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Brian P. McGlinchey of the lobbying and public relations firm Qorvis MSLGROUP has filed its latest semi-annual disclosure forms with the Justice Department's Foreign Agents Registration Act Office, which covers the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2013. Qorvis plays a central role in expansive Saudi efforts to influence not only U.S. foreign policy and public opinion, but even the American justice system. Here are some points of interest from the new filing, which Continue reading a classified 28-page report on The Congressional Joint Investigation of Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 can be read in its originally published PDF format by clicking on the image on the right. Below, we've posted a 28-page full transcription service for anyone who finds this format easier to read or work with. Dotted lines represent line acts and do not accurately reflect the length of the line or the number of words or characters in it. PAGE 415, PART FOUR — FINDING, DISCUSSING AND NARRATIVE OF CERTAIN SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN THE 20TH CENTURY Finding: While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact, and received support or assistance, from a person who may be associated with the Saudi government. There is information, mainly from FBI sources, that at least two of these individuals claimed that some were Saudi intelligence officers. A review of the joint investigation confirmed that the intelligence community also has information, much of which has not yet been independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Government of Saudi Arabia in the United States may have other links to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. The FBI and the CIA have announced a joint investigation that since September 11, 2015, the fbi and the recently, and at least partly because of the focus of a joint investigation, this gap in us intelligence community must address this area of reports from any member of the Intelligence Community that there was a ———— presence in the United States. According to various FBI documents and at least one CIA memorandum, some of the Saudi government. Although the joint investigation uncovered this material during the review of fbi and CIA documents, it did not attempt to investigate and assess the accuracy and significance of that information independently, acknowledging that such a task is not part of a joint investigation. Instead, the joint investigation provided a detailed set of information discovered in documents and interviews discovered during the investigation, to the FBI and the CIA for further investigation by the intelligence community and, where appropriate, to law enforcement agencies. This report is prepared with an illustrative brief summary of the available information on any such person: Omar al-Bayoumi. The FBI had received several reports from individuals from the Muslim community that date back to 1999, claiming that al-Bayoumi may have been a Saudi intelligence officer. FBI records show that al-Bayoumi provided vital assistance to hijackers in a public place shortly after his meeting with the saudi consulate suite, and the files show that his encounter with the hijackers was not accidental. During that same time, al-Bayoumi had extensive contact with Saudi government agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and received financial support from a Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and Saudi pernment agencies and Saudi pernment agencies in the United States and Saudi pernment agencies and support increased significantly in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived in San Diego, decreased slightly in December 2000, and remained at the same level until August 2001. The company reportedly had links to Osama Bin Ladini and al-Qa'ida. In addition, the FBI determined that al-Bayoumi was in contact with several people under FBI investigation and the Holy Land Foundation, which has been under investigation for fundraising. Page 417 Osama Bassnan may have been in contact with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi while in San Diego. Bassnan was a close associate of the hijackers. He also lived across the street from the hijackers and commented on FBI assets, which he did more than al-Bayoumi did for the hijackers. According to the FBI document, Basnan told another person that he met two hijackers through al-Bayoumi was arrested because he knew al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar very well. The document says that Bassnan and al-Bayoumi have been close to each other for a long time. Bassnan has been several times by the Saudi government, including the last employment of a Saudi Arabian education mission, called FBI documents — —. The FBI also received reports from individuals in the Muslim community claiming that Bassnan may be a Saudi intelligence officer. According to the CIA memo, Bassnan allegedly received money and perhaps a fake passport from Saudi government officials. He and his wife have received financial support from the Saudi ambassador to the United States and his wife. The CIA report also shows that Bassnan traveled to Houston in 2002 and met with a person who was – . The report notes that during this trip, a member of the Saudi royal family gave Bassnan a significant amount of money. FBI records show that Bassnan is an extremist and supporter of Osama Bin Laden and is linked to the Eritrean Islamist jihad and blind Shaykh; Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to FBI documents and a CIA memorandum, al-Hazmi and al-Midhar may have been in contact with Shaykh al-Thumairy, an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and one of their imams at the King Fahad mosque in Culver City, California. Also, according to FBI documents, the mosque was built in 1998 with funding from Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdulaziz. The mosque has reportedly been attended by members of the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles and is widely recognized for its anti-Western views; Page 418 Saleh al-Hussayen. In September 2001, Saleh al-Hussayen claimed to have been a member of the European Commission since 9/11, he was not a member of the European Commission. He was able to leave the U.S. despite the FBI's efforts to find and re-interview him; and Abdullah Bin Ladin by the FBI as Usame Bin Ladin's half brother. He is a close friend of Mohammed Quadir-Harunani, Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehh, before the 9/11 attacks. A joint investigation also found other individuals associated with the Saudi government had links to terrorist networks, including: The CIA and FBI have identified the Ibn Tamiyahi Mosque in Culver City as a place of extremist activity. Several subjects in THE FBI's investigations before September 11 had close ties to the mosque and are believed to have laundered money through this mosque's nonprofit overseas affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin. In an interview, an FBI agent said he believed that Saudi government money that been laundered through the mosque; Another Saudi citizen with close ties to the Saudi Royal Family, ———-, is the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation and reportedly had to check security at the United States; According to FBI documents, several of the phone numbers found in Abu Zubaida's phone book, a senior al-Qa'ida operative imprisoned in Pakistan in March 2002, at least indirectly, could be linked to phone numbers in the United States. One of these U.S. numbers is commissioned by ASPCOL Corporation, based in Aspen, On Page 419 in Colorado, and manages the affairs of the Colorado, and manages the EBI's response to the joint investigation states that CIA traces have shown no direct links between the numbers found in Zubaida's phone book and the numbers in the United States. According to an FBI document, the phone number of the Saudi Embassy bodyguard in Washington was also found on abu Zubaida's property, who has claimed it may -. Al-Qudhaeein participated in the 1999 World Conference on The Great American People's March. During the flight, al-Qudhaeein then tried to enter the cockpit twice. Al-Qudhaeein and his partner flew to Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. During the investigation, the FBI discovered that both al-Qudhaeein and the other person involved in the allegations contained in the CIA Memorandum identified by the Joint Undertaking. Staff at the FBI's San Diego Field Office. That memorandum on —,d 11. A CIA official sent it to the CTC to determine whether the CIA had any additional information. He also provided a copy of the fib agent who is responsible for investigating one of the individuals discussed in the memorandum. Despite the clear national implications of the CIA memorandum, the FBI agent included the memorandum in a separate case file and did not transfer it to FBI headquarters. FBI headquarters was therefore not aware of page 420 of the statements in the memorandum until the joint investigation brought the impact of the memorandum to the attention of the bureau. — - possible Saudi government connections to terrorists and terrorist groups while in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact, and received support or assistance from individuals are allegedly Saudi intelligence officers. A review of the joint investigation confirmed that the intelligence community also has information, much of which is speculative and has not yet been independently verified, indicating that Saudi government officials in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. The committees are particularly concerned about the seriousness of the allegations contained in the CIA memo, which were found in the fbi's San Diego Field Office files. That memorandum on alleged financial links between the 11th and 12th —————, the Financial Regulation of the European Union and the Republic of China on the protection of personal data by the Community In their testimony prior to the joint investigation, the CIA and the FBI were not able to definitively establish for these committees the extent of Saudi Arabia's support for terrorist activities worldwide or in the United States, and to what extent such support, if any, is intentional or innocent. Both the FBI and the CIA have informed the committees that they are now aggressively dealing with Saudi terrorism issues. Before 1 -- representative. closed Page 421 hearings were heard ———-, 9/11. It should be clear that this joint investigation has not made any final decisions, that the reliability or sufficiency of information on these matters we found contained in FBI and CIA documents. The task of this joint investigation was not to carry out the kind of extensive investigation necessary to establish the true importance of such alleged links with the Government of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it is possible that further investigation into these allegations may reveal legitimate and innocent explanations of those associations. However, given the serious national security consequences of this information to both the FBI and the CIA for investigation and for appropriate investigation and for appropri that one of the parties who provided assistance to Nawaf al-Hazm and Khalid al-Mihdhar may be linked to the Government of Saudi Arabia. Another person who may have been in contact with al-Hazm and Khalid al-Mihdhar may be linked to the Government of Saudi Government, including contacts with Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States. Fbi files show that people have claimed that both individuals may be Saudi intelligence officers; The September 11 hijackers may have been in contact with other Saudi government officials in the United States before September 11, and Saudi government officials in the United States before September 11, and Saudi government officials in the United States before September 11 hijackers may have been involved in the Osama Bin Ladin terrorist network. Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan Two individuals known to the FBI before September 11, 2001 - Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan-perhaps for help or support of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar while the two hijackers-to-be lived in San Diego. While the documentary evidence that Osama Bassnan had contacts with two people. When al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved to San Diego, al-Bayoumi provided them with significant assistance. Before the hijackers moved in together with an FBI informant, they stayed in Al-Bayoumi brovided them with significant assistance. Before the hijackers moved in together with an FBI informant, they stayed in Al-Bayoumi brovided them with significant assistance. Mihdhar moved into their apartment, al-Bayoumi threw a party to welcome them to the San Diego community. He also tasked Modhar Abdullah was their translator, helped them get their driver's licenses and helped them find flight schools. - 1 FBI notes in its November 18, 2002 response that financial records show a cash deposit the same amount as the cashier's check on al-Bayoum's bank account on the same day, indicating that the hijackers compensated him. Fbi 18. However, another FBI document, dated October 14, 2002, seems to reach a slightly different conclusion. That document states that the review of the bank documents of Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazm shows that there are no bank documents to support the reimbursement of [the rental money] or the money to Omar Al-Bayoum in Al-Hazm or Al-Hazm or Al-Hazm or Al-Hazm or Al-Hazm or Al-Hazm or Al-Hazm shows that there are no bank documents to support the reimbursement of [the rental money] or the money to Omar Al-Bayoum in Al-Hazm or Al-Hazm the Saudi government than previously understood. In fact, according to an October 14, 2002 FBI document, al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi government. The connections identified by the FBI are as follows: Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi government. The connections identified by the FBI are as follows: Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi Givil Aviation Authority from 1976 to 1993 when he moved to the United States; According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in frequent contact with the Emir at the Saudi Defense Ministry, which was in charge of air traffic control; The FBI has also found records showing that al-Bayoumi received \$20,000 from the Saudi Defense Ministry through a Saudi company called Ercan. ———, company informed the FBI after September 11, 2001 that while al-Bayoumi only showed up at the company on one occasion, it received monthly salary, but was told that his company would lose the contract if he did not pay him. ——— told the FBI that at the time he attributed it to saudi arabian corruption. Al-Bayoumi also had frequent contacts with Saudi authorities in the United States. In a review of phone data, the FBI learned that Saudi Cultural Mission in Washington; and three at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. When searching —— ——, Bayoum, they also discovered that he had a phone number of a person at the Saudi Consulate in London. Two former San Diego agents questioned whether al-Bayoumi] acted like a Saudi intelligence officer, in my opinion. And if he was involved in the hijackers, which seems to be when he signed the leases, if he's offering any kind of financing or some kind of payment, Then I'd say there's a clear possibility that the FBI received a lot, I would say, half a dozen reports from individuals who believed that al-Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence officer. Fbi 18. In its response, the FBI notes that al-Bayoumi --- —— until 9/11, had received reports from a trusted source even before 9/11. Al-Bayoum was known to have access to large sums of money from Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that he did not appear to be in the job. On one occasion before 9/11, the FBI took over the 1998 World Police. Page 425 From 11 October 2002, the Commission acknowledged the ——-, that after exhaustive translations of Bayoumi documents, it is clear that Bayoumi's correspondence he provides guidance to young Muslims and some of his writings interpreted as jihad. According to information obtained by the FBI after September 11, 2001, al-Bayoumi also noted in one of his school requests that he work for a company called Dallah/Avco. According to the FBI, Ercan is a subcontractor for San Diego's Dallah/Avco. According to a separate document, Dallah and Avco belong to the same umbrella company, Avco Dallah Trans Arab, which is a Diego Field Office apparently never received this information. According to FBI documents, al-Bayoum's salary increased while al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in the U.S., al-Bayoumi generally received about \$465 a month in grants. According to the document, in March 2000, a month and remained at that rate until al-Bayoumi left the United States in August 2001, about one month before 9/11. Page 426 - A memorandum dated July 2, 2002, incorrectly noted that al-Bayoumi's wife, living in San Diego, received \$1,200 a month from Princess Haifa Bint Sultan, the wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The FBI has now confirmed that only Osama Bassnani's wife received the money directly from Prince Bandar's wife, but al-Bayoum's wife tried to deposit the three checks of Prince Bandar's wife, which had to be paid to Bassnani's wife, on their accounts. A joint investigation also found FBI files, information suggesting that Osama Bassnan may also have been in contact with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, including: Bassnan was a very close associate of Omar al-Bayoumi's and was in phone contact with al-Bayoumi several times a day when there was both in San Diego. Bassnan also has close ties to people associated with the hijackers, including Omar Bakarbashati, who is being treated below, who in FBI documents is called Bassnan's brother-in-law; According to an October 16, 2001 FBI document, Bassnan announced early that he had met Nawaf al-Hazmi through Omar al-Bayoumi. According to the FBI document, he is Said early on that al-Bayoumi was arrested because he knew al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar very well. The document says that Bassnan and al-Mihdhar very well. The document says that Bassnan and al-Mihdhar very well. The document says that Bassnan lived in a San Diego apartment complex across the street from al-Haze and al-Mihdhar; Bassnan made a comment to an FBI source after the September 11 attacks suggesting that he did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did; On page 427, the FBI is aware of a contact between the hijackers and Bassnani's close friend Khaled al-Kayed, a commercial airline pilot and a San Diego certified flight instructor. Al-Kayed testified to the FBI that in May 2000, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi contacted him about learning to fly a Boeing jet aircraft; FBI documents speculate that Osama Bassnan ———-. In 1992, when he was living in totaling \$74,000, between February 22, 1999 and May 30, 2002. These checks had to be paid to Bassnani's wife and were taken out of princess Haifa's account since January 1999 to send \$2,000 a month to Bassnani's wife. Bassnani's wife allegedly received funding for --. On at least one occasion, Bassnan received a check directly from Prince Bandar's account. According to the FBI, on May 14, 1998, Bassnan cashed a check for Bandar in the amount of \$15,000. Bassnani's wife got at least one check directly from Bandar. He also received an additional check from Bandar's wife, \$2,000 a month to about \$64,000. The money was for what we don't ————-. He gives money to a lot of different groups and people around the world. We've been able to detect many of these... But maybe if we find out he's giving to 20 different radical groups, well, maybe there's a pattern. The FBI has also developed additional information that clearly shows that Bassnan is an extremist and supporter of Usama Bin Ladin. In 1993, the FBI learned that Bassnan had been a member of the Fbi since 1992. Bassnan had been a member of the Fbi since 1992. Bassnan had been a member of the Islamic world. According to FBI assets, Bassnan spoke to Bin Ladin as if he were a god. Bassnan also informed the FBI early that he heard that the U.S. government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. He considered such measures inadequate because the United States and turn it into an Islamic state for 10 to 15 years. According to FBI documents, Bassnan also knew the Bin Ladin family in Saudi Arabia and speaks on his cell phone to family members living in the United States. The phone numbers living to the FBI document, a review of toll records is linked to several numbers found in Zubaida's phone book with U.S. phone numbers. One of the numbers is unlisted and ordered by ASPCOL Corporation in Aspen, Colorado. On July 15, 2002, Page 429, FBI headquarters sent a letter to the Denver Field Office asking that they had completed their initial investigation. According to the FBI's Denver Office, ASPCOL is an umbrella company that manages the affairs of colorado resident Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The facility is protected by Scimitar Security. Denver Field Office agents noted that neither ASPCOL nor Scimitar Security are listed in the phone book and are not easily local. In addition, the Colorado Secretary of State's office does not have data from ASPCOL. The Denver office did not attempt to make local inquiries to ASPCOL because they believed that any inquiries from aspcol would be quickly reported to Prince Bandar's staff. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, they decided to investigate ASPCOL until further guidance was received from FBI headquarters. McLean———, in Virginia, was found in the influence of address as Prince Bandar's address. According to the FBI, ——- is officially the driver of the Saudi Embassy. —— the number was also associated with ASPCOL, a Prince Bandar umbrella company based in Colorado. It should be noted that the FBI's November 18, 2002 response says that CIA traces have shown no direct (emphasis added) links between the numbers found in zubaida's phone book and the numbers in the United States. Page 430 of the U.S. government also located another Virginia number usama bin ladin safe house in Pakistan. The number is subscribed by a person named — -- interviewed by the FBI in June 2002. He could not explain why his number ended up in a safe house in Pakistan, but noted that contact with the September 11 Hijackers among individuals who may have been associates of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to a memorandum conducted by the Joint Committee of Inquiry, the initial indications are that al-Thumairy may have a physical or financial connection to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, but we are still looking for this possibility. Al-Thumairy is an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is also considered one of the imams at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California. —————— — . According to FBI documents, king fahad mosque was built in 1998 with funding from Saudi Arabia's crown Prince Abdulaziz. The mosque is attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely known for its anti-Western views. FBI documents show that Mohdhar Abdullah drove al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to king Fahad mosque, before al-Mihdhar Saudi Arabia. Several individuals on the east coast whom the hijackers may have met may also be linked to the Saudi government. After the terrorist attacks, the FBI discovered that in 2001, the United States and Its 10 000 people were killed in a terrorist attack. According to FBI documents, al-Hussayen is apparently a Saudi Interior Ministry employee/official. He said he didn't know the hijackers, Page 431, but agents at the FBI discovered that in 2001, the United States and Its 10 000 people were killed in a terrorist attack. Hussayen either fainted or pretended to have a seizure in need of treatment. He was released from the hospital several days later and managed to leave the United States despite law enforcement efforts to find and re-interview him. Saleh al-Hussayen is the uncle of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Sami al-Hussayen is affiliated with the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) and is the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation. The FBI has also discovered that Saleh al-Hussayen is a major supporter of IANA, a nonprofit organization based in Michigan that is dedicated to spreading Islam around the world. According to the FBI, IANA's mission is to actually spread Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the United States and around the world more broadly. IANA asks for money from Prince Bandar, but the documents are unclear whether Bandar actually contributed money to that organization. FBI documents also show that several Saudi Navy officers were in contact with the 11th FBI documents claiming that the San Diego Field Office opened a counterterrorism investigation into a person named Osama Nooh, a Saudi Naval officer, because of his connection to Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. In addition, Lafi al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Hazmi on nine occasions since March 11, 2000 on March 27, 2000. The Jacksonville FBI Field Office is conducting an investigation to determine whether Saleh Ahmed Bedaiwi, a Saudi Naval officer on his territory, was in contact with any of the hijackers. ---. The FBI has also discovered some more weak connections between Saudi government employees and hijackers during the PENTTBOM investigation. For example, according to the FBI, a person named Fahad Abdullah Saleh Bakala was close friends of the 9/11, 2001, 11th-century president. The bachelor previously worked as a pilot for the Saudi Royal Faily, flying to Usama Bin Ladin between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia during UBL exile. In addition, an FBI source reported that after September 11 that he was 50% certain that al-Midhar was a guest in an apartment in McLean, Virginia, which was occupied in July and August 2001 by Hamad Alotaibi of the Saudi Embassy's military division. FBI documents also note that September 11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi may also have visited the address. Connections between Saudi government officials in the United States and other potential terrorist operatives Joint investigation also reviewed information from FBI files, suggesting other possible links between Saudi government officials and terrorist operatives. For example, according to FBI documents, there is evidence that the hijackers Marwan al-Shehhi and Mohammed Rafique Quadir Harunan since 1999. Abdullah Bin Ladin, who is the subject of several FBI investigations, is currently based in the United — —. He claims to be working as an administrative officer at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. Abdullah Bin Ladin has funded Quadir's company, and quadir has been listed as an emergency contact for Quadir's children. They are a frequent email and phone contact as well. According to the FBI, Abdullah Bin Ladini has numerous links to terrorist organizations. He is president and director of the World Arab Muslim Youth Union (WAMY) and the American Institute of Islamic and Arab Sciences. Both organisations are local NGOs based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that WAMY is closely involved in financing and financing and financing international terrorist activities, and in the past, it has provided logistical support to those who wish to fight in the War in Afghanistan. In 1998, the CIA published a paper describing WAMY as a non-governmental organisation providing funding, logistical support and training that may be linked to the Arab Afghan network, Hamas, Algerian extremists and Philippine fighters. 2 Also, in the aftermath, potential interest is the 1999 Arab World War. Al-Qudhaeein and al-Shalawi flew from Phoenix to Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. After boarding the Phoenix plane, they began asking flight attendants technical questions about a flight that flight attendants find suspicious. When the plane was on the flight, al-Qudhaeein asked where the bathroom was; A flight attendant pointed him at the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the cockpit as the plane and tried twice to enter the cockpit as the plane and tried twice to enter the cockpit as the plane and tried twice to enter the bathroom was; A flight attendant pointed him at the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the cockpit as the plane and tried twice to enter the cockpit as the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice to enter the back of the plane and tried twice the back of the ba and al-Shalawi claimed that the Saudi Embassy was paying for their plane tickets. After the FBI discovered that a person in Phoenix who was the subject of a counterterrorism investigation. In November 2000, the FBI received ———- report that al-Shalawi had been training in afghan terror camps and trained in explosives to carry out Khobar Towers-type attacks. Following the 9/11/ First WorldS, The New Phoenix FBI communications explained the theory behind: Phoenix FBI now 2. Under the FBI's November 18, 2002 response, although several officials in WAMY support al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups, intelligence is not enough to show whether the organization as a whole and its senior leadership support terrorism. On page 434, it is known that both men specifically attempted to test The Security Procedures of America West Airlines in the preparation and promotion of UBL/Al Qaeda operations. In a testimony before the joint investigation, the agent who compiled the Phoenix EC noted: Post 9/11 in the world, I went back and looked at that maybe some kind of dry run. It's currently being investigated. By letter of 11 September 2001, the Commission shall, 200 — - believed al-Qudhaeein could have been ———-11 September 2000, shall be the first to be 11 years In interviews, an FBI agent in Phoenix reported that Phoenix – -- ----. His profile is similar to that of al-Bayoum and Bassnani. He is a student in the United States and is not a visible income tool. He has frequent contact with saudi arabian government agencies in the United States and seems to be very involved in the affairs of the local Saudi community. He runs a Saudi club in Phoenix and helps Saudi students in the region. The FBI has also developed information that al-Qudhaeein received money from the Saudi government, but since 2002, the FBI's Phoenix field office has speculated —. There are other indications in the FBI files that elements of the Saudi government may have supported terrorist networks. For example, the FBI had identified the Ibn Tamiyahi Mosque in Culver City as a place of extremist activity, both before and after 9/11. Several subjects of the San Diego investigation before September 11 had a close connection to the mosque. Based on interviews and a review of FBI files, San Diego FBI agents believed at the time that these items were laundered through this mosque, the first Somali nonprofit and then other entities linked to Usama Bin Ladin. Page 435 About 1998, the FBI became aware of millions of dollars in bank transfers to the Somali community of San Diego Al Barakaat Trading Company and other companies affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin. At the time, it seemed that the funding came from the local Somali community in the form of donations to various somali non-profits. But the FBI now believes that some of the funding actually came from Saudi Arabia and that both the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the San Diego Islamic Center were involved in money laundering. According to a former FBI agent in San Diego who was involved in this investigation, this plan could allow the Saudi government to provide funds to al-Qaeda through covert or indirect means. In its 9th day at 12:00 And knowing that probably 70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Usama Bin Ladin, this may be a sign. There are also signs of Saudi government support for terrorism, is: suspicious remittances, document forgery, job offer for wanted terrorist suspects, and youth travel funding for jihadist training. Defense communications notes that since September 2001, UQ couriers have transported more than \$330,000 in cash, most of which they received from Saudi embassies in the Far East. In January 2002, UQ administrator Yassir El-Sayid Mohammed travelled to Thailand to pick up about \$200,000 from the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, a personal assistant to the UQ administrator travelled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, a personal assistant to the UQ administrator travelled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, a personal assistant to the UQ administrator travelled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Embassy in Saudi Arabia. According to the Department of Defense, he came back with tens of thousands of dollars. CIA, Treasury and FBI officials have all expressed concern about the al-Haramain Foundation's links to both the Saudi government and terrorist activities, According to the FBI's Page 436 November 18, 2002 response, the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (HIF) has clear ties to the Saudi government, and intelligence reporting shows that it provides financial and logistical support to al-Oa'ida. In 1993, HIF founded its U.S.-based office in Ashland, Oregon, and that office has since received about \$700,000 from older offices in Saudi Arabia. The FBI is under investigation by HIF and the Portland HIF bureau. As mentioned above, the FBI has entered into correspondence between al-Bayoum and HIF. It is clear from the documents that HIF was interested in appointing the imam of the Cajon Mosque in California, which al-Bayoum led. The Treasury's chief counsel acknowledged his agency's concern for the foundation: MR. AUFHAUSER: Secondly, and to treasury's chief counsel acknowledged his agency's concern for the Politics of the United States. This is, of course, the largest, I think, the largest Islamic charity in the world. It's called an Islamic world charity. Its direct supervisors are members of the royal family; important contributors are members of the royal family. We do not have much information at headquarters on whether they knowingly help people al-Qa'ida and others; however, in important offices that have not yet been designated, and under this investigation, we have sufficient evidence that large amounts of cash are couriered to these offices, that a large part of the money is being spread out due to improper expenses, and finally that these offices have significant contacts with extremists. Justine large amounts of cash are couriered to these offices, that large part of the money is being spread out due to improper expenses, and finally that these offices, that large part of the money is being spread out due to improper expenses, and finally that these offices, that large part of the money is being spread out due to improper expenses, and finally that these offices, that large part of the money is being spread out due to improper expenses, and finally that these offices, that large part of the money is being spread out due to improper expenses, and finally that these offices, that large part of the money is being spread out due to improper expenses. progress in its investigation of al-Haramain: a year ago we had many reports suggesting branches were linked to al-Qa'ida ... Over the last year, we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement data and compiled about a month, six weeks ago, which gathered together... This document gave us the first clear sign that the leader of the central authority is complicit in supporting terrorism, and it also raised questions about Prince Nayef. Finally, the ————, the Phoenix and Portland FBI counterterrorism investigations, also have close ties to a member of the Saudi royal family. ———- no longer live in the United States, but is still the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI opened a Page 437 investigation into --- employee of Saudi Arabian became the source of reporting in 1999 that ———- security at the Southwest border and discussed the possibility of infiltrating individuals into the United States. The FBI has developed information that the ———— recently interrogated at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. He informed the FBI that he had a job at Saudi Arabian Airlines through his contacts. He said he didn't make much money for this job, but that he had another source of income through a Saudi prince named Khalid al-Bandar. According to ———, ———- performed various tasks for the prince, such as dealing with real estate matters and assisting the prince's grandmother. —— travelled to many places with the prince, including Europe, and often to the United Arab Emirates. -— was apparently able to evade customs and immigration and naturalization services because he was traveling with a Saudi prince. The FBI only found out about the trip after the fact. Fbi Portland Field Office agents expressed concern that others were using their status as saudi arabian airlines employees as cover to allow them to transport weapons to and from the United States. Lack of cooperation with Saudi Arabia In testimonies and interviews, several FBI agents and CIA officials complained about a joint investigation into the lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 11 attacks. For example, a veteran New York FBI agent reported that from his Page 438 point of view, the Saudis have been useless and obstructive for years. According to this agent, the Saudis will only act if it is in their own interests. When a high-level officer was asked how the September 11 attacks might have been prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation, citing the example since the summer of 2001, when the U.S. government learned that a person in Saudi Arabia was in contact with Abu Zubaida and was probably aware of the impending al-Qa'ida operation. The U.S. government to find him. The Saudis informed the U.S. government to find him. The Saudis informed the U.S. government agency that had originally learned this person's knowledge refused to provide additional information to the Saudis because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tried to put pressure on the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without further information. According to some FBI employees, such an answer is typical of the Saudis, but the Saudis would not cooperate without further information after 9/11. The Saudi government claimed they had no information on the issues. According to former chief of Alec Station, a unit of DCI's Counterterrorist Center founded in 1996 to focus specifically on Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from around 1996 that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States on maters related to Usama Bin Ladin, it was clear from the United States on th decision. Goes back to our efforts to communicate with the Saudis to help us tour al-Qa'ida... mostly it was a very turbulent relationship where the Saudis did not offer us a quick or very forceful response to it. Sometimes they didn't. It was just really slow coming. Both FBI and CIA personnel referred to a person named Madani al-Tayyibi as a specific case in which the Saudis had not cooperated. The CIA and FBI had been pressuring the Saudis for years to allow them to speak to al-Tayyib. According to the former head of the ALEC station, al-Tayyib oved to London in 1996 to work for Khalid al-Fawwaz, another important al-Qa'ida figure who has since been arrested. In the summer of 1996, al-Tayyab returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis consistently refused requests from the FBI and the CIA to speak to al-Tayyib, saying that al-Tayyib was just a poor man who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything. The former head of Alec station also referred to the example of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Khalifa is Bin Ladin's brother-in-law and an important figure in al-Qa'ida. The US government arrested Khalifa in the bombing in Jordan. The Jordanians then returned him to Saudi Arabia. According to a CIA official, the Saudis bought the Jordanians for Khalifa's return. According to a CIA official, when Khalifa later arrived in Saudi Arabia, he was met by at least one important government official. Khalifa now works for a non-governmental organisation based in Riyadh and travels and operation with the U.S.: Page 440 in an almost intuitive sense, however, that things are not voluntary. So I want to inform you in full that we have to ask and we have to look and we have to try. I'll give you an example and a half. The first is after a while, the Saudis have agreed to the name of a man named Julaydin, who is notoriously involved in all this; and his appointment has been made public within the next 10 days. They came to us two weeks ago and said, Okay, we think we should move forward with a name and a freezing order against Mr. Julayin. We asked, what do you have for him? Because they certainly know what we have about him, because we shared it when we tried to convince them that they should join us. The answer was, nothing new. Do you believe that? No, I think that charges creed, or there is another motive that we do not have The status of investigations into counter-terrorism and links between Saudi government officials in the US intelligence community, both the FBI and the CIA, have informed the committees that they are treating the Saudi issue seriously. According to the November 18, 2002 FBI response, the certainly Saudis in the United States and that al-Qa'ida and Usama Bin Ladin are especially-they Page 442 to invest in the important energy cultivating what Abu Zubaydah called good relations with the Saudis all standing... He said that bin Ladin is very pleased with the Saudis in the military, those successful in business and those close to the royal family, to actively support their cause. he said that bin Ladin is actively seeking such relationships. — ———— noted: What we find troubling cases we've learned from the FBI, both in the Los Angeles cases and in some cases that the Washington Field Office has investigated, where you see Saudi money going to people, is that it fits the sort of pattern that we've seen regarding direct payments to the

that these ties are going back, that we can prove that the Saudi royal family sponsors terrorism. But there's enough smoke that we're conducting a number of studies to try to determine what other information is out there. What is clear is that the FBI did not consider the Saudis to be a ———

Saudis, the Saudi Arabian government's long-term support for very fundamentalist Wahabi and Salafi charities and movements around the world, which in some of it does not bleed over terrorist support ... We have had a lot of doubts before 9/11. Do the people making payments know what's going on with the money? If they know what's going on, why are they making payments? Is this a form of blackmail? Do they recognize support for terrorism? There is a question of whether they regulate themselves as well as they do the due diligence that they should. Pasquale D'Amato, deputy fbi executive director, testified at the same hearing: So far, I can't sit here and say

— the fight against terrorism until 9/—- ———-

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