Why was germany responsible for ww1

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In my opinion, Germany blames the war because they have caused many problems between the countries. (Source D) And also where the first to attack another countries and has forced them to start a war. They said it was better to fight now and later. Because later Austria will Hungary weaker and will not be able to fight side with the Germany is to blame for starting World War I because they were the first country to declare war before any other country. This country was Belgium, and Belgium was one of those neutral countries that did not want war, but Germany decided to attack them. Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, and as a reason the war was in even greater conflict, but this attack was only forced because Germany had strong influence and said Austria-Hungary had started a fight with Serbia. Thus, overall, Germany not only started the war, but also influenced another country, which was a member of their alliance (Austria-Hungary) to fight another country (Serbia). Article 2(2) shall be replaced by the following Piranavan R. Evidence A:On July 6, German Foreign Minister Bethmann told Austrians that Austria must judge what needs to be done with Serbia. But whatever Austria decides, you can count on Germany to stand by you as an ally. He added: If there is to be a war, it is better now than in a year or two when .a Triple Entente will be stronger. Emperor Wilhelm and Bethmann not only gave Austria-Hungary free rein. They were confident they would now win, but were less confident of winning later. If they wanted a peaceful solution, they would have approached the British immediately. Instead, they did nothing, To keep Britain neutral in a continental war. By A. J. P. Taylor, The Fight for Craft in Europe, 1954. Evidence 2: A British propaganda poster from World War I. Evidence 3:Germany and Austria were responsible for starting the First World War believing they could win European rule, historian Sir Max Hastings said. Germany pushed and bullied others to take the first step and start ww1. Evidence 4: Russian mobilization and the threat of a two-front war, Germany had no choice but to initiate an attack on France in self-defense. Germany was guilty of many things before and during the First World War, such as the use of mustard gas against British troops and the slaughter of the many. Evidence 5: Since Germany had in fact invaded neutral Belgium before any other nation attacked another, it appeared that the clause was an obvious validity. Evidence 6: This blank cheque was also used for germany's handling of the Austro-Hungary never wage a great war without Germany's support. But instead of preventing Austria-Hungary from starting World War I, Germany simply allowed Austria-Hungary to start World War I. This is the argument that many blame on Germany gave Austria-Hungary a blank check to start World War I. This is the argument that many blame on Germany gave Austria-Hungary to start World War I. This is the argument that many blame on Germany gave Austria-Hungary to start World War I. This is the argument that many blame on Germany for launching the First World War. Witness 1 German militarism (which has been a crime for the past fifty years, has been working on it for twenty-five years. It's the logical result of their witness. He had to come. Walter Hines Page, U.S. Ambassador to London, 1914. The US was an ally of Britain and France during the war and fought Germany from 1917 to 1918. Witness 2 The Schlieffen plan must be one of the most stupid things of modern times... It has disastrously limited the actions of the German government. In July 1914, they had only two choices; Either they abandon their only plan to win the next war, or they go to war immediately. But Marshall is a historian in the Great War: myth and reality, 1988 Witness 3 The greatest war of modern times, and perhaps in the history of all mankind, Germany began the sin of a schoolboy as an excuse... For many years, Austria has been concerned about Serbia's growing power... The situation in Europe seemed to encourage the German peoples in this adventure. England, they thought there was nothing they could do... the dangers of Ireland's civil war. Russia was in the midst of a reorganization of its military... As far as France is concerned, he thought he could deal with it, and he was looking for an opportunity to do so. The Great War: The Standard History of the Whole of Europe Conflict, 1914 (Vol. IV). It was a patriotic weekly newspaper written and published in Britain and described the war as it happened. Witness 4... the Emperor has authorized me to inform our gracious dignity that in this case, as in all other cases, we can count on the full support of Germany... The emperor's opinion was that his actions should not be postponed... Russia was in no way prepared for war and thought twice before resorting to arms... If we had recognized the need for combative action against Serbia, the Emperor would regret not applying the present moment, which is in our favour. Count Sogyeny, the Austrian ambassador to Berlin, report on a famous conversation with the Emperor, July 1914. Historians are divided on whether the emperor made a planned political statement or simply reassured him in the heat of the moment. On August 1, 1914, Germany entered World War I when it declared war on Russia. In accordance with his war plan, he ignored Russia and first took action against France, declaring war on August 3 and sending its main armies through Belgium to attack Paris from the north. Due to the German invasion of Belgium, Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August. Most of the main parties were at war. In October 1914, Turkey joined the war in Germany and became part of the central powers. Italy, which was allied with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Alliance before The First World War, was neutral in 1914 before switching to the Allied side in May 1915. Historians vehemently denied Germany's role. The period of interpretation, supported by German historian Fritz Fischer in the 1960s, argues that Germany has long wanted to dominate Europe politically and economically and seized the opportunity that opened unexpectedly in July 1914 and made it guilty of launching the war. At the other end of the moral spectrum, many historians argued that the war was, coincidentally, caused by a series of complex accidents that no one could control. The third approach, especially important in recent years, is that Germany has seen itself surrounded by increasingly powerful enemies, Russia, France and Britain- who could eventually crush if Germany acted defensively in a preemptive blow. [1] Military alignment in 1914. When the war began Italy declared neutrality; In 1915, he switched and joined Triple Entente (i.e. the Allies). Background Main Article: Causes of World War I as the War Began, stood behind an ally of Austria Hungary confrontation with Serbia, but Serbia, but Serbia was under the protection of Russia, which is allied with France. Germany was the central including Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the war, and later the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria; Against them were the Allies, which consisted mainly of Russia, France and Britain at the start of the war, Italy, which joined the Allies in 1915, and the United States, which erupted unexpectedly in June and August 1914, including conflicts and hostilities over the previous four decades. Militarism, alliances, imperialism and ethnic nationalism played an important role. However, the direct origins of the war are hidden in decisions taken by statesmen and generals during the July 1914 crisis, triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, crown prince of the Austro-Hungarian State, by a Serbian secret organization, the Black Hand. [2] Since the 1870s or 1880s, all major powers have been preparing for large-scale war, although none expected it. Britain has focused on building the Royal Navy, which is already stronger than the next two ships combined. Germany, France, Austria, Italy and Russia, as well as some smaller countries, set up national systems during which the young men spent one or three years in the army and spent the next 20 years in the reserves with annual summer training. Men of higher social status became officers. [3] All countries have developed a mobilisation system that allows reserves to be drawn down quickly and sent by rail to key points. The plans were updated each year and increased in complexity. Every country has amassed weapons and supplies for an army that has cost millions. Germany in 1874 had a regular professional army of 420,000, with an additional 1.3 million reserves. By 1897, the regular German army had 545,000 and the reservists had 3.4 million. The French had 3.4 million reservist in 1897, Austria 2.6 million and Russia 4.0 million. Every major country had a general staff that planned war plans against potential enemies. [4] Each plan required a decisive opening and a brief war. [5] The German Schlieffen plan was the most worked out; the German army was so sure that it would succeed that no alternative plans were planned. It was secretly in Austria, as well as the German Navy, the Chancellor and the Foreign Ministry, so there was no coordination, and in the end the plan failed. [6] Leading historians focus on a handful of German leaders, as in most countries in 1914. [7] For Germany, special attention is paid to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, thanks to the discovery of Kurt Riezler, the rich, honest diary. [8] Annex II. Wilhelm, Emperor of Germany, he received publicity from both sides and signed on to important decisions, but was largely misrecorded or persuaded by others. [9] Helmuth von Moltke, Head of the German Joint Chiefs of Staff all the planning and operations of the German army. He kept his plans a secret. The Emperor approved, but did not share details with the Navy, the Chancellor, or his allies. As the crisis grew, Moltke became the most powerful man in Germany. [10] Public opinion and pressure groups have played a significant role in influencing German politics. The army and navy had a nationwide network of supporters, with one million members in the German Army in 1912. [12] The most talkative and aggressive NGO was the Pan-German League. [13] Agricultural interest was led by large landowners, who were particularly interested in exports and were politically well organised. Large companies in the steel and coal industries were effective lobbyists. All these economic groups supported an aggressive foreign policy. Bankers and financiers were not pacifists like their London counterparts, but they did not play much of a role in shaping foreign policy. Pacifism had its own well-organized groups, and the unions strongly condemned the war before it was declared. In the 1912 elections, the Socialists (Social Democratic Party or SPD) won 35% of the national vote. The conservative elite exaggerated the tacit threats of radical socialists such as August Bebel and was alarmed. Some saw a foreign war as a solution to Germany's internal problems; others have considered how to suppress the Socialists. [14] The SPD's policy limited antimilitarism to aggressive wars – the Germans saw 1914 as a defense war. On July 25, 1914, the SPD board turned to its membership to demonstrate for peace, and they were honored in large numbers at organized protests. The SPD was not revolutionary and many of its members were nationalists. When the war began, some conservatives wanted to use force to suppress the SPD, but Bethmann-Hollweg wisely refused. SPD MPs voted 96-14 on 3 August to vote for the war. There's an anti-war element left, especially in Berlin. In 1916, they were expelled from the SPD and formed the German Independent Social Democratic Party. [15] According to newspaper articles, the nationalist right openly supports the war, even if it was pre-emptive, while moderate editors supported only the defense war. Both the conservative press and the liberal press have increasingly used the rhetoric of German honor and popular sacrifice, and have often portrayed the horrors of Russian despotism in terms of Asian barbarism. [16] German goal historian Fritz Fischer launched an intense debate in the 1960s about Germany's long-term goals. American historian Paul Schroeder agrees with critics that Fischer exaggerated misinterpreted many points. Schroeder, however, supports Fischer's fundamental conclusion: Germany has continued to be a world power. This offer stemmed from the deep roots of Germany's economic, political and social structures. After the war broke out, world power became Germany's fundamental goal. [18] However, Schroeder argues that this was not the main cause of the war in 1914—in fact, the search for one or two that have started the war. He argues the fact that so many obvious explanations for the outbreak of war have advanced over the years indicates that, on the one hand, that it is massively overdefined, and secondly, that there is no effort to analyze the causal factors involved ever fully succeed. [19] In recent years, many historians have stressed that uncertainty about the future deeply troubled German policymakers and motivated them to go to preemptive war before it was too late. The nation was surrounded by enemies who grew stronger; the bid for rival British naval supremacy failed. [20] Bethmann-Hollweg was mesmerized by the continued growth of Russian power, largely due to French financial and technical assistance. For the Germans, this deepened the Emperor's concern that Germany was surrounded by increasingly powerful enemies. [21] One consequence was that time was against them, and a war that would be more beneficial to Germany than a later war. Among the French, there was a growing fear that Russia would be significantly stronger than France and become more independent of France, perhaps even returning to its old military alliance with Germany. The consequence was that the war could count on the Russian alliance with Germany would condemn France to death. [22] France, which is a third smaller than Germany, needed Russia's enormous potential, and the fear was that the two would clearly exceed Germany's military capabilities within a few years. This argued for war sooner rather than later. Bethmann-Hollweg knew he was taking calculated risks by supporting a local war in which Austria would politically destroy Serbia. The hope was to localize that war by bringing the rest of the power out of it. Russia had no contractual obligations to Serbia, but tried to make itself the leader of the Slavic peoples opposed to their German and Austrian oppressors. If Russia intervened in Serbia's defence, Germany would have to intervene in austria's defence, and france would most likely respect its treaty obligation and join Russia. assumed that Britain was not interested in the Balkans and would remain neutral. It was also possible that Russia would go to war, but France would not follow, in which case the Triple Entente would become meaningless. Calculated risk failed Russia mobilized. The German General Staff, which has always been a hawk and was eager for war, has now taken over German politics. His war plan called for immediate action before Russia could mobilise great force and instead used the very rapid mobilisation of German active service and reserve forces to invade France through Belgium. After France was knocked out, German troops were sent east to defeat Russia with the help of the Austrian army. After Russia mobilised, Austria and Germany mobilised on 31 July. The Germans had a very sophisticated plan for rapid mobilization. It worked well while everyone else had days or weeks behind. The general staff convinced the Emperor to activate his battle plan, and Bethmann-Hollweg could only follow him, Most historians treat the emperor like a man far from his depth, who was the army's chief of staff. [23] In 1913, the Army Act increased Germany's peace force to 870,000 and increased the final war force from 4.5 million to 5.4 million. France responded by expanding the training periods for all draftee from two to three years. Russia has similarly increased the size of the military to 5.4 million. Austria increased its war power to 2.0 million in 1913. Rival armies have improved their effectiveness, especially with more powerful artillery and machine guns. [24] The main battle plan, the Schlieffen Plan, was developed by the army headquarters. He called for a large infantry to sweep through Belgium to encircge Paris and defeat France in a few weeks. Then the Foreign Ministry, the Chancellor, the main ally in Vienna, nor with separate military headquarters in Bavaria and other states. No one could point out the problems or plan to coordinate with him. The generals, who knew about it, expected a quick victory within weeks — if that didn't happen, there was no plan B. [26] [27] Rivalry with Great Britain, when explaining why a neutral Britain was at war with Germany, Paul Kennedy (1980) acknowledged that it was critical for the war that Germany would become economic trade, the Baghdad railways, confrontations in Central and Eastern Europe, high-charged political rhetoric and domestic pressure groups. Germany has relied on sheer power over and over again, while Britain has increasingly resorted to moral sensitivities, playing a role, especially in regarding the occupation of Belgium as a deep moral and diplomatic crime. Kennedy claims that by far the main reason was London's fear of a repeat of 1870 - when Prussia and german states smashed France in the Franco-Prussian war - would mean that Germany, a powerful army and navy, controlled the English Channel and northwestern France. British policymakers that it would be a disaster for British security. [28] Naval Competition Main Article: Anglo-German Naval Arms Race The Royal Navy ruled the world in the 19th century. The resulting naval race has intensified tensions between the two nations. In 1897, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz became The German Navy from a small coastal defence force to a fleet that served as a challenge to British naval power. As part of a wider bid to decisively change the international balance of power in favour of Germany, Tirpitz called for a risikoflotte (Risk Fleet) because, although it is still smaller than the British fleet, it would be too big for Britain to risk. [29] [30] The German Navy, under Tirpitz, was a rival to the Royal Navy, and in 1890, in order to protect its new fleet, Germany traded assets. He acquired the strategic island of Heligoland off the German North Sea coast and gave up the island of Zanzibar in Africa. In 1898, Tirpitz launched a warship construction program. The Brits, however, are always well ahead in the race. The 1907 British battleship Dreadnought was so advanced in terms of speed and firepower that all other warships were immediately obsolete. Germany copied, but never surged forward in quality or numbers. [33] The Berlin blank cheque repeatedly and urgently called on Vienna to act quickly in response to the June 28 bombing, so that a counter-alliance would not have time to organize, and Austria could pin its fierce anger on it. Vienna delayed the critical ultimatum until July 23, and the actual invasion until August 13. This gave the Russian-French opposition time to organize. It also allowed many details to be found during the investigation, but there is no evidence directly referring to the Serbian government. The main reason for the delay was that virtually the entire Austrian army was tied up at home in the real work, providing a food supply that would be essential for any war if the reserves were to enter service. [34] In July 1914, Germany gave Austria a blank cheque to deal with Serbia's punishment for the murder of the Austrian crown prince. This meant that Germany would support the decision taken by Austria. Austria decided on a war with Serbia, which quickly escalated with Russia. Bethmann-Hollweg told the Austrian Ambassador to Berlin on 6 July: Finally, as far as Serbia is concerned, His Majesty cannot, of course, interfere in the current dispute between Austria-Hungary and the country, as this is not his responsibility. The Emperor Joseph, however, can be sure that His Majesty stands faithfully for the Austro-Hungarian Republic, [editor: Bethmann-Hollweg] here deleted the phrase that he was in all circumstances included in his first draft, as required by the obligations of his alliance and ancient friendship [36] Shortly after the war began, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement explaining the blank cheque needed to preserve Austria and the Teuton (German) competition in Central Europe. The statement said: It was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy, so that the ispendáta across the border could now look at it in this way. The imperial and royal governments valued Germany in this concept and asked for our opinion. We have been able to agree with his assessment of the situation of our ally with all our hearts and assure him that any measures they deem necessary to end the Servian movement against the protection of the monarchy are in line with our approval. We were perfectly aware that the possible Hungary attitude of Austria towards Slavish could bring Russia into the field and that it could therefore bring us into war in accordance with our duty as allies. However, Hungary the vital interests of Austria, which were at stake, we could not advise our ally to take a yielding attitude that was incompatible with his dignity and we cannot deny him our help in these difficult times. This could be done even less, as serbian agitation continued. If the Serbs continued to threaten the existence of Austria-Hungary with the help of Russia and France, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all Slavic slavs would occur under a Russian syllable, which would make the situation of the Teuton species in Central Europe untenable. [37] July: Crisis and war More information: In early July 1914, following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the imminent likelihood of war between the Austro-Hungarian Republic and Serbia, the German Government informed the Austro-Hungarian Government that Germany would maintain its alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Republic and Serbia, the German Government that Germany would maintain its alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Republic and Serbia. Austria was entirely dependent on Germany for its support — it had no other allies to trust — but the Emperor lost control of the German government. Bethmann-Hollweg has repeatedly rejected requests from Britain and Russia to pressure Austria to compromise. The German elite and the public have also demanded mediation. Now at the end of July he turned around and begged or demanded that accept the mediation, warning that Britain is likely to join Russia and France if a major war begins. The Emperor directly asked Emperor, however, did not know that the German army had its own line of communication with the Austrian army and insisted on a rapid mobilization against Russia. German Chief of Staff Moltke sent an emotional telegram to Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad on July 30: The Austro-Hungarian Republic must be preserved and mobilized immediately against Russia. Germany will mobilize. The Vienna officials decided that Moltke was indeed responsible, which was true, and refused mediation and mobilized against Russia. [38] When Russia brought about a general mobilization, Germany considered the act provocative. The Russian Government has promised Germany that its general mobilisation does not mean preparing for war with Germany, but a reaction to Hungary between Austria and Serbia. The German government considered the war without war with Germany nonsense, and Germany was mobilised for war. On August 1, Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia, stating that since both Germany and Russia are in a state of military mobilisation, there is an effective state of war between the two countries. Later that day, France, an ally of Russia, declared a state of general mobilization. The German government justified military action against Russia if necessary because of Russian military, which resulted in germany's mobilization in response. [39] After Germany declared war on Russia, France and its alliance with Russia prepared a general mobilization in the hope of war. On August 3, 1914, Germany responded to this measure by declaring war on France. Germany, facing a two-front war, enacted the so-called Schlieffen Plan, which included german armed forces requiring to move to Belgium and swing south toward France as well as the French capital Paris. The aim of the plan was to win quickly against the French and did not accept German forces passing through its territory. Germany ignored Belgian neutrality and invaded the country to launch an attack on Paris. This prompted Britain to declare war on the German Empire because the measure violated the Treaty of London, which was signed in 1839 by Both Britain and Prussia, guaranteeing Belgian neutrality and protection of the kingdom if a nation withdraws. Then, at the end of August 1914, several states declared war on Germany, Italy in 1915, Germany on April 6, 1916, and Greece on July 1917. Ottoman Allied Main Article: Ottoman entry into World War I 1912 Danish shows Balkan war, in October 1912 Turkey has been severely defeated in a series of wars over the past decade, decade, the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 and the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12. [40] However, relations with Germany were excellent, including investment aid for financing and support for the Turkish army. At the end of 1913, German General Liman von Sanders was hired to reorganize the army and control Ottoman forces in Constantinople. Russia and France protested strongly and forced him to reduce his role. Russia has had a long-term goal of supporting the new Slavic states in the Balkan region and has even taken over Constantinople tissaing. [42] Britain and Germany have developed a long-standing conflict through the Baghdad Railway through the Baghdad Railway through the Ottoman Empire. In June 1914, German power towards Britain's zone of influence (India and southern Persia) would have been resolved. Berlin has agreed not to build the Baghdad line and acknowledges Britain's great interest in the region. The issue was resolved to the satisfaction of both sides and played no role in bringing about the war. In June 1914, Vienna and Berlin discussed capturing the military alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey to neutralize the threat of the Balkan League under Russian and French patronage. When the war broke out, the Ottoman Empire was officially neutral at first, but bent toward the central powers. Promises of war loans, military coordination and the restoration of lost territories are appealing to Turkish nationalists, especially the young Turks of Enver Pasha and the Nationalist Union and Progress Committee (CUP). [44] [45] [46] See also the German Empire portal military military military portal World War I portal history of Germany during The First World War I Austro-Hungarian entry into World War I Historiography causes the i. 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