what the way of life of people who are so equipped will be. Don't they grow bread and wine, clothes and shoes? And will they build the house themselves and continue their work in the summer for the most part unclad and unshod and winter dressed and [372b] shod enough? And in their diet they will provide flour from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will be precious cakes and loaves on some negated or clean leaves arrangement, and, reclining rustic beds strewn with bryony and mirtle, they will feast with their children, drink their wine in it, garland and sing hymns to the gods in a pleasant fellowship, do not get offspring for their funds [372c] to prevent them from getting into poverty or war? Here Glaucon broke. No relishes<sup>85</sup> apparently, he said, for the men you describe as a celebration. True said I. I forgot that they would also have relishes: sail, of course, and olives and cheese and onions and greens, the sort of things they cooked in the country, they will be cooked together. But for dessert we will serve them with figs and chickpeas and beans, [372d] and they will be roasted berries and acorns before fire, washing them from moderate pots and yes, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and die in a similar life to their offspring. And he said, If you founded the city of pigs.<sup>86</sup> Socrates, what other feed would I give? Why, what did you have, Glaucon? said I. What is common, he replied: They have to lean back on the couch. I think if they don't have to be uncomfortable, [372e] and dine from tables and made dishes and sweets such as those now used. Good, said I, I understand. It seems that we are discussing not only the origin of the city, but also the origin of the luxurious city. Maybe it's not such a bad proposition, either. Because observing such a city may be that we can discern the origins of justice and injustice in the States. The real state, I think, is the one we described – a healthy state, as it were. But if it's your pleasure that we also consider fever state, there's nothing to bother. [373a] For there are some who seem not to be satisfied with this kind of fare or with such a lifestyle; but the sofa will have to be added to it and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girls<sup>87</sup> and cakes of all kinds of them all. The requirements we first mentioned, houses, clothes and shoes, will no longer apply only but we need to set paintings to work and embroidery, and buy gold and ivory and similar jewelry, can we not? [373b] Yes, he said. Then we will have to increase the city again. That healthy state is no longer enough, but we need to start swelling out of its bulk and fill it with a lot of things, which exceed the requirements of necessity in states, such as the entire class of hunts, and imitators,<sup>89</sup> many of them occupy figures and colors and many with music- poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors<sup>90</sup> and [373c] all articles, especially those associated with the producers of women's centerpiece. And so we also want more servants. Don't you think that we will need trainers, nurses <sup>91</sup> and dry, beauty shop ladies, hairdresser<sup>92</sup> and once again chefs and chefs? And we will need to continue, pigs, pigs; there were none of these creatures in our former city<sup>93</sup>, for we would not need them, but there will be this continuing need in this city; and we will also demand other cattle, which shall be many if they are eaten [373d] or not? So. Doctors are also someone whose services<sup>94</sup> are we much more likely to need if we live like this than before? Many. And the territory, I think, was enough then to feed the then population, to make it fit, too small. Is that it, isn't it? That is. Then we have to cut out our neighbor's land <sup>95</sup> cantle<sup>95</sup> if we want to have enough pastures and pling, and they turn ours if they also abandon themselves to unlimited <sup>96</sup> property acquisitions, [373e] regardless of the threshold set by our necessary wishes. Inevitably, Socrates. We go to war<sup>97</sup> as the next step, Glaucon or what happens? What you say, he said. And we have yet to talk, said I, of any evil or good impact of war, but only confirm that we have yet<sup>98</sup> discovered the origins of war, i.e. the origins of those things, of which<sup>99</sup> major disasters, public and private, come to the states when they come. Course. Then, my friend, we need to increase our city even further [374a] without a small step, but for the whole army, which will march forward and fight the attackers, defending all our wealth and luxury just described. How's that? he said: are citizens <sup>100</sup> themselves not enough? No, if you said I did, and we were all right in the acceptance we made when we were casting our city. We really agreed if you remember that it is impossible for one person to do a good job of many arts. True, he said. Well, then, said I, [374b] Don't you think that fighting business is art and profession? That's really the matter, he said. If our concern were to be then, for the art of pebbles than the art of war? No way. Did we think <sup>101</sup> then that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from trying to be a farmer at the same time, weaver, or builder, not just a cobbler, to the end that<sup>102</sup> we could have cobbler business well done, and similarly assign each man one occupation for which he was fit and naturally adapted and in which he had to work all days [374c] not a leisure<sup>103</sup> from other pursuits, not allowing to slip the right moments for the job well, and that else we doubt whether the correct achievement of war business is not the highest moment? Is it so simple<sup>104</sup> that a man who cultivates soil at the same time will be a soldier and one who engages in cobbling or any other trade, even though no man in the world has been able to make himself a competent expert in draughts or dice who do not practice that and nothing more since childhood<sup>105</sup>, but treated as a casual business? And we must believe that a man who [374d] takes a hand shield or any other instrument of war springs up to the same day a competent fighter in heavy armor or any other form of war, although no other means will be a man or athlete in his hand, nor will it be any service to those who have neither purchased science<sup>106</sup> of it, nor enough practiced themselves using it? It's really great, he said, it would be the value of the tools in this case.<sup>107</sup>, and then I said that the task of our guardians<sup>108</sup> is the greatest of all, [374e] would require more leisure time than any other business and the greatest science and training. I think so, he said. Does it also not require a character adapted to great persecution? Course. This becomes our task, it seems, if we can choose which and what kind of nature is suitable for state care. Yes, ours. After my word, I said, it's not an easy task that we've taken for ourselves. However, we must not faint [375a] to the extent that our strength allows. No, we don't. Do you think I said that there is any difference between the well-bred hound nature of this watch dog's work and a well-born creation? What do you mean? I mean, each of them must be eager for perception, quickly pursue what she detained,<sup>109</sup> and strong too if she has to fight it in her captivity. Why, yes, he said, need all these qualities. And she needs to be brave<sup>110</sup> if she is to fight well. Course. And will the creature be ready to be brave, that is not high spirited, or a horse or a dog, or [375b] someone else? Have you ever noticed what an irresistible and irresistible thing is the presence of spirit,<sup>111</sup> does every soul into everything fearless and unconquerable face? I got it. The physical characteristics of the caregiver are obvious. So. And also those who are his souls, namely that he must be of high spirit. Yes, it is, too. How then, Glaucon, said I, they escape being savage to each other<sup>112</sup> and other citizens, if this is to be their character? Not easily, Zeus, he said. And yet [375c] we have them gentle for our friends and our harsh enemies; otherwise they do not wait for their destruction in the hands of others, he said. What, then, do we have to do? said I. Where do we discover a disposition that is immediately gentle and very tenacious? There seems to be opposition between a persistent type and a soft nature<sup>113</sup>. Is, but still, if one lacks any of these qualities, a good mentor he can never be. However, these requirements are similar to obstacles, so the result [375d] is that a good guardian is impossible. It seems likely, he said. And I stopped and reviewed what we said: We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, because we have lost the parable that we have established before ourselves.<sup>114</sup> What do you mean? We could not point out that there is after all such nature, as we considered impossible, awarded these opposite qualities. Where? This can be observed in other animals, especially what we [375e] liked to be a guardian. You have certainly noticed in well-bred hounds that their natural inclination must be most gentle to their acquaintances and those they recognize, but contrary to those who do not know. I know that. The thing is possible then, I said, and it's not an unnatural requirement that we look for our mentor. It doesn't seem like it. And do you think that our guardian will also need, in addition to being of high spirits, but also of the continued quality of wisdom of love of its nature? How's that? he said, I'm not going to make sense of you. [376a] This too, I said, is something that you will discover dogs and which is worthy of our miracle creature. What? That glimpse of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any damage, but familiar he will fawn on something he never got any kindness from him. Have you ever wondered about that? I have never paid any attention to this issue until now, but that it works in some way is obvious. But surely this is an exceptional [376b] trait of its nature and one that shows true love of wisdom.<sup>115</sup> What respect, pray? For, said I, that it distinguishes friendly from hostile nothing but his detention for one and his inability to recognise the other. How, I ask you,<sup>116</sup> can the love of learning can be denied by a creature whose criterion friendly and alien is intelligence and ignorance? It really can't, he said. But you confess, said I, that love to learn and the love of wisdom is the same? Same thing, he said. Then we can't confidently set him in the case of a man that if he had to be [376c] some gentle friend and acquaintance he must be a lover of inherent wisdom and learning? Let us assume that, he replied. Then love of wisdom and high spirit, quickness and strength will unite us in the nature of him who must be a good and true guardian of the state. By all means, he said. Such, then, I said, would be the basis of his character.<sup>117</sup> But the cultivation of these men and their education, how will we manage it? And will reading this topic in any way to see what the subject of our entire investigation is – in a state of justice and injustice – that our aim must be to keep up with enough debate and not to pull it to a tedious length? And Glaucon's brother replied: Of course, I hope this study will bring us closer to this goal. Of course, then, my dear Adeimantus, said I, we can't give up, even if it proves to be quite long. No, we don't. Come on, then, as if we were telling stories or fables<sup>118</sup> and [376e] had enough leisure time, <sup>119</sup> let us educate these men in our discourse. So we have. What is, then, our education?<sup>120</sup> Is it hard to find better than the one you have long discovered?<sup>121</sup> Which is, I think, gymnastics <sup>122</sup> body<sup>122</sup> and soul music. That is. And can't we start educating <sup>123</sup> before gymnastics? Course. And according to the music included a fairy tale, doesn't it? I know. And fairy tales are two kinds, one true and the other false.<sup>123?</sup> So. And education has to take advantage of [377a] on both, but the first of the wrong ones? I don't understand your meaning. Don't you understand, I said that we start telling kids fab spoken, and the fable is, given as a whole, false, but is the truth in it as well? And we use fable with kids against gymnastics. That's it. This, then, is what it means by saying that we have to take music against gymnastics. You were right, he said. Do you not know, then, that the beginning of each task is the main thing, <sup>124</sup> especially any creature that is young and gentle?<sup>125?</sup> [377b] Because it is that it is the best litas and my impression<sup>126</sup> that one wants to stamp on it. The room was quite clean and quite clean. Do we, then, so easily suffer<sup>127</sup> of our listen to any chance stories have formed any chance teachers and thus take into account the opinions of their minds, largely at odds with those that we think it is desirable that they must have when they are grown up? By no means will we allow this. We have to start, then, seem to censor [377c] through our storytellers, and what they do well we have to pass, and what not, reject. And with stories about the adopted list, we will encourage nurses and mothers to tell children and thus shape their souls with these stories away, not their bodies with their own hands. But most of the stories they now tell we have to reject. What are the stories? he said. An example of bigger stories, I said, will show us less as well. Of course, the model must be the same, and the larger and less [377d] must have a similar trend. You don't think so? I did, he said; but I did not hold back what you mean, the greater, but. Those I said that Hesiod<sup>128</sup> and Homer and other poets related. This, methinks, consists of false stories, which they have told and still tell to mankind. What? he said; and what in them do you find guilt? With that, I said who should first and most blame, especially if the lie is not quite one. [377e] What is it? When someone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, as a painter whose portraits have no resemblance to their persons. It's really fair to condemn things like that, he said; but what do we mean and what exactly things? There is, above all, I said: the biggest lie about the greatest concern is things that weren't quite inventive to him, which told him how Uranium did what Hesiod says he did to Cronos, and how Cronos in turn took his revenge; [378a] and then there is the inflict and suffering in the hands of Cronos in the hands of his son. Even if they were real, I should not think that they should be easily told that young people. But the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there was some necessity<sup>129</sup> on dealing with them, that only a very small audience should be accepted under the secret of the pledge and after sacrificing, not the pig,<sup>130</sup> but some huge and incurable victim, to the end, that as little as possible should hear these tales. Why, yes, he said, such stories are hard sayings. Yes, and they need not say [378b] Adeimantus, in our city, it must also be said that the young man that makes the greatest mistake he is nothing more human than to again punish his father's <sup>131</sup> wrong actions to the limit, but would only be after the example of the first and greatest gods.<sup>132</sup> heaven said, I did not think they are fit to be told. It is also not possible to confess at all, said I, that the gods war with gods<sup>133</sup> and plot against each other and argue, because this is not true either. [378c] if we want our future guardians to consider nothing more shameful than easily falling out with each other; Even less we have to make battles of gods and giants them the theme of stories and embroidery,<sup>134</sup> and a lot of other hostility and variety of gods and heroes toward their kith and tribe. But if there is any chance that we will convince them that no citizen has ever challenged the citizen with their fellow citizens and that the idea itself is impiety, [378d] it is a sort of thing that should be said to their elders, men and women, that children from the beginning and how they grow older, and we must force poets to keep close to this composition of their own. But Hera's fetterings<sup>135</sup> her son and hurling out of the heavenly hephaestus of his father when he tried to save his mother from beating, and the gods battles homer line is that we can't take to our city or wrought allegory<sup>137</sup> or without allegory. Because young people cannot distinguish between what is and what is not an allegory, any opinion is taken into account that the mind of the age is a want to prove [378e] indelible and irreparable. For whatever reason, perhaps, we must do our best to make the first stories that they hear should be so composed of the fairest lessons of virtue in their ears. Yes, this is reasonable, he said; but if one should again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions can be and what we call? And I replied: Adeimantus, we are not poets,<sup>138</sup> you and I are currently, [379a], but founders of the state. And for the founders it is related to knowing the patterns by which poets must write their fables and from which their poems should not be allowed to depart; but the founders do not have to create fables themselves. Right, he said; but it's a great thing. patterns or norms right to talk about gods, who would they be? Something like that, I said. The true quality of God that we must always give him, whether we write in the epe, in the memoravers, or in a tragic poem. We have. And there is no God, of course!<sup>139</sup> good reality [379b] and must always be talked about<sup>140</sup> as such? Course. But further, isn't the good thing being harmful, is it? I think not. Is this what is not harmful damage? No way. Does anything that doesn't hurt do something wrong? Not that either. But what is not evil would not cause any evil as well? How could that? Once again, is good good good good good? So. Then the cause of well-being? So. Then the reason for good is not the cause of all things, but what is good is the reason, things that are sick of it are innocent, so, [379c] he said. Neither, then, could God, said I, because he is good, to be, as the crowd says, the cause of all things, but for mankind it is the cause of several things, but many things are not the reason.<sup>141</sup> Because good things are much less<sup>142</sup> with us than evil, and for good we must assume no other cause other than God but the cause of evil we have to look for other things than God. What you're saying to me seems most true, he replied. Then, I said, we don't have to take [379d] from Homer or any other poet such a fool of error as it is about gods when he says, Two urns stand on the floor of the Palace of Zeus and filled with dooms he glides, one of the blessings, gifts that are evil, Hom. Il. 24.527-8and to whom Zeus brings so much reunited.— Now on evil he chances and now god is his part again: Hom. Il. 24530But a man to whom he does not mix lots, but to whom he gives unmixed evil: Hunger, devouring, driving him, wandering all over the world, Hom. Il. 24.532 [379e] and we will not tolerate the saying that Zeus is a dispenser of both good and evil for mortals. <sup>143</sup> But because of the violation of the oath<sup>144</sup> and the truce of Pandarus, if anyone confirms that this was done in the actions of Athena and Zeus, we will not confirm, and that the disagreements and disagreements of the gods<sup>145</sup> were the actions of themes and zeus; and also again we must allow our youth to hear what Aeschylus says– god implants the guilty men's cause when he completely destroys the house, Aesch.146 but if any poets write sorrow niobe, a poem containing these iambs, or a kind of Pelopidae or Trojan tale, or anything else, we must or forbid them to say that these troubles are God's work, or they must draw such an interpretation as we now demand, and must declare that what God did was right and good, and they benefited from <sup>147</sup> disciplines. But that they were miserable, who paid the punishment, and that it was God, is a thing that the poet should not be tormented to say; if, on the other hand, he should say that the need to be punished by the wicked were miserable and that they were good for God when paying the punishment, that we should allow. But in terms of the fact that God, who is good, becomes the cause of evil for all, we must fight in every way that neither anyone would claim it in their city, if it is to be well managed, nor does anyone hear, [380c] neither younger nor older than telling the story meter or without a meter; for not such things, if they say, let us say, let us say, let us say, and they would not be useful or uncompossimounted to us. I give my vote to you for this bill, he said, and I am very pleased with it. This, then, I said, will be one of the laws and models gods<sup>148</sup>, who will be required to make speakers and poets satisfy that God is not the cause of all things, but only the cause of goodness. And a completely satisfactory one, he said. [380d] And what's the second. Do you think God is a wizard and can manifest design, now in one aspect, now to another, at one time<sup>149</sup> changing and changing its shape in many transformations and in another to deceive us and make us believe such things about him; or that it is simple and less likely than anyone else to deviate from its form? I can't say the pick, he replied. But what's out of it: If someone came out of <sup>150</sup> in its form, wouldn't move and replace either himself [380e] or something else? Necessarily. Is it not true that you need to change and move<sup>151</sup> something happens at least things that are in the best condition, such as food and drink and the human body, and plants<sup>152</sup> solar and wind heat and similar influences, it is not true that the healthiest and strongest are the least changed? [381a] Of course. And this is not the soul that is the bravest and smartest to be the least disturbed<sup>153</sup> and replaced by any external love? So. Then, again, it's really true about all the composite implements, dirmes, and habitments, by parity reasoning that those who are well made and in good condition are the least affected in time and otherwise. That's it. It's universally<sup>154</sup> true, then, that what is the best state of nature or [381b] art or both recognizes the least change of something. So it seems. But God, of course, and everything that belongs to God is in all respects the best possible state. Course. In this regard, then, it would at least be likely that there would be many forms of God. At least indeed. But would he transform and change himself? Obviously, he said, if he is replaced. Then does he change himself better and do something fairer, or worse<sup>155</sup> and something uglier than himself? [381c] It must necessarily, he said, be worse if it is replaced. Because we will not say that God is not enough than beauty or competence. Most righteously spoken, said I. And if this was his condition, would you think, Adeimantus, that any god or man would be on his own would degrade himself in any way? Impossible, he replied. It is impossible then, said me, even god wants to change himself, but as it seems, each of them is the fairest and best possible abides<sup>156</sup> forever just in its own form. Absolutely necessary conclusion of my thinking. Not a poet then, [381d] I said. My good friend, must be allowed to say that the Gods, the similarity of strangers, many disguises the belief as they visit mortal cities. Hom, what am I. Od. 17.485-486157 Nor can anyone tell lies about Proteus<sup>158</sup> and Thetis, nor any tragedy or other poems bring Hera to disguise as priests to gather alms for the life-giving son of Inachus, argue stream. Aesch.159 [381e] And many similar lies they do not say. Mothers also no longer have to intoxicate their children <sup>160</sup> harmful tales, as are certain gods whose apparitions persecute the likeness of many strangers from all lands at night, so that they do not speak evil about the gods, which they do at the same time do the cowardice of children. They don't, he said. But I said, can we assume that while the gods themselves can't change they cause us to fancy that they look like different forms of deception and practicing magic on top of us? Maybe, he said. Consider[382a] said I. Would god want to cheat, or lie, by giving a word or an act of what is just appearance? I don't know, he said. Don't you know, I said, that a true lie, if expression is permissible, is the thing that all gods and people abhor? What do you mean? he said. This, I said, that lying the most vital part of myself, and about their most important concerns, is something that no one willingly agrees with, but it is above all that everyone is afraid. I still don't understand. This is because you suspect me in some grand sense. [382b] I said; but what I mean is that the deceived soul of the realities was to cheat and be blindly ignorant and have lies there, that's what all people would at least accept, and that is the case that they lost it the most. That's the way, he said. But it would surely be absolutely true, as I just now said, to describe it as a very truth-lying-ignorance namely a human soul cheat. The lie of the words is a copy of love<sup>161</sup>. [382c] after the emerging image, not a completely unmixed lie. Isn't that right? By all means. Then not only the gods, but also the people hate the essential lies. Agree. But what of the words lie, when and to whom it is useful, so as not to be worth the abhorrence? Won't it be against enemies? And when any of those we call friends because of madness or stupidity attempts to do some wrong, will then not become useful [382d] to avoid evil as a drug? And as well as fabs from which we are just now talking about our ignorance of the truth about antiquity, we equate the false truth as much as we can and the way that it is nurtured.<sup>162</sup> We really do, he said. Tell me, then, for which motifs would be official to God. Does it because of the ignorance of his antiquity to make false similarities about it? Absurd premise of that, he said. Then there is no lying poet to God. I think not. [382e] Well then, would it be too fearful of your enemies that he is lying? Very good Would it be because of the stupidity or madness of your friends? No, no fool or madman is a friend of God. Then there is no motive for god to cheat. Not. In all respects<sup>163</sup> divine and divinity are free from lies. By all means. Then God is a completely simple and correct deed and a word, and neither changes himself nor deceives other visions or words or characters [383a] by sending awakens or dreams. I myself think so, he said when I hear you say. You agree then, I said, is it, as our second norm or canon of speech and poetry about gods, that they are neither wizards shape-changing nor do they mislead us with lies of words or deeds? I agree. Then, while there are many other things that we praise Homer, so we don't applaud, send Zeus<sup>164</sup> dream to Agamemnon, nor do we confirm Aeschylus when his Thetis<sup>165</sup> avers that [383b] Apollo sings his wedding, foretold happy fates of his questionHom. Il. 2.1 Their days extended, from pain and illness free, and rounding the tale of heavenly blessings, raised by a proud paeon, so pleased with my heart. And I believed that Phoeus's mouth divine, filled with prophecy breathing, could not lie. But he himself, the singer himself, who sat next to the meath with us, himself, who promised everyone, is now my son's own slayer. Aesch. Frag. 350 [383c] When someone says that the sort of thing about gods, we will break with him, we will give up the chorus for him, nor will we allow teachers to use it for young education, if our guardians are to be God's afraid of men and god-like as much as it is possible for mankind. By all means, he said, I agree with these norms and would use them as canons and laws.

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