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Based on philosophy and social theory, the Social Theory of International Politics develops the theory of the international system as a social construction system. Alexander Wendt explains the main claims of the constructivist approach, presenting a structural and idealistic worldview that contrasts with individualism and materialism, which is the basis of the basic theory of international relations. It builds a cultural theory of international politics that accepts whether states view each other as enemies, rivals or friends as the main determining factor. Wendt describes these roles as cultures of anarchy described as Gobbesian, Lokian and Cantian respectively. These cultures are common ideas that help shape public interests and opportunities and generate trends in the international system. The book describes four factors that can lead to structural changes from one culture to another -

interdependence, common destiny, homogenization and restraint - and examines the consequences of capitalism and democracy in the emergence of Cantian culture in the West. The publisher's description. This article requires the attention of an expert on this issue. Please add a reason or setting of the conversation to this template to explain the article problem. When you post this tag, consider linking this request to WikiProject. (December 2015) Social Theory of International Politics AuthorAlexander WendtLanguageEnglishGenre Foreign Relations theoryPublisherCambridge University PressPublication DateOctubor 1999Media TypeBooks452ISBN978-0-521-46557-1 Social Theory of International Politics is an academic book by Alexander Wendt. It expresses a constructivist approach to the study of international relations and is one of the leading texts in the constructivist approach to international relations. The social theory of international politics expresses a theory that emphasizes the role of common ideas and norms in shaping state behavior. He is critical of both liberal and realistic approaches to the study of international relations, which Wendt argues emphasize the materialistic and individualistic motives of the State's actions, rather than norms and shared values, as Wendt argues. In a review of the social theory of international politics in foreign affairs, G. John Ikenberry argues that the first section of the book is a tortuous tour of constructivism. Wendt then explores the possible alternative cultures of international relations (Gobbesian, Lokian and Kantian) as a result of his view that anarchy does not necessarily mean that states must adopt selfish self-help behavior. Wendt goes on to explore this view in an influential journal article, Anarchy - this is what states make of it, published in the journal Anarchy Organization. The book was the winner of the International Association of Studies The Best Book of the Decade 1991-2000. The title is a reference to Kenneth Walls' 1979 work Theory of International Politics. Summary This section needs to be expanded. You can help by adding to it. (February 2014) Four Sociologys of International Politics Part I: Social Theory of Scientific Realism and Social Ideas Up? Structure, Agency and Culture Part II: International State Policy and the Problem corporate agency Three Cultures of Anarchy In this chapter Wendt challenges a neo-realistic view of anarchy and argues that multiple cultures of anarchy can dominate. They are called Gobbesian, Local and Cantian cultures. Process and Structural Change Conclusion Criticism Realist Critics In a review of an essay titled Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism by Dale Copeland argues from a structural point of view a realist and states that Wendt does not take into account how uncertainty affects the behavior of the state: Despite Wendt's important contribution to the theory of international relations, his critique of structural realism has inherent flaws. Most importantly, it does not adequately address the critical aspect of a realistic worldview: the problem of uncertainty. Constructivist critic Wendt acknowledges that his version of constructivism is a subtle version of constructivism, as it concedes important moments to materialistic and individualistic perspectives and endorses a scientific approach to social investigation. Thus, he was criticized from the position of more radical fat constructivists, who give less reason for rationalist theories, such as Roxanne Lynn Doti, Stefano Guzzini, Friedrich Kratchvil, 10 years and Maya Sehfuss. References to Kratochvil, Friedrich, the construction of a new Orthodoxy? Wendt Social Theory of International Politics and Constructivist Challenge, Millennium - Journal of International Studies January 2000 29: 73-101. doi:10.1177/03058290002900100901 - Social theory of international politics. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. January 28, 2009. Social theory of international politics. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. January 28, 2009. Wendt, Alexander, Dan Daniel Friedhelm. Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and East German State. International Organization 49, No. 4 (1995): 689-721. - Review: Copeland, D. 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Rasse, Thomas 2000. Let's argue!: Communicative actions in world politics. International, Tom. 54, issue. 1, page 1. Page 2 The essence of Alexander Wendt's theory of international politics lies in his intellectual efforts to develop the theory of the international system as social construction, which stands in stark contrast to the positivist and materialistic ideas about IR, which, in particular, were theoretically theoretically realistic and liberalistic. In fact, it is initially a cultural theory of international politics, explained by various cultures of anarchy built by the states themselves, which challenges ontological atomism and epistemological positivism as neo-realism and neoliberalism as traditional IR theories in principle. As a social theory, constructivism challenges materialism by pushing the structures of human association as primarily cultural rather than material phenomena and rationalism, asserting their function not only as regulating behavior, but also as a personal and interested construction, although material forces he acknowledges that still matters and people, he acknowledges that still are deliberate subjects. For Wendt, constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following basic statements: (1) States are the main pieces of analysis of international political theory; (2) The key structures in the state system are intersubtecive, not material; and (3) state identity and interests are in an important part built by these social structures, rather than being given exogenously by the human nature system (as neo-realists claim) or domestic theories (as neoliberals favor). In his innovative social theory of international politics (1999), he formulates the central principles of constructivism and, based on the philosophical views of Thomas Hobbs, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, theorizes three cultures of anarchy characterized by respectively hostile, rivalry and friendship. He calls his moderate version of constructivist theory subtle constructivism because it concedes important points to materialistic and individualistic perspectives (neorealism) and endorses the scientific approach to research. Identities and interests for the concept of identity is important because it plays a crucial role in interpersonal and international interactions. Wendt sees it as a subjective property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral attitudes and which is rooted in their self-insensitivity Identity does not have simply a subjective or unitary level of quality, since understanding of I also depends on the understanding and understanding of the Other about it, hence the intersubsive or systemic quality of identity and its construction by both internal and external structures. Arguing that identity is not a unitary phenomenon that is susceptible to a common definition, Wendt emphasizes the existence of different kinds of identities and discusses four of them. First, it is a personal or corporate style that is composed of self-organizing and homeostatic structures that distinguish themselves from others. Since building this identity into personal subjects involves feeling self or personal I am through the work of consciousness and memory, building it into corporate actors as a state requires the feelings of us or the group by forming a collaborative narrative about us. Having an autogenetic quality, personal and corporate identity is constitutionally exogenous to foreignness. Second, it is the type of identity that is placed in a site of personal/corporate identity and falls into a social category or, as James Fearon puts it, a label applied to individuals who share (or are believed to share) certain characteristics or characteristics, by appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills (e.g. language), knowledge, opinions, experiences, historical common traits (as region or place of birth). In order for general characteristics to be type identifiers, they must have social content and meaning that are provided by certain rules of group or society membership, although they also include characteristics that are mostly internal to their owners, hence their simultaneous social and self-organizing qualities. Thus, these identities depend in part on their constitution on the understanding and perception of others. Thirdly, a role-playing identity that depends on culture and shared expectations and as such exists only in relation to the Other and thus cannot be accepted solely by I on its own, but is achieved by taking positions in the social structure and observing behavioral norms towards others who have a corresponding counter-numunic identity. Contrary to many foreign policy which appears to have avoided applying role theories to structural IR theory, Wendt argues, for strong links between the two conceptual categories. And the fourth species is a collective identity that leads to the identification of OneSelf and the Other by blurring the distinction between them, i.e. I am classified as another. The collective formation of identity uses the role and type of identity, but also goes beyond them by merging One and others into a single identity, according to which subjects define the well-being of the Other as part of me and thus behave altruistically. While identities say who or what actors, interests mean what actors want and show their behavioral motivations. Interests, Wendt argues, presuppose identity because an actor can't know what he wants until he knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will be the interest. However, in the absence of interests, there is a lack of motivational power and they cannot explain actions that are the result of a combination of desire and faith. Interests in social theory are divided into objective and subjective species, the former referring to those needs or functional imperatives that are necessary to reproduce all four kinds of identity - corporate, type, role and team - and the second, consisting of those beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity needs, which are actually the direct motivation for behavior that rationalists call preferences or tastes. At the same time, the behaviour of the State is dictated by different interests rooted in different identities, and since states have important property because of their corporate identity as states, we can speak of universal interests. Explaining the concept of national interests from the point of view of objective interests, namely, as fulfilling the requirements of reproduction or the security of public-public complexes, Wendt argues that the subjective interests or preferences of states are determined in part on the basis of their certain security needs or objective interests, and that in the long run, the persistent inability to bring subjective interests in line with objective interests will lead to the death of the actor. He relies on Alexander George and Robert Keohan to explain the three categories of national interest they describe as life, freedom and property, to which he adds a fourth category, collective self-esteem. The forms that these interests can take vary from state to state according to their type, role and collective identity, but their basic needs are common to all, fulfillment necessary if states want to replicate themselves as corporate corporate The first national interest is physical survival, which refers to the life-extension of the public-social complex as individuals. Autonomy, the second national interest, consists of the ability of the public-social complex to control the allocation of resources and the choice of government, which derives from state sovereignty and along with physical survival is necessary for the reproduction of corporate state identity. Without such freedom, State control, as well as all other organizations, will not be able to meet their internal needs and external needs. The third national interest that Wendt draws attention to is economic well-being, which is achieved through proper and effective maintaining the production regime in society and, accordingly, the resource base of the state. Unlike many scholars in the field of international relations, who assume economic growth as the most important interest of states as a whole, Wendt argues that this depends on production regimes within states and, more broadly, state forms such as capitalist ones, and is therefore a function of historically conventional identities such as states rather than their corporate identity. Collective self-esteem is the fourth national interest it introduces, namely a group must feel good about itself, for respect or status, that depends heavily on collective self-esteem, both positive or negative, which in turn is created partly through relationships with significant others like this, taking the perspective of another that Self sees themselves. While positive self-assessments stem from mutual respect and cooperation between actors and largely imply recognition of sovereignty by other States, negative self-esteems are the result of perceived disrespect or contempt on the part of others and may encourage States to pay compensation by self-affirmation and/or devaluation and aggression towards another. Anarchy as Made By The States Critical issues Wendt raise in his path-breaking article 1992, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social building of power politics revolves around the nature of anarchy and the extent to which the actions and behavior of states are the result of interaction between the international structure of power and the process of interaction between the state: The lack of centralized political power will force play a competitive government policy? Can international conditions overcome this logic and under what conditions? What is in anarchy given and immutable and that Change? The general neo-realist and neoliberal answer to these questions is that anarchy is necessarily a self-help system in which States will have to fight for their security and survival because of a lack of central order, ensuring security and a lack of guarantees of collective security; a state that creates essentially competitive dynamics of the security dilemma and the problem of collective action. Therefore, in answering this question, Wendt argues that neo-realistic and neoliberal scholars in the field of international relations ignore issues of identity and interest formation. He acknowledges, however, the neoliberal argument of such theorists as Joseph Gnais, Robert Jervis and Robert Keohane - whom he calls strong liberals as opposed to predominantly medium and rationalism-oriented liberals, whom he calls weak liberals - that the identities and interests of state actors can be transformed through the process of learning/cognition and interaction and within the effective influence of institutions and interactions but goes beyond his development of constructivist theory of international politics, according to which identities and interests, being endogenous to it, are socially constructed by knowledgeable practices. Thus, his theory departs from the (micro) economic theory, which in harmony with scientific rationalism dominates the neo-realistic systemic theory of international relations, and instead embodies the sociological social psychological form of systemic theory, where identities and interests are seen as dependent variables, that is, disguised for transformation. He disputes the neo-realistic assertion that self-help is logically and necessarily caused by the anarchic structure of the international system as exogenous or independent of the process, and instead argues that, The elf-aid and policy of power do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy, and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, it is related to process, not structure. There is no logic of anarchy other than practice, which creates and instantly creates one structure of identities and interests, not another; structure has no existence or cause-and-effect powers other than the process. Self-help and the politics of power are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it. Unlike neo-realists, and in particular Kenneth Valls, for whom anarchy is a material phenomenon from which public interests flow in the form of material and security challenges, for constructivists and Vendt in particular, the structure of anarchy consists of ideological or cultural elements, which in turn make the logic of anarchy susceptible to change. Making big successes in the development of constructivism, he theory of anarchy in the social theory of international politics, initiating a seminal argument about the various non-realistic cultures of anarchy in international politics based on The Gobbesian, Local and Kantian philosophical views on human nature and social association. These cultures come from different types of role structures and subject positions - hostile, rival and friends - from the point of view of which states represent me and others, and have different rules of engagement, interaction types and systemic tendencies. They can be found, according to Wendt, in the regional subsystems of the international system - Buzan's security complexes or in the system as a whole. The subjective position at the heart of the hobby culture of anarchy is the enemy based on The Rival of Lokean and the Cantian friend, each of which includes the distinct posture or orientation of I to the other in relation to the use of violence, meaning enemies are characterized by threats of violence in an unlimited way, the posturing of rivals is one of the competitors that includes the use of violence to maximize interests. however, in a limited and prudent way, and the orientation of friends is based on a union that eliminates violence to settle disputes and encourages collective action against security threats. Anarchy, even the most controversial ones, is often made up of general ideas or understandings, or general knowledge. One of Wendt's central themes in his constructivism theorist is that culture simply hides behind interests, that the meaning of the distribution of power at the systemic international level is determined by cultural entities and consists of common ideas that make up norms and institutions. This meaning-constitution is achieved by joint knowledge by the constituent states perception of this distribution or by creating their identity and interests. Simply put, the importance of anarchy at the international level or the distribution of power and interest among States depends to a large extent on the perception of each other or the common ideas that make up their identity and interests in the eyes of others. The meaning and influence of power and interests depend on the ideas of the actors. The build-up of the U.S. military base in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf is of different importance to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. According to Wendt, Hundreds of British nuclear weapons are less dangerous to the United States than the five North Korean ones because of the common arrangements that underpin them. What gives meaning to the forces of destruction is the relationship of destruction in which they are embedded: common ideas, whether joint or conflict, this structure between states. The central role of common knowledge between states in constructivism theory in how the relationship of power in the international system is organized and understood stems from two of its fundamental assumptions: (1) that the structures of human association are defined primarily by common ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of the main actors are built by these common ideas, not by nature. So to speak, inter-subjective knowledge, which is a competitive identity and interests, is not exogenously given, but is constructed every day by the processes of social will formation. It should be added here that for moderate constructivists, the general ideas, beliefs and practices they encourage actors to conduct have an objective reality in the form of external social facts, which are nevertheless external to the subjects collectively. Social structures, wendt argues, are no less real than material structures. The ideal nature of socially constructed structures in an international environment does not mean that their transformation is easy in this context, but for social change to be realized by institutionalization, asymmetry of power and collective action, it must be addressed, which may be more difficult, as Wendt argues, in social structures than material ones. A. Hobbesian culture of anarchy and enmity Building In the Gobbian culture of anarchy, which neo-realists often generalize as a permissive cause of war, interstate relations are marked by enmity more than anything else, which is based on the representation of the Other as an actor who, according to Wendt, (1) does not recognize the right to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit his violence towards himself. The enemy, whose intentions are limitless in nature, differs from the rival whose intentions are limited, that is, the enemy does not recognize the right of I to exist as a free subject at all, and therefore seeks to revise his life or power, while the rival must recognize the right of I to life and freedom, and therefore seeks to reconsider only his or her behavior. Wendt calls the first posturing or orientation deep revisionism and the second small revisionism. He also points to the real or imagined status of enemies and adds that enemies are real, in that others are indeed existentially threatening Themselves, as the Nazis made Jews, and others are chimeras like Jews were Nazis. However, it is extremely important that this difference in status and nature does not affect Gobbesian cultures, and the actions of the actors depend on their perception of their enemies, either they really exist or are imaginary. Wendt argues that at the systemic level of analysis, anarchy is formed and operates differently. Collective representations at the macro level, in which the personal roles are embedded micro-level, follow their own logic, which cannot be reduced to the perception or behavior of subjects. It is well worth quoting here as more and more members of the system present each other as enemies, eventually reaching a tipping point when these submissions take over the logic of the system. At this point, the actors begin to think of the enmity as a property system, not just of individual actors, and therefore forced to present everyone else as enemies simply because they are part of the system. Thus, The Other becomes Mead's generalized other, a structure of collective beliefs and expectations that persists over time even as individual actors come and go, and the logic of which new actors are socialized. (The concepts of discourse and hegemony I believe have a similar, macro-level orientation.) It is in terms of positions within this structure that actors make attributions about themselves and others, not in terms of their actual qualities. It should also be added that the frequency with which the Action or Behavior of the Other occurs or is perceived plays a key role in shaping the collective perception of him or his role. Collective representations, Says Wendt, are frequency-dependent in that they depend on their existence for a sufficient number of representations and/or behaviors at the micro level.... 34 When full knowledge of the other is private and domestically composed, it can be argued that the actors are in a kind of Hobbesian anarchy that has no common culture. This situation usually prompts Hobbesyan's first meeting, in which a state actor is likely to jump to the worst conclusion of another previously unknown state at the first impression and therefore try to kill, conquer or enslave him. These situations of private knowledge, according to Wendt, still have a social structure, because they are related to ideas and calculations about the other, which do not yet form a culture, because they are not common. However, after the first meeting, the actors begin to learn about each other and form a general understanding of their condition, that is, the culture of Hobbes. However, anarchy does not necessarily lead to situations marked by Gobbesyan meetings, even if it often happens. According to Wendt, you can imagine the first meetings between Lokean and Kantian. He analyzes three main ways cultures can contribute to the creation of interests by building each other's enemies, which can also be defined from the perspective or conceptual framework of the opponent's symbiosis. The most conventional explanation for this phenomenon concerns the interests of certain groups that are created within the State as a result of interaction with the Gobbes international environment and who seek to maximize their power by encouraging military competition with the established adversary and lobbying national decision-makers to cope with it. In doing so, they help to create a state identity whose existence depends on the existence of another enemy. Thus, I encourages the Other to assume an enemy identity so that she can, in turn, preserve her own identity. The enmity between the U.S. and Soviet militaries during the Cold War was cited as an example of this form of constitution of interest through the symbiosis of the enemy. According to the second debate, which deals with group solidarity, the enemy is built so that States can fulfil their national interests, especially security and self-respect interests. Wendt refers to David Campbell and Jonathan Mercer38 to clarify this type of hostile construction as the Act of the Constitution of Interest in the Hobbesian structure. Campbell argues in the postmodern regime that the American state uses the discourse of danger to justify its existence, in the sense that it invents or exaggerates threats to its political policy of the body to build us and distinguish it from them. Such a hypothesis bears an analytical resemblance in some respects to the sabotage theory of war according to which weak governments distract internal dissent by engaging in external aggression. After a similar argument, Mercer is concerned about the needs of states for self-esteem, and using the theory of social identity, argues that members of groups in states favorably compare themselves with other states to boost their self-esteem, which in turn encourages states to define their interests selfishly. This is a group bias that provides a cognitive resource for aggressive or hostile behavior. If there is a general understanding of what, explains Wendt, is how states will make up each other, then states may find that enmity has value in itself, since by mobilizing group/outside group dynamics it can greatly strengthen the self-esteem group. Accordingly, in the light of national interest in collective self-esteem, such aspirations in the Gobb cultures of anarchy tend to translate as the need for glory and power at the expense of others. Project Identification is a mechanism of interest, which Wendt defines in Hobbes' cultures and teases, relying on Theory. He builds The Other as an enemy and emphasizes his role as a platform for displacing unwanted feelings towards I. According to the project identity thesis, Individuals, which, due to personal pathologies, cannot control potentially destructive unconscious fantasies like feelings of rage, aggression or self-loathing, sometimes attribute or project them to another, and then through their behavior pressures that others identify with or act these feelings, so that Self can control or destroy them, controlling or destroying them. Aside from the self-assessment function this mechanism has that forces it to make favorable comparisons with others, it moves a step further and tries to destroy it. This process requires dividing I into good and bad elements, the latter of which is projected onto another. In this cultural enmity design, Self needs another to collude in order to justify his rejection and destruction of unwanted elements. In fact, Self seeks or even drives others to be, as he wishes, bad or evil. Then, if the Other does not cooperate with I to fulfill his desire, I will remain with chimeric enemy images rather than with common culture, but if the Other in return projects his bad attributes on Himself and thus allows him to channel his desire for destruction to the Other, everyone will play a role that the other needs, and their shared (if silent or unconscious) knowledge will make them more important. B. Lokei culture of anarchy and predominance of rivalry Unlike neo-realists who refer to the predominance of Gobbesyan's logic in international history and focus on continuity rather than change, in the sense that wars are still taking place and power still matters, Wendt acknowledges the quality structural changes in international politics generated in the last few centuries. That means that he kills or will be killed, the logic of the Gobb state of nature has been replaced by the living and let the living logic of The Local's anarchic society. The role structure of this culture is rivalry, not enmity, because its substantive position is a rival rather than an enemy that is also made up of ideas about Himself and others, but differ in nature, since Lockean's ideas are less dangerous, namely, Unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their life as their life as their right. therefore, do not try to conquer or dominate them. When the sovereignty of the Other is recognized by me and vice versa, it develops in principle from a simple ownership of individual States into an institution shared by many States, which is based on shared expectations that they will not seek to destroy each other's lives and freedoms. According to Wendt, the meder's interstate rivalry... is limited by the convention of sovereign rights recognized by international law and is to this extent based on the rule of law. However, this does not mean that the use of force and violence has no place in this culture, but it is expected that it will sometimes be used to settle disputes, but within living and living limits. Rivalry as a collective representation at the macro-structural level of the international system creates an anarchic society in which, according to Wendt, four trends can be observed. The first trend is to simultaneously recognize war as a normal and legitimate means of advancing state interests and narrowing it down as a tool to destroy states, meaning the local culture of anarchy does not dominate what John G. Ruggy calls founding wars in which the very existence of state units is at stake, but by a configative war that is staged over territory and strategic advantage, while the sovereign existence of a rival is infexor. although the very use of violence is being disrupted. The second trend that follows from the first is limited war is the authorization for relatively stable membership or a reduction in the mortality rate of States in the international system. The fact that this trend or membership applies only to those States whose sovereignty is recognized by the system and thus puts the fate of unrecognized States close to the fate of the recognized, is testament to the merits of the Westphalian norms, by which weak micro or even failed States manage, in stark contrast to the pre-Westphalian epochs, to survive, because international society recognizes its legal sovereignty, an indicator of restraint in the modern era. A third trend is efforts to balance power, which Wendt argues is not an effect of anarchy per se, as Kenneth Valls sees it, but a mutual recognition of sovereignty, meaning that if States think that their sovereignty is recognized by others and therefore their survival is not at stake, then the Gobbish tendency towards concentration of power and maximization will be arrested. , and thus balancing can paradoxically become a relatively stable source of order, because it is not essential for survival. The fourth trend is that in the Local anarchy system, neutrality or non-alignment becomes a recognized status as a result of the fact that States can Thus, despite the propensity of States to dilemmas of violence and security, the assumption that conflicts can be resolved without a serious threat to their survival and autonomy leads to the fact that mutual indifference becomes a stable result in living life and let lives. These explanations are sufficient to indicate the importance of constructivism to the institution of sovereignty, which, according to Wendt, is the basis of the modern international system. An important advantage of sovereignty as a well-established institution in the local culture of anarchy is that it helps achieve their national interests in a collective self-esteem in a much less threatening and virtuous way than in the culture of the Gobbian State, as it helps to reassure them not only by minimizing, if not eliminating, the physical threat to their survival, but also by assuring them against the mental threat of standing up. This is partly the case with regard to the individualizing effect of the local culture, which defines the criteria for membership in the international system and thus determines which types of individuals have status and are therefore part of the distribution of interests. It can also be said that in the WestPhal system of international politics, only States have such status, namely those individuals who enjoy empirical sovereignty and whose legal sovereignty is recognized at the international level. So it is safe to say, as Wendt and other constructivists do, that the local culture of anarchy involves a closure structure embodied by the sovereignty that structural power exerts, excluding certain types of players from the game of international politics. Determining which types of identities deserve recognition as individuals is another way in which Lockean culture represents a state. This means that in order to gain membership in the WestPhal system, subjects must not only have the corporate identity of the state, but also meet the criteria of identity for legitimacy defined by the system. These criteria have historically been linked to how the internal political power of the state is achieved and organized, and in the modern era they are institutionalized as norms such as being a national state, having the institutions of a modern state, refraining from genocide and, according to Wendt, being a capitalist and democratic state. The third constituent influence of Lokean culture on states concerns their collective or social identity, that is, despite their tendency towards vested interests and individualization within the group defined by culture, the internalization of such a culture leads states to feel a sense of loyalty and to the group so culturally defined. The significance of this collective/social identity building is that it helps mobilize collective action against threatening outsiders: When a group is threatened, its members will see themselves as us, who must act collectively as a team in their defense, Wendt argues. The Local culture of the ultimate influence of anarchy on states is their constitution as possessive individuals, which is seen in Vendtian constructivism as an influence on their role identity and a key basis for interstate rivalry. As a distinctive characteristic of the liberal view of the individual, attractive individualism is manifested in the individual's conception of himself as the sole owner of her/his personality, the virtues and opportunities for which, so to speak, the c/he owes nothing to society. The Individual, in the words of Crawford MacPherson, was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as the owner of Himself. Ruggy, as Wendt says, recognizes the similar influence of Westphalia culture on the states. The explanation of the latter illuminates: the Westphalian States are possessive personalities who do not appreciate how they depend on each other for their identity, being instead jealous of their sovereignty and seeking to make their own way in the world. An important reason for such individualism may be the criterion of membership in the international society itself, which encourages States to regard legal sovereignty as a right that they are due, as a result of purely their own efforts to establish empirical sovereignty in the first place. This collective amnesia about their identity and sovereignty forces States to represent own interests as their right, which must be recognized and respected by others; a practice that leads to self-help at the systemic level. Self-interest and self-help, Wendt concludes, are not an inalienable attribute of states and anarchy, as neo-realists and neoliberals claim, but the effects of a particular conception of the individual. c. c. The Kantian culture of anarchy and centrality of friendship Unlike Gobbesian and Lokean, following the famous work of Immanuel Kant the Eternal World. The role structure of Kantian culture is based on friendship, and its subjective position. Within this role, friends must follow two basic rules: first, the rule of non-violence, which means resolving disputes without resorting to war or even the threat of war, and the other - mutual assistance, namely collective action as a team an outsider who threatens the safety of a team member. Both rules are independent and equally necessary and will hang friendship when they are enforced by states; however, friends can show indifference to each other's fate by agreeing to live in peace but to go their own way and use force within the framework of friendship. Within these limits, they can have significant conflicts with each other on a range of issues, but when it comes to national security, disagreements are suspended and priority is given to protecting each other. Unlike an alliance that is a temporary, mutually exclusive arrangement within a rivalry, or perhaps animosity, friendship is temporarily open as the relationship between friends is expected to continue despite the occasional consequences. The result of the Kantian culture of anarchy is the formation of collective security and pluralistic security communities, in which members are confident that disputes will not be resolved through physical struggle or threat that is not caused by Leviathan or the central authority of peace to members, but comes, according to Wendt, from a general knowledge of each other's peaceful intentions or behavior that generally represents a community as such. The norm of mutual assistance, or all for one, one for all, on which collective security systems are based, is the issue of generalized reciprocity, in which mutual assistance is not denied even in the absence of direct or immediate return, as opposed to specific reciprocity when each party is expected to return the benefit to the other party. When such a rule works properly, Wendt explains, the dominant behavioral trend will be multilateralism and national security assistance. In the modern era, the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), can be cited as working examples of joining the Kantian culture of anarchy. The fact is that members of these regional subsystems or security complexes can cooperate not because they perceive outsiders as a threat to their individual security, but because they behave in a commanding approach to security with members of their bloc. Concluding note Despite being a state-run centrist scholar of international politics, Wendt criticizes neo-realists and neoliberals for changing the structure of the state system and taking for granted its ontological and ideological properties, which prevents us from considering and assessing the potential for structural and institutional change in international politics. He argues that States are deliberate and corporate actions whose personalities and interests are, to an important extent, determined by domestic policy, not by domestic policy systems, and as States change, so does the international structure. This does not contradict the arguments in favor of the structural social construction of states and their identity as well as interests, but that this is a different level of construction; states are self-organizing facts in relation to the international system. This means that if we are indifferent in how the system of states works, rather than how its elements are built, we will have to take the existence of states for granted, just as sociologists must accept the existence of people as given to study how society works. This is perhaps the main reason why Vendt constructivism is widely regarded as the quintessence of systemic theory. There lies, however, a fundamental critique of traditional thinking in the dispute, namely, as Wendt puts it, systemic theory cannot problematicize the state down, as this will include changing the subject matter from the theory of the system of states to the theory of the state, which the neo-realists already view as a fixed phenomenon, having essential features inherent in it, such as selfishness, sovereignty, rationality and the desire for power. In his words, the denial or brackets of states are the collective authorship of their identity and interests ... A realistic rationalist alliance denies or braces the fact that the competitive policies of power help create the very problem of order - that realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Vendtian constructivism seeks to highlight that the values of material forces and the premeditation of state actors largely depend on the common ideas in which they are embedded, and as such culture is a condition for the opportunity to explain power and interests. It emphasizes the importance of regulatory structures that have as much influence on the behaviour of international relations as material structures, support the role of identity as a factor shaping the interests and behaviour of States, and attach great importance to dynamic interaction between agents and structures. Notes. Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 200. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 193. 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