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The greatest of all modern philosophers was born in the Baltic seaport of Koenigsberg, East Prussia, the son of the saddle and never left the neighborhood of his remote place of birth. Through his family pastor, Immanuel Kanta was able to study at the newly founded Fredericianum College, after he enrolled at Koenigsberg University, where he became acquainted with the philosophy of Wolfian and modern natural science by the philosopher Martin Knutzen. From 1746 to 1755 he served as a tutor in various households near Koenigsberg. Between 1755 and 1770, Kant published treatises on a number of scientific and philosophical topics, including the hypothesis of the origin of the solar system. Some of Kant's writings in the early 1760s attracted the favorable attention of respected philosophers such as J. H. Lambert and Moses Mendelssohn, but the professorship eluded Kant until he was over 45. In 1781, Kant finally published his great work, Criticism of Pure Mind. Early reviews were hostile and incomprehensible, and Kant's attempt to make his theories more accessible in his Prolegomena to any future metaphysics (1783) was largely unsuccessful. Then, partly influenced by former student J. G. Herder, whose writings on anthropology and history challenged his Enlightenment beliefs, Kant turned his attention to questions in the philosophy of morality and history, writing several short essays on the philosophy of history and sketching his ethical theory into the basics of morality metaphysics (1785). Kant's new philosophical approach began to gain attention in 1786 through a series of articles in the widely circulated Gottingen journal of the philosopher Jena C.L. Reinhold. The following year, Kant published a new, widely revised edition of Critics, followed by a critique of practical reason (1788), examining the basics of moral philosophy, and criticism of the court (1790), the study of the aesthetics of rounding his system through a strikingly original attitude to two topics widely perceived as highly on the philosophical agenda at the time - the philosophical meaning of the taste for beauty and the use of teleology in natural science. Since the early 1790s, Kant was regarded as the coming generation of philosophers, both by overthrowing all previous systems and as opening up a whole new philosophical perspective. During the last decade of his philosophical work, Kant devoted much of his attention to the application of moral philosophy. His two main works in the 1790s were Religion within the simple mind (1793---94) and The Metaphysics of Morality (1798), the first part of which contained Kant's theory of law, law and political state. At the age of 74, most philosophers who are still active are engaged in consolidation and protection of views, Designed. However, Kant felt an important gap in his system and began to rethink its foundations. These attempts continued for another four years, until the devastating effects of old age finally destroyed Kant's ability to further intellectual work. The result was a long but disorganized manuscript, which was first published in 1920 under the name Opus Postumum. It shows the influence of some of the more radical young thinkers Kant's philosophy itself inspired. Kant's philosophy focuses on the active role of the human mind in the process of learning the world and its autonomy in granting moral right. Kant saw the development of the mind as a collective possession of the human species, a product of nature that has been working throughout human history. For him, the process of free communication between independent minds is the life of the mind, the calling of which is to remake politics, religion, science, art and morality as the end of fate, the form of which is our collective task. Abstract criticism of practical reason is the second of three criticisms of Kant, one of his three main treatises on moral theory and the fundamental text in the history of moral philosophy. Originally published three years after its Basic Metaphysics of Morality, Criticism provides further development of the main themes of Kant's moral theory, gives the most complete statement about his highly original theory of free will, and develops his practical metaphysics. Kant's new edition of Criticism of Practical Mind, prepared by Kant's renowned translator and scholar of practical philosophy, presents the first new translation of this work in several years. The substantial and clear introduction of Andrews Lita puts the main themes of criticism in the context of Kant's moral theory and his critical system. Keywords No Keywords mentioned (fix this) Category Kant Works in 17/18 Century Philosophy Kant: Ethics in 17th/18th Century Philosophy (classify this paper) Reprint years 2012 ISBN (s) 978051809576 97805215999627 Options edit this record Sign as a duplicate of the export removal request from the No. Add more quotes Related Books and Articles Practical Philosophy.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - Cambridge University Press. Analytics My Notes Log in to use this feature First published by Fri Sep 12, 2008; Significant revision of Wed November 1, 2017 Two of the most famous issues in Kant's critical philosophy are a concern for the cause. One question is central to his theoretical philosophy. It stems from the metaphysical assertions of earlier rationalists of philosophers, especially Leibniz and Descartes. What claims can lead to hope for a reliable establishment? The second issue is central to his Philosophy. Emerges the subordinate role of the British empiricists, first of all, Hume, who stated: The mind is completely inactive and can never be the source of such an active principle as conscience or sense of morality (Treatise, 3.1.1.11; see also the record of rationalism against empiricism). What practical relevance can lead to approval? These questions are reflected in the names of two key works: monumental critique of pure reason and criticism of practical reason, which is the middle point of his great trio of moral writings (between the basis of the metaphysics of morality and the metaphysics of morality). It is clear that the practical reason is the basis of Kant's moral philosophy. It is less clear what role the mind plays in its theoretical philosophy. Kant insists that metaphysics is completely impossible, or at best, a messy and goofy work unless we separate ideas of reason from concepts of understanding (Prolegomena No.41, 4:329). But while he emphasizes the firmness of empirical knowledge gained through understanding, reason and its ideas often appear as simple sources of errors and illusions. (This is especially true for the most read sections of the first critique - aesthetic, analytical and dialectical.) But if that were all Kant wanted to say, the status of philosophical reasoning would be in serious doubt. In addition, it can be noted that Kant rarely discusses the causes as such. This leaves a difficult interpretation of the task: just that Kant is a common and positive account of reason? This record has the following structure. The first section outlines the role that the mind plays in Kant's account of knowledge and metaphysics in the first criticism. The second section examines the key aspects of reason in moral philosophy, with a particular reference to the second criticism. Reflecting Kant's canonical texts and the bulk of secondary literature, these discussions of theoretical and practical reasons are relatively independent of each other. The third section therefore considers how Kant's views on theoretical and practical causes can be linked. It highlights the most outstanding modern interpretation of the Cantian mind that Onora O'Neill. The final observations underline the philosophical interest of a unified interpretation of Kant's account of reason. The first half of The Pure Mind Critics argues that we can only gain substantial knowledge of the world through sensitivity and understanding. Very crudely, our ability to sense experience and concept formation cooperate so that we can form empirical judgments. The next big section, Transcendental Dialectics, destroys the mind's claim to give knowledge of the transcendent world, that is, the world that is revealed by feelings. Dialectical, says Kant, is the logic of illusion (A293): in his dictionary, the dialectical idea is empty or false. However, criticism of the pure mind should not be seen as destroying the cognitive role of the mind. Kant, of course, wants to distinguish between the boundaries of reason, but it is not the same as claiming that he plays no role in our knowledge. Three things are crucial: (No.1.1) the attitude of reason to empirical truth; (No.1.2) the role of reason in scientific investigation; and (1.3 euros) the positive benefits that come from assessing the limits of the mind. In addition, sound philosophical reasoning requires that the mind gain knowledge of itself - a task that the first Criticism begins, but does not complete (No1.4). 1.1 The reason as an arbiter of empirical truth The first thing to note is Kant's bold assertion that reason is the arbiter of truth in all judgments - empirical and metaphysical. Unfortunately, it barely develops this idea, and this issue has attracted surprisingly little attention in literature. (But cf. Walker 1989: Ch. 4; Guyer and Walker 1990; Kant's Theory of Judgment, No.1.3, 1.4). However, some of the main points are clear from the text. We make judgments about the world around us all the time, without a second thought. We see the hand before us and judge its existence, after sleep, we consider ourselves dreams, and the content of dreams is illusory; we see the sunrise and assume that it revolves around the Earth. Kant devotes great philosophical efforts to show that all these judgments are based on categories such as cause and effect, which should order our sensory impressions. Faith, which corresponds to these conditions, corresponds to the formal conditions of truth. However, if we are fundamentally confused about something, all our beliefs meet these conditions. So, there is another question: which of our beliefs are materially true, and which are wrong? In accordance with the fundamental priority he attributes to judgment, Kant begins by observing that only after there is a solution can there be a mistake: It is right to say that feelings are not wrong; but not because they always judge correctly, but because they don't judge at all (A293). For example, there is no error associated with sleep experiences, no matter how confusing or fantastic they may be. But if someone had to get confused in her dreams experience, and assume that it really happened, then she would make decisions and false too. So Kant argues that the error is made only through the undetected influence of sensitivity on the understanding through which occurs, that subjective basis of the decision to join the objective (A294). In this example, someone confuses the subjective ground of judgment (I had this dream) with objective (these events took place). As Kant says in Prolegomena: The difference between truth and dream... not decided the quality of views are called objects because they are the same in both, but through their communication according to the rules that determine the combination of representations in the concept of the object, and how far they may or may not stand together in the same experience. How does the mind come into business? In the famous Refutation of Idealism Kant says the following: Whether a particular meowy experience is not just imagination, not sleep, not delusion, etc., must be established in accordance with its specific definitions and through its consistency with the criteria of all real experience (B279). To find out what Kant means, let's take a simple example. Suppose our dreamer thinks she won the lottery, but then starts learning that faith. To solve her truth, she must ask how far she connects with her other judgments, and the judgments of others. If she can't connect (she checks the winning numbers, say, and doesn't see a match with her actual ticket), she must conclude that the belief was false. Otherwise, it would be contrary to the fundamental law of possible experience so that it could be united. As Kant sums up his position: The law of reason is necessary to seek unity, because without it we would have no reason, and without it there would be no consistent use of understanding, and without it, there is not enough sign of empirical truth... (A651/B679). In general, the material error separating from Kant's true cognition is that true knowledge must find a place in a single, one-to-one experience of the world. Since reason is an important source of unifying structure of experience, it is necessary as an arbiter of empirical truth. 1.2 The reason in science is the same principle of charred unity applied to judgments that are not always accepted on the basis of everyday experience. Why are we sure that the Sun does not revolve around the Earth, despite all appearances? To answer such questions, we must take into account the role of reason in scientific knowledge. Kant argues that the reason lies in the origin of certain concepts and principles (A299/B355), regardless of sensuality and understanding. Kant calls them transcendent ideas (A311/B368) or pure cause ideas (A669/B697). And now he defines reason as the Faculty of Principles (A299/B356) or The Faculty of Unity of The Rules of Understanding by Principles (A303/B358). The problem is how to justify these concepts and principles. This problem is acute because Kant also claims that they often lead us to mistakes and contradictions. Aside from ideas about objects that lie beyond sensory experience, such as God or soul, we also form transcendental ideas about faces that are designed to form the ultimate foundation of everything that exists, such as the universe as a whole: Kant speaks of the whole world or Ideas. As mentioned at the time (No. 1.3), claims to objective knowledge about these cosmological ideas, such as the assertion that the universe has a beginning in time or the opposite assertion that this is not the case, lead us to contradictions or antinomies. However, science assumes that the world is forming an orderly, systematic unity in which all events can be incorporated into cause-and-effect laws. As mentioned only, we rely on the basic version of this principle when we judge that some impressions are illusions or dreams. It should also be clear that, however concerted our experience may be, they will inevitably be finite in scope. That is, we could never have experienced enough to justify this seemingly cosmological assertion that every object and event complies with causal laws, let alone that these laws will continue to be enacted in the future. However, Kant argues that reason is justified in accepting these principles (among others) as long as it does not view them as requirements of knowledge. This is his distinction between the constituent and regulatory use of ideas. (See, for example, Buchdal 1992; Friedman 1992c; Kant's Theory of Judgment, No.4.2.) For Kant, the composite use of our faculties helps to compose objects of knowledge, ensuring their form as objects of possible experience. Thus, the founding principles have a strong objective status - a matter of paradigm, which is a category of understanding. Regulatory principles, on the other hand, regulate our theoretical activities, but do not provide (composing) guarantees for objects that are under investigation. As Kant says, activity should have purpose if they do not degenerate into just random touch (bvii, A834/B862). Science seeks to detect the maximum possible completeness and systemicity (Wed. Geyer 1989 and 2006, Abela 2006, Mudd 2017), subsubson objects and events in accordance with the most comprehensive laws. When Kant speaks of the unity of reason in the first criticism, he means that reason gives unity a priori through the notions of diversity of knowledge

(A302/B359; cf. A665/B693, A680/B780). As indicated, this unity must be a priori, since it cannot be given through any set of experience. Nor can we know in advance how far science will succeed, or that nature is completely similar to the law. Thus, the principle of the search for unity forms (what Kant calls) the maxim or regulating principle of reason (A666/B694; see Mudd 2016 for a recent discussion of this principle and its practical nature). In contrast, the assertion that such unity exists would be a founding principle, a kind of cosmological knowledge that we cannot justify. Our judgment that the Earth revolves around the Sun (rather than gives a simple illustration. The opposite statement seems more convincing to common sense, and consistency in observations is usually enough to confirm the confirmation Knowledge. But scientific knowledge strives for a legal-similar completeness. It's not just that Galileo's observations with the telescope show that everyday performances are misleading. What matters to Kant is how the mind combines these observations through the laws of gravity, momentum, and so on. Compass movement of all celestial objects, not just the movement of the sun in relation to the earth, Newton provides proper confirmation of the heliocentric hypothesis copernicus (Bxiii n; cf. No. 1.4 below). The expansion and change of Newton's laws by the general theory of relativity provides one of the signs of the open, regulating nature of this aspiration; so does the as-yet unsatisfied ambitions to integrate general relativity with quantum mechanics. Kant's story about science, and especially about the role of teleological or directorial judgment, further develops in the Criticism of the Court. See Geyer 1990, Freudiger 1996, and Nuzzo 2005, as well as Kant's aesthetics and teleology. No. On Kant's account of science as a whole, see Vartenberg 1992, Buchdahl 1992, Friedman 1992b and 2013, and Breitenbach (upcoming). On Mind and Science, see Neumann 1994: Ch. 2 and Griener 2001: Ch. 8. Kant's philosophy of science examines Kant's view of science, especially physics. 1.3 The Limits of Reason The Third Paragraph is best known, and is detailed in the record on Kant's criticism of metaphysics. Kant destroys a number of supposed evidences of the existence of God (The Ideal of Pure Mind) and Soul (Paralogisms). It also demonstrates that it is equally possible to prove some judgments about the world as a whole, as it is to prove their opposites, such as the claim that space should be unlimited and that it should be limited (Antinomia, including the idea of the absolutely first cause: the problem of freedom, as is put in the famous Third Antinomia). These sections have always been seen as one of the most compelling parts of the first critique. Mendelssohn spoke from many of Kant's contemporaries, calling him the all-destructive, for devastating reasons, pretentious transcendental insight. By placing these limits on metaphysical knowledge, Kant's intentions are not simply destructive. Exercise not only gives self-knowledge of the mind (No1.4); in addition, Kant believes that the inability of metaphysics to create safe soul, as far as we may know, has been more destructive than any criticism. In the hands of theologians and metaphysics, the mind argued that the knowledge it could not have, leading to empty battles that elicit outright skepticism. On the contrary, Kant's criticism is aimed at clearing the ground for rational assertions that can be justified. These include both the claims discussed in No.1.1 and No.1.2 above, and the practical reason discussed below at No. 2. (Gava and Vilaseck usefully emphasize this aspect of the first critique.) At the beginning of the Method Doctrine (the last, least read part of the first Critique), Kant refers to the biblical history of Babylon. God punished the attempt to build a tower that will reach the heavens (A707/B735) with a confusion of languages, leaving people unable to understand each other and unable to cooperate in such unspurious endeavors. Again and again, the mind returns to some very simple ideas with great consequences - the immortal soul, God, freedom; moreover, it prepares more or less convincing evidence of this. Without acidic validation of the experience of the general world, people are bound to come up with conflicting versions of these ideas (if perhaps they empty each other's words without real understanding). Then they will either talk to each other, or fall into conflict, or, one of Kant's constant fears, will be forced to submit to unreasonable power. In metaphysics, Kant refers to the ridiculous despotism of schools (Bxxxv). However, when we turn to the practical sphere, despotism is far from laughable: it is the last, brutal step to ensure the coexistence of people who insist on contradictory doctrines. Thus Kant often refers to Hobbes, on the order of the theory that only possible if unaccountable sovereign overrules all members of society. Saner 1967, O'Neill 1989, and Neumann 1994 all offer interpretations that see the Kantian mind as providing intersubjective order and overcoming the threats of Babylonian arrogance, conflict and despotism. One of the most famous lines of the first critique takes place in the foreword of the second edition, where Kant says: I had to deny knowledge to make room for faith (Bxxx). Knowing the world as a whole or entities that transcend this world (the immortal soul or God) is not humanly possible: it is impossible through experience, and the mind has no power to deliver knowledge in its place. However, as stated in No. 1.2, Kant argues that science has the right to rely on certain principles that govern its design without being known as objects. In the final section of the Critique, Kant argues that knowledge is not the only or even the main end of reason: in practical use, reason examines our role in the world. This is how Kant describes his concept of philosophy as cosmic (Ein Veltgegriff, literally a world concept), rather than scholastic (A838/B866; cf. Ypi 2013 and Ferrarin 2015). In keeping with this concept, Kant offers three questions that meet all the interests of my mind: What can I know? What should I do? And what can I hope for? (A805/B833). We saw his answer to the first question: I may know this world as shown through feelings, but I can't know amount of everything that exists, no world beyond this (supersensitive world). Kant does not answer the second question until the basis of metaphysics of morality, four years later. (Perhaps he doesn't see the need to answer this question in this form, as he's sure people have known for a long time what their responsibilities are. We certainly fall into error if we think the mind can know the world beyond the senses. Kant develops this requirement systematically in the second criticism, as summarized below (No2.3). Kant's idea that the mind has interests or even needs may seem strange, and is discussed by Kleingeld 1998a and Ferrarin 2015: Ch. 1. For finite beings, the mind is not given by consciousness transparently or infallible (as some rationalist philosophers seemed to think), just as it cannot deliver transcendental truths. Thus, the mind must imagine itself in the process of getting clarity about his own work (Kleingeld 1998a: 97) - above all, the principles that it must give itself. As the next section says, this means that Kant views the mind as essentially self-reflexive. 1.4 Self-knowledge of Reason First criticism claims that so far there has been no real progress in metaphysics. In the second edition of Preface, Kant proudly proclaims that his book finally put metaphysics on the right path of science (Bvii; cf. Axiom). What, then, is the attitude of metaphysics or philosophical reasoning more generally to those areas of human query that seem to generate certainty (geometry and mathematics) and the expansion of knowledge (science in general)? Kant has long insisted that mathematics cannot provide any model for philosophy. Mathematics gives the most brilliant example of pure intelligence, happily expanding itself without the help of experience (A712/B740). But metaphysics can't follow its course. This is not just a rhetorical moment, as many of Kant's predecessors tried to do just that - Spinoz's ethics are one example, Christian Wolf's philosophy is another (see Upcoming). Kant's main argument against such efforts is that mathematicians are justified in constructing objects or a priori axiom, because they can work with pure intuition (albeit very abstract: lines or forms of a triangle, say), rather than being limited to analyzing concepts alone. (See Kant's philosophy record Such a procedure is not available to philosophers who do not have the right to a priori assume any a priori intuition or axiom about metaphysical entities. Attempts to build on such claims have only produced so many house of cards (A727/B755). But if mathematics is not a model for genuine scientific metaphysics, the link between metaphysics and empirical sciences is also unpromising. First, Kant argues that experience cannot reveal metaphysical entities. We could never have known, for example, that we are free: like everything else that we can know, human behavior is in principle open to a full definition of a causal explanation. Second, experience cannot generate such a need Kant is associated with metaphysical findings. (This is a long-standing bone of contention between the Humey and Cantian accounts of knowledge, for example, regarding cause and effect. That is, our study of the world, however systematic or scientific, only reveals conventional facts: it cannot show that it should be. To say that scientific laws have the quality of necessity, so they are indeed laws, not just generalizations or rules of the thumb is a metaphysical statement, not an empirical statement. None of the point, however, deters Kant from using images of science and experimentation to describe his own philosophical endeavors. Such metaphors are particularly evident in the foreword to the second edition of the Critique, where he writes: Mind, in order to reach by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, under which the agreement between speeches can be considered laws, and, on the other hand, the experiment is thought out in accordance with these principles, in order to be instructed by nature not as a disciple who read to him all that the teacher wants to say, but as an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he poses to them. (Bxiii) No, no, no. In other words, the mind, like a self-appointed judge, doesn't sit and just watch what comes. It actively offers principled reports on the phenomenon under study, i.e. legal hypotheses. He then develops experiments to confirm or disprove these. As a characteristic of philosophical reasoning, this encourages Kant to be optimistic, but it can puzzle his readers. Kant is optimistic, because philosophy should explore not the infinite scale of the empirical world, but rather what mind puts completely out of itself ... once the general principle has been discovered (Axx). (One of the uses of this idea is in the Transcendental Dialectics of the First Critic, where Kant insists that there are only three transcendental ideas - a thinking subject, a world in general, and a being of all beings - so that one can exhaustive illusion, to what reason is subject.) But there is also plenty of room for bewilderment. Kant suggests that the reason to conduct an experiment on yourself is an idea that approaches the paradox. It also suggests that the cause has a general principle, but nowhere in the first criticism does it explain what it is. How Kant's experiment functions with respect to our everyday knowledge is well known. His hypothesis of Copernicus (Bxvi f) is that experience regarding the point of view and capabilities of the observer. Only on this basis, Kant argues, can we find an explanation for the a priori structure of this experience (e.g., its temporality or cause-and-effect relationship). The alternative is that we take a unified point of view and do not distinguish between objects of experience and those that are just thoughts ... beyond experience (i.e. things in themselves) fails because it leads to an inevitable conflict of reason with oneself (Bxvii n) - for example, in the antimony mentioned above (No. 1.3). Kant argues that the inability to separate visibility (everyday elements of experience) from things within ourselves (metaphysical entities that lie beyond experience) leads us to starkly contradictory conclusions. However, this still leaves uncomfortable questions about philosophical knowledge, and reasoning in general. Kant's philosophical task is not only to forced sensitivity and the understanding of acting as witnesses: the mind faces its own tribunal and must take into account itself. (This metaphor explored by Stoddard in 1988; Kant's legal and political metaphors play the central philosophical role of Saner in 1967 and O'Neill in 1989.) When reason decides to act as a judge and jury in its own case, how can we expect the results to withstand scrutiny? Section 3 examines the most thorough answer to this question in the literature proposed by Onura O'Neill. To anticipate briefly: The common problem hinted at the metaphors of the Kant-experiment mind on itself, or want to give yourself evidence of it is self-knowledge of reason (p. Axi f). Kant suggests that we have the capacity to reason; but mind provides respect only to those who have been able to withstand its free and public examination (Axi n). Therefore, we cannot dogmatically assert the authority of this ability: mind... has no dictatorial powers (A738/B766). This point is particularly compelling, given how an extraordinary mind has turned out to be in metaphysics: How few reasons should we trust our cause, if in one of the most important parts of our desire for knowledge it not only leave us, but even seduces us with delusions and eventually betrays us! (Bxv). Kant's question, then, is how we could protect the mind from various doubts and how we could discipline it without begging questions - for example, referring to claims or premises that are themselves open to doubt (Mr. O'Neill 1989: C. 1, 1992, 2004 and 2015). This is the central task of the critic (bxxxv): a self-reflexive examination of the mind about itself, which sets its limits and its general principle, and justifies its power. 2. Practical reason: morality and primacy of pure practical reason In the first criticism there are only hints as to the form of Kant's moral theory. The story of the practical reason at the heart of the metaphysics of morality (1785) and The Critique of Practical Mind (1788) is radically new. Kant now claims to have discovered the supreme principle of practical reason, which he calls a categorical imperative. (More precisely, this principle is an imperative for finite beings like us who have needs and inclinations and are not perfectly rational.) It is noteworthy that Kant proposes several different formulations of this principle, the first of which works as follows: to act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time be that it will become a universal law (4:421). (According to various versions of the Imperative, which Kant claims are equivalent, see Kant's moral philosophy, No.5-9.) Kant considers this principle implicit in the common human mind: when we make moral judgments, we rely on this criterion, although invariably we do not formulate it as such. The categorical imperative is not the only principle of practical reason that Kant supports. Almost at the same level of generality is the principle underlying all hypothetical imperatives. (See Kant's Moral Philosophy, No.4.) The imperatives of mastery and prudence are based on the principle: Whoever is at the end will also be (because the mind has a decisive influence on his actions) the indispensable necessary means for him to be in his power (4:417; cf. 5:19f). Following Hume, many philosophers believe that practical thinking is essentially important. Therefore, they see all practical requirements as ultimately hypothetical, that is, provided that we have specific goals or inclinations (p. Kant and Hume on morality, No. 3). Kant, however, considers the principle of hypothetical imperatives to subordinate to the categorical imperative (Wed. Korsgaard 1997). Reason can also be a source of unconditional requirements, i.e. requirements that do not involve any specific goals or inclinations. Kant's claims can be made even stronger: reason is the only source of unconditional demands that people can ever have access to. 2.1 Freedom implies a moral limitation in the form of a categorical imperative, along with the conclusion of its highest moral principle, the most difficult questions about Kant's view of the reasonable center on his attitude to freedom. While the widest successively, Kant's views on the subject seem to be changing more than usual through his critical writings. (See Kant's moral philosophy, No.10, for a brief sketch, and Allison's 1990 for a masterful, though not indisputable, score.) This and the next sub-charge focus on Kant's central, radical assertion that freedom and unconditional practical law, that is, for any finie, a categorical imperative mutually implies each other (5:29f). On the one hand, freedom implies that practical reason can be pure (not instrumental, unconditional), and therefore that we are subject to the requirements of a categorical imperative. On the other hand, our belittling of morality means that we must be free. Kant's argument from freedom to categorical imperative is indeed very short (see Criticism of practical reason, 5:19-30). If I am free to move away from all inclinations, these inclinations do not give a good reason to act in any particular way. All that is left to determine my mode of action (my maxim, in Kant's terminology) is a simple form of granting universal law (5:27). On a simple form ... Kant's law means that there has to be some principle, some common policy or structure that determines what I do, otherwise my actions would be just random, and therefore incomprehensible: no one will be able to follow them (even me). Moreover, no principle is truly the law unless it is abstracted from the agent's specific motives and situation in order to be followed by everything. Only then will she be able to give a universal law. Although Kant sometimes writes as if it was difficult to understand what practical reasons requires (for example, in his comments about practical wisdom: No. 3.2 below), he usually assumes that everyone easily understands the basic principles that all can follow. That is, he is surprised at the ability of people to independent moral understanding. In recent literature, there is some consensus that Kant has not recognized the complexity and complexity of moral reasoning (Mr. Herman 1993: Ch. 4 and 2007; O'Neill 1996). But judging by what a categorical imperative requires, we face serious difficulties only if Kant properly justifies it. Specifically, his equation of simple legal likeness with principles that everyone can follow may seem too fast. To see what Kant means, it helps to consider some other principles that may seem stable or legal, but go beyond a simple form of law - and thus cannot be justified. To illustrate, take two of the six candidates he discusses in the second critique (5:39f). One possibility would be for politics to follow my inclinations wherever they lead (Kant defines point of view with Epicurus). It's kind of a policy, and really one that a free agent can take. But it goes beyond the form of law, taking substantial instructions from subjective factors. In doing so, he renounces the legal type and inter-subjective credibility. Aside from the fact that my inclinations will certainly change and clash, this is not a policy that anyone can follow: if they did, the results would be chaotic and defeat anyone's attempts to satisfy their inclinations. (That is, it's not universal in the sense that it leads to a contradiction in the will. More abstractly, this policy gives weight to the specific conditions of one particular agent. But these conditions can hardly claim the power to direct the thoughts or actions of others. So, Kant says: it is necessary that the law of reason that it should presuppose only himself, because the rule objectively and universally acts only when it holds without a contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another. (5:21) The second possibility - in some respects, the inversion of the previous one - would be to ignore my own inclinations and obey the dictates of another, or perhaps the laws and customs of my community. Kant mentions Mendeville, but Hobbs' decision on the state of nature offers a more familiar example. This requires that everyone obey a single sovereign, and not sue himself what he should do. There are many problems with this decision, but for Kant the most fundamental is that obey another dictate to waive the requirement that these dictates be justified in turn. However, benevolent or enlightened authority, its instructions would be unjustified in the fundamental sense that the causes are no longer relevant to those who represent. (Of course one might imagine, because one might find power justified. There is a common difficulty underlying all the failed alternatives Kant believes. They seek substantial guidance from outside the mind itself - just as hypothetical imperatives only direct action if an end is taken for granted. Kant calls this heteronomy, that is, reasoning directed from the outside, a power that is simply assumed or imposed. The challenge is to find ways of action and thinking that are authoritative, that is, have the right to direct the actions and thinking of everyone. To get this right, they must be autonomous, that is not to depend on a body that itself excuse. Kant's ban to look at the very form of the law at first does not seem to provide provide at all, and often reproached on that basis. Kant's ethics advocates argue that it represents a significant limitation: avoid all the ways of thinking and acting that everyone cannot follow. (For discussion see in particular O'Neill 1989: Ch. 5; Herman 1993; Allison 1990: Ch. 10 II.) If so, the autonomy of reason may indicate a positive sense of freedom underlying Kant's practical philosophy (Brand 1979). It is an opportunity to act in a way that does not rely on contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another (5:21), and therefore do not fall under the other people's demands of justification. 2.2 As moral limitation implies freedom: the fact of Kant's reason In addition to asserting that freedom implies the subject is a categorical imperative, Kant also believes that moral obligation implies freedom. Throughout the critical writings, Kant argues that nothing in appearance can be explained by the concept of freedom (5:30). Therefore, he often insists that morality exists in a reasonable world (a world known through feelings and science) but without breaking its laws (5:43). Every action, considered an event in the world of visibility, should be considered as caused (whether we think of explanations, data from neuroscience or physics or perhaps even psychology). Thus, the experience of objective peace does not give us any orders for freedom. Instead, it is to our consciousness or subjectivity that Kant addresses: ask if his prince demanded pain... immediate execution that he gives false testimony against an honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy under a plausible pretext, he will find it possible to overcome his love of life ... Perhaps he would not dare to say whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without hesitation that it would have been possible for him. Therefore, he believes that he can do something, because he knows that he must do it, and learns freedom within himself, which without moral right would remain unknown to him. (5:30; cf. 5:155f) As Kant says, the moral law, and with it the practical mind, came and forced us to this concept (5:30). In the following section, Kant introduces this idea in notorious terms, as the fact of reason: Consciousness of this fundamental law can be called a fact of reason, because it cannot be discussed from the preceding data of the mind (5:31; cf. 5: 6, 42f, 47, 55, 91, 104). This fact has caused considerable controversy among commentators. This is partly because Kant is not entirely clear that he is taking this fact to demonstrate. This is also because he has repeatedly argued that morality cannot be based on facts about people, and must be identified a priori, regardless of experience. (In this importantly, Kant also uses the Latin word factum, meaning the case. In other words, we are dealing with an act of reason and its result, not just a fact. See Kleingeld 2010.) Moreover, Kant speaks of the knowledge of moral law when he is well aware that no author before him has formulated this law the way he did. The final source of the difficulty is that this fact, as it was not in its previous treatise, the Basics, and does not appear again. One school of thought - which includes many influential Kant scholars, and is sympathetically represented in Allison's 1990 (Chs. 12 and 13) - sees a fundamental change in Kant's thoughts here. While Part III of the Basic seems to give a deduction (justification) of freedom, in the second criticism Kant sees that this project is impossible on his own premises. Thus, he stops the argument short, appealing to the supposedly irresistible fact. Others emphasize the clear continuity between the two works, in particular Kant's constant dependence on general moral consciousness. For example, the 1993 zukov emphasizes the parallel between the role played by Akhtung (respect or respect for morality) and the fact of reason. Kant refers to reverence in all his ethical writings: it is the only sense of self-perception caused by a rational notion (moral law) (4:401n). So he clearly parallels what he now calls the only fact of pure reason (5:31). (See also O'Neill 2002 and Timmermann 2010.) There are serious difficulties in this scientific dispute. But Kant's line of thought in the long passage, just quoted, is relatively clear: we all (most of us) recognize that there are situations where we have to do something, even if it costs us something that is very dear to us (i.e. we feel like the object of an unconditional moral imperative). As far as we really recognize this ought, we pledge to believe that it will be possible for us to do so (i.e. that we are free). This shows something that we could hardly be sure of, except through this encounter with our own activities of moral reasoning (Wed. Kleingeld 2010). Obviously, this line of thought is not immune from criticism. Our sense of moral limitation can be explained from the point of view of the Freudian super-ego, for example. But it allows us to understand why Kant thought that moral awareness, unlike any other experience, gives us practical confidence in our freedom, being a fact in which pure reason in us is actually practical (5:42). (Practical certainty, because it is not knowledge of the same kind as empirical and scientific knowledge.) At the same time, if Kant is right that only a categorical imperative shows the ways of action that we can justify to others, then we can understand why he claims freedom and the law mutually implies each other (5:29f). 2.3 The primacy of Kant's practical reason does not give full consideration of the practical cause relationship to the theoretical reason in Groundwork or any later works. However, the second criticism includes an important section that bears on this issue: On the primacy of pure practical reason in relation to speculative reason (5:119-121). (See Gardner 2006 and Willaschek 2010.) At the very general level, the notion of Kant's autonomy already implied some kind of primacy for purely practical reasons. Against the various bands of rationalism, Kant denies that the theoretical reason may have any idea of the supersensitive. Thus, the mind has no access to transcendental power that can give commands for thought or action. Against Hume, Kant denies the regulatory power of inclination. These points exclude the only ways in which theoretical or instrumental reasoning can give authoritative grounds to act. If there are such reasons as the fact of reason pronounces, then there is only a pure practical reason to supply them. Now, however, Kant argues that pure practical reason has primacy even on the home field of theoretical reason. That is, pure practical reason should guide some of our beliefs as well as our actions. Kant defines the primacy as the prerogative of one's interests, because the interests of others are subordinate to him (5:119). It gives two reasons to think that the practical reason has this prerogative. First, the practical reason may be pure or independent of pathological states, that is, our inclinations. So it is not caused by anything else, for example, the desire for happiness or subjective desires. In other words, the (clean) practical reason does not depend on our inclinations. Theoretical reasons, on the other hand, fall into error if they assert independence from getting rid of sensuality and understanding, for example, in an attempt to prove the existence of God. Secondly, Kant argues that we cannot leave the issue of primate unresolved because the practical causes otherwise conflict with the theoretical cause. The interest of the theoretical reason is to expand our knowledge and avoid mistakes, which means suspending all claims to knowledge beyond experience. However, since the theoretical cause has interests at all, this is in itself a practical issue, since all interests are ultimately practical. So, Kant writes: But if pure cause itself can be and indeed practical, since the consciousness of the moral law proves that it is cf. 2.2 on the fact of reason, then it is still only the same reason, which, whether from a theoretical or practical point of view, judges in accordance with a priori principles; then it's clear that even from the first theoretical theoretical his ability does not extend to the establishment of certain sentences (e.g. the existence of God) in the affirmative, although they do not contradict him, once these same sentences are inextricably linked to the practical interests of the pure mind, he must accept them. (5:121) Kant's main claim is not implausible prima facie - all interests are ultimately practical and even speculative reasons are only conditional and are complete only in practical use (5:121). But what he means by that, for sure, is a difficult question of interpretation. (Cf. Neiman 1994: Ch. 3; Geyer 1997; Rauscher 1998.) Moreover, the use to which Kant puts this argument is as debatable as any question in his philosophy, as he is restored here - as objects of faith rather than knowledge - the very ideas that the first critic claimed to lie beyond human comprehension. (See below for a note on Kant's philosophy of religion.) To this end, Kant introduces the idea of a postulate defined as theoretical proposal, although not obvious as such, as it is inextricably linked to a priori unreservedly valid practical law (5:122). These postulates are those immortality, freedom is viewed positively (as causality of being because it belongs to an understandable world), and the existence of God (5:132). The law to which they are attached is, of course, a moral law. He instructs us to act for the sake of duty, without guarantee that something will follow for the sake of our own happiness or the happiness of others. This creates a dialectic or conflict between happiness and morality. Although morality for Kant is the only unconditional good for man, he certainly does not deny that happiness is an important good, and in fact a natural and necessary end of each person (see 4:415). This leads him to the notion of the higher good: virtue (as dignity to be happy) is the ultimate condition of what may even seem desirable to us and therefore all our pursuit of happiness ... and is therefore the ultimate good. But it is not a whole and a complete boon for the ultimate rational beings; for this, happiness is also required, and that not only in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself the end, but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, in other words, this question does not include a subjective judgment about whether I want to be happy, but an objective judgment that happiness is a natural end for man, just as good is our moral end. happiness, distributed in an exact proportion to morality (as a person's value and his dignity to be happy) represents the highest good of a possible world. (5:110) Kant's argument is bold but questionable. He believes that we should think about moral activity as it really leads to happiness. However, the human agency is far away to this task: I (or even we) cannot hope for this higher good except for the harmony of my will with the consent of the holy and reverent author of the world (5:129). So, Kant argues, we must postulate the existence of God. We must also postulate immortality, because it allows us to hope that we will move closer to virtue in order to be worthy of happiness. (Reit 1988 argues that Kant sometimes also deploys a more justified, secular or this world, the notion of the higher good. Further recent discussion includes Kleingeld 1995 and Geyer 2000a and 2000b.) 3. Unity of theoretical and practical reason We have seen one way in which Kant links theoretical and practical reasons. In response to the question: What can I hope for? Kant refers to the primacy of the practical mind, so that the theoretical reason can accept the postulates of God, freedom, and immortality as a foreign possession transferred to him (5:120). While Kant's argument about freedom may be more persuasive, other arguments find little favour among contemporary authors, although they have been accepted in some comments to Kant's account of teleology (as in The Court's Criticism (Guyer 1989, Freudiger 1996; see also Kant's aesthetics and teleology, No.3) and beyond this work (Wood 1970, Kleingeld 1998). Jens Timmermann, for example, emphasizes that Kant never doubted that the practical and theoretical reason represents the same faculty, and trenchantly argues that the principle that unites the realms of theoretical and practical reason ... is the assumption of a wise and benevolent God who created a teleological world that is connected with morality (2009: 197; cf. Kleingeld 1998b: 336). However, whatever Kant's own beliefs, this position has no broader philosophical resonance. Most modern philosophers suggest that in this way the world is not harmonized with morality - or, in any case, that the creation of such harmony is a human task, not a matter of divine will. (Again, cf. reath 1988, and see also Guyer 2000b and 2006.) The main attempt to reveal the unity of the Kantian mind and connect it with modern philosophical problems is connected with Onora O'Neill (1989 and subsequent essays). This section will focus on its central assertion of the unifying role of the categorical imperative and the main grounds for this assertion in Kant's texts. Although O'Neill's interpretation of the Kantian mind is highly respected among Kant scholars, it should be added that it has not yet attracted significant critical literature. (Among the early reviews see Engstrom 1992 and Wood 1992; for recent approval and re-bistro, see Korsgaard 2008: 12 and Westphal 2011.) General Principle of Reason in the original preface to the first criticism, Kant raised the idea of a common principle Nothing here can run away from us, what causes the whole thing cannot be hidden, but the mind itself is brought to light once the general principle of reason (gemeinschaftliches Prinzip) has been discovered (Axx). Unfortunately, none of the critics' publications considers what this principle might be. This question is raised in the works for practical reasons, but then postponed and never answered clearly. In the foreword to Basic, Kant explains why the book is not entitled Criticism of Pure Practical Reason: Criticism of Pure Practical Reason is not such an extreme necessity as criticism of a purely theoretical mind because in moral matters the human mind can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and achievement, even in the most general sense, while in its theoretical but pure use it is entirely ideological. I demand that the criticism of pure practical reason, if it is to be carried out in its entirety, be able, at the same time, to present the unity of practical with the speculative mind in the general principle, since in the end there can be only the same reason, which should be discerned only in its application. (4:391) In the second critique, Kant compares the structure of the book with the first criticism and comments: Such comparisons are encouraging; for they will rightly curb the expectation that one day they will be able to achieve an understanding of the unity of the entire rational faculty (both theoretical and practical) and extract everything from one principle: the undeniable necessity of the human mind, which finds complete satisfaction only in the complete systematic unity of its knowledge (5:91). Tone Kanta is sure, but the fact is that understanding the unity of the whole rational faculty has been postponed again. (Prauss 1981 argues that Kant failed to achieve this understanding, in part because he did not appreciate how cognitive success is a fundamentally practical goal. However, as Onora O'Neill points out in the famous essay (1989: Ch. 1), Kant's claim is being made about the practical reasons to actually commit his third claim against reason general principle. Kant argues that a categorical imperative is the highest principle of practical reason. He also argued that the practical cause has superiority over the theoretical cause. It follows that a categorical imperative is the highest principle of reason.-Of course, Kant never expresses this conclusion directly. But there is reason to believe that this was his view, and in some places he is very close to such an assertion. (Rescher 2000 (Ch. 9) also emphasizes the isomorphism of a theoretical and practical cause. Rauscher 1998 notes that Kant's own use practical reasons is more limited than O'Neill's, while endorsing O'Neill's overall case.) Direct text evidence to read O'Neill is insignificant. The clearest passage is a footnote (I) to Kant's essay What is it to navigate thinking? (1786): Using your own cause means nothing more than asking yourself when someone should assume something, whether it is appropriate to make a land or a rule on which it is assumed that it is a universal principle of the use of reason. (8:146n) The parallel with the first formulation of the categorical imperative - to act only in accordance with the maxim with which it is possible at the same time that it will become a universal law (4:421) - hardly needs to be written. Kant now says: think only in accordance with this maxim, which can be a universal law. In different ways: thinking is an activity, and if the categorical imperative is really categorical, then this applies to all our activities. Other areas of Kant's thought also support this interpretation. The most attention was drawn to Kant's maxims of common human understanding and his famous story about the public use of reason. 3.2 In the maxims of common human understanding, Kant outlines three maxims of common human understanding that are closely related to the categorical imperative. They appear twice in his published works, in relation to both acting and thinking. Maxims discussed by O'Neill 1989: Ch. 2 and 1992, and Neumann 1994: Ch. 5. In his latest published work, Anthropology, Kant presents maxims in a practical context, as guidelines for achieving a certain degree of wisdom: Wisdom, as the idea of practical use of reason that perfectly corresponds to the law (or: perfectly law-like-gesetz'm'g-vollkommen), is undoubtedly too much to demand from man. But also, even the slightest degree of wisdom cannot be poured into man by others; and he has to make him out of himself. The commandment to achieve it contains three leading maxims: (1) Think for yourself, (2) Think of the place of another person (in communication with people), (3) Always think consistently with yourself. (7:200; cf. 2:28f) Maxims also appear in the Criticism of the Court, where they are closely related to the theoretical use of reason. This happens in a well-known section about the sensus of communism or community sense, which Kant describes as: faculty to evaluate that ... takes into account (a priori) the way everyone else is presented in thought, in order to, as it was to hold its judgment up to the human mind as a whole and thus avoid the illusion, which, from subjective private conditions that can be easily considered objective, will have detrimental effects on judgment. (5:293) That is, the maxims are judge according to the mind as a whole and avoid distortions that may arise from subjective private conditions. To think for himself Kant describes as a maxim of unbiased thought; its opposite is passivity or heteronomy in thought, leading to prejudice and superstition. To think in the place of everyone else is the maxim of extended or broad thought. And always thinking according to yourself is the maxim of consistent thought (5:294). Although the latter maxim sounds more simple, Kant carefully emphasizes its complexity: it can only be achieved by combining the first two and after frequent compliance they made them automatic (5:295). Consistency is not only about getting rid of obvious contradictions in our obvious beliefs. It also requires coherence with all the consequences of our beliefs, and they are often not obvious to us. Achieving this kind of legality in thought depends both on a genuine attempt to judge for oneself and on the determination to subject one's judgment to the attention of others. In other words, it includes, first, as a true author of his judgments, and secondly, as accountable to others. As we might also say, it represents a determination to take responsibility for its judgments. Maxims support the thesis that theoretical and practical reasoning has a single structure, and will specify the consequences of a categorical imperative. To think, to reason is to discipline one's judgment so that others can follow them. 3.3 Public use of reason and the importance of communicating Kant's famous essay What is enlightenment? (1784), is of particular importance to commentators concerned about Kantian reason and politics. (See O'Neill 1989: Ch. 2, 1990 and 2015: Ch. 3; Welkley 1989; Deljorgi 2005; Patrone 2008.) Kant's second maxim, thinking in the place of others, shows that he believes communication is necessary to make valid judgments and act wisely and well. So Kant writes: ... how much and how right we would think if we did not communicate with other people with whom we communicate and communicate with us! Kant also describes the first maxim as a way to achieve liberation from superstitions, which he equates to enlightenment (5:294). What is The Enlightenment? Kant formulates both of these thoughts in a political context, demanding that we have the courage to use our own mind: Enlightenment is the appearance of man from his own immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This is self-inverter, if its cause is not a lack of understanding, but a lack of permission and courage to use it without the guidance of another. Sapere ood! Don't fight to be wise! thus, the motto of enlightenment. (8:35) Here Kant is not primarily concerned with enlightenment as an activity or condition of the individual, but rather as something to which people should work together. To do this, he said, nothing is required, but ... Least harmful ... freedom, namely the freedom to use one's cause publicly in all matters (8:36). It's not freedom to act politically. Instead, this is what we now call the freedom of the pen, according to Kant, the use of reason as a scientist in front of the entire public of the reader's world (8:37). Kant's contrast with the reasoning that someone takes over as an employee: as a civil servant or military officer or clergyman of an established church. In each case, the employee is required to comply with the dictates of the manager or organization, at least as long as he or she or she or she or she can hold office (8:38). In doing so, he uses his mind to decide how best to achieve the goals that others have set. (There is a loose parallel with instrumental reasoning that decides the best means to achieve the goals outlined by the tilt. Although this kind of reasoning is often made in what we now call public services, such as as a public servant, Kant describes such use of reason as private, that is, deprived of liberty and accountable only to a particular authority. On the contrary, the public use of reason is not associated with any purpose and is accountable to all: a person speaks as a member of the society of the citizens of the world (8:37). Outside of his office, as he shares with all other people, a public servant or clergyman can reason freely, offering critical control of public policy or religious teachings. However, he must continue to accept them in his employment as a passive member (8:37) of the commonwealth. Some commentators consider Kant's emphasis on pen freedom elitist and regret his emphasis on the importance of obedience. (See also Kant's social and political philosophy, No. 4, 6.) Taken together, these two points imply a clear gap between practical and theoretical, or at least between what citizens do and what they believe needs to be done. However, the essay is clear as Kant equates reason with the pursuit of full publicity. To use your own cause is to search for all citizens of the world. Our judgments and principles are reasonable only to the extent that they can be accepted by all. Among other things, this means that they take over the authority of any particular organization or manager. In fact, Kant has already said this, in a famous passage from the critique of pure reason: Mind must subject itself to criticism in all its endeavors, and cannot restrict the freedom of criticism through any prohibition without hurting itself and relying on itself for unfavorable suspicions. For there is nothing so important because of its usefulness, nothing so sacred that it can be exempt from this search review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons, i.e. does not recognize any person as carrying more authority than any other-GW. This freedom is the very existence of a mind that has no dictatorial powers, but whose claims are never more than the consent of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express its reservations, and even its veto power, without restraining. (A738f/B766f, translation slightly modified) In the term used by several modern Cantians (Herman 2007: Ch. 10, Korsgaard 2008, Reath 2013), this procedure is mind. This makes the cause the only unconditional (i.e. non-hetheron) form of power for our thinking and action. 4. Kant's concluding remarks on theoretical reasons are obviously not related to his account of practical causes. His stories about truth, scientific method and limited understanding of the theoretical mind are as complex as his view of practical reason and morality. No one doubts that knowledge and scientific research, no less than action, are subject to the requirements of rationality. However, if Kant's story of reason is based, as O'Neill argues, above all, in avoiding the principles of investigation and actions that others also cannot accept, one could see the underlying unity of these demands. We would understand, for example, why Kant is so strenuously resisting claims of transcendental understanding. It would be irrational to give power to such statements, such as revelations and religious authority, because they are based on principles of faith that cannot be accepted by all. At the heart of the complexity of synthesis and interpretation of Kant's account of reason is of course a huge question about what the reason is. Many philosophers, both modern and historical, continue as if this is already clear. However, once this question is raised - a question of self-knowledge of reason, as Kant put it - it is difficult to see the grounds for such trust. While the secondary literature discussing her proposal remains limited, Kant O'Neill's interpretation is an ambitious and distinctive answer to this question. O'Neill (2000) situates the account of the Kantian mind against three alternatives, which she calls instrumental, communitarian, and perfectionist. The first remains very common: with Hume, he finds instrumental as a fundamental (wed. practical reason, No.4; reasons for action: internal vs. external). The second sees the mind as embedded in complex traditions: rationality is what a given tradition or community takes it to consist of (Cr McIntyre 1988; communitarianism). The third option, akin to the forms of rationalism that Kant opposed, is to see reason as an individual ability to distinguish or intuitive normative truths (c. moral non-naturalism, No.3). Perhaps all three accounts are not in providing a reasonable justification for some audiences. The instrumental cause is not accountable to anyone, in fact, to anything other than any desires or goals that it happens to have. Anyone who adopts its particular tradition to determine which beliefs and practices are considered reasonable can have little to say to those who stand outside. And a person who believes that he can intuit something that is good or true will be dumb or worse, in the face of those with different intuitions. About the interpretations put forward by Saner, O'Neill, Neumann and others, Kant knew all these options and rejected each of them. We have seen below (No. 1.4) that Kant characterizes the mind in terms of self-reflexive procedure. The reason is autonomous and does not submit to any external authorities; it gains power from submitting itself to criticism; and criticism involves giving up any way of thinking or acting that cannot be accepted by everyone. In less abstract terms, self-control of the mind is a test by all those who require justification for any particular way of thinking or action. This view does not imply that we are necessarily connected with our interests and inclinations (as does the instrumental account). He doesn't ask us to rely on what others accept (as does a communal account). It's not related to the fantasy that we already know or intuit that everyone should take (as a perfectionist account does). Instead, it offers a vision of people who are able to move away from their specific inclinations, habits, and intuitions, and who are willing to use this ability to find terms that everyone can accept to build an inter-subjective order of coexistence, communication, and cooperation on terms that everyone can accept. Such a story depends on the specific interpretation of Kant's texts and is both ambitious and very complex in its consequences. However, if successful, it captures two powerful attractions of Kant's philosophy: universalism that transcends egocentrism and community boundaries, and modesty that respects the limits of human understanding. Understanding. critique of practical reason cambridge pdf. kant critique of practical reason cambridge. Kant critique of practical reason cambridge pdf

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