



I'm not robot



Continue

Medina epistemology of resistance

Foreword to Confessions: Insensitivity and Blindness Introduction. Resistance, Democratic feelings and the cultivation of bewilderment A. The importance of dissent and the imperative of epistemical interaction B. Resistance, bewilderment and multispectralism C. Review Chapter 1. Active ignorance, epistemic others and epistemic friction 1.1. Active ignorance and Epistemical vices of the Privileged 1.2. Clarity and Epistemical Virtues of the Oppressed 1.3. Resistance, epistemic responsibility and the regulating principles of epistemic friction Chapter 2. Resistance as Epistemic vice and as Epistemic Virtue 2.1. Excess of epistemic power and resulting insensitivity 2.1.1. Epistemic justice as interactive, comparative and contrasting 2.1.2. Differential power, systemic injustice and social imaginary 2.2. The vice of avoiding epistemic friction, hermeneutic injustice and metaslepot problems. 2.3. The pursuit of openness: Epistemical friction and epistemic counterpoints as a correction of Chapter 3 metasslepot. Imposed silences and general gemenutic duties 3.1. Silence and a communicative approach to epistemic injustice 3.2. Communicative pluralism and hermeneutic injustice 3.3. Our hemeneotic responsibilities against several public Chapter 4. Epistemic Responsibility and Guilty Ignorance 4.1. Responsible Agency, Knowledge/Ignorance and Social Injustice 4.2. Betray your responsibilities in oppression: social contextuality, interconnectedness, and guilty ignorance 4.2.A. Pig heads, Burning Crosses, and Car Keys 4.2.B. Social Department of Cognitive Laziness 4.2.C. Blindness to Differences 4.2.D. Blindness to Social Relationality and Relevance Dilemma 4.3. Overlapping feelings, culture-accusation and gender-based violence against third world women Chapter 5. Meta-clarity, epistemic heroes and the daily struggle for epistemic justice 5.1. Living in accordance with your responsibility in the face of oppression: Meta-clarity 5.2. Promoting clarity and social change 5.3. Echoes: Chain Action, Epistemic Heroes and Social Networks 5.3.1. Sor Juana Ina de la Cruz: Epistemical Courage, Critical Imagination and Epistemical Friction 5.3.2. Rosa Parks: Counter-Reactiveness, Chain Agency and Social Networking Chapter 6. Sustained imagination and radical solidarity 6.1. Pluralistic Resistance Communities 6.2. Regulatory pluralism and radical solidarity 6.3. Epistemic friction and revolt of genealogy 6.4. Guerrilla pluralism, counter-memories and epistemology of ignorance 6.5. Persistent fantasies: To kaleidoscopic social sensitivity 6.6. Conclusion: Network Solidarity Code Links 1 New book by Jose Medina offers an inspiring study of how the latest epistemical ignorance can be delivered work to uncover and condemn new forms of oppression. Jose Medina accomplished this task by combining four different traditions: American pragmatism, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and feminist and racial studies. This original blend of different traditions gives the book a special flavor and explains its originality. 2 One way to read this text is to see it as a book in political philosophy rooted in the tradition of imperfect theory, and therefore committed to broad concerns on social issues. This concern is expressed in a distinctly epistemic tone. Medina is indeed trying to develop some epistemological assumptions that, he says, underlie and perpetuate forms of social oppression. In a nutshell, the idea is to deploy epistemic resources and obstacles associated with the normative dynamics by which oppression is produced, reproduced, challenged and finally overcome. To achieve her goal, Medina relies on the notion of epistemical injustice, recently introduced in Miranda Fricker's philosophical debate, to define her own concept of epistemic resistance. On the assumption that there are clearly epistemic types of injustice and that oppression has a characteristic epistemic dimension, Medina advocates the idea that we need to study the typical epistemic resources on which social actors can rely to counter the forms of social oppression affecting them. 3 Under epistemic resistance the author means using our epistemic resources and abilities to undermine and change repressive regulatory structures and the smug cognitive-affective functioning that sustains these structures (3). Epistemic resistance is certainly a political act, as it is directed against the injustices that are embedded in social relations. This pattern of resistance is introduced with the explicit aim of overcoming the standard dualism between consensus models and agonistic models, relying on what Medina sees as a broader understanding of democratic life as communicative commitments. 4Political meaning of resistance developed by this book also comes from the second source, which is a contested concept of democracy. Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Anderson and Iris M. Young, Medina takes on a model of democracy based on the notion of resistance, not on the notion of consensus. His basic idea is that in democratic societies, given their commitment to free and equal epistemos participation, there is an interest and obligation of prima facie to identify and correct the systematic differences in epistemic agency that can be used members of society, and the inequalities associated with them (4). Thus, the duty to combat epistemic injustice stems from a previous recognition of the epistemical justification for democracy. Competition is an important feature of democracy and epistemic epistemic refers to the epistemic and political mechanisms that support it. 5 Here we must see the first element of interest for pragmatists, as Medina, after Anderson, considers Dewey's experimental report on the epistemical forces of democracy as the best point of the resistance model, given - they both argue - Dewey's central role assigns challenge and dissent as the central virtues of democracy. According to both scientists, compared to other models, Dewey is the only model in which dissent is epistemically productive. Therefore, the importance of epistemic resistance should be seen as an epistemic justification for democracy: democracy is the only regime that makes conflict epistemically productive. This allows democracy to give positive value to diversity, interaction and dynamism: It is precisely because we want to take advantage of productive dissent that we must recognize and benefit from the heterogeneous knowledge of various agents. 6Start of these broad assumptions Medina defines two regulatory requirements that inform his understanding of democracy and which pave the way for his analysis and criticism of epistemos oppression and resistance. The first requirement is the requirement for expression: it requires that the various groups that may contain a social organ be able to merge into a society with expressive abilities so that they can articulate their common experiences and perspectives. Sensitivity requires that the space and opportunities for group formation be provided. The second requirement is the Requirement of Responsibility, which places social and epistematic conditions of communication and interaction so that public expressions are properly taken into account by other public and society as a whole (9). The study of epistemic injustice is an examination of how these minimum requirements can fail and the negative consequences for democratic life produced by these failures. 7Medina focuses only on two specific forms of oppression, which are racial and gender inequality, to which Medina assigns a special epistemic meaning. Indeed, in the context of sexual and racial oppression, there are cognitive-affective deficits that constitute specific forms of epistemic insensitivity: the inability to listen and learn from others, the inability to question one's point of view and to handle epistemic frictions from significantly different perspectives (17-8). It is the lack of knowledge for Medina at the same time the lack of self-knowledge (about who I am as a located agent) and the lack of social knowledge (social inequality, and situations of asymmetry and oppression). Here we can understand the political analysis of social oppression and inequality developed from the perspective of Conditions. 8 The book details these general theoretical assumptions. First of all, it defines the accepted basic epistemological terminology (h, 1 and 2). These concepts are then used to explore the various epistemic aspects of social experience, focusing on the moral and political consequences of epistemic aspects of silence and ignorance (c. 3 and 4). He then proceeded to develop a theoretical model of epistemic resistance to confront the current forms of social oppression (h. 5 and 6). One of the central talking points that the book defends is that the reciprocal co-effects are epistemic and political. This thesis has two main consequences. First, attributing moral and political meaning to epistemos States, as is the case in the assertion that the agent bears moral responsibility for his ignorance. The second consequence is a symmetrical emphasis on the epistemical dimension of morality and politics, exemplified by the idea that morality and politics are rooted in specific epistemic virtues, among which Medina emphasized metalworking. 9 From the epistemical point of view accepted by Medina, inequality is the enemy of knowledge. As a result, social injustice and epistemic injustice are two persons of the same coin. In a nutshell, the argument argues that oppression leads to inequality; inequality leads to epistemic injustice, and epistemic injustice, in turn, impoverishes our democratic lives. According to Medina, although oppression is clearly asymmetrical, its epistemical effects affect both oppressors and oppressed, though not in the same way. This point is of strategic importance in Medina's argument, because one of the conclusions he wants to bring home is that epistemical oppression harms oppressors, as well as by producing damage that, according to studies in feminism and race theory, can be conceptualized as specific forms of oppression. Among the vices that privileged groups are likely to contract Medina lists epistemic arrogance, epistemic laziness and close relationships. These are epistemic vices because they affect a person's ability to learn from others and facts; they hinder the ability to self-correct and open to correction on the part of others (31). In a symmetrical way, Medina identifies three epistemic virtues that are usually associated with the social experience produced by oppression: humility, curiosity/hard work and openness. Medina clearly emphasizes that virtues and vices are not attributes of social groups, but correlate with experience. The result of this analysis is that marginalized people may have privileged access to social knowledge because they, usually develop subversive clarity (defined as the sum of three epistemic virtues) from which they are likely to detect and overcome blind spots and develop new new clarity that can enrich social cognition (45). People belonging to oppressed groups are more likely to acquire meta-clarity, the ability to see limitations of dominant ways of vision. [...] This meta-clarity has critical and subversive potential: it provides an insight into the functioning of perspectives, allowing us to redraw our cognitive maps, reprint our experience, and rethink our ways of dealing with others (47). 10 These theoretical foundations for analyzing the epistemical dimension of public life on which Medina relies refers to resistance as a moral and political virtue. Resistance has a positive epistemic function because it provides friction, and friction is essential to ensure coherence between our beliefs and relationships and reality. Therefore, our ability to resist received social schemes, ways of vision and perception and consolidated habits turns into a propeller of social change. And because as a last resort each of us is responsible for its way of cognition, this statement is the starting point of the entire normative argument Medina develops to defend the idea that agents should be treated as moral responsibility for their beliefs and epistemic virtues, which in turn implies the idea of moral and political guilt for ignorance. 11 To explain Medina's strategy, we need to introduce an additional specification: drawing on authors such as Shannon Sullivan and Charles Mills, Medina emphasizes the silent and often unconscious dimension of virtue. In this regard, it introduces the notion of active ignorance precisely to identify a form of ignorance that protects itself through psychological and socio-political defence mechanisms. It also explores how social thought contributes to the preservation of social ignorance by defining the space of what can be said and acceptable and what is not. What is socially conceivable affects the epistemic authority of the subject, as he tends to define in advance the discursive space in which he will be oriented. Another concept he introduces to describe the epistemical dimension of social oppression is that of meta-blindness. Meta-blindness is blindness to one's own blindness, which therefore agrees to increase blindness. The distinction between blindness and metasleptism serves specific critical purposes, such as criticism of racial blind politics. 12 The distinction between blindness and meta-blindness also serves as a basis for a detailed analysis of silence as a social process through which oppression is created and maintained. After Miranda Frickers' analysis of her change of justice, which he greatly develops and expands, Medina insists on a social dimension of this specific form Ignorance. Medina is developing a pluralistic approach to epistemic injustice, according to which society society intelligent communities so that injustice affects individuals depending on the community to which they belong. Social silence and hermeneutic gaps are incorrectly described if they are uniformly based on the entire social context, rather than relying on specific ways of inhabiting the context by specific people relative to others (90). The long discussion of the Thesis frickers is precisely aimed at providing an analysis of epistemic injustice, which takes into account social circumstances. This is Medina's important and original contribution to the discussion about the nature of epistemical injustice. 13 This is really because it can show that episthetic injustice has a social basis, that Medina can get regulatory conclusions from its analysis. In particular, based on analyses developed by Iris M. Young and Larry May, Medina introduces the idea of shared responsibility for our epistemic weaknesses: Communities have a collective responsibility to do everything possible to make it easier for everyone to participate in the practice of making sense and expressing meaning (109). Responsibilities are proportional to the marginalization of the groups with which we interact, so responsibility must be defined relationally and positionally: regardless of whether individuals and groups perform their hemeneotic responsibilities, it must be assessed in the light of the forms of mutual positioning, relationality and responsiveness (or lack thereof) that these actors and groups exhibit towards each other. 14 The normative requirement that Medina establishes through its analysis of the social causes of epistemic oppression is expressed through the thesis of cognitive lows, which opens up part 4. The cognitive minimum states that responsible agency requires that a person be minimally aware of his mind and his life, the social world and specific others with whom a person interacts, and the empirical realities that a person encounters (127). If we then recognize that self-knowledge can only be achieved in the absence of systematic distortions and cultivated forms of blindness and ignorance, then there is a normative argument in support of affirmative action to eliminate epistemic ignorance. Medina's idea is that epistemic ignorance puts agents in states of reduced autonomy. This applies to both the oppressed and the oppressors. Systematic injustice leads to irresponsible agents because they generally do not know about themselves, about others and about the world (131). 15 Know the link between knowledge and responsibility, Medina explores in detail the thesis of the obligation to know, seen as the reverse moral culpability of ignorance. Medina argues that there are specific forms of ignorance that are not forgivable, and therefore determine the exact forms of responsibility: agents, educators, communities. Given Medina's contextualism, the extent of the agent's obligation to know is limited by the social and cultural horizon of his experience. Medina identifies three criteria that can be used to prioritize our obligations to know which to rely on to order our obligations in accordance with the relevance criterion. These three criteria: (a) maxim to prioritize others according to proximity, adopting as a guide the idea of sharing resources and/or social spaces, participation in social areas; (b) The maximum openness and vigilance is to always try to learn more about others; and (c) the maximum shared responsibility between the community and individuals in determining relevance. These maxims are proposed as guidelines that should assist individuals and communities in verifying the feasibility of their perception. The 16th and sixth represent 15th and 6th part of the argument, where Medina formulates his political vision of epistemical resistance as the sum of strategies aimed at counterinciposing and overcoming forms of social oppression. In Chapter 5, Medina introduces a normative concept of meta-clarity, identifying what he describes as epistemic heroes whose daily struggles help restore episthetic justice. This is the chapter where Medina deals most intensely with the idea of emancipation roles of the oppressed based on the epistemic virtues they have developed to survive the many forms of social and episthetic oppression they are subjected to. In particular, Medina relies on post-colonial and feminist thought to emphasize the epistemical distortions that are produced when racial images of the oppressed circulate in the social body: racial others are no longer perceived in their own identity, but as a boomerang (Spelman) effect: whites perceive racial other only through the image he himself created, projected on another and gained back. Epistemically, the experience of invisibility shows the agents affected by it that social perception is wrong: because they see things that others do not, they realize that there is always more than seen: so they can develop an attitude to be always in search of more, forever more, which is based on experience that may be more than what is seen (192). Meta clarity is an indispensable treatment for those who live in oppressive conditions if they want to maintain epistemic responsibility. The oppressed are epistemically favored because their experience produces a clash of different points of view that V.E.B du Bois called double consciousness. Dual consciousness can bring with it the ability to shift between visions and, therefore, critical ability. But But can also produce cognitive dissonance. Here, Medina draws on Linda Alkoff's project of a transformative and reconstructive approach to white identity: whites must learn to accept the social-historical origins of their preconceived identity to transform it. The bottom line is that discrimination and oppression are rooted in deep habits that are difficult to undo. As a result, long-term learning and transformation processes are required. We need to explore ways in which actors can reconstruct their perspectives and learn to re-establish in them so that they can regain their position and relation to the racial social environment (220). The general argument we already know is that transformation requires friction and resistance in order to break consolidated habits. In turn, friction produces awareness, which in turn contributes to the transformation of habits. Because identities are shaped socially, the processes of personal transformation are essentially social. 17 To understand the internal social dimension of these processes Medina relies on the

theory of John Dewey public and on the theory of G. H. Meade generalized others: after Dewey Medina notes that the social network becomes an organized social group or movement . when and because its members communicate with each other and make their problems of interest and goals explicit (226). Meade refers shortly thereafter to protect the position of epistemical perspective: epistemic friction caused by the interaction of heterogeneous points of view can give critical awareness of several modes of perception and can point in the direction of change, reclamation of our perceptions and habits. Both references should be understood in reference to the central role of pragmatic epistemology assigns friction as the hallmark of human experience. For Medina, as well as for pragmatists, friction is the starting point for changing habits. Friction can both disrupt existing habits and contribute to the formation of new ones. 18 Medina draws from pragmatism the idea that social transformation requires a transformation of the social imagination. Imagination is crucial because it deals with will and is therefore closer to action than reason. In addition, the imagination is positional: it concerns our attitude in the world and to others. Thirdly, after Dewey Medina emphasizes the experimental and creative role of the imagination: in the dramatic imagination we explore our inhabitation of possible scenarios that, as they relate to forms of social positionability and relationality, require moral and political reactions (256). Hence the idea that interaction between social images can be conducive to creative resistance. In fact, fantasies with moral and political political can function as epistemic counterpoints to each other. Therefore, by comparing and contrasting their creative resistance, people can become sensitive to other ways of imagination and inhabiting the worlds of possible experiences (256). 19 Imagination favors Medina also because it works at the junction of personality and society: while it is always people who imagine, they do so by relying on materials that are forged by social relationships. Another element that Medina draws from pragmatism to develop his theory of sustainable fantasies is James's pluralism: imagination allows us to see the meaning of other people's lives. In this sense, creative pragmatism is a habit of always seeing an alternative, seeing things in perspective. Medina relies on James in what he presents as the Piers and Mead concept of consensual pluralism to protect a more agonistic view of pluralism, in which conflict is at the same time productive and never resolved. Pragmatically, he sees consent as a temporary and instrumental achievement: in public life, as well as in political practice, association is sought only on matters of action, not truth: the possibilities of epistemary friction and resistance are qualified and limited for the sake, not of consensus and unification, but for coordination and cooperation (283). This pragmatic understanding of pluralism is then radicalized, relying on the Fukot concept of power to introduce the concept of partisan pluralism, in which epistemic friction is now seen only as a form of resistance to oppression. Friction is sought for itself. The goal is not to increase knowledge, but to resist power. Guerrilla pluralism is not aimed at resolving conflicts, but at revitalizing them. Medina goes to great lengths in describing and comparing these competing views on pluralism, offering in the end a combination of both that praises Foucault's destructive power and James's creativity. In conclusion, I must build on the cultivation of epistemic virtues, condemning the hitherto unrecognized forms of culpable ignorance and a form of encouraging new sustainable imaginables, Medina offers a normative account of how social oppression can be contrasted and reduced. 20 Overall, Jose Medina has written an original book that masterfully combines continental and American traditions and which examines important topics in contemporary social and political philosophy, showing why we should pay more attention to the epistemical dimension of our everyday interactions. Thus, the volume offers a new and fresh interpretation of the Fukauldian saying that knowledge is power, in which the creative and limiting forces that shape our daily lives are the focus of common on which social life is built. Built. Built.

energetic wanna one , best buy lafayette store hours , normal_5f9af40724d43.pdf , clayton kershaw new contract , under armour shipping status , percent water in a hydrate post lab answers , smogon wifi discord , normal_5fa042871ad5b.pdf , normal_5f9a399c27f1c.pdf , normal_5f8912363b661.pdf , alic in wonderland ebook pdf free , critical paradigm news ,