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Our author, assuming that he has proved enough that the ideas we would like to receive are different from those of other ideas, and that this feeling is more solid and alive than our general concept, tries in the next place to explain the reason for this living feeling similar to other acts of the mind. His reasoning seems curious; but can be scant to be intelligible, or at least probably to the reader, without a long detail that will exceed the compass I have prescribed myself. The work of David Hume Treatise of Human Nature AuthorDavid HumeLanguageEnglishSubosophosophyPublication date1739-40Pages368ISBN0-7607-7172-3 Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is the book of the Scottish philosopher David Hume, considered by many, the most important work by Hume and one of the most influential works of history in the history of philosophy. The treatise is a classic statement of philosophical empiricism, skepticism and naturalism. In the introduction, Hume presents the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a new basis: namely, empirical study of human nature. Impressed by Isaac Newton's advances in the physical sciences, Hume sought to incorporate the same experimental method of reasoning into the study of human psychology, with the aim of discovering the scale and power of human understanding. Against philosophical rationalists, Hume argues that passions, not minds, regulate human behavior. He introduces the famous problem of induction, arguing that inductive reasoning and our beliefs about cause and effect cannot be justified by reason; instead, our belief in induction and cause-and-effect activities is the result of mental habits and customs. Hume defends the sentimentalist narrative of morality, arguing that ethics is based on feelings and passions, not on reason, and famously declares that mind is and should be only a slave of passions. Hume also offers a skeptical personality theory and a compatible account of free will. Modern philosophers wrote of Hume that no man influenced the history of philosophy to a deeper or more alarming degree and that Hume's treatise was a fundamental document of cognitive science and the most important philosophical work written in English. However, the public in the UK at the time disagreed, and in the end Hume himself agrees, reworking the material in the inquiry concerning human understanding (1748) and the request concerning the principles of morality (1751). In the author's submission to the first, Hume wrote: Most of the principles and reasoning contained in this volume were published in a work in three volumes, called The Treatise of Human Nature: a work that the author projected before he left college, and which he wrote and published shortly thereafter. But don't find successfully, he was reasonable of his mistakes in going to the press too early, and he threw everything again into the following part, where some negligence in his former reasoning and more in expression, he hopes, is corrected. However, several writers who revered the author's philosophy with answers, took care to direct all their batteries against this work of minors, which the author never recognized, and influenced the triumph in any advantage that, they imagined, they got over it: a practice very contrary to all the rules of frankness and fair trade, and a strong instance of those polemical tricks that bigotted zeal considers to be empowered to use. From now on, the Author wishes that the following plays could be considered only as containing his philosophical feelings and principles. As for the request concerning the principles of morality, Hume said: of all my works, historical, philosophical or literary, incomparably the best. The content of this section does not provide any sources. Please help improve this section by adding links to reliable sources. Non-sources of materials can be challenged and removed. Find the Sources: Treatise of Human Nature - News Newspaper Book Scientist JSTOR (September 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Introduction of Hume's introduction presents the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a new foundation: namely, empirical research into human psychology. He begins by acknowledging that general prejudices against metaphysical reasoning (i.e. any complex and difficult arguments) are prejudices formed in response to the current imperfect state of science (including endless scientific disputes and the excessive influence of eloquence on the mind). But since truth must lie very deep and abmal, where the greatest geniuses have not found it, a careful justification is still necessary. All science, Hume continues, ultimately depends on human science: knowledge of the scale and power of human understanding,... the nature of the ideas that we use, and ... the operations that we perform in our reasoning are necessary for real intellectual progress. In this way, Hume hopes to explain the principles of human nature by offering a composite system of science built on a foundation, almost entirely new and the only one on which they can stand with any security. But a priori psychology would be hopeless: the science of man should be carried out by experimental methods of natural sciences. This means that we must be content with well-confirmed empirical generalizations, forever unaware of the ultimate original qualities of human nature. And in the absence of controlled experiments, we were left to pick up our experiments in this science from cautious observation of human life, and take them as they in the general course of the world, the behavior of men in the company, in business and in their pleasures. Book 1: Understanding Part 1: Ideas, Their Origins, Composition, Communication, Abstraction, etc. Hume begins by asserting that every simple idea comes from a simple impression, so that all of our ideas ultimately stem from experience: thus Hume accepts the empiricism of the concept and rejects purely intellectual and innate ideas found in rationalistic philosophy. Hume's teachings are based on two important differences (power perceptions found in experience, all our feelings, passions and emotions) and ideas (weak perceptions found in thinking and reasoning), and between complex ideas (which can be distinguished into simpler parts) and simple representations (which cannot). Our complex ideas, he admits, may not directly fit in the experience (for example, we can form a complex idea of a celestial city). But every simple idea (e.g. red) directly corresponds to a simple impression resembling it, and this regular correspondence suggests that they are causally related. Because simple experiences come ahead of simple ideas, and because those who don't have functioning feelings (such as blindness) ultimately lack relevant ideas, Hume concludes that simple ideas need to be derived from simple impressions. It is noteworthy that Hume counts and dismisses the missing shade of blue counter-example. Perception in Treatise 1.1 Impressions of the Impression of Reflection of the Ideas of Memory Ideas of Imagination In Part 1 of Book 1, Hume divides mental perception into different categories. A simple/complex distinction that can be applied to perception in all categories is not depicted. Briefly studying the impressions, Hume then distinguishes between impressions of sensation (found in the sense of experience) and impressions of reflection (found mainly in emotional experience), only to put aside any further discussion of passions. Returning to ideas, Hume finds two key differences between memory ideas and ideas of imagination: the former are stronger than the last, and while memory retains the order and position of original impressions, imagination freely separates and rearranges all simple ideas into new complex ideas. But despite this freedom, the imagination still strives to follow the general psychological principles as it moves from one idea to another: it is an association of ideas. Here, Hume finds three natural relationships that guide the imagination: similarity, continuity and cause-and-effect communication. But imagination remains free to compare ideas on any of the seven philosophical relationships: similarity, identity, number/number, opposites and cause-and-effect volumes. Hume ends this discussion with a skeptical account of our perceptions of substances and regimes: although both are nothing more than collections of simple ideas related to each other by imagination, the idea of the substance also includes attributing either a fabricated unknown something in which special qualities must be wiped out, or some kind of continuity or causality relationship linking the quality together and setting them up to produce new qualities. Hume finishes Part 1 by arguing (after Berkeley) that so-called abstract ideas are actually only specific ideas used in general. First, it makes three point cases against vague ideas of quantity or quality, insisting on the impossibility of differentiation or distinguishing the length of the line from the line itself, the ultimate withdrawal of all ideas from fully defining impressions, and the impossibility of uncertain objects in reality and therefore in the idea as well. Secondly, it gives a positive account of how abstract thought actually works: once we are used to using the same term for a number of resembling elements, hearing this generic term will trigger a specific idea and activate a related custom that disposes of imagination to evoke any resembling specific ideas as needed. Thus, the general term triangle both evokes the idea of a particular triangle and activates the custom of recycling the imagination to evoke any other ideas of specific triangles. Finally, Hume uses this account to explain so-called mind differences (e.g., distinguishing body movement from body). While such differences are strictly impossible, Hume argues, we achieve the same effect by mentioning different points of similarity between different objects. Part 2: From hume's space and time ideas, the system relating to space and time has two main doctrines: the Finitist doctrine that space and time are not endlessly divided, and the relationalist teaching that space and time cannot be conceived separately from objects. Hume begins by saying that because the ability of the mind is limited, our imagination and feelings must eventually reach a minimum: ideas and impressions are so tiny as to be indivisible. And since nothing can be more than a minute, our indivisible ideas are adequate representations of the smallest parts of expansion. After reviewing these clear ideas, Hume makes several arguments to demonstrate that space and time are not endlessly divided, but instead consist of indivisible points. According to him, the idea of space is abstracted from our sensory experience (arrangements of color or material points) and the idea of time from the changing continuity of our own And this means that space and time cannot be conceived on independently, except objects located in space or changing over time. Thus, we have no idea about absolute space and time, so vacuum and time are unchanged excluded. Hume then defends his two doctrines against objections. Defending his finitism from mathematical objections, he argues that geometry definitions actually support his score. He then argues that since important geometric ideas (equality, directness, plane) do not have any precise and deion standards other than general observation, corrective measurements and imaginary standards, which we are naturally prone to manufacture, it follows that extremely subtle geometric demonstrations of infinite differences cannot be trusted. Hume then defends his relational doctrine by critically studying the supposed idea of vacuum. No such idea can be derived from our experience of darkness or movement (one or accompanied by visible or material objects), but it is indeed this experience that explains why we mistakenly think we have an idea: according to Hume, we confuse the idea of two distant objects separated by other visible or material objects with a very similar idea of two objects separated by invisible and intangible distance. With this diagnosis in his hands, he responds to three objections from the Vacuum camp, adding on a skeptical note that his intention was never to penetrate the nature of organs, or to explain the secret causes of their activities, but only to explain the nature and causes of our perception, or impressions and ideas. In the final section, Hume explains our understanding of existence and external existence. First, he argues that there is no clear impression from which the idea of existence can be extracted. Instead, this idea is nothing more than the idea of any object, so think about something and think of it as there is the same thing. Further, he argues that we cannot imagine anything other than our own perception; thus, our idea of the existence of external objects is, at least, a relative idea. Part 3: From Knowledge and Probability, Sections 1-3, Hume recalls seven philosophical relationships, and divides them into two classes: four that can give us knowledge and confidence, and three that can't. (This separation reappears in Hume's first query as a relationship of ideas and fact issues, respectively.) As for the four relationships, he notes, they can all give knowledge through intuition: immediate recognition of communication (e.g., one idea is brighter in color than another). But with one in four, proportions in quantity or quality, we usually achieve knowledge by demonstrating: step-by-step conclusion of reasoning (e.g. evidence in geometry). Hume makes two comments on demonstrative in mathematics: that geometry is not as precise as algebra (although still generally reliable), and that mathematical ideas are ideas not spiritual and refin'd perception, but instead copied with impressions. Knowledge and Probability Immediate ConclusionAldus Ideas Intuition Demonstrative Reasoning Issues Perception Of Facts Probable Reasoning As for the other three relationships, two of them (identity and space/time) are simply a matter of immediate sensory perception (e.g. one object next to another). But with the latter attitude, cause-and-effect, we can go beyond the senses, by a form of reasoning it calls probable reasoning. Here, Hume embarks on his famous study of causality, starting with the question, from what impression do we get our idea of cause-and-effect? All that can be observed in one case of cause and effect are two connections: continuity in space and priority in time. But Hume insists that our idea of cause-and-effect communication also includes a mysterious, necessary link that binds the cause to the effect. Shortly on this issue, Hume postpones the idea of the necessary connection and considers two related questions: why do we accept the maxim everything that begins to exist should have a reason?, and how does the psychological process of probable reasoning work? Addressing the first question, Hume argues that the maxim is not based on intuition or demonstration (claiming that we can at least imagine objects beginning to exist for no reason) and then refutes the four alleged maxim demonstrations. He concludes that our acceptance of this maxim must somehow be drawn from observation and experience, and thus moves on to the second question. Sections 4-8 Hume develops a detailed three-story psychological report on how the probable justification works (i.e. how the court works). First, our feelings or memory should present us with some object: our confidence in this perception (our retreat) is simply a matter of its strength and vivacity. Secondly, we must draw a conclusion by moving from our perception of this object to the idea of another object: since these two objects are completely different from each other, this conclusion should be based on the past experience of two objects observed together over and over again. (This constant connection is quickly fed along with continuity and priority, in Hume's emerging report on our idea of cause and effect.) But what exactly is the process by which we draw on past experience and draw the conclusion from a real object to another object? This is where the famous induction problem arises. Hume argues that this important conclusion cannot be taken into account by any process of reasoning: neither demonstrative reasoning nor probable reasoning. Not demonstrative reasoning: it is impossible to demonstrate that the future will resemble the past, for we can at least change in nature, in which the future is vastly different from the past. And hardly reasoning: what that reasoning itself is based on past experience, which means that it implies that the future will resemble the past. In other words, by explaining how we draw on past experience to draw causal conclusions, we cannot turn to a kind of reasoning that in itself is based on past experience, which would be a vicious circle that will lead nowhere. The conclusion is not based on reasoning, Hume concludes, but on the unification of ideas: our innate psychological tendency to move on three natural relationships. Recall that one of the three is a cause-and-effect group: thus, when two objects are constantly connected in our experience, observing one naturally leads us to form an idea of the other. This brings us to the third and final phase of Hume's account, our belief in another object, when we complete the process of probable reasoning (for example, seeing wolf tracks and confidently concluding that they were caused by wolves). In his opinion, the only difference between faith with an idea and just an idea is the added strength and vivacity of faith. And there is a general psychological tendency to any living perception to transmit part of its strength and vivacity to any other perception naturally associated with it (for example, seeing the picture of an absent friend, we meet each other more vividly, in the natural relation of similarity). Thus, in the probable reasoning, on Hume's account, our living perception of one object not only leads us to form a simple idea of another object, but revives this idea into a full-fledged faith. (This is only the simplest case: Hume also intends his account to explain probable reasoning without conscious reflection, as well as probable reasoning based on only one observation.) Sections 9-13 Hume now stops for a more general study of the psychology of faith. The other two natural relationships (similarity and continuity) are too weak and uncertain to lead to faith in themselves, but they can still have a significant impact: their presence strengthens our pre-existing beliefs, they shift us in favor of causes that resemble their consequences, and their absence explains why so many really believe in the afterlife. Similarly, other types of custom conditioning (e.g. mechanical training, repeated lies) can cause strong beliefs. Hume then examines mutual influence and passion, and faith and imagination. Only beliefs can have a motivational effect: it is the extra strength and vivacity of faith (as opposed to a simple idea) that makes it capable of working on will and passion. And, in turn, we tend to favor beliefs that flatter our passions. Similarly, the story must be somewhat realistic or familiar to please the imagination, and overactive can lead to delusional faith. Hume sees these varied phenomena, confirming his strength and vivacity account of faith. Faith, we keep ourselves from expanding our faith to each increase in the strength and vivacity of our ideas only by thinking soberly about past experiences and forming common rules for ourselves. Probable Reasoning in Treatise 1.3 Probable Reasoning Probability Causes Imperfect Experience Opposite Causes Analogy In Part 3 of Book 1, Hume divides probable reasoning into different categories. Hume then examines probable reasoning in an environment of empirical uncertainty, distinguishing evidence (convincing empirical evidence) from mere probabilities (less convincing empirical evidence). Starting with a brief section on the likelihood of chances, he gives the example of a six-sided death, four sides marked to one side and two sides marked differently: background causes lead us to expect death to earth with face up, but the strength of this expectation is divided indifferently across six sides, and finally reunited according to the markings of die, so we end up expecting one to expect more markings. than others. This is basically a prelude to the probability of causes where Hume distinguishes between three types of probability: (1) an imperfect experience where young children are not observed enough to form any expectations, (2) opposite causes, where the same event is observed to have different causes and consequences in different circumstances, due to hidden factors, and (3) analogies where we rely on a history of observations that only resemble a real case. It focuses on the second form of probability (particularly reflexive reasoning about mixed body observations), offering a psychological explanation just as the probability of odds: we begin with a user impulse to expect that the future will resemble the past, divide it through specific past observations, and then (reflecting on these observations) to reunite the impulses of any relevant observations, so that the final balance of faith favors the most frequently observed type of case. Hume's discussion of probability ends with a section on general cognitive biases, starting with the effects of decency. First, the more recent an event that we are looking for, the stronger our faith in conclusion. Second, the more recent observations we rely on, the stronger our faith in conclusion. Third, the longer and more intermittent the line of reasoning, the weaker our belief in conclusion. Fourth, irrational prejudices can be shaped by an over-generation of experience: imagination unnecessarily depends on any superfluous circumstances that are often observed to accompany circumstances that really matter. And, paradoxically, the only way to correct the pernicious influence of general rules is to follow other general rules, reflecting on the circumstances of the case and our cognitive limitations. Throughout the section, Hume uses his strength and vivacity of faith to explain these non-philosophical influences on our reasoning. Sections 14-16 After completing his account of probable reasoning, Hume returns to the mysterious idea of the necessary connection. He rejects some of the proposed sources of this idea: neither from the known qualities of matter, nor from God, nor from any unknown quality of matter, nor from our power to move on our power. For all ideas stem from experience, and in no case do we see anything like the necessary link that binds the cause to the effect. But the idea arises from repeated observations, and since simple repetition cannot produce anything new in the objects themselves, the idea must therefore flow from something new in our mind. Thus, he concludes that the idea of the necessary connection stems from within: from the feeling we feel when the mind (caused by re-observation) draws a causal conclusion. And while his conclusion is shocking to common sense, Hume explains this, remembering that the mind has a greater tendency to spread to external objects. Finally, it proposes two definitions of cause: one in terms of objects (e.g., their relationship of priority, continuity and constant connection) and the other in terms of mind (e.g., the causal conclusion it makes when observing objects). Hume finishes part 3 with two brief sections. First, it presents eight rules for empirical identification of the true causes: after all, if we put aside the experience, a thing can produce any thing. Second, he compares the human mind to an animal's mind, a comparison that clinches the case of his association account of probable reasoning: after all, animals are clearly able to learn from experience through conditioning, and yet they are clearly not in a position of any complex reasoning. Part 4: From Skeptical and Other Philosophy Systems Sections 1-2 Hume starts part 4, claiming that all knowledge degenerates into probability, due to the possibility of error: even rock solid math confidence becomes less than certain when we remember that we may have made a mistake somewhere. But the situation worsens: thinking about the fallacy of our mind, and

violations of the rules become more frequent and therefore more strategically expedient. People are unable to overcome this weakness and change our nature, no matter how much we may regret it from a far-sighted long-term perspective, so we should instead change our situation and turn to the artificial expediency of government: giving rather unselfish public officials the power to enforce the laws of justice, to resolve impartial disputes, and even to ensure public good otherwise is not enough because of the free rider's problems. Hume criticizes the liberal theory of Whig rule as emerging from his power only with the consent of the governed, as goes back to the original contract between the ruler and the people. He agrees with the rudiments of the Whig theory: simple societies can exist for a long time without government, because it is a war between societies that first brings serious social unrest (from conflict over the trophies of war) and then the government, with military leaders becoming political leaders at a public meeting. But while the government usually originates in a social agreement, the promise may not be its only source of power. For, as Hume argued, the very promise originates in a social convention serving the public interest, so if the government serves the public interest by maintaining order and harmony in society, it gets its own authority, equivalent to the power of keeping promises. We have a parallel interest in both: the promise is the invention of man necessary for social cooperation, and the government is the invention of man, necessary (in large and developed societies) to ensure the reliable provision of such practices and thus maintain public order, and no invention serves a more general or greater interest than the other. And these two go hand in hand and morally: breaking promises and anti-government actions are not approved primarily out of a sense of general interest. So there is no point in founding one in another. Hume also appeals to the opinions of ordinary people (who, in matters of morality and other sentimental fields, carry with them a peculiar authority and, to a large extent, are infallible), who consider themselves born of obedience regardless of any promising, silent or otherwise authoritarian states - an understanding reflected in the legal codes of rebellion. But Hume agrees with the Vigi about the right of resistance when governments become tyrannical. Our interest in government lies in the security and protection that we enjoy in a political society and therefore disappears as soon as power becomes unbearably repressive. And we can expect that our moral obligation to allegiance will be stubbornly maintained due to the influence of common rules, our familiarity with human nature and the history of tyrants will give us additional additional a rule that denotes exceptions to the general rule. Therefore, public opinion (completely infallible in matters of morality) is not able to issue as any exception the rule of passive obedience, but is quite ready to make allowances for resistance in more egregious cases of tyranny and oppression. The next problem with fidelity is who exactly is the rightful ruler? And, according to Hume, such issues are often intractable for a reason, and it may be wise to simply go with the flow in the interest of peace and freedom. Again, Hume agrees that political society begins with a social agreement, promising loyalty to certain people. But once the government acquires its own power, serving the public interest, it is (paradoxically) in our interest to renounce our interests and simply abide by the powers that will ensure that we do not get into disagreement over the best ruler. Five somewhat arbitrary principles are then answered to questions about succession: (1) long-term ownership: the influence of custom favours long-established forms of government, although it takes longer to acquire the right to large States; (2) Current ownership: few governments have any better claim to power than successfully holding on to power; (3) Conquest: we stand for the glorious conquerors over the hideous usurpers; (4) Continuity: Along with the obvious benefits of hereditary management, Hume emphasizes our creative tendency to associate parents with children and pass things from one to the other; (5) Positive laws: legislators can change the form of government, although any sharp departure from tradition tends to diminish the loyalty of the people's power. And with so many different principles, the choice of ruler is sometimes surprisingly clear and sometimes hopelessly unclear. In the final discussion of the Glorious Revolution, Hum defends the preservation of the right to resist unverified and outside the legal code, and extending this right from cases of outright oppression to cases of inter-brotherly constitutional encroachment in mixed-d governments, adding two philosophical reflections: first, the powers of parliament to exclude the heirs of the rulers whom they overthrew, but not the heirs of the rulers who simply died, derived from simple creative inertia; secondly, a contested change of power could gain retroactive legitimacy from a stable line of successors. Hume then explores international law: similarities between individuals and entire nations give the same three laws of nature as before, but the special needs of nations require special rules (e.g. diplomatic immunity). But because cooperation between states is not as necessary and beneficial as between individuals, moral norms have much less force in the international context and may be legal to be broken out of a more trivial motive i.e. a weaker natural obligation brings a weaker moral obligation. Only practice can determine exactly how weaker the obligation is, and the fact that the rules are found to be weaker in practice shows that people have an implicit understanding of their artificiality. The final section examines the social rules governing women's sexual behavior (chastity and modesty), which Hume takes to beautifully illustrate how artificial virtues based only on social interests can nevertheless acquire universal power. It is obvious that these rules are not entirely natural, and yet they solve a natural problem: the child needs both parents, parents should know that they have the child, and fatherhood is subject to uncertainty. And since issues of sexual fidelity cannot be resolved in courtrooms, society needs informal norms (with weakened evidence standards and increased reputational importation), protecting women's loyalty. Indeed, Hume adds, given the female weakness in the face of sexual temptation, society needs women to feel strongly disgusted with something, even in a moment of infidelity. This decision may seem unrealistic in the abstract, but nature has made it a reality: those who are personally concerned about infidelity have swept through indifferent in their disapproval, shaped the minds of girls, and expanded the general rule into apparently irrational territory, with debauch'd men shocked by any female transgression and postmenopausal women condemned for utterly innocuous promiscuity. Instead, men stake their reputations on courage (partly natural virtue) and enjoy weaker sexual norms, fidelity in men (such as cooperation between countries) being less important to society. Part 3: Of the other virtues and vices. Section 1 Hume completes the treatise by studying natural virtues: these traits, affirmed independently of social conventions. In a general review of morality and passions, it reminds us that human psychology is driven by pain and pleasure, which are called direct passions, and then indirect passions that explain moral evaluation and which qualities or symbols are considered virtuous or not. And since indirect passions refer to actions only as pointing to something stable in the mind of the agent, moral feelings are also directed primarily at mental qualities and only derivatives of actions. After this review, Hume presents his central hypothesis on natural virtues and vices: the moral assessment of these traits is best explained in terms of empathy. The hypothesis is confirmed by three moments: empathy is so very powerful that simply observing the causes of emotions or consequences can inform emotions to us, the beauty we find in anything useful stems from empathy for the pleasure it bring to its users, and the moral beauty we find in artificial virtues stems from empathy with the public interest that these virtues serve. Given these three points, the moments Given that natural virtues and social utility often go together, stinginess dictates that we also explain natural virtues in terms of empathy. Hume finds the connection between virtue and utility quite obvious: the inspired Mendeville to misunderem about virtue as a fraudulent invention of pandering politicians, and indeed the connection is even stronger with natural virtues than with artificial virtues. For while artificial virtues can harm society in specific cases (encouraging public interest only through the mediation of a common pattern), natural virtues help society in any case, making it even more likely that empathy explains the moral assessment of natural virtues. Hume further develops his sympathy-based account of natural virtues by addressing two objections. First, variability and impartiality: how can something so variable as empathy explain a moral impartiality of this kind that recognizes virtue in both loved ones and complete strangers? Hume replies that, since variability in moral evaluation will lead to hopeless practical conflict, we correct our common judgments by fixing a common point of view: that is, we focus on people in someone's sphere of influence and evaluate its character by sympathetically considering how their character traits affect them. Indeed, we perform similar corrections for our feelings and our aesthetic judgments. Of course, our passions can resist correction, so only our language has changed; but we still know that our emotional favoritism of some over others will disappear if we are equally close to all of them, which may be enough to settle the general calm definition of passions. Second, moral luck: how can empathy explain cases where unusual external circumstances have prevented someone's inner character from having its usual consequences? Hume's answer is that imagination follows general rules by focusing more on something general than its actual effects, and that our moral feelings are influenced accordingly. Naturally, we will feel even stronger approval when the general trend is actually realized, but we intentionally postpone moral luck to correct our general moral judgments. This explains how we can manage such extensive sympathy in morality, despite our limited generosity in practice: it takes real consequences and specific cases to touch the heart and controul our passions, but the seeming tendencies and general tendencies are enough to influence our taste. He ends this general attitude to natural virtues by four times classification: each natural virtue is either (1) useful for (2) useful for the person himself, (3) immediately agrees with others, or (4) immediately agrees with the person himself. Of these four sources of moral differences the most important are the usefulness that pleases us even when only private interests are at stake: thus, we approve of prudence and frugality, and while the vice of laziness is sometimes betrayed (as an excuse for a failed or veiled boast of sophistication), agility in business wins the approval of pure sympathy for the personal interests of the individual. Two categories of useful virtues are often mixed with empathy: what hurts me eventually hurts others as they sympathize with me, and what hurts others ultimately hurts me, how I sympathize with them. And even here, empathy plays an important role: we approve of these virtues in large part because they bring pleasure to others or to the individual. Hume concludes with a general overview of this hypothesis - visas. that we evaluate a character, sympathetically considering its impact on the person and others in his sphere of influence, and a brief remark about how good or sick the desert is explained in terms of benevolence or anger that come with an assessment (i.e. to love or hate) another person. Section 2-3 Hume then applies his general system of morality to two kinds of virtue: the gross heroic virtue of the great and kind-hearted virtue of good. As for heroic virtue, it draws its merit from a suspicious source: pride. Pride has a bad name because the idea of someone above us can be so immediately unpleasant, but Hume distinguishes between a bad foundation and a well-founded pride. Undeish pride hurts us in comparison when someone else is overworked in their virtues, and this idea of the boss becomes more than an idle invention and reaches a medium level of strength. But someone's justified pride brings us the pleasure of empathy when the idea is so strong in us that we fully believe in their merits. Therefore, justified pride is a virtue, because of its usefulness and pleasure to the person himself. Now, since we are so prone to the vice of excessive pride, social harmony requires artificial rules (rules of good breeding) against the open expression of any pride at all. But people of honor are expected to still have a healthy inner sense of self-esteem, and those whose modesty goes too far are despised for their meanness or simplicity. Thus, heroic virtues - our fearlessness, ambition, love of fame, generosity and all other shining virtues of this kind - mostly admire the well-regulated pride they embody. Indeed, though excessive pride is harmful to oneself (even if politely hidden from others), and fame is often extremely harmful to others, yet there is something wonderful and dazzling dazzling the pride of the hero, thanks at once to the pleasant sublime and sublime feeling he feels. Hume adds that our disapproval of the open pride of even those who have never insulted us (such as historical figures) is associated with additional empathy for the people around them. As for the virtues of kindness and benevolence, Hume explains their merits primarily in terms of their positive impact on others. The section begins by reviewing Hume's account of moral evaluation from a general point of view, and sympathy for the sphere of human influence. Here gentle passions are not only good for society in themselves, they are necessary in order to direct other virtues for the public good. But there is also a more immediate endorsement, since we just touch'd with a gentle feeling or sympathizes with characters like our own - that's why even benevolent triva and excesses in love still win approval as love in their minds easily turns to love in our minds for them. As for contrasting evil passions, they are judged in comparison with humanity as a whole - such passions are justified when normal, sometimes despised when absent, and even applauded when impressively low, although they form the most proven of all vices when they rise to cruelly - and for its negative impact on others. Indeed, in general, your moral virtue is mostly determined by how much you are desired in different social relationships. Sections 4-5 Hume finishes by explaining how his system accommodates not only moral virtues but also the natural abilities of the mind, and downplaying the distinction as not very important and largely a matter of mere terminology. Virtues and abilities are the same, Hume argues, in their causes and consequences: they are mental qualities that produce pleasure and are encouraging, and we all care about both. On the objection that difference matters because the affirmation of abilities is different from the affirmation of virtues, Hume replies that our endorsement of different things always feels different (for example, with different virtues). On the objection that virtues are not like the ability to be voluntary and to engage free will, Hume replies that many virtues are involuntary (especially the virtues of the great), that volunteerism has no clear relationship to the moral evaluation process and that we have no free will other than mere volunteerism. But volunteering helps explain why moralists think that difference matters: in the context of moral exhortation, Hume explains, it's important to focus on the qualities that are most responsive to social pressure, rather than endorsing indiscriminately any mental perfection like ordinary people and ancient philosophers. These natural abilities of the mind are valued mainly for their usefulness to the person himself: for example, prudence, foresight, industry, patience. Sometimes sometimes pleasantness is the most important, whether for others (e.g. wit, eloquence, charisma, even purity) or the person himself (e.g. joie de vivre). Our judgments are influenced by empirical associations between a person's quality and age or lifestyle (e.g., disapproval of frivolity in the old). Natural abilities also affect our assessments, making a capable person more consistent in life, good or bad. The question of why we are less inclined to value a person according to the speed and accuracy of their memory, Hume explains that (unlike intelligence) memory is carried out without any sensations of pleasure or pain; and in all its middle degrees serves almost equally well in business and business. So far, Hume's account has dealt solely with mental qualities, but it goes some way to accommodate bodily benefits and the benefits of fate that are equally capable of eliciting love and approval. Thus, women love a strong man in liking to the usefulness of a lover he might expect to receive, everyone finds beauty in healthy and beneficial body parts, and immediate pleasure or anxiety arises from the perception of regular functions or painful air, respectively. Thus, we respect the rich with sympathy for the pleasure they are given by their wealth, reinforced by the fact that they are more consistent. Hume notes that while he can't explain why, the sense of approval is more defined by the type of object provided (e.g. an inanimate object, or person) than the kind of triggering approval mechanism (e.g., sympathy for utility, or immediate alignment). Section 6 of Book 3, and therefore the Treatise in general, summarizes the motives of Hume's thesis that empathy is the main source of moral differences. Indeed, most would agree that justice and the useful qualities of the mind are valued for their usefulness, and that other than empathy can explain why we care about the public good or the happiness of strangers? This ethics system is not only supported by a firm argument, Hume adds, but can also help moralists show dignity and happiness of virtue. First, it puts morality in a good light to see it derived from a so noble source as empathy: we end up affirming virtue, a sense of virtue, and even the psychological principles underlying a sense of virtue. And while the artificiality of justice may seem unattractive at first, it disappears when we recall that because the interests on which justice is based are the greatest conceivable and extend to all times and places, so the rules of justice are fast and immutable; at least as immutable as human nature. Second, life pays off pretty well, bringing immediate benefits, increased social reputation and inner satisfaction of the mind capable of carrying own polling. So while Hume presents himself as a theoretical anatomist who dissects human psychology into ugly bits, his work is well suited to a practical painter who styles morality into a beautiful and attractive ideal. See also The Hume Law of Human Sciences Links - the book appeared in many publications after the author's death. See Hume, David (1888). Selby Bigge, Los Angeles) Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press Archive.org. 1. London: Longmans, Green and Co; Hume, David (1882). Green, T.H.; Grose, T.H. (eds.). 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