


☐

I'm not robot

  
reCAPTCHA

Continue

## Zoon logon echon in greco

The index of item1. The relationship between ethics and the word 2 The word as apophantikos3 logos The determination to be like ousia (substance)4 Meaning and meaning of the definition in Aristotid do not see the marginal ones in the left click here 1. The relationship between ethics and speech in determining man's being. In Aristotle there are at the same time two determinations of the essence of man (which will remain substantially even in the following tradition). These two determinations, which must be thought of in their connection, are: 1) Man is zoon logon echon (usually translated as rational animal, animal rationalis, translation that goes back to the Romans and then became canonical; however, it is problematic as a translation).2) Man is zoon politikon: political animal When trying to think together these two notions it is possible to come to understand at the root the relationship between the word and ethics (and therefore a relationship that is implicitly at the heart of Aristotle's reflection on logos. First, let's clarify the meaning of the words in the two definitions. Let's start with the first: zoon login echon literally: the living (zoon) that has (echon) the word (login).1) The word zoon does not indicate for the Greeks animality in the sense of the mere biological functioning of a body or even in the sense of what is merely instinctive (in the sense of so-called animal instincts). This word literally taken means nothing more than living, and interprets here living in the sense of a particular openness to the world, which characterizes coming in the presence of all that is alive. In this sense, for the Greeks, even the gods were zoons, certainly not because they were destined as animals, not even in the sense, in themselves quite vague, of mere animation, but rather because it was precisely for them, to the highest degree, to live, to enter into the presence of a living way, to the point that, in their light , everything that is at its highest degree of presence and life. Therefore, the term zoon indicates first of all a way of being, a certain way of reaching the presence, that of the living: a living and vegetative presence. The same root on which the verb is constructed indicates the pure ascent or exit to light, openness, and openness (for example, in the sky, think about opening a flower at first dawn). 2) The participle echon indicates how man, like a living man, is in relation to logos, with the word. In the Greek echo it means not only 'ho' in the sense of 'I own', but also, among other things: 'I take care', 'hold for me', 'reggo', 'dress', 'I find myself' (as Latin habeo). From this verb also derives exist term meaning yes possession, but in the sense of the Latin habitus (also derived from the habeo), therefore in the sense of faculty, attitude, temperament, even better: posture.3) As is then apparent from the context of the passage from which this definition is treated (Policy 1252b27-1253a39), in which reference is made directly to the phenomenon of the human voice , well away from the animal's verse, the logos are found here to indicate the word, in the sense here of speaking specifically, and not reason. Based on these indications, a possible translation of the meaning of the Aristotelian expression may be: man, that is: the living person who enters properly into the presence (comes to light as such) having the word, provided that, however, when organizing one also hears care, the living, the stay in the word. Given what has been said about the meaning of the zoon, the aristotelian expression zoon politikon can be explicitly translated in this way: the living person who fully deploys his life (therefore stands out adequately as a man) only within the cops, which can be understood, albeit in a sense a little too general and therefore inappropriate , as a community. By composing in a single formula both the indications of Aristotle, the following consideration can be proposed: the human being is the living one who, entrenched and rooted in the community, has the floor in the sense that he cares for it, in it inhabits and sustains with his fellowmen, thus determining, in discussion, the very openness of the space of a particular community. 1 This is the context in which the Greek experience of speaking is rooted, and of which Aristotle makes his considerations on logic. Community and speech are closely related precisely in relation to what is the most essential aspect for man, that is, becomes and be the one he is appropriately (this means, in a strong sense, living), for example, in the specific situation of the class, being a teacher or a student. The word is essential to man to the extent that he is called to participate in the life of a community. To be present with one's own discourse, that is, to be able, at the right time, to take the floor to engage within a community, constituted for the Greek the eminent way of gaining visibility (for better or worse, in glory or dishonorable) and therefore to be (show each other as one). 2 2. The word as apophantikos logos (apofantic declaration) Since, as we have seen, in determining the essence of the human being, the relationship that human beings have with the word is central, is now to show, in more depth, what aristotle is to be logos, at least according to the perspective we are interested in here. Aristotle thinks of the essence (or being) of the word (i.e., what makes the word a true word) from apophansis, from its ability to show, to bring to light phenomena, that is, what is shown (from Greek phainesthai: show each other). For him, logos are in his own being apophantic logos (usually translated as apophantic or declarative, in the sense of that statement declaring or exposing the phenomenon as it is). Let us try to better understand what the adjective apophantic indicates here, based on the consideration of the Greek word. This adjective comes from the preposition apo- and the verb phainesthai, which means: I show, highlight, show, show, make it appear. The media form indicates that the action, in this case the show, assumes a particular relevance for the person who performs it and for all those to whom the action is directed (my word that shows). In other words, the demonstration must be understood here in the sense of bringing the phenomenon up for sale here in the middle for all present, in order to determine, in its own presence, the proximity in which they are located, which constitutes their authentic and genuine inter-them. The apo- preposition indicates instead a movement 'away from', indicating the origin. It indicates that apophantikos logos should be careful to show or bring to light the phenomenon from the latter, and not, for example, from some preconceived idea. This simply means: the task of the word is to let the thing as it is appear, in its own words. Let's think about what the concrete meaning of a proposition is. When, for example, I say, looking up: the sky is blue, this is not in an abstract way, as is often reported in grammar books, the mere attribution of a quality among the many achieved towards a randomly chosen object among the many available, but it is the discovery of a particularly prominent trait according to which that particular phenomenon that is under my eyes (the sky) manifests itself by what it is (blue!). One should be able to feel a kind of amazement at the fact that this is only the case rather than otherwise, astonishment at his own presence. The function of speaking is a function that is first revealing (what it reveals), and for this reason it can assume its communicative function (in which precisely what has been brought to light is shared with others). In this sense, the word must be take care of the truth first, here understood not as mere adaptation, but as the very manifestation of the phenomenon. But what is this cure more appropriately? To understand this you can refer to what Aristotle says about a certain type of logos, that of episteme (of scientific knowledge), horisms, definition. The reason for this choice is that the practice of scientific knowledge is what should actually be able to be carried out together in the classroom. Therefore, reflection on the meaning of horisms can be an opportunity for the whole class to reflect on the way forward that should be promoted together and that each participant in the lessons must learn to care for. This term comes from the verb horizo, meaning 'limit', 'determino', 'define', 'circumscribed' and therefore: 'separate', 'disjoint', 'distinguish'. Aristotle, in the subsequent analysis (B 3, 90 (b 16), determines the horismo-isms in the sense of what makes it possible to become familiar with the ousia (the substance), that is, with the being of the institution, to the extent that it circumscribes it and makes it look like such (think about how one has previously tried to circumscribe the essence of man; gender and species are those conceptual tools that help precisely circumscribe the being of one entity and distinguish it from the others; genre, while being endowed with a word is the species, which specifies precisely what man's being consists of, bringing it to light as such, that is, how to speak). In this sense, horisms, that is, the definition in the authentic sense, is, therefore, as Plato had already said, logos tes ousias: a word that has the task of exhibiting the being or the very essence of the thing, in the sense that it manifests itself. To understand how horism works, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the word ousia. 3. The determination to be like ousia (substance). The Greek term ousia is normally translated as a substance. But what does this term really mean? In order to be clear about the philosophical meaning attributed by Aristotle to this fundamental concept, it is first necessary to clarify what this word indicated for the Greeks in their daily discourse, that is, before it became, thanks to Plato and above all thanks to Aristotle, a real philosophical concept. The way Aristotle in particular comes to use this word to indicate the question that was at the center of his reflection, is a very interesting example of what it means, in philosophy, to circumscribe, define and therefore make appear, from a word, a phenomenon. It is, in some way, a definition that comes from abstraction (or by induction, in Greek epagoghé), but this is a very particular type of abstraction, very different from what the current formal logic teaches us. In the common language the uraia indicates possessions, substances, goods indispensable for the life of men, that is, all things present that concern, in one way or another, the daily life of man, such as tools (think of the tools of the farmer or craftsman, but also of the fields or workshop). Therefore, Ousia indicates not only this or that particular thing in its particular content or aspect, but also and above all the set of things of the surrounding world trapped in its particular way of coming to the presence, that way that makes us appear as relevant to us, or as those things that it is essential for us to have immediately available (by hand) to live and live in the world. Aristotle elevates this notion of common language to the range of a philosophical term by choosing its essential trait (that of reaching the presence of things in the way they appear as essential to us and to our daily lives), and then transfer it to being and the appearance of all that it is. Therefore, Ousia comes to mean what it gives to everything inso way that it causes its arrival in presence to care for man in his own life. Even from our daily experience, we actually say, in a strong sense, that one thing is to the point that it touches us one way or another and concerns us. However, ousia is no longer referred by Aristotle only to the things that are needed and that are indispensable for daily life, such as tools, but, more generally, it also refers to nature (mineral, vegetable, animal), stars, gods, to the extent that the appearance of these bodies (their being) comes to worry man in his own life and live , to the extent that they constitute his own inter-them, that is, what he is inevitably in the middle and within which he goes from his own being, or even in other words, in other words: his genuine being in the world and in things. Aristotle's implicitly implemented process is a form of abstraction, but not in the usual sense we attribute to this term, so it would simply bring an abstract concept to life. The philosophical notion of ousia is not obtained by abstracting from reality an empty and general concept (abstract in the common sense of the term) that indifferently concerns everything. In the abstraction process implemented by Aristotle, on the contrary, a very specific phenomenon (that of ousia in the common sense of the term) is selected, a essential or characteristic, which is precisely chosen as a fundamental feature of what appears and therefore refers, more generally, to each institution (and no longer only to tools). This trait is certainly not selected simply because it is an abstract thing (in the common sense of the term), and therefore refers indifferently to everything, but because, very specifically, it is considered as the most appropriate trait to indicate what seems to characterize the way in which everything in the presence, the way in which the surrounding world is considered in its entirety , that is, more appropriate to indicate the fact that this same world, and everything that appears in it, tells us and concerns us in who we are, since it calls into question our own existence. 3 Uraia (as a name indicating, according to Aristotle, the being of the entity) can therefore be understood as giving a phenomenon its own relevance and proof, which gives the phenomenon its own being to the extent that it enters into the presence by touching and affecting man in a very particular way, that is, in relation to his own being in the world. (At the basis of this determination is the typically Greek understanding of being like a presence, or rather as an entry into presence: being what makes a world appear, that is, it brings in presence, the entity as it is; this entry into the presence of the institution concerns man in an essential way, to the extent that he must inhabit a world and relate to reality; astonishment; , from which Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy was born, is precisely the astonishment of entry in the presence of the whole, in the face of the fact that something is, more than anything). 4. Meaning and meaning of the definition in Aristotle Once the notion of ousia has been deluciya in this way, it is possible to clarify the way of working precisely of horisms (definition) as logos tes ousias (literally word of essence or being, in the sense of that word that says and therefore brings to light the being of an entity)■A very succinct way , and starting from the perspective that has become formed in the course of the journey, it can be said that the definition in the Greek sense (horisms) is, within a scientific and philosophical practice, that word that delimits and circumscribes the being of an entity (of a phenomenon) in such a way that it appears in its evidence and relevance, in its essential feature , that is, what makes it seem precisely so relevant to the acquisition of knowledge and truths related to that same phenomenon. The definition, in a genuine sense, is therefore not simply the fixation of an abstract concept or notion, but what can allow us to genuine contact with the phenomenon. Definition should be seen as a fundamental possibility of speaking accurately of man, that is, as a possible basis for our own meaning. The definition presupposes a fundamental experience of the phenomenon, which finds its roots in the way we open ourselves to what is occasionally found. This also applies above all to the abstraction process, which, in a genuine sense, is always an extraction of the evidence (of eidos) typical of a given phenomenon, therefore not, above all, the derivation of an empty and abstract concept. Therefore, on the basis of this reflection it is possible to better understand what is the true meaning of any genuine scientific (or practical) research, which, in researching a phenomenon, always stands before the latter and in advance has looked at what is important and essential in it to detect, and this is not based on concepts outside the phenomenon itself , but within a perspective in which the one preparing for research is himself, first of all, looked at by the phenomenon, because it was about him one way or another. From what has been said, a kind of ethics can be derived from the word, that is, a kind of standard of behavior that each of the participants in the lesson should observe when taking responsibility for taking the floor during a debate. In other words, one should always ask one another, for example: 1) How can what I am about to say form the basis or basis for all participants of effective knowledge or common learning, as a basis on which, because of its strength and clarity, I can trust to take a real step forward? 2) How is my word capable of defining and characterizing the phenomenon so that it appears in its full evidence, that is, according to those characteristic features that allow the phenomenon to settle and appear in the presence, that is, to stand out as such, as it concerns the whole class? Note: [1] This, which at first glance may seem like a rigid definition, does not actually contain any particular content, does not say what a man should be or become such correctly, but indicates only one way of being. In this regard, it only clarifies one task and can therefore be formulated differently from time to time depending on the phenomena or situations that are actually in sight. Each definition should always be understood as the mere indication of a cognitive task, as it will appear later in the interpretation of what Aristotle means by horisms [2] These considerations constitute an attempt to build, from common care towards speech, proximity to phenomena in which all of us, students and teachers, are played together during the common learning process. The point is to understand what is decisive to talk about, that is, how revelation or closure of a particular situation, a certain relationship or a certain possibility is sometimes called into question: w.a. the manifestation or not of what is or may be correct. [3] This genuine sense of abstraction is also working in our common language. When, for example, we say, on a hot summer's day, the sky is blue, we only choose or select a particular stretch of that sky, a certain quality of the other: its blue being (its blue). Here, too, we operate a kind of abstraction, but what we get from it is not a simple abstract quality; by saying the sky is blue rather we rescue an essential trait that at that time concerns us and touches us in a particular way, how can we touch and worry about the blue of the sky on a beautiful summer day. in summer.