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The MentalLarfly Map of your research in UniversalisSee policy, or trade policy, consists of all means available to a state to guide the country's trade flows by abroad. The range of instruments that can be used distinguishes tariffs from other obstacles. The types of policies selected and the nature of the way implemented depend on the organization of the different institutions from country to country. While international trade theories emphasize the full benefits of free trade for all partners, the government has never given up entirely on protecting their domestic activities or assisting the export industry. The state's intervention found justification in some economic analysts. This highlights the visible gains in the country in different situations than implied by free trading theory. In fact, a country's trade policy often stems from a compromise strategy between a desire to isolate certain national activities from the impact of external competition and the need to tempt partner intervention impulses. InstrumentsTo reduces the impact of external competition, the government levys duties on trade. Derogatory regimes can be provided to promote the development of certain activities and territories. In essential, when the country is part of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the same rights apply to all partners and are the result of multilateral negotiated agreements. However, certain protection provisions, known as unusual measures, can be adopted. In addition, all states have non-tariff obstacles, and some manipulate the exchange rate. Tariff tariff is a tax set by the state on [...] 1 2 3 4 5 ... 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In developing countries, the debt crisis has led the government to reduce their spending sharply and redefink their policies, particularly agriculture, in relation to international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, regional banks [...] Read any first 10 references (out of 182 references)Register for our weekly newsletter and accept as your preferred ebook giftsummary C130041 Introduction InstrumentsThe tariff ad valorem and certain rightsSee effective protection of special tariff customs regimes in Subsidies and contingency measures Non-tariff Barriers (ONT)SubsidiesEsAm technical and health barriers to plant health measures public procurement health measures and institutional exchange rate policies of the President and Congress in the United States institutions of the European Union, China. openness and statism, GATT and WTO Economics flow into bilateral Mercantilism foreign trade policy and educator protectionsMultilateralism and interventionsThe new justification for political intervening protectionistsLa international trade cooperation - Foreign Trade Policy, Universalis Encyclopedia [online], accessed October 23, 2020. URL: URL. Entily Summary increasingly engaged in trade policy areas that are generally exclusive federal jurisdictions in most federations. This chapter is the concept of this phenomenon as an example of the federalisation process, which is the transition from the way governance in the political field previously dominated by federal orders to modes in which both levels of government are now simultaneously active. While the federation of trade policy appears to be a fairly common trend in the federal system, the participation patterns of federal entities and, ultimately, their influence on trade policies vary significantly from one system to another. Drawing on the results of a wider research project, this chapter examines the causes of federated entity mobilization and how federal institutional architecture affects their choice to influence trade policy agreements. In the final section, chapters speculate on conditions that can strengthen or weaken this trend in the future. The introduction of the objectives of the establishment of an economic union is important, if not the main reason, in the process of creating a federal system. It is therefore not surprising that in most federations, the central government has been given exclusive jurisdiction over significant powers relating to the economy, such as customs, currencies or international and domestic trade (Watts 2008: 90). However, recent developments have shown that federal tendencies in key areas of economic policy, international trade, can no longer be taken for granted. To be confident, let us recall the threat of Wallonia not to sign a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union in October 2016, which could derail the deal, which has been negotiated for several seven years. This has also gained a lot of media attention. But this is not a unique case. Indeed, the French Brussels-Capital and Community Region, for example, has adopted a resolution similar to Wallonia in CETA. Similarly, since 2013, the federal states of Germany and Austria are increasingly involved in international trade policy, while the Swiss canton has been involved since the early 1990s (Ziegler, 2020). For Canada and Australia, the growing interests of federal entities in trade policy began even in the 1980s (for Australia, see, for example, Ravenhill 1990; and, for Canada, Doern and McDonald, 1999; Kukucho. Australia and Canada represent the first manifestations of a broader trend: the federation of international trade policy. In line with Mireille Paquet's (2019) approach, I mean the federation of transformative changes in the way of governance in certain areas of policy: from a mode dominated by one level of government (here's the federation) to a mode in which both levels of government are at the same time active (see Package (2019) for immigration policies in Canada). The Fed of Commerce policies take very different forms from one system to another. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether new activism of associated entities in certain federal ones, such as Germany and Austria, will be sustainable, or whether it is just a temporary phenomenon. Research in this area is difficult, and scholars of federalism and regional have recently begun to explore this trend through comparative analysis (see for example Broschek and Goff, 2018; 2020a; Freudlsperger, 2018; Egan and Guimaraes, 2019). The donation summarizes the initial findings of a large research project, funded by the Canadian Council of Social Sciences and Humanities (SSRC) (see also Broschek and Goff, 2020). It addresses three questions: first, why are associates increasingly involved in international trade policy? Second, despite the fact that they generally only have limited or none of the constitutional powers in this particular political area, how do they participate in trade policy? Third, what are the implications of a federal phenomenon for trade policy governance? 1. Why are federal entities involved in trade policy? Since the early 1980s, federal entities have become increasingly involved in international trade policy. The trend was observed for the first time in the Anglo-Saxon federation, especially in Australia, Canada and, to a certain extent, the United States. Canadian territory, for example, has gradually emerged as a new player in international trade policy since the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Negotiations. (FTA), which later became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), including Mexico, in 1994 (Kukucho, 2008). In Australia, tensions between the Commonwealth and Countries have arisen on international trade policy agreements since late 1970s and early 1980s (Ravenhill, 1990). U.S. states began expressing their concerns in the mid-1990s, in the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), about what they perceived to be less responsive to the federal government in comparing trade agreements (Sager 2002). In Europe, the entity's efforts are allied to enter the field of trade policy more recently, Belgium's regions and communities, as well as the Austrian and German countries, have been very active in trade negotiations between the European Union and the United States, which are now stalled, relating to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and CETA. However, the first major resolution on the international trade policy of German countries was adopted before, in May 2013, on another agreement: the European Union Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru (Broschek, Bu-jeger and Schramek, 2020). Finally, the Swiss canton played a more active role in international trade policy in the early 1990s, during negotiations on the European Economic Area (EEA) and - for the United States - at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of GATS (Ziegler, 2020). Public politics forms a political life (Schattschneider, 1935; Pierson, 1993). Therefore, the change of trade agreement provides a useful starting point for analyzing the federal roots of trade policy. Free trade agreements such as NAFTA and the EEA have announced a major transformation in international trade policy: the emergence of so-called mega, profound or second generation of free trade agreements (Young, 2016; Ravenhill, 2017). The number of these free trade agreements doubled between 2005 and 2015, from 132 to 260 (Mattoo et al., 2017). More importantly, new free trade agreements differ from traditional trade agreements in scope and depth. Reducing or eliminating tariffs and quotas is no longer the main objective of a new free trade agreement. Instead, they are designed to encourage and regulate market transactions in an increasingly fragmented global economy. Firstly, free trade agreements are wider in scope as they seek to realize trade in new areas, such as the services sector, public procurement and intellectual property in the digital economy. Secondly, a new one Free trade is deeper as they seek to reduce or eliminate non-tariff trade barriers and promote harmonisation through regulations with potential implications for sensitive areas, such as health care, consumer protection, infrastructure, cultural or environmental policies. Third, some new free trade agreements, such as the new CETA or NAFTA, the U.S.-Mexico Canadian Agreement (ACEUM), increasingly include policy objectives that are not directly related to trade policy —such as gender equality, workers' rights or climate change. This policy change, which can be described as paradigmatic, has profound implications for domestic policy. The new free trade agreement creates a significant impact within the boundaries of the states (Young 2016), an effect that directly or indirectly affects the jurisdiction of the associated entity. As a result, the central government in the federation has an incentive, or even a legal obligation, to include these associated entities in trade agreement negotiations, although in very different forms, from informal consultation to more direct participation. In Canada, for example, the central level of government has



exclusive jurisdiction over international trade policy. However, since it could not enforce Canada's own international trade policy commitments when it relates to territorial exclusive jurisdictions, Ottawa generally seeks to gain federal entity support when concluding a free trade agreement (Hederer and Leblond, 2020). In the case of CETA negotiations, for example, territories and territories have even been invited to participate directly in certain rounds of negotiations with the European Commission (Kukucha, 2016). Despite the prospect of potential execution problems encouraging territorial inclusion in Canadian trade policy, it remains with Ottawa's discretion to decide whether and how territory and territory participate in the negotiation process (Paquin, 2020). On the other hand, in Germany, a legal obligation could force, under certain conditions, the federal government to seek the support of federal states to conclude trade agreements. The nature of these conditions is still the subject of debate among legal experts. Current opinion among them, however, suggests that ratification by the second chamber, the Bundesrat, should take the form of consent law. In fact, the right of mutual decision) each time a mixed agreement triggers the need for approval in accordance with Basic Laws (Broschek, Bu-jeger and Schramek, 2020). But the federal trade policy is not only the result of to-down dynamics, whether it's the central government's incentives or legal obligations to open the door to the involvement of associate entities. The new free trade agreement also affects the different interests of the associated entity, moving them for lower-top participation. In other words, associated entities not only respond passively to trade policy changes, but sometimes also actively demand new roles in this area of policy. We have identified three types of interests that encourage allied entity players to take a more active position in trade policy: the regional economy (1), institutional interests (2) and politics (3) (Broschek and Goff, 2020b). Literature on regional economic geographies reports that federal entities are engaged in trade policy as they seek to protect and develop their regional economies. As a result, factors such as the economic size of federal entities, the dominant economic sector and their integration into the global economy make up the priorities of the trade policy of allied entities and ultimately engage them in them. Neo-institutions outline the importance of bureaucracy, that is, the ability of political and administrative institutions to maintain, or even extend, their autonomy in regulating and implementing their political objectives. As a result, associated entities can also be motivated by a desire to avoid losing some of their powers through trade agreements, including to unelkable bodies responsible for monitoring and enforcing the provisions of trade agreements. Examples include regulatory cooperation committees or investor-state dispute resolution tribunals. Ultimately, federal entities also develop political-ideological priorities toward trade policy. As a result, their government seeks to participate in trade policy to form a free trade agreement according to their political priorities. Political interests also point to the interests of political parties operating on arena democratic (territory and federal) and the role of interest groups and social movements in understanding the federal model of trade policy. The types of interests that occur in different federal systems vary significantly from system to system (Broschek and Goff, 2020c). In the Anglo-Saxon federation and in Switzerland, regional economic interests are the main drivers of federal entity efforts to form trade policy. The general pattern in this federation is the same: associated entities generally favor liberalization through free trade agreements, but strive to ensure the existence of provisions that exclude certain sectors, such as agriculture, fishing or public procurement. In this federation, international trade policy is also often associated with domestic trade policy (Anderson, 2012; Kukucha, 2015; Egan, 2015; Hederer and Leblond, 2020; Egan and Guimarães, 2019). For example, in line with CETA negotiations, Canadian territories have negotiated several agreements between biennial and multi-way governments to eliminate barriers to internal trade through harmonization of certain standards (Kukucha 2015). In the continental European federation, regional economic interests are not entirely absent, but institutional and political interests are clearly dominating, and sometimes even mutually strengthening. For example, concerns about investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as regulatory cooperation, are constantly being added to parliamentary resolutions and between federal entity governments in Belgium, Austria and Germany. These associate entity actors expect the loss of their unreliable political authorities through this mechanism, which is an important element of the most recent free trade agreement. In addition, they fear the erosion of regulatory and dismantling standards of precautions, with negative implications on labor and environmental standards, public infrastructure or consumer protection (see Broschek, Bu-jeger and Schramek, 2020). 2 How do federal entities participate in trade policy? The ability of federal entities to form trade policies varies from case to case. Austrian countries, for instance, unite in their opposition to CETA, regardless of the coalition of ruling parties. Again The federal government was able to ratify the deal in June 2018. On the other hand, German states are divided in their position vis-à-vis CETA. Coalition governments including the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) or liberal FDP generally support CETA, while coalition governments formed by left-wing parties (SPD, Greens and/or Linke) tend to oppose it. In some cases, affiliate partners have agreed to exclude in the event of a ratification bill. However, this means that such a bill would likely not be passed by federal states in the second chamber, the Bundesrat. In fact, Germany's ratification of CETA remains ongoing. Institutional differences between the federal systems are crucial in understanding the relative strength of federal entities in trade policy. For example, the relatively strong role of the German Bundesrat gives the federal government the opportunity for veto trade agreements, under certain circumstances, whereas Austrian countries do not have such institutional resources. Generally, three elements of federal architectural institutions provide federal entities in different ways of pressure to assume a role in trade policy: jurisdictions (directly or indirectly related to trade policies), existing interregional relations systems (RIGs) and second space nature in the central government level. Direct trading policy skills put associate entities in a beneficial balance of power. However, they are an exception. Belgium's regions and communities are unique in this regard: The Belgian Constitution does not have a hierarchy of constitutional norms and assumes that various levels of government are sovereign in elements of national and international competence given to them (Bursens and Massart-Piérard, 2009). Unlike in most federations, international trade policy in Belgium is not an exclusive federal jurisdiction. As a result, areas and communities enjoy important rights enshrined in the Constitution, which is why the Walloon government may have threatened Belgium's ratification of the CETA. The Swiss canton is in the same position. Although, unlike Belgium, the Coalition is responsible for external relations, the Constitution gives cantons the right to negotiate, or even participate, when their powers are affected. These include trade policy, in which the federal government must take into account the importance of cantonese in formulating the negotiating mandate and the negotiation process itself (Ziegler, 2020). In most federal, however, federal entities are relatively indirectly authorized to participate in the negotiation process, despite the provisions of trade agreements invading their jurisdictions. With the emergence of new in-depth free trade agreements, this is more frequent than in the past. In a system where allied entities have many exclusive powers, such as in Canada, it is likely that free trade agreements will affect their jurisdiction. But even in more centrist federations, such as Australia, the government's central level may have an interest in negotiating with an associate entity during the implementation phase, to ensure compliance with the provisions contained in the trade agreement. Two factors are very important in this regard: first, institutional ambiguity arising from the division of power can contribute to an associate entity arguing that trade provisions have an impact on their own areas of expertise. Second, it is the existence (or absence) of overcoming federal power. For example, in the United States, countries must comply with trade provisions once they come into force under federal law: which takes precedence over regulations at the state level. The federal government of Canada has no such befalling power when the exclusive jurisdiction of the territory is concerned. The RIG system at work also offers associated entities of various opportunities to engage in trade policy. Through intergovernmental councils, federal entities can try to align their interests gracefully, and collaborate vertically with the central government level. In general, variations in GIRs are related to their level of instatization. The mature continental federations of Austria, Germany and Switzerland are characterized by relatively high levels of GIRs institutionalization, both horizontally and vertically. Austrian and German federal countries have used rig systems, particularly horror, to formulate some resolutions on the provisions of trade policy, specifically on TTIP and CETA (Broschek, Bu-jeger and Schramek, 2020). In Switzerland, cantons also the importance of their trade policy follows horrible logic, but they do so through the Cantonal Government Conference, and interact vertically with the federal government in a relatively informal dialogue (Ziegler 2020). On the other hand, GIRs are less distation in the Anglo-Saxon federation and, as little as, in Belgium (Broschek and Goff 2018). When former Wallonian President Paul Magnette, explained the region's resistance to CETA in October 2016, he criticized the federal government for not cooperating with territory and communities from the beginning of the process to address their concerns (Magnette, 2016). In Canada, the province and the federal government sought to institute GIRs in trade policy in the 1990s through the C-Trade committee system, where trade officials met and exchanged information on a regular basis (Kukucha, 2008; Paquin, 2020). Moreover, and most importantly, both levels of government coordinate and cooperate unofficially when free trade agreements are negotiated that could affect territory. The influx of territories and the way in which they are involved, however, depends on the will of the federal government that day. Moreover, these regions are also very active individually. For example, former Ontario Prime Minister Kathleen Wynne held a meeting with 33 U.S. governors and state senators during NAFTA renegotiations (In U.S. Trade, 2018), and Quebec developed an ambitious trade policy agenda (Schram, 2019; 2020). Ultimately, one of the functions of the second half in the federal system is to ensure representation of regional interests in federal institutions. However, with significant exceptions from the German Bundesrat, we found that the second space played a small role in the allied entity effort to form trade policy. Moreover, the Bundesrat was not elected, but consisted of members coming from the federal states government. In other federations, senators are generally elected. Party rows are then often judged on regional interests; and while senators seek to defend regional concerns, as is often the case in the U.S. Senate, they rarely speak on behalf of the federal entity itself (Broschek and Goff, 2018). 3 Towards a new multi-level trade policy? This trend shows that the federation is a heavy trend, but it is not uniform in its materialization. The involvement of associated entities in trading policies presents a wide range of models, through the interaction of different factors (Broschek and Goff 2020c). There are many trends and ways in which federal trade policies are. Variations in the level of engagement of related entities, for example, to temporary dimensions. This temporal dimension does not refer only to the difference between pioneers in these areas - such as Australian states or Canadian territories - and more active federal entities recently in the field of trade policy, such as Austria or Germany of federal states. Temporary dimensions also point to variations arising from the exact moment in which the associated entities intervene, that is, whether they are actively involved in the drafting of trade policy agreements, or if their roles are more limited to the ratification process. Participation of associated entities also seems large in various interests; Regional economic interests are the main drivers of their involvement in the Anglo-Saxon federation and in Switzerland, while institutional and political interests have more weight on the continental European Federation. Associated entities also have diverse institutional resources, form their strategy and ultimately power them over the central government level. Finally, party politics, the dynamics of interest groups and the level of mobilization of civil society influence in different ways of the international trade policy federalization process. While party politics and social mobilization are important data in some European federations, these factors are somewhat overlooked in Australia, Canada or Switzerland (see Bollen, De Ville and Gheyle, 2020; Siles-Bregge and Strange, 2020; Schram, 2020). The conclusion of this phenomenon has led to the development of exciting research programs for experts in comparison to federalism and regional. Not only do we need to better understand how different factors interact together in a variety of specific cases, but it is also important to know if we witness a large and capable transformation in international trade policy governance. With regard to long-term consequences, it remains to be seen whether associated entities will increasingly be able to consolidate their new roles in trade policy and then formalize limited administrative capacity, for example, can hinder their efforts in this area. In addition, the types of trade policy agreements can also change further, which may exclude any possible future participation by an associated entity. The European Union, for example, seems to have learned from the difficult process experience of CETA ratification, avoiding in future provisions that could make a mixed agreement (i.e. affecting the efficiency of the Member States) (van der Loo, 2018). Even in Canada, where territories have played a role in trade policy since the 1980s, the level of territorial engagement varies from consensus to agreement, without a formal intergroup framework to clarify and institute international trade policy governance. Canton Switzerland or the Belgian region and community, on the other hand, have officially enshrined participation rights in the Constitution, meaning that we should expect a permanent role of associate entities in this area. Ultimately, Wales and Scotland are developing an ambitious trade policy agenda, suggesting that the federation of international trade policy may be just one part of a broader transformation toward multi-level trade policy, where entities that are not based in unitary countries will also play an important role. Proposed readings of Broschek, J. and P. Goff, 2018, Federalism and International Trade Policy: Canadian Territories in Comparative Perspectives; IRPP Insight 23, Montreal, The Institute for Public Policy Research. Broschek, J. and P. Goff, 2020, Multilevel Trade Politics. Toronto, University of Toronto Press. Freudspurger, C., 2020, Trade Policy in Multilevel Government. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Gsthl, S., and D. 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