




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Issue 1, Volume 3 – May 2007 Virtue or Will Two Concepts of Freedom in the Concept of Arendtian PoliticsStefanie RosenmüllerBut just as we still believe, despite all theories and isms, that to say freedom is nothing more than a truism of politics. The meaning of politics is freedom This is the famous but somewhat opaque definition of freedom in Hannah Arendt's fragmentary introduction to politics. This obviously special relationship between politics and freedom will be examined in this article. Obviously, many difficulties lurk behind the establishment of a clear definition of Arendt's concept of freedom, as Arendt develops her concepts in a metaphorical language. Her description of current political phenomena refers to long-buried notions that she is trying to resurrect. Arendt often raises these extinct references by digging up their etymology, often by contrasting them with common ambiguities and misinterpretations that explain this extinction of these archaic concepts. In this way, Arendt indirectly combines political and terminological history; for this reason, the recent scholarship has rekindled interest in Arendt's work. In the essay What is Freedom? (1958) Arendt develops her concept of political freedom as freedom in an extraordinary sense. Arendt defines the concept of political freedom primarily by contrasting it with several other concepts of freedom - especially that of free will, which has played a dominant role in the Christian tradition. The notion of free will has traditionally dominated the understanding of politics, but it has done so by misinterpreting freedom as independence and sovereignty. To find out what Hannah Arendt's antipodal concept of political freedom is, I would like to take up two strands of controversy that were addressed in the Workshop On Violence and Politics in arendt.'s work. Interruption and initiation¹. We can think of Foucault's concept of power as an analogy to the Arendtian concept of the machinery of the social. This machinery of the social falls under Arendt's category of work, one of the three basic forms of work, 'work', 'work' and 'action' which it elaborates in The Human Condition. Under this analogy, we can interpret Arendt's essay on violence (1970) as an attempt to conceive political freedom as the ability to interrupt the automatisms of the category of labor. In On Violence, Arendt draws attention to the great temptation to stop or interrupt these automatisms by force. Violence triggers a new chain of events - but this chain of causes and impacts distinguishes as Arendt points out, strong from the sequence of events initiated by politically free beginnings, which she would call action. For example, Arendt insists on distinguishing between two different types of automatic processes that can be easily confused. For a definition of the difference between these two types of interruptions, we use the two terms of the beginning, which Arendt introduces in The Human Condition, and refer to the ideas of Principium versus Initium of St. Augustine. A principle - a cause - starts a new beginning for a chain of causes and effects. The initium, in Augustine's somewhat enigmatic definition, refers, however, to the character of human existence in the world. In Arendt's interpretation, this kind of beginning differs from the beginning in the sense of principle that refers to God's creation of the world. Man is free because he is a beginning and was created after the universe had already been created. Arendt gives some clues to understand the difference between initium and principle. Initium means the freedom to call into being that did not exist before, that was not given, not even as an object of knowledge or imagination, and which could therefore not be known strictly speaking. Arendt adds that, according to Augustine, the word principium has a much less radical meaning: the beginning of the world does not mean that nothing was done before (for the angels), while he explicitly (...) referring to man that no one was before him. 2. Can we apply this distinction to the distinction between acts of violence and free political beginnings? If we understand violence in the Arendtian sense of a strictly instrumental category, we can say that the beginning of an act of violence is planned as a first step in a strategy by which certain means are used to achieve a particular goal or purpose. This interpretation corresponds to the above-mentioned category of work in the analysis of the activities in Arendt's The Human Condition. The idea of the goal and perhaps also the means to achieve it are already planned and given in the sense of the above Arendtian definition. Arendt, however, suggests that a political beginning does not have to be planned, but can only be something that the actor himself does not fully know or know. This is the first difference between political action that takes place in public space and is related to people, and instrumental work that takes place in the world of objects, as Arendt points out in The Human Condition. The second difference relates to the consequences. While instrumental activities, i.e. work in Arendt's terminology, have a clear result and end, action in terms of its consequences is unpredictable. In FuP/WF, Arendt emphasizes this point when she says that action, seen from the perspective (...) of the in whose context he appears and whose automatisms he interrupts is a miracle - not to be expected. For from the point of view of the processes in the universe and in nature and their statistically overwhelming probabilities, the emergence of the earth (...) and (...), the evolution of man, finally from the processes of organic life, are all 'infinite improbability', they are 'miracles' in everyday language. Now we understand that there are two steps in Arendt's reasoning in On Violence. Violence is intended to disrupt social automatisms under the category of work. But acts of violence fall into the category of work. Their beginnings may be free, but only insofar as they are controlled by the actor as their creator. He decides to set an impulse to start a chain of causes and effects. The Creator chooses one of the given possibilities. And so the act of violence interrupts the automatic process, only to start an equally inevitable chain or a circle of violence: a predetermined process of events is converted to another predetermined chain of events. It follows that the interruption is not a real interruption. This kind of beginning does not free the Creator from automatisms; it simply leads to a different form of predestination. It follows, however, that the instrumental, i.e. violent, beginning is not even strictly free, in the sense of indeterminacy, which Arendt wants to preserve. The authority to dictate action is not a question of freedom, but a question of strength or weakness. In general, we can now say that arendt is not the category of cause and effect in politics and should be reserved for the sphere of objects.³ As a result, Arendt links this idea to a critique of the concept of political sovereignty. There is again a clear analogy with Foucault, who also refuses to see power as a form of justified violence or sovereignty as a political principle. The reason for this criticism may be the same for both, since sovereignty leads to the legitimacy of violence. Arendt argues, at least, that the category of cause and effect always presupposes a sovereignty typical of homo faber, i.e. man as the working being; not for the actor, the human being as a political being. For, in contrast to Homo faber, man as a political actor is never a master and sovereign of his actions. Therefore, sovereignty is not a political category for Arendt, and its use in politics has a rotting or perishable effect. First, in Arendt's view, the confusion between these two categories leads to a misinterpretation of freedom as independence, while dependence on others is perceived as coercion. But since politics is the space in which people focus on their freedom becomes something to be excluded from the political sphere; Freedom then means a freedom of politics. This must seem absurd to Arendt, who uses freedom in his ancient concept, which as a radical political concept: it exists only within the political sphere and can therefore only be successful or fail there. But confusion is not just a problem of theory. According to Arendt, it also has a practical effect because it destroys freedom itself. Sovereignty and freedom are antagonistic concepts: that is, according to Arendt's concept, non-sovereignty seems to be the prerequisite for freedom, not the other way around. Arendt draws the link between homo faber and sovereignty when he quotes Carl Schmitt: he clearly recognizes that the root of sovereignty is the will: sovereignty is who wants and commands. One can suggest that, in Arendt's view, the identification of freedom and sovereignty leads to an understanding of politics as a battlefield. For it leads either to a denial of freedom (...) or to the realization that the freedom of a man, a group or a political body can only be acquired at the price of freedom, that is, the sovereignty of all others. On the contrary, arendt says, if men want to be free, it is sovereignty that they have to renounce. We now see that Homo faber, as the sovereign of his work, is connected with this quotation from Schmitt on freedom of will. With Augustine, Arendt defines freedom of will as liberum arbitrium, i.e. a freedom of choice that sways and decides between two given things, one good and one evil, and whose choice is predetermined by a motive that only needs to be argued in order to begin its operation. Now we have a systematically clear contrast between instrumental work, a relationship of violence based on a principle that refers to goals that can be chosen and are therefore dominated by motives and free will and political action with a free start in the sense of initium. But the content of this opposition has not yet been illuminated. What is Arendt's counter-concept? What is freedom in Arendt's concept if it is not the freedom of will? Will and Virtueln WF Arendt does not give a clear definition of political freedom, but it gives certain clues within the conflicting system of work, work and action that can help us to approach their concept of political freedom. Arendt states that action to be free must be free of motives on the one hand, and of its intended goal as a predictable effect on the other. This is not to say that motives and goals are not important factors in every single act, but their determining factors, and action is free to the extent that it is able to overcome them. This, too, is a definition that classifies political freedom as opposed to the category of instrumental work. In addition, it seems Freedom not to be defined by the existence or absence of certain given circumstances, but rather by the actor's relationship to his own motives, that is, to himself. To follow Reasoning and understanding how the actor can be free from his own motives, let's draw the parallel with Foucault again. In his late thinking, Foucault suggests self-care as the right ethical relationship with himself. This self-care must therefore have a different structure from the power of the social that dominates us. So perhaps we can draw an analogy to Arendt's concept of virtue as a proper ethical relationship with herself and others, while calling it self-care rather than self-care.¹ How does Arendt describe virtue? In WF, Arendt explains her idea of the freedom inherent in political action by recalling Machiavelli's concept of virtu, which in her words is: the excellence with which man answers the opportunities that the world before him offers in the guise of Fortuna. Arendt then offers three qualities that are connected with one's own relationships with others: virtue is a kind of virtuosity, that is, an excellence, it needs an audience as a space in which freedom can appear, and it needs courage. Because of the similarities that political virtuosity may have with creative arts, Arendt must now define these aspects in their specific political sense. Courage is political, Arendt argues, in that one does not have to deal with questions of individual survival and self-sufficiency, but rather with considerations of the public interest. Courage is essential, because in politics, it is not life that is at stake, but the world. This implies the ability to direct his interest to public affairs and requires the courage to break away from the worries of daily survival and perhaps even risk life itself - at least a clear analogy to Foucault's attempt to conceive individual courage as the quality needed to take the risk of holding an opinion, which differs from that of a despot. Arendt could also point out that it takes courage in politics to face up to the public's judgment on our actions and speeches. Arendt's specific definition of the political, which separates survival, i.e. in its concepts, social issues, from political matters, is highly controversial, at least in its relevance and applicability to modernity. However, we can admit that there are two main points: the focus on public and communicative issues and those on survival issues. Thus, the virtue that Arendt himself compares with the Aristotelian concept of ethical virtue, the areté, is a habit that, in relation to his relationship with other instrumental relations and relationships of the social, nature and the category of the Facing. In contrast to work and nature activities, virtue requires a public space and has its purpose within the performance, not as a result, as is the case with work and instrumental or cultural activities. Is. techné and poiesis. I have already mentioned above the difference between the actor's initiative in action and homo faber's beginning of a work and alluded to the difference in the focus of the activities. As far as the feeling of freedom is concerned, we can now summarise what is missing, that is, a negative freedom, freedom from survival and freedom from the criteria. Let us now see if we can see this difference as a difference in the relationship between man and himself.² This above-mentioned excellence is the Telos that can be fulfilled in policy measures. The way in which this kind of Telos leads political action shows us what kind of freedom it is. In order to distinguish them from goals and motives, Arendt calls it a principle. Although this term is similar to the Augustian term Principium mentioned above, there is no similarity in the terms themselves. Some elements can be found to help us characterize this kind of principle as telos. Arendt describes it in the central passage: Principles do not work out of the self, as motifs do - my own deformity or my fair share - but inspire, so to speak, from awe; and they are far too general to prescribe specific objectives, although each objective can be assessed after the commencement of the act in the light of its principle. For, in contrast to the judgment of the intellect that precedes action, and in contrast to the command of the will that initiates it, the inspiring principle manifests itself only in the performance itself, while the merits of the judgments lose their validity and the strength of the command is exhausted in the course of the action which they carry out in cooperation. , the principle that inspires it, loses nothing of strength or validity through execution. In contrast to its objective, the principle of an act can be repeated again and again, it is inexhaustible, and in contrast to its motive, the validity of a principle is universal, it is not bound to a particular person or to a particular group. (...) Such principles are honor or glory, love of equality, which Montesquieu called virtue, or distinction or excellence (...), but also fear or distrust or hatred. Freedom or its opposite appears in the world when such principles are updated; the appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, coincides with the performing action. People are free - so differ from their possessions of the gift for freedom - as long as they act, neither before nor after, for being free and acting is the same. The differentiation between these telos as a principle that frees us from survival, and Aspects leads us to conclude that these are activities that do not have to be carried out in contrast to others. While the work is initially guided by an idea that and leads, at least in general, to predictable consequences, acting in the sense of Arété is, as Arendt says, inspired, but not prescribed by principle. This gives the concept of freedom the quality of an open future, of indecision. One can adhere to the principles of an action, even if impulses can lead to effects other than what was planned. Virtuosity therefore involves the ability to engage in the actions of others and to respond appropriately to the unpredictable effects of one's own actions. The manifestation of an action is thus in the performance itself and, as Arendt adds, the principle is not exhausted. This expression sounds a bit strange. Arendt probably means that, unlike technical purposes, there is no need to find a new target after it has acted appropriately. The Telos have been met, but cannot be detected like a technical product. There is no need to perform a defined completion step, but new steps and paths can always be used or invented. This aspect, of course, also emphasises the concept of freedom in the sense of indecision. In addition, the Telos transcends the individual purpose. They do not act as motivation in the self, but from the outside, from outside the self, it is up to us to complete this sentence ourselves. It is not easy to reformulate this universality of principle as a freedom from individual interests, because the concept of universality usually describes a non-relative validity (independent of persons or cultures) that implies a stronger moral bond than liberation. But, of course, it articulates a retreat of personal motives and special interests in public space. Arendt points out that the manifestation of the principle does not depend on the circumstances measured by the judgment or on the purposes indicated by reason and will. This underlines once again their distinction between the aspects of initiative and the executive elements of an activity in which will and reason work together and which fall within Arendt's working category. At this point, it is not yet clear whether freedom itself is a principle or a habitus (a hexis), like a virtue to follow the right or the opposite principles, but it seems to be the latter: freedom appears where the principles are updated. We generally assume that freedom means the opportunity to achieve something. That would be a positive definition of freedom. But for the realization are referred to, it does not seem to be about failure. Maybe it will be easy under the right principles. But don't they have to manifest themselves somehow, if not in a result? They can be realized in an Aristotelian way by choosing the middle way, the mesotes, between two polarities. Selects. Wouldn't that be too close to what Arendt calls freedom of choice between two possibilities, freedom of will? Goals such as fame, equality, excellence, and honor could lead an action and be only stylistically visible. If we distinguish with Aristotle between individual activities and a learned, rehearsed, more permanent habitus, then we do not need to interpret the middle way as a kind of arithmetic means of a certain collection of possible actions. After all, this would be nothing more than a quantified scale that would calculate what was best for or worst for a target-mean equation. Instead, the mesothé hexis refers to a medium, moderate attitude to passions that helps you to adhere to ethically good principles. We can therefore confirm that there is a conceptual difference to freedom of will. But if excellence is one of the principles and freedom is also excellence, as we have seen above, then freedom of virtue is also the principle of freedom. It now seems that Telos and Habitus are mixed in this passage. A second slight shift in meaning occurs in this passage in which Arendt explains the meaning in which freedom is inherent in action. Arendt first gives a definition in which freedom is a possible form of action. Action, as far as it is free, stands for action insofar as it is determined. Later, Arendt defines freedom and action as identical: men are free when they act... being free and acting are the same. It is therefore not clear whether action is a descriptive term with two possible manifestations - free and non-free - or a normative term - action deserves to be called only as action when it appears in its free form. This difficulty is general and is due to Arendt's phenomenological method, which it does not explicitly examine.³ Arendt contrasts the ancient conflict between the two faculties of reason and passion with another conflict within the will that appeared with Christianity. What was unknown to antiquity was not that there was such a thing as I-know-but-I-will-not exist, but that me and I will not be the same - non hoc est velle, quod posse. To understand the difference between these two conflicts rather than a gradual difference, we should consider the Greek metaphor of taming the horses of the soul, which Arendt cites. The taming of horses describes the conflict between passions and reason in the soul. In Plato's allegory of the Carriage of Personality in the Phaidros Dialogue, two different horses are described: one is able to understand and obey words and logos, the other While the horses go to Arendt, enter the movement, the reason, logos, the direction, logos must tune in to the power of the two steeds so that they coincide where they otherwise in different directions. We can also think of the Christian model of the will as a chariot, but of a different kind, because this time, as Arendt says, the good commands. In the allegory of the chariot we can describe this as the leading will that oppresses the horses of natural will. There are also two competing powers in this model, but this time one that makes the request is sitting on the wagon, one is standing in front of it. So they weaken each other. The two-in-one of loneliness (...) has exactly the opposite of the will: it paralyzes and locks him in himself; willing in solitude is always velle and nolle, to want and not to want at the same time. Thus the will itself is broken. In Greece, the conflict between reason and the horses of passion can take this form: reason knows what is best, but passion, Tymos, does not want to follow. Arendt points out that in the intellectual tradition of the Socrates concept, in which virtue is a kind of knowledge, this problem is solved, because reason is stronger than passions in the long run. Once reason has understood and seen beyond the dazzling glow of passions, they seem to fade: there is no longer any passion to prevent man from doing what he thinks is right. Interestingly, all these conflicts are understood as conflicts with external circumstances: all these factors, the psychological ones that are not excluded, conditioned the person from the outside. The art of freedom thus consists of the virtuosity of skillfully freeing oneself from these necessities. We can even transfer this kind of pressure to the modern age, as a consumer constraint from which we must free ourselves in order to find out what our real interests are. Alternatively, we present the conflict as a battle between goodwill and passion. This Christian model of will is reflexive: the will commands the self, not the outer world, the self is thus the place of conflict, not a struggle between the ego and external obstacles. Can we now answer the question of whether political freedom in Arendt's concept of virtue can be seen as a good relationship with oneself - with a guiding principle that inspires but does not force it as a government purpose? While it may be essential for Foucault to presuppose a constitutional concept of intersubjectivity for his concept of self-care, Arendt's refusal to see virtue as a relationship to the self is too strong to support this analogy. On the contrary, their criticism is based on the assertion that the reflective transition to a freedom of will comes with the fall of the political. While both Foucault and Arendt are seeking corrections to the automatisms of the social, Foucault constructs them as singular elements, while Arendt vehemently denies that loneliness is a political political and it designs resistant pulses only within a network.⁴ The problem is that in Arendt's system, political freedom constantly presupposes the domination of the private sphere. Only those who were already rulers (i.e. housechiefs who ruled over slaves and family) could begin something new. This leads to a contradiction in Arendt's argument. On the one hand, sovereignty is rejected as a principle in politics and is linked to freedom of will, which, as I have tried to show, can be attributed to the instrumental work area. On the other hand, Arendt does not miss an opportunity to underline that it is the starting point for the Greeks to enter the political sphere as ruler and household ruler and to play their role as archontes, rulers, beginners and leaders who give initiatives within politics. So it is essential to be masters in both directions, to control and govern a house as Father familias and to control oneself by taming the horses in order to be virtuous in public, where they no longer ruled, but were rulers under the rulers. This is due to the hierarchy of activities in HC. Work is fundamental to action; there is the frame, lays and defends the Polis like the walls of the Polis, where the political debates and the power can take place, as on a stage. So how can Arendt claim that her idea of politics is very different from that of Carl Schmitt? Isn't politics in Arendt's system so dependent on sovereignty? We can use Arendt's own example of the Archontes and Fathers families to demonstrate this dependence. without sovereignty, one cannot avoid having to fight for it, neither in the case of individuals nor groups, sovereignty must be acquired in order to win back or create the political sphere and free debate. It then sounds almost cynical to insist that politics should be free of sovereignty. Politics is portrayed as a purified sphere, but only by sliding its problematic aspects into the apolitical arena of violent struggles. The separation of instrumental violence and the free sphere of the political would then be a purely rhetorical means of purifying politics from its emotional side. One argument for Arendt would be that violence, even in its systematic framework, is based on power and authority and loses its power if consent, at least tacit consent, is withheld. The other justification is that Arendt, like no more, insists that the instrumental category of work must be interpreted as functional to politics, their tendency to dominate and usurp politics, which leads to an erasure of the political sphere, must be viewed critically. It emphasises that while action requires work, it violence and strategy must not be reduced to the latter or confused with it. Thus, the systematic difference between work and action could culminate in two other concepts of freedom that Arendt contrasts in the IP: courage, as we have seen above, freed from questions of survival. But this is only the first step. The positive freedom that Arendt combines with virtuosity describes how people realize actions in public. In IP, Arendt explains in a positivist way that people must be freed before they can be free; it distinguishes between liberation, which is an end which can be achieved by a particular means, and freedom which exists beyond the technical sphere. How can these two aspects of freedom - the negative freedom of not being governed and the positive freedom not to govern - be conceived differently than to make violence a necessary but insufficient condition for positive freedom? These are the lines being followed for a further representation of Arendt's concept of political freedom. NotesPage 2 The People Do Not Want Etienne Tassin Power and Constitution in Hannah Arendt's Hauke Brunkhorst The Sense of Difference and the Dangers of the Unlimited. I always begin to say: a and b are not the same (Hannah Arendt) Christina Thürmer-Rohr ethics and human relationality: between Arendt's moral reports Garrath Williams Hannah Arendt's reception in Argentina Claudia Andrea Bacchi from the Globe to the World. Oliver Marchart, New Beginnings. Hannah Arendt, the revolution and globalization. Frank Stühlmeyer Hannah Arendt in conversation with Joachim Fest. A radio broadcast from 1964 Hannah Arendt Speech on the occasion of the awarding of the Hannah Arendt Prize 2006 and Julia Kristeva Zoltan Szankay Hannah Arendt's Thinking and History: A Necessary Dialogue. Lectures in Curitiba / Brazil Marion Brephol ISSN: 1869-5787 1869-5787

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