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Our author, assuming that he has proved enough that the ideas we would like to receive are different from those of other ideas, and that this feeling is more solid and alive than our general concept, tries in the next place to explain the reason for this living feeling similar to other acts of the mind. His reasoning seems curious; but can be scant to be intelligible, or at least probably to the reader, without a long detail that will exceed the compass I have prescribed myself. The work of David Hume Treatise of Human Nature AuthorDavid HumeLanguageEnglishSubosophosophyPublication date1739-40Pages368ISBN0-7607-7172-3 Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is the book of the Scottish philosopher David Hume, considered by many, the most important work by Hume and one of the most influential works of history in the history of philosophy. The treatise is a classic statement of philosophical empiricism, skepticism and naturalism. In the introduction, Hume presents the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a new basis: namely, empirical study of human nature. Impressed by Isaac Newton's advances in the physical sciences, Hume sought to incorporate the same experimental method of reasoning into the study of human psychology, with the aim of discovering the scale and power of human understanding. Against philosophical rationalists, Hume argues that passions, not minds, regulate human behavior. He introduces the famous problem of induction, arguing that inductive reasoning and our beliefs about cause and effect cannot be justified by reason; instead, our belief in induction and cause-and-effect activities is the result of mental habits and customs. Hume defends the sentimentalist narrative of morality, arguing that ethics is based on feelings and passions, not on reason, and famously declares that mind is and should be only a slave of passions. Hume also offers a skeptical personality theory and a compatible account of free will. Modern philosophers wrote of Hume that no man influenced the history of philosophy to a deeper or more alarming degree and that Hume's treatise was a fundamental document of cognitive science and the most important philosophical work written in English. However, the public in the UK at the time disagreed, and in the end Hume himself agrees, reworking the material in the inquiry concerning human understanding (1748) and the request concerning the principles of morality (1751). In the author's submission to the first, Hume wrote: Most of the principles and reasoning contained in this volume were published in a work in three volumes, called The Treatise of Human Nature: a work that the author projected before he left college, and which he wrote and published shortly thereafter. But don't find successfully, he was reasonable of his mistakes in going to the press too early, and he threw everything again into the following part, where some negligence in his former reasoning and more in expression, he hopes, is corrected. However, several writers who revered the author's philosophy with answers, took care to direct all their batteries against this work of minors, which the author never recognized, and influenced the triumph in any advantage that, they imagined, they got over it: a practice very contrary to all the rules of frankness and fair trade, and a strong instance of those polemical tricks that bigotted zeal considers to be empowered to use. From now on, the Author wishes that the following plays could be considered only as containing his philosophical feelings and principles. As for the request concerning the principles of morality, Hume said: of all my works, historical, philosophical or literary, incomparably the best. The content of this section does not provide any sources. Please help improve this section by adding links to reliable sources. Non-sources of materials can be challenged and removed. Find the Sources: Treatise of Human Nature - News Newspaper Book Scientist JSTOR (September 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Introduction of Hume's introduction presents the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a new foundation: namely, empirical research into human psychology. He begins by acknowledging that general prejudices against metaphysical reasoning (i.e. any complex and difficult arguments) are prejudices formed in response to the current imperfect state of science (including endless scientific disputes and the excessive influence of eloquence on the mind). But since truth must lie very deep and abmal, where the greatest geniuses have not found it, a careful justification is still necessary. All science, Hume continues, ultimately depends on human science: knowledge of the scale and power of human understanding,... the nature of the ideas that we use, and ... the operations that we perform in our reasoning are necessary for real intellectual progress. In this way, Hume hopes to explain the principles of human nature by offering a composite system of science built on a foundation, almost entirely new and the only one on which they can stand with any security. But a priori psychology would be hopeless: the science of man should be carried out by experimental methods of natural sciences. This means that we must be content with well-confirmed empirical generalizations, forever unaware of the ultimate original qualities of human nature. And in the absence of controlled experiments, we were left to pick up our experiments in this science from cautious observation of human life, and take them as they in the general course of the world, the behavior of men in the company, in business and in their pleasures. Book 1: Understanding Part 1: Ideas, Their Origins, Composition, Communication, Abstraction, etc. Hume begins by asserting that every simple idea comes from a simple impression, so that all of our ideas ultimately stem from experience: thus Hume accepts the empiricism of the concept and rejects purely intellectual and innate ideas found in rationalistic philosophy. Hume's teachings are based on two important differences (power perceptions found in experience, all our feelings, passions and emotions) and ideas (weak perceptions found in thinking and reasoning), and between complex ideas (which can be distinguished into simpler parts) and simple representations (which cannot). Our complex ideas, he admits, may not directly fit in the experience (for example, we can form a complex idea of a celestial city). But every simple idea (e.g. red) directly corresponds to a simple impression resembling it, and this regular correspondence suggests that they are causally related. Because simple experiences come ahead of simple ideas, and because those who don't have functioning feelings (such as blindness) ultimately lack relevant ideas, Hume concludes that simple ideas need to be derived from simple impressions. It is noteworthy that Hume counts and dismisses the missing shade of blue counter-example. Perception in Treatise 1.1 Impressions of the Impression of Reflection of the Ideas of Memory Ideas of Imagination In Part 1 of Book 1, Hume divides mental perception into different categories. A simple/complex distinction that can be applied to perception in all categories is not depicted. Briefly studying the impressions, Hume then distinguishes between impressions of sensation (found in the sense of experience) and impressions of reflection (found mainly in emotional experience), only to put aside any further discussion of passions. Returning to ideas, Hume finds two key differences between memory ideas and ideas of imagination: the former are stronger than the last, and while memory retains the order and position of original impressions, imagination freely separates and rearranges all simple ideas into new complex ideas. But despite this freedom, the imagination still strives to follow the general psychological principles as it moves from one idea to another: it is an association of ideas. Here, Hume finds three natural relationships that guide the imagination: similarity, continuity and cause-and-effect communication. But imagination remains free to compare ideas on any of the seven philosophical relationships: similarity, identity, number/number, opposites and cause-and-effect volumes. Hume ends this discussion with a skeptical account of our perceptions of substances and regimes: although both are nothing more than collections of simple ideas related to each other by imagination, the idea of the substance also includes attributing either a fabricated unknown something in which special qualities must be wiped out, or some kind of continuity or causality relationship linking the quality together and setting them up to produce new qualities. Hume finishes Part 1 by arguing (after Berkeley) that so-called abstract ideas are actually only specific ideas used in general. First, it makes three point cases against vague ideas of quantity or quality, insisting on the impossibility of differentiation or distinguishing the length of the line from the line itself, the ultimate withdrawal of all ideas from fully defining impressions, and the impossibility of uncertain objects in reality and therefore in the idea as well. Secondly, it gives a positive account of how abstract thought actually works: once we are used to using the same term for a number of resembling elements, hearing this generic term will trigger a specific idea and activate a related custom that disposes of imagination to evoke any resembling specific ideas as needed. Thus, the general term triangle both evokes the idea of a particular triangle and activates the custom of recycling the imagination to evoke any other ideas of specific triangles. Finally, Hume uses this account to explain so-called mind differences (e.g., distinguishing body movement from body). While such differences are strictly impossible, Hume argues, we achieve the same effect by mentioning different points of similarity between different objects. Part 2: From hume's space and time ideas, the system relating to space and time has two main doctrines: the Finitist doctrine that space and time are not endlessly divided, and the relationalist teaching that space and time cannot be conceived separately from objects. Hume begins by saying that because the ability of the mind is limited, our imagination and feelings must eventually reach a minimum: ideas and impressions are so tiny as to be indivisible. And since nothing can be more than a minute, our indivisible ideas are adequate representations of the smallest parts of expansion. After reviewing these clear ideas, Hume makes several arguments to demonstrate that space and time are not endlessly divided, but instead consist of indivisible points. According to him, the idea of space is abstracted from our sensory experience (arrangements of color or material points) and the idea of time from the changing continuity of our own And this means that space and time cannot be conceived on independently, except objects located in space or changing over time. Thus, we have no idea about absolute space and time, so vacuum and time are unchanged excluded. Hume then defends his two doctrines against objections. Defending his finitism from mathematical objections, he argues that geometry definitions actually support his score. He then argues that since important geometric ideas (equality, directness, plane) do not have any precise and deion standards other than general observation, corrective measurements and imaginary standards, which we are naturally prone to manufacture, it follows that extremely subtle geometric demonstrations of infinite differences cannot be trusted. Hume then defends his relational doctrine by critically studying the supposed idea of vacuum. No such idea can be derived from our experience of darkness or movement (one or accompanied by visible or material objects), but it is indeed this experience that explains why we mistakenly think we have an idea: according to Hume, we confuse the idea of two distant objects separated by other visible or material objects with a very similar idea of two objects separated by invisible and intangible distance. With this diagnosis in his hands, he responds to three objections from the Vacuumist camp, adding on a skeptical note that his intention was never to penetrate the nature of organs, or to explain the secret causes of their activities, but only to explain the nature and causes of our perception, or impressions and ideas. In the final section, Hume explains our understanding of existence and external existence. First, he argues that there is no clear impression from which the idea of existence can be extracted. Instead, this idea is nothing more than the idea of any object, so think about something and think of it as there is the same thing. Further, he argues that we cannot imagine anything other than our own perception; thus, our idea of the existence of external objects is, at least, a relative idea. Part 3: From Knowledge and Probability, Sections 1-3, Hume recalls seven philosophical relationships, and divides them into two classes: four that can give us knowledge and confidence, and three that can't. (This separation reappears in Hume's first query as a relationship of ideas and fact issues, respectively.) As for the four relationships, he notes, they can all give knowledge through intuition: immediate recognition of communication (e.g., one idea is brighter in color than another). But with one in four, proportions in quantity or quality, we usually achieve knowledge by demonstrating: step-by-step conclusion of reasoning (e.g. evidence in geometry). Hume makes two comments on demonstrative in mathematics: that geometry is not as precise as algebra (although still generally reliable), and that mathematical ideas are ideas not spiritual and refin'd perception, but instead copied with impressions. Knowledge and Probability Immediate ConclusionAldus Ideas Intuition Demonstrative Reasoning Issues Perception Of Facts Probable Reasoning As for the other three relationships, two of them (identity and space/time) are simply a matter of immediate sensory perception (e.g. one object next to another). But with the latter attitude, cause-and-effect, we can go beyond the senses, by a form of reasoning it calls probable reasoning. Here, Hume embarks on his famous study of causality, starting with the question, from what impression do we get our idea of cause-and-effect? All that can be observed in one case of cause and effect are two connections: continuity in space and priority in time. But Hume insists that our idea of cause-and-effect communication also includes a mysterious, necessary link that binds the cause to the effect. Shortly on this issue, Hume postpones the idea of the necessary connection and considers two related questions: why do we accept the maxim everything that begins to exist should have a reason?, and how does the psychological process of probable reasoning work? Addressing the first question, Hume argues that the maxim is not based on intuition or demonstration (claiming that we can at least imagine objects beginning to exist for no reason) and then refutes the four alleged maxim demonstrations. He concludes that our acceptance of this maxim must somehow be drawn from observation and experience, and thus moves on to the second question. Sections 4-8 Hume develops a detailed three-story psychological report on how the probable justification works (i.e. how the court works). First, our feelings or memory should present us with some object: our confidence in this perception (our retreat) is simply a matter of its strength and vivacity. Secondly, we must draw a conclusion by moving from our perception of this object to the idea of another object: since these two objects are completely different from each other, this conclusion should be based on the past experience of two objects observed together over and over again. (This constant connection is quickly fed along with continuity and priority, in Hume's emerging report on our idea of cause and effect.) But what exactly is the process by which we draw on past experience and draw the conclusion from a real object to another object? This is where the famous induction problem arises. Hume argues that this important conclusion cannot be taken into account by any process of reasoning: neither demonstrative reasoning nor probable reasoning. Not demonstrative reasoning: it is impossible to demonstrate that the future will resemble the past, for we can at least change in nature, in which the future is vastly different from the past. And hardly reasoning: what that reasoning itself is based on past experience, which means that it implies that the future will resemble the past. In other words, by explaining how we draw on past experience to draw causal conclusions, we cannot turn to a kind of reasoning that in itself is based on past experience, which would be a vicious circle that will lead nowhere. The conclusion is not based on reasoning, Hume concludes, but on the unification of ideas: our innate psychological tendency to move on three natural relationships. Recall that one of the three is a cause-and-effect group: thus, when two objects are constantly connected in our experience, observing one naturally leads us to form an idea of the other. This brings us to the third and final phase of Hume's account, our belief in another object, when we complete the process of probable reasoning (for example, seeing wolf tracks and confidently concluding that they were caused by wolves). In his opinion, the only difference between faith with an idea and just an idea is the added strength and vivacity of faith. And there is a general psychological tendency to any living perception to transmit part of its strength and vivacity to any other perception naturally associated with it (for example, seeing the picture of an absent friend, we meet each other more vividly, in the natural relation of similarity). Thus, in the probable reasoning, on Hume's account, our living perception of one object not only leads us to form a simple idea of another object, but revives this idea into a full-fledged faith. (This is only the simplest case: Hume also intends his account to explain probable reasoning without conscious reflection, as well as probable reasoning based on only one observation.) Sections 9-13 Hume now stops for a more general study of the psychology of faith. The other two natural relationships (similarity and continuity) are too weak and uncertain to lead to faith in themselves, but they can still have a significant impact: their presence strengthens our pre-existing beliefs, they shift us in favor of causes that resemble their consequences, and their absence explains why so many really believe in the afterlife. Similarly, other types of custom conditioning (e.g. mechanical training, repeated lies) can cause strong beliefs. Hume then examines mutual influence and passion, and faith and imagination. Only beliefs can have a motivational effect: it is the extra strength and vivacity of faith (as opposed to a simple idea) that makes it capable of working on will and passion. And, in turn, we tend to favor beliefs that flatter our passions. Similarly, the story must be somewhat realistic or familiar to please the imagination, and overactive can lead to delusional faith. Hume sees these varied phenomena, confirming his strength and vivacity account of faith. Faith, we keep ourselves from expanding our faith to each increase in the strength and vivacity of our ideas only by thinking soberly about past experiences and forming common rules for ourselves. Probable Reasoning in Treatise 1.3 Probable Reasoning Probability Causes Imperfect Experience Opposite Causes Analogy In Part 3 of Book 1, Hume divides probable reasoning into different categories. Hume then examines probable reasoning in an environment of empirical uncertainty, distinguishing evidence (convincing empirical evidence) from mere probabilities (less convincing empirical evidence). Starting with a brief section on the likelihood of chances, he gives the example of a six-sided death, four sides marked to one side and two sides marked differently: background causes lead us to expect death to earth with face up, but the strength of this expectation is divided indifferently across six sides, and finally reunited according to the markings of die, so we end up expecting one to expect more markings. than others. This is basically a prelude to the probability of causes where Hume distinguishes between three types of probability: (1) an imperfect experience where young children are not observed enough to form any expectations, (2) opposite causes, where the same event is observed to have different causes and consequences in different circumstances, due to hidden factors, and (3) analogies where we rely on a history of observations that only resemble a real case. It focuses on the second form of probability (particularly reflexive reasoning about mixed body observations), offering a psychological explanation just as the probability of odds: we begin with a user impulse to expect that the future will resemble the past, divide it through specific past observations, and then (reflecting on these observations) to reunite the impulses of any relevant observations, so that the final balance of faith favors the most frequently observed type of case. Hume's discussion of probability ends with a section on general cognitive biases, starting with the effects of decency. First, the more recent an event that we are looking for, the stronger our faith in conclusion. Second, the more recent observations we rely on, the stronger our faith in conclusion. Third, the longer and more intermittent the line of reasoning, the weaker our belief in conclusion. Fourth, irrational prejudices can be shaped by an over-generation of experience: imagination unnecessarily depends on any superfluous circumstances that are often observed to accompany circumstances that really matter. And, paradoxically, the only way to correct the pernicious influence of general rules is to follow other general rules, reflecting on the circumstances of the case and our cognitive limitations. Throughout the section, Hume uses his strength and vivacity of faith to explain these non-philosophical influences on our reasoning. Sections 14-16 After completing his account of probable reasoning, Hume returns to the mysterious idea of the necessary connection. He rejects some of the proposed sources of this idea: neither from the known qualities of matter, nor from God, nor from any unknown quality of matter, nor from our power to move on our power. For all ideas stem from experience, and in no case do we see anything like the necessary link that binds the cause to the effect. But the idea arises from repeated observations, and since simple repetition cannot produce anything new in the objects themselves, the idea must therefore flow from something new in our mind. Thus, he concludes that the idea of the necessary connection stems from within: from the feeling we feel when the mind (caused by re-observation) draws a causal conclusion. And while his conclusion is shocking to common sense, Hume explains this, remembering that the mind has a greater tendency to spread to external objects. Finally, it proposes two definitions of cause: one in terms of objects (e.g., their relationship of priority, continuity and constant connection) and the other in terms of mind (e.g., the causal conclusion it makes when observing objects). Hume finishes part 3 with two brief sections. First, it presents eight rules for empirical identification of the true causes: after all, if we put aside the experience, a thing can produce any thing. Second, he compares the human mind to an animal's mind, a comparison that clinches the case of his association account of probable reasoning: after all, animals are clearly able to learn from experience through conditioning, and yet they are clearly not in a position of any complex reasoning. Part 4: From Skeptical and Other Philosophy Systems Sections 1-2 Hume starts part 4, claiming that all knowledge degenerates into probability, due to the possibility of error: even rock solid math confidence becomes less than certain when we remember that we may have made a mistake somewhere. But the situation worsens: thinking about the fallacy of our mind, and

meta-thinking about the fallacy of this first reflection, and so on indefinitely, ultimately reduces the likelihood of complete skepticism - or at least it would be if our beliefs are governed by understanding alone. But, according to Hume, this extinction of faith does not really occur: the presence of beliefs is part of human nature, which only confirms Hume's story of faith as a more correct act of sensitivity than about the cognitive part of our nature. And why aren't we immersed in total skepticism. Hume argues that mind has a limited amount of strength and activity and this difficult and clever reasoning strains the imagination and prevents the regular flow of passions and feelings. As a result, extremely subtle skeptical arguments fail to overcome and destroy our beliefs. Then there is the extremely long story of why we believe in the external physical world: that is, why we think of objects have a continuation (existing when unnoticed) and a distinct (existing external and independent of the mind) existence. Hume examines three potential sources of this faith - feelings, reason, and imagination. These are not feelings: it is obvious that they are not able to tell us anything that exists unnoticed. Nor can they inform us of objects with a distinct existence: feelings represent us only perception of the senses, which means that they cannot present them as representations of certain other objects, nor present them as objects with distinct existence (for the senses are unable to define the mysterious self, distinguishing it from and comparing it with the perception of the senses). And this is not the reason: even children and fools believe in the outside world, and almost all of us naively accept our perception as objects with an extension and a distinct existence that goes against the mind. So this belief has to come from the imagination. But only a few of our impressions are about faith: namely, impressions with permanence (immutability in appearance over time) and consistency (regularity in changing visibility). Thus Hume continues to develop an account as imagination, fed with coherent and constant impressions, brings about faith in objects with continued (and therefore distinct) existence. Given the agreed impressions, we have only one way of keeping track of our observations consistently with past experience: we form the assumption that some objects exist untested. And since this implies a greater pattern than it was in the past observation, cause-and-effect reasoning alone cannot explain this: thus Hume refers to the tendency of the imagination to continue in any train thinking inertially, like galleys in the movement of oars. But explain so huge a building as ... the continuous existence of all external bodies, Hume considers it necessary to bring permanence to his account, as follows: (1) Identity is characterized as immutable and continuity over time. (2) Since the mind is usually confused closely resembling ideas, it is naturally confused by the case of aborted observation of an unchanging object with a case of perfect identity. (3) This combination of perfect identity and aborted observation creates cognitive dissonance, which is solved by fabricating further existence. (4) This fiction is enlivened in a full faith in the living impressions of the memory of the observed object, this naive belief in and the clear existence of our perceptions is false, as simple observations can easily demonstrate. Philosophers therefore distinguish mental perception from external objects. But, Hume argues, this philosophical system of double existence could never have originated directly from reason or imagination. Instead, it is a monstrous offspring of two principles, viz. our naive belief in the continuing and clear existence of our perception, along with our more reflexive conclusion that perception must depend on the mind. Only after going through the naive natural faith, the imagination fabricated this philosophical system arbitrary invention. Hume ends up expressing strong doubts about any system based on such trivial qualities of fantasy and recommends madness and attention as the only means of skepticism. Sections 3-6 Next, Hume presents a brief critique of anti-anti-philosophy (traditional aristotelian) and modern philosophy (after the scientific revolution of mechanical philosophy), focusing on his competing concepts of external objects. As for the incomprehensible fictions of anti-islamic philosophy, in his opinion, they can shed additional light on human psychology. We begin with contradictions in our ideas about bodies: between seeing bodies as ever-changing bundles of different qualities, and seeing bodies as simple units that preserve their identity over time. We reconcile these contradictions by producing something unknown and invisible that underlies change and brings together different qualities together: that is, the essence of traditional metaphysics. Such inventions, fabricated by the imagination to solve such difficulties, include substantial forms, accidents and occult qualities, all meaningless jargon used only to hide our ignorance. Modern philosophy, however, argues that it renounces the trivial inclination of imagination and follows only good reasons (or, for Hume, solid, permanent and consistent principles of imagination). Its fundamental principle is that the secondary qualities (colors, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold) are nothing but impressions in the mind, as opposed to the primary qualities (movement, expansion and hardness) that exist in reality. But Hume argues that primary qualities cannot be conceived separately from secondary qualities. Thus, if we follow a firm mind and exclude the latter, we will be forced to contradict our own feelings, excluding the former, thereby denying the entire outside world. Hume then examines the nature of the mind, starting with a materialist-dualistic discussion on the merits of the mind. He dismisses the whole issue as incomprehensible, because we have no impression (and therefore do not know) about any and defining a substance as something that might exist alone doesn't help (each of our submissions, Hume argues, are then considered a separate substance). Turning to the question of the local combination of mind and matter, he believes and supports an anti-materialist argument that asks how unstretched thoughts and feelings might be able to be found in some place with an extended substance similar to the body. Hume then provides a psychological account of how we get taken into such illusions (in his example, figs and olives are at opposite ends of the table, and we mistakenly assume the sweet fig taste to be in one place and the bitter taste of olive be in another), arguing that unexploring perceptions must somehow exist without place. But for dualists there is the opposite: how can extended perception (extended objects) be associated with a simple substance? Indeed, Hume waggishly adds that this is basically the same problem that theologians usually press against the naturalistic metaphysics of Spinoza: thus, if theologians manage to solve the problem of extended perception belonging to a simple substance, then they give that famous atheist Spinoza the solution to the problem of advanced objects as a means of mere substance. Finally, Hume examines the cause-and-effect relationship, arguing on behalf of materialists that our observations of regular mind-body correlations are sufficient to show the cause-and-effect dependence of the mind on the body, and that since we never reasonably have any connection to betwixt causes and effects in general, our inability to detect any a priori link between mind and body does nothing to show causal independence. Finally, Hume weighs in on the topic of personal identity. It is noteworthy that he argues that introspective experience does not show anything like itself (i.e. a psychically substance with identity and simplicity), but only an ever-changing bundle of specific representations. And so it gives a psychological account of why we believe in personal identity, arguing that the identity we attribute to the human mind is merely a fictitious and similar to what we attribute to the vegetables and bodies of animals. Hume's account begins with our tendency to confuse resembling but opposing ideas, seemingly the idea of perfect identity and the idea of a sequence of related objects, the absurdity we justify through fiction, either something unchanging and continuous, or something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least ... propensity for such fictions. Further, he argues that everyday objects that we attribute to identities (e.g. trees, people, churches, rivers) are indeed such as a sequence of related objects, related similarities, continuity or causality: thus, we lose sight of relatively minor changes, especially when slow and gradual, and especially when some common goals or sympathy parts to their common end. Applying it all to personal identity, he he that because all of our ideas are different from each other, and since we never see any real connection between objects, our perceptions are simply related to each other by natural relationships of similarity (partially produced by memory) and cause-and-effect communication (only detected memory). And, therefore, by leaving aside the fiction we invent, the questions of personal identity are too vague to answer with precision. Section 7 Hume finishes Book 1 with a deeply skeptical interlude. Before continuing his exact anatomy of human nature in Books 2 and 3, he muses with dismay that the danger of trust in his weak abilities, along with the loneliness of caring for a well-established opinion, makes his bold entrances reckless. All his thinking is based on it seems... trivial principles of imagination (memory, feelings and understanding are all based on the imagination or vivacity of our ideas) that leave us so entangled in intractable contradictions and so alarmingly ignorant cause-and-effect relationships. And how much should we trust our imagination? Here looms a dilemma: if we follow the imagination wherever it leads, we end up with ridiculous absurdities; if we follow only its general and more established properties, we are immersed in complete skepticism. As Hume writes, So we have no choice but to bet for the wrong reason, and we don't have any. Faced with this dilemma, we tend to just forget about it and move on, even though Hume is on the verge of intellectual disintegration. Fortunately, human nature steps in to save him: I dine, I play a back-gammon game, I talk, and I'm hilarious with my friends; and when after three or four hours of entertainment, I would go back to these speculations, they appear so cold and strained, and funny that I can not find in my heart to enter them further. And later, when he gets tired of with entertainment and company, his intellectual curiosity and scientific ambitions pop up and bring him back into philosophy. And since no man can resist thinking about transcendental matters in any case, we might as well follow philosophy rather than superstition, for, generally speaking, mistakes in religion are dangerous: those in philosophy are only funny. After all, Hume still hopes that he can make a small contribution to the development of knowledge by helping to refocus philosophy on the study of human nature - a project that can be made possible by even exposing his skeptical doubts to healthy skepticism. Book 2: From Passion Part 1: Pride and Humility Sections 1-6 Hume begins by remembering Book 1 the difference between impressions of sensation (original impressions arising from physical reasons outside the mind) and impressions of reflection (secondary impressions arising from other representations in the mind). Just the last one. He shares these three impressions - passions and other emotions, resembling them - in calmness and violence (almost imperceptible emotions of beauty and deformation, and violent passions we experience more strongly) and in direct and indirect (depending on how complex the cause-and-effect history behind them). Pride and humility are indirect passions, and Hume's account of them is his leading representation of the psychological mechanisms responsible for indirect passions. Passion in the treatise 2 Impressions from the Reflection Direct Passion Pain/Pleasure Joy/Mountaint Fear/Hope Desire/Disgust Instinct Benevolence/Anger Hunger/Thirst for Parental Care Indirect Passion Pride/Humility Love/Hate Throughout Book 2, Hume Divides Passion into Different Categories. The calm/violent distinction that can be applied to passions in all categories is not depicted. Since we cannot put a sense of passion into words, Hume defines passion through their characteristic causes and consequences. The reason for passion is what evokes passion: for example, pride can be caused by its beautiful home. The reason can be divided into the object itself (such as the home) and the quality of an object that works on passions (e.g. the beauty of your home). The object of passion is what passion is ultimately directed at: pride and humility are both directed at themselves. Both the object and the cause have a basis in human nature: according to Hume, the object of these passions is enshrined in the basic constitution of human psychology (Hume uses the term original), while their causes are determined by a more general set of adaptable psychological mechanisms (natural, but not original). Hume's account is based on three mechanisms. First, the association of ideas: the mind tends to move from one idea to another idea, which is naturally connected with it. Secondly, the association of impressions: the mind tends to move from one passion to another passion, resembling it by feeling (for example, from joy to love). Third, their mutual help: if we feel a passion for something, we tend to feel a resembling passion for something else, naturally associated with it (for example, from anger to one person to impatience with a related person). Applying it all to pride, Hume argues that a pleasant sense of pride directed at ourselves naturally tends to be triggered when something naturally related to oneself produces a pleasant feeling, while with humility, when something naturally connected to oneself produces an unpleasant feeling of our own, it usually makes us ashamed of ourselves. Thus, these indirect passions are the result of a relationship of impressions and ideas. Hume connects his score with five First, for pride or humility to be created, the attitude of ideas must be relatively close. Secondly, since our judgments are highly dependent on comparison, this attitude should apply only to ourselves or to a few others. Thirdly, the cause of pride or humility must be something obvious to ourselves and others. Fourth, this reason should be long-term. Fifth, the general rules have a strong influence on our passions, as a result of which we lose sight of random anomalies. Sections 7-10 In the following three sections, Hume puts his score to the test, studying three causes of pride and humility: the qualities of his mind, his body, and external objects. First, the qualities of the mind: our virtues and vices. Here Hume's main point is that, regardless of the true nature of moral evaluation, whether it's a matter of innate moral psychology (hum of his own point of view), or instead of vested interests and cultural training (kind of Hobbs and Mandeville), his account will keep. For, in any theory, virtues produce a pleasant feeling of their own and vices a painful feeling of their own. Then there will be the qualities of the body: physical beauty and deformation. Here Hume's main point is that beauty or warty is something structure is nothing more than his power to produce pleasure or pain in us. To the objection that, although health and disease produce pleasure and pain in us, they are generally not sources of pride or humility, it reminds us that these passions require a long-term affair involving only us or a few others, so a long record of exceptionally poor health can be a source of shame. Finally, Hume explores the qualities of external objects associated with us. While the natural relationship of similarity has little effect, he explains, external objects do not evoke pride or humility without any connection of continuity or cause-and-effect - a fact it takes to confirm its overall account. After a few minor illustrations, Hume explains why pride in his ancestors is enhanced when the family enjoys continuous ownership of the land, and when it is passed from man to man (both conditions, he says, serve to strengthen the connection of ideas). Hume devotes a whole division of property and wealth. His account easily holds the property: it defines it as private use under the laws of justice, argues that (whether justice is a natural or artificial virtue) our minds naturally associate owners with their belongings, and notes that all things are useful, beautiful or amazing to cause pride in their owner. But it is more difficult to place wealth: i.e. simply the power of acquiring the comfort of life. For Hume's earlier account of the cause-and-effect relationship, the differences between the authorities were eliminated exercise of power, as well as the very idea of inexhaustible power, and how proud I can be of simple coin coins paper without such an idea? Hume finds two ways for something like inexhaustible power to influence our passions: first, predictions of human behavior (missing strong motives) suffer from uncertainty, and we may get the expected pleasure or anxiety of the likely or simply possible exercise of power (pre-reasoning from our own past behaviors to guess what we might do); secondly, the false sense of freedom presents us with all feasible course of action that gives us the expected pleasure, not related to any reasoning from experience. Hume ends by mentioning the pride we take in power over others, the pride amplified by comparing our wealth to theirs (thus, people are more proud to own other people than to own complex equipment). Sections 11-12 Hume in the next section adds a new kind of cause for pride and humility: viz., reputation, secondary business, based on an extremely important mechanism of empathy. For Hume, sympathy for others, or communication, is the mechanism by which we naturally tend to receive and share in the passion and opinions of those we feel close to. We begin by observing external signs (such as smiling or speaking) and forming an idea of our feelings. Since our extremely vivid self-image will seek to revive any related idea, the closer we see the relationship we see between ourselves and the other person, the brighter our understanding of their feelings. And if this connection is close enough, we will eventually feel their passion or believe their opinion: that is, our understanding of their passion or opinion will grow so vividly as to become the most passion or opinion. This reflects Hume's earlier account of causal reasoning: both processes move along three natural relationships, bringing the strength and vivacity of vivid representations into weak ideas, enlivening them into much stronger perceptions. Pride or shame in his reputation, Hume continues, stems primarily from the sympathetically informed opinions of others. But other factors also play a role: others can be seen as a good judge by character (authority), and the question of a person's self-esteem is both emotionally amplified and tends to cause shy respect for the opinions of others. The resulting report explains the various observations: why pride is more influenced by the opinions of some people (those whose character we like, whose judgments we respect, or whom we know for a long time), and fewer opinions that we know to be false (and thus cannot share). Hume ends by illustrating and confirming his account with a concrete example (e.g., a man from an upscale family who fell in difficult times, leaving home to do manual labor elsewhere), and some minor objections. In the final section, Hume seeks to confirm his general record of pride and humility by applying it to animals. Next Following A model of anatomists who test hypotheses by studying similar structures in humans and animals, Hume argues that animals can be observed to show pride and humility, that the causes are largely the same (visas, pleasant body qualities), and that animals have the necessary psychological mechanisms (visas, communication of ideas, connection of impressions). Part 2: From Love and Hate Sections 1-3 Hume's treatment of love and hate is just like his treatment with pride and humility: all four indirect passions produce double the relationship of impressions and ideas. As Part 2 begins, it again distinguishes the object from the cause, and the quality from the subject; while pride and humility were directed at themselves, love and hatred are directed at some other person. As before, it is necessary to link ideas between the cause of love or hatred and a loved one or a hateful person, and the relationship of impressions between the cause (with a pleasant or unpleasant feeling of one's own) and the resulting love or hatred. And because pride and love are closely related (as Hume points out, we strive to win the love of others by demonstrating qualities that we are proud of), the arguments of Part 1 can simply be moved. In a series of eight experiments, Hume checks his account for observations taken from ordinary life. The first four experiments simply confirm that four indirect passions arise only in response to something pleasant or unpleasant associated with a person: completely neutral objects (such as an ordinary stone) and objects associated with none (such as an unfamiliar environment) will never produce pride or humility, love or hatred. The last four experiments focus on how easy the transition comes from one passion to another. As predicted in Hume's story, we easily go from love and hatred to pride and humility: for example, I can be proud of my attitude to someone else with cute qualities. Curiously, however, the opposite does not hold: for example, my pride in my qualities will not lead me to love someone else for their attitude towards me. To explain this, Hume argues that imagination has trouble moving from living ideas to hiding ideas (e.g. from the idea of yourself as another person). Further, as Hume's story would have predicted, we easily move from one person's love to love for others associated with that person. But the transition is easiest when we go down from love to the less: for example, it is more natural for us to love a son by father than a father at the expense of a son. Yet the imagination has the opposite tendency: for example, it is easy to move from the moons of Jupiter to Jupiter itself. To solve this difficulty, Hume argues that it is easier for passions to make minor changes (adding in love to a related lesser person) than major changes (adding to the love-related more person) and that passions are powerful principle than imagination. Finally, Hume recognizes a case where we can easily move from pride to love: when a matter of pride and humility plac'd in some other person, for example, when your praise excites me excites my pride and I end up loving you for it. But this exception only confirms Hume's account: since the first passion arises from another person, we easily move on to passion directed at the same person. Hume then faces an objection: his account ignores the intention of having us love or hate those who bring us pleasure or pain, even if it is entirely unintentional. In response, Hume insists that qualities unrelated to intentional action can indeed cause love or hatred if these qualities are constant and inherent in man and character: for example, dislike of someone for their ugliness or stupidity. It is with isolated actions that intention is important: it connects the action with the person and can also enhance the pleasantness or nuisance of the action, while completely involuntary and random actions cause only mild or short-lived passions. In another illustration, Hume examines our emotional response to those who harm us out of justifiable motives (such as judges, competitors): although we won't hate them if we're reasonable, we often hate them anyway, even coming up with reasons to hate them. Sections 4-5 In the following two sections, Hume uses empathy to address some of the specific causes of love and hate. First, attitude, familiarity and similarity: we sometimes love others not for their personal qualities, but simply because they are connected to us, familiar to us or like us. In these cases, pleasure arises from the simply stimulating effects of empathy: family members, neighbors and acquaintances are a solid source of living ideas, as are people with personal qualities resembling our own. And, as Hume put it, a very lively idea is nice, but especially the idea of passion. It adds an explanation of why children feel much less connected to mothers who are remarried and at the same time only slightly less related to fathers who in remarriage-imagination (which finds difficulty in transitioning from more to less) are more inclined to move from mother to new mother family than from father to new father family, a transition that weakens the original relationship between parent and child. Secondly, we sometimes respect people not for their personal qualities, but simply for the fact that they are rich and powerful (respect and contempt are kinds of love and hatred). To explain this phenomenon, Hume identifies three candidates of principles: (1) We are happy to think of their luxury. (2) We think they could give us some of their wealth. (3) We sympathize with their happiness. He then argues that the third principle today is the most important. The first principle has some some independently, but mostly acts through empathy. And the second principle has little influence: it is relatively rare to gain any personal benefit from the rich and powerful, and we respect them even when it is known not to be possible. Hume closes the section with a review of the power of empathy. Many animals, and especially people, have a psychological need for social interaction. Moreover, sympathy for usefulness explains the most types of beauty: for example, the convenience of the house, the fertility of the field. Finally, Hume notes that people's minds are mirrors for each other: a rich man enjoys his luxury, which brings respect from others, which in turn excites the pride of the rich man, which encourages further pursuit of wealth. Sections 6-12 The following six sections focus on complex passions, i.e. passions arising from mixing love and hatred with other emotions. Hume begins with benevolence and anger, motivational desires designed to bring happiness or unhappiness to a man of white'd or hateful. This marks an important contrast: love and hatred have innate motivational consequences, while pride and humility are only pure emotions in the soul. But Hume further notes that benevolence and anger (despite talk of mixing) are not a substantial part of love and hate; instead, they have a different passion of their own that only happens to be naturally associated with feelings of love and hatred, just as hunger is naturally associated with an empty stomach. Then further sorry and malice. Like benevolence and anger, they are motivational desires to bring happiness or unhappiness to another person; but unlike benevolence and anger, they apply in general, not only to those we love or hate, but even to complete strangers. Thus Hume calls them fake versions of benevolence and anger. Regret (also called compassion) is a sympathetic communication: everyone can cause our pity by simply telling us their interests, their passions, their pains, and pleasures. Even people who show no emotion from their unhappiness can cause our pity because of the influence of general rules on our imagination. The malevolent joy is produced in comparison - the suffering of another gives us a more vivid insight into our happiness, and his happiness of our suffering - and the malice itself is an unproven desire to produce evil to another in order to reap the pleasure of comparison (though Hume adds a brief discussion of malice against himself). Hume also uses comparison to account for envy: the unpleasant feeling we experience when another real pleasure makes our own happiness seem diminished by comparison. He finishes the section by emphasizing close communication ideas: thus, our envy is usually limited to those in a similar line of work, work. The horse seems more dwarf big horse than mountain, and we are happy to tolerate two neighboring paintings, whose disparate styles would be monstrous if united in one picture. In the next section, Hume makes changes to his account in response to a problem. If love and hatred are produced by anyone who brings us pleasure or pain, as Hume argued, then we must love those who bring us evil joy, and hate those who bring us the pain of pity. But this goes against experience: we tend to hate objects of our malice, and love objects of our pity. Hume solves this problem by introducing a new kind of relationship of impressions: in addition to the similarity of sensations, there is also a parallel direction of desires. Thus, the link between pity and love, and between anger and hatred, lies in their motivational tendencies (which run parallel to each other) rather than how they feel (which go against each other). Hume gives examples to illustrate and reaffirm this principle of parallel direction, including discussion of emotions found in business competitors and business partners. But there is another problem: since Hume says that we have respect for the rich and contempt for the poor, how can he say that we tend to love objects of our pity? Hume's decision presents us with three levels of empathy for unhappiness: (1) the weak empathy that makes us feel only the real misfortune of the victims, producing only contemptuous pity; (2) the strong empathy (i.e. double empathy) that moves us beyond the present unhappiness so that we can show motivational interest in their entire lives by creating compassionate love; (3) the all-consuming empathy that makes us fixate on real unhappiness, leaving us too overcome by the horror to experience any other passions. In the next section, Hume continues to explore complex passions, characterizing respect (also called respect) as a mixture of love and humility and contempt as a mixture of hatred and pride: the qualities of others produce love or hatred immediately, pride or humility in comparison, and respect or contempt when they are united together. And because we have a much greater propensity for pride than humility, there is more pride in contempt than humility in regard. Hume acknowledges the problem: why, given his story, is not love and hatred always accompanied by respect and contempt? His answer is that, while pride and hatred enliven the soul and are associated with magnificent objects, love and humility are unfeasible and associated with medium objects: thus, attractive objects too soft to produce much pride (e.g. good nature, good humor, object, generosity, beauty) will produce pure love, but with a small Humility. Hume ends with an explanation of why social lows are expected to keep keeping distance from his superiors. The final connection is the passion of love passion, i.e. romantic love. It consists of three different passions: a sense of beauty, libido and kindness. These three passions are related to each other as similarities (all have a pleasant feeling) and parallel desire (all have appropriate motivational tendencies). Accordingly, either of them may end up producing the other two, with beauty likely to produce the other two (kindness and libido being too far apart, and beauty plac'd in just the average betwixt of them). Hume argues that this phenomenon reinforces his dual relationship of impressions and ideas score. Hume finishes Part 2 with his latest section on animal psychology. Love and hatred, he writes, can be produced in animals simply by pain or pleasure from an object, or by relationships such as dating and likeness of species. Sympathy works to spread feelings (such as fear, grief) from one animal to another, keep the game animals from leading to injury, and revive a flock of hunting dogs beyond their individual level of excitement. In general, Hume notes, psychological mechanisms at work do not require any sophisticated force of reflection or penetration: Very thing is done by springs and principles that are not peculiar to humans, or to any one species of animal. Part 3: Out of the Will and Direct Passions Sections 1-2 In Part 3, Hume begins to explore the motives that bring us to action. Looking at the direct passions and superficial definition of will as a simple impression we feel, he faces the philosophical problem of free will and determinism, devoting two sections to the defense of mild determinism. In the first section, he makes the case for the doctrine of necessity. The question, according to Hume, is whether human action is defined by a necessity comparable to physical necessity - a necessity that controls physical objects. But since, according to Book 1, physical necessity is nothing more than a constant connection and causal conclusions drawn by the human mind, the question is whether there is regular correspondence between human action and human psychology, and do we base causal conclusions on such patterns? Hume believes that the answer to both questions is obviously yes: the uniformly found in the world of human affairs is comparable to what is in the natural world, and the conclusions that we base on moral evidence (relative to human psychology and action) are comparable to the conclusions we base on natural evidence (relative to physical objects). Thus, given Hume's peculiar account of necessity, it is hard to deny that human actions are governed by necessity. In the next section, Hume challenges freedom - the view that people are endowed with free will by producing and determining the reasons for its prevalence. First, because we confuse necessity with enforced restriction, we end up confusing freedom with necessity (indefinite freedom of indifference) with freedom from violent restrictions (compatible freedom of spontaneity). Hume compares the last kind of free will, considering it the kind of freedom we should use to preserve and even the most common sense of the word; but the rights of freedom from necessity as absurd (being nothing more than a chance) or incomprehensible. Secondly, we are deceived by the false sense of freedom: when discussing our own actions there is a certain looseness of will, so that we can easily create an image or weak motivation for each alternative course of action. Thus, we are ultimately convinced ... that we really could have acted differently, although the viewer can usually draw a conclusion about our actions from our motives and character. Finally, we mistakenly believe that necessity poses a threat to moral responsibility and is therefore dangerous... religion and morality. Saying that being dangerous is not the same as being false, Hume recalls that his necessity is very clouded: there is nothing dangerous or even contradictory in saying that a permanent connection and causal relationship are applicable to both human actions and physical objects. He then tries to turn the tables on his opponents, arguing that necessity is actually necessary for moral responsibility: rewards and punishments of human rights would be pointless if human actions were not regular and uniform, and divine punishment would be unfair if human actions were a matter of pure chance, having no causal connection with human psychology, and revealing nothing about the character of the person. Thus, the threat of moral responsibility comes not from necessity, but from uncertain freedom. Sections 3-8 Hume then moves from the very will to the motivational factors that determine voluntary action. Against the traditional view that reason and passion often enter into motivational conflict, Hume argues that the mind is incapable of resisting passions, and that passions cannot contradict reason. First, the mind alone cannot motivate us - it can only perform demonstrative or causal arguments, and since abstract demonstrations affect us only by directing cause-and-effect reasoning (for example, doing math to pay your debts), and cause-and-effect reasoning only affects us by directing pre-existing motives (for example, figuring out how to make the food you want), the mind itself cannot lead to any motivation. And this, in turn, means that it cannot counteract or regulate passions: on the contrary, the elation is and should be only a slave of passions. Second, passions cannot be agreed upon disagreement with reason: for this it is a question of consent or disagreement between the idea and the object it represents and the passion is nothing else. Thus Hume knowingly writes: It does not contradict the mind of preferring the destruction of the whole world to scratching my finger. Of course, if passion is based on a false judgment - an object that doesn't really exist, or a cause-and-effect relationship that doesn't really hold on, then passion can be considered unreasonable in the less strict sense of the word. But even then, insists Hume, it's not a passion, rightly speaking, which is an unreasonable decision, but a decision. Finally, Hume argues that the supposed conflict between mind and passion is actually a conflict between two different kinds of passions - calm passions and violent passions. Since both calm passions and reason opera with the same calmness and calmness, we confuse them with each other and mistakenly assume that our quiet passions are definitions of reason. The following five sections explore the factors that give passion their motivational power. Unsurprisingly, the violence of passion makes it stronger; but even a calm passion can be extremely strong because of repeated customs and its own power, especially when it has been confirmed by reflection, and some resolutions. However, because on the other hand, violent passions have a greater impact on the will, Hume focuses on factors that increase the violence of passions. First, when prevailing passion is accompanied by other lower passions, it can acquire violence by swallowing them: for example, strong love can be made by a more passionate touch of anger. Other psychological phenomena (e.g. opposition, uncertainty, obscurity) can have the same effect, stimulating us with excitement and mental effort. Further, custom and repetition can both leave us with a direct propensity to perform activities that we repeat, as well as affect the violence of related passions. Hume discusses three phases of repetitive action: (1) The sheer novelty of unfamiliar activities makes our feelings more intense, either increasing our pain or adding to the pleasure of miracle and surprise. (2) Activities performed with a moderate object is an infallible source of pleasure (wed. stream), sometimes even converting pain into pleasure. (3) But excessive repetition can make previously pleasant activities so boring as to be unpleasant. Our passions can also acquire violence from the vivacity of our ideas. Thus, concrete ideas make for more violent passions than general ideas, and so too for fresh memories, traditional ideas and ideas, animated by great eloquence or passionate delivery. And, as in book 1, only persuasion (as opposed to just fiction can call any of the Passion. Hume also devotes two sections to the study of the vivacity of our ideas of space and time and the corresponding influence on our passions. In the first section, he explains three phenomena of vivacity and violence: (1) Distance in space and time is associated with reduced vivacity and violence (for example, we care more about the near future than about the distant future), simply because of the number of mental steps required to move from the present to the distant. (2) Distance in time is associated with more reduction than distance in space, because our sensory experience makes it easier to hold an array of spatial dots in mind than an array of time points. (3) The distant past is associated with a greater abbreviation than the distant future, because it is easier for the mind to go over time than to go against it. In the second section, he cites three very similar phenomena concerning respect and admiration: (1) Distance in space and time is associated with increased respect and admiration (e.g., the great traveler, the Greek medal), because the pleasure derived from the vast majesty of the distance is transmitted to the most distant object. (2) Distance in time has a greater effect than distance in space (for example, ancient relics are more admired than furniture from abroad) because we are challenged and intensified by the greater difficulty of mentally passing distance through time. (3) The distant past has a greater effect than the distant future (for example, we admire our ancestors more than our descendants) because we are challenged and invigorated by the great difficulty of going against the flow of time. Hume completes with a handy summary of the previous six sections. Sections 9-10 Finally Hume explores direct passions, dividing them into two classes. First, and most importantly, there are those direct passions that arise immediately from pleasure or pain (in Hume terminology, good or evil) - it is simply because they are directly related to their objects. The second class consists of indirect passions that arise from the original instinct that orients us to pleasure and pain. Joy and grief/sadness arise from pleasure or pain, which is definite or probable. Hope and fear arise from pleasure or pain, which is uncertain to some extent. Aspiration and disgust arise from pleasure and pain consider simple. And the power puts itself when pleasure or pain in our power to receive. Secondly, there are those direct passions that emerge from a natural impulse or instinct that is completely unaccountable: here Hume mentions benevolence, anger, hunger and worship (in section 3 he mentioned the self-preservation and love of his children). These diverse instinctive passions, Hume writes, produce good and evil, i.e. pleasure and pain, unlike other direct passions that arise from pleasure and pain. Hume spends the rest of the section hope and fear, starting with a simple account based on probability. In an environment of uncertainty, when the imagination oscillates between a pleasant scenario and an unpleasant scenario, passions follow suit, oscillating between joy and grief. And since different passions can blend together (such as the lingering notes of a stringed instrument), the mixture of joy and grief will eventually produce either hope or fear. But opposite passions interact in different ways depending on what they are directed at: passions have no influence on each other, if their objects are completely unrelated (e.g., joy in x, grief y); passions tend to cancel each other out if they have the same object (e.g. joy on x, but also grief on x); and passions tend to mix if they have conflicting views on the same object (e.g. joy about x, woe on non-x). Next, Hume tries to confirm and expand his story, less that hope and fear can arise from all kinds of uncertainty: thus, fear can be caused by a simple thought of possible evil, if it is large enough, the immediate presence of a potential evil is known to be impossible, the certainty of evil too awful to think or whose exact nature is unknown, or anything extremely surprising. Even totally inappropriate circumstances, or something expected to be pleasant, can cause fear if shrouded in uncertainty. Hume closes the section by begging for any discussion of subtle variations of hope and fear, or about the role of will and direct passions in animals. Book 2 concludes with a brief section on curiosity, love for truth that makes us enjoy intellectual pursuits and achievements. As for the abstract truths of mathematics and algebra and for the real truths of morality, politics, natural philosophy we do not care much about the truth just as such. Instead, there are three other factors primarily responsible for the pleasure of learning: (1) The Intellectual Challenge: Exercise should make us correct our attention and attach our genius. (2) Importance/usefulness: The topic should be useful or important enough to correct our attention through remote empathy with those our work can help (sympathy that even motivates scientists not having in the public spirit). (3) Direct concern: Just as hunters and players begin to care about success itself more than the reward it brings, scientists are also beginning to develop direct concerns about the scientific problems they are working on (this is because of the aforementioned principle of parallel direction). Finally, Hume offers an account of social curiosity that fuels gossip: since doubt and uncertainty are painful, especially when they concern events whose ideas are strong, we are naturally curious about our immediate social environment. Book 3: Moral Part 1: Virtues and Vice in General Hume Begins Book 3 by Studying moral evaluation, offering criticism of moral rationalism and the defense of moral sentimentalism: in terms of his common system, Hume argues that the assessments in our minds are impressions, not ideas. His main purpose is the rationalism of philosophers such as Clark and Balguy, who puts the eternal suitability and unsuitability of things that are the same for every rational being that considers them to essentially classify morality along with mathematics within the relationship of ideas. Hume's main arguments against this rationalism rest on the thesis of Book 2 that there is no opposition between reason and passion: reason alone cannot motivate us, and passion, will and action cannot be agreed upon or disagree with reason. This thesis directly proves, he writes, that the moral status of action cannot consist of consent to action or disagreement with reason, and it indirectly proves that a moral assessment that has a practical effect on us and can excite passion and produce or prevent action cannot be a descendant of reason. The moral of an action cannot also be based on true or false judgments causal to it: no immoral action is wrong because of its occurrence due to a fact error, or (contra Wollston) because of its infliction of false judgments in others. Summing up this criticism, Hume is developing a more specific case against rationalism, recalling two types of reasoning in his system: comparison of ideas and conclusion of facts. Now, as far as demonstrative reasoning is concerned, the four abstract relationships in Book 1 seem totally out of place for morality, and it is really difficult to understand how any connection can only have the right scope (holding only between someone's psychology and the external situation) and the right practical consequences (somehow there must be definitely a priori that no rational being can consider these relationships without motivation accordingly). Consider the immorality of parricide and incest: this cannot consist only of abstract relationships in the game, for the same relationships can be found in completely incomparable contexts involving inanimate objects and animals. As for probable reasoning, Hume famously argues that we see nothing in action other than his usual non-moral qualities - experience does not reveal any moral qualities, unless a person looks at moral feelings in his mind, so that virtue and vice are (for example, secondary qualities of modern philosophy) not qualities in objects, but representations in the mind. This first section ends with a famous paragraph. Hume, therefore, remains to endorse moral sentimentalism somewhat similar to Hutcheson: Morality ... more correctly fell than judg'd of. Moral evaluations in our mind of impressions -- nothing but pains or pleasures -- and Hume's task is to explain how certain kinds of species or feelings, or character produce these special moral feelings in us. But there is a problem: since pleasant or painful feelings can be caused by inanimate objects, why does sentimentalism defy the same objection that Hume has just raised against rationalism? First, he argues that there are many different kinds of pleasure and pain, and that moral feelings (which arise only when the character is considered'd in general, without reference to our special interest) have a distinctive feeling, markedly different from the feelings called inanimate objects (or issues of interest). Secondly, it reminds us that four indirect passions are produced by pleasant or unpleasant qualities in ourselves or others, rather than inanimate objects. This objection is sent, Hume closes with two points about the psychological origin of moral feelings. First, based on the working assumption that nature seeks to produce diversity from several principles, he hopes to find the general principles underlying our moral psychology. Secondly, when asked whether these principles are natural, he replies that it depends on the meaning of natural: they are not miraculous, and they are not rare, but sometimes they can rely on human cunning (his system will include both natural virtues and artificial virtues), adding that none of these values can support popular opinion (Butler defends) that virtue is the same with that that's natural, and a vice with what's unnatural. Before embarking on a detailed study of moral psychology, Hume takes a long shot at moral rationalism and his incomprehensible attitudes and qualities that never existed in nature, or even in our imagination, by any clear and clear representation. Part 2: Justice and Injustice Sections 1-2 Hume devotes part 2 of artificial virtues: those positive character traits that have no moral appeal, were it not for the social conventions established by human cunning. The most important of these virtues is justice, and in the first section Hume proposes his so-called circle of argument to show that justice will not be seen as a virtue in a hypothetical world lacking relevant social conventions. First, Hume argues that character-based motives are morally more fundamental than action: we approve of action only if it indicates some kind of virtuous motive in the agent's character, so what makes the action virtuous in the first place is the virtuous motive from which it comes. But this motive must be an ordinary motif in human nature, as opposed to the distinctive moral motive of performing because it is virtuous (i.e. sense of duty). After all, this moral motive assumes that action is already considered virtuous, and it would circularly draw the virtue of action from a motive that itself assumes the virtue of action. And if justice is justice natural virtue, must be a common motif in human nature, which could force someone to obey the rules of justice. But, according to Hume, such a motive can not be found: unbridled vested interest leads us away from justice, concern for reputation only goes on until now, impartial public benevolence can not explain all cases of justice and is not even a true element of human nature (Contra Hutcheson, we love others only in a limited and discriminatory way), and personal benevolence to our loved ones can not explain the universal and impartial nature of justice. Thus, there is no motive for making justice a virtue until certain social conventions come into force. Hume closes this section, adding that we evaluate motives in large part compared to what we consider normal human psychology, and that the rules of justice are so obvious and necessary an invention that they can still be considered natural to the human species. Hume then devotes an important and lengthy section to two questions: First, how do we go to tie the rules of justice with moral significance? His answer to the first question begins with our need in society. People are not strong, skilled or safe enough to meet our needs alone, and only society can offer additional labor, specialization and mutual assistance - all important social benefits derived from growing up in families. But this necessary social union is threatened by both human selfishness (or rather, closed generosity), as well as the deficit and instability of external goods. And since our raw natural attachments cannot overcome these obstacles (we see nothing wrong with having a normal amount of selfishness and generosity), it remains our mind and vested interests to find a solution: through a common sense of common interest that is mutually expressed and known to all, we are gradually developing a social convention to stabilize and protect external goods, with improved conformity and stronger social expectations feeding each other. Hume's process compares with the development of languages and currency. He insists that this convention is not a promise, famously illustrating this moment with the example of two men who agreed to paddle the boat together, simply out of a sense of mutual benefit, not from any promises. And since justice is defined from the point of view of such a convention, the concepts of property, law or obligation mean nothing in its absence. Since the main obstacle to society (our selfishness, especially our insatiable curiosity) is actually the motive itself, for society, the growth of public order depends not only on our moral qualities than on our intellectual qualities. But since the stabilisation of external goods is such a simple and obvious apparent convention is set with a slight delay, so the state of nature is just philosophical fiction - not very realistic, but useful for theorists. Similarly, the instructive, golden age (fictional time of our ancestors' residences and universal brotherly love) helps to shed light on the origins of justice: if there were no certain indefatigable circumstances (selfishness, limited generosity, scarcity of resources, inability of resources), these cases also illustrate the idea: care for personal relationships is not a natural virtue, but a social convention. And the rules of justice are not natural, but artificial, because they are not based on natural facts, but on human inventions. (1) Public benevolence is not a natural virtue, because it is not based on natural facts, but on human inventions. (2) Moral rationalism cannot make sense of justice: mere abstract reasoning cannot offer help for the fact that justice depends on specific background conditions, nor issue concerns about our interests, which initially leads us to establish the rules of justice. (3) Justice is artificial virtue: while the whole purpose of justice is to serve our interests, the link between justice and our interests is dissolved in the absence of an appropriate social convention. For without this convention, a sincere pursuit of the public interest would render justice meaningless, and the unbridled persecution of private interests would leave justice in ruins. Similarly, without this convention, some individual acts of justice (such as the return of money to the villain) would be contrary to our private interests and even to the public interest: such deplorable actions should be carried out only because of our expectations, based on convention, that others would follow our example and strengthen the whole system that serves all in their own interests. Hume answered the second question that our endorsement of justice and disapproval of injustice is based on empathy for the public interest. Justice has been established to serve our interests, but when society becomes large enough, we may lose sight of how injustice threatens social order. Fortunately, the threat can be shined again when I am a victim of injustice or when I am impartially sympathetic to others who are at risk of injustice. Their sympathetic negative feelings form the basis of my disapproval of injustice, and this assessment subsequently extends to my own behavior under the influence of general rules and sympathy for the opinions of others. Three additionally factors then reinforce these moral feelings: (1) Public leaders promote on behalf of justice (contra Mandeville, this works only by reversing and reinvigorating the moral feelings we already have). (2) Parents instill in children a reliable and deep-rooted concern about the rules of the rules Justice. (3) Reputation care makes us scrupulously avoid injustice on personal basis. Sections 3-6 The following four sections see Hume completing his consideration of justice as an artificial dignity: he argues that the three basic laws of nature that stability of possession, its transfer by consent, and fulfillment of promises are all based on human convention. It begins by discussing the general rule of stability and its application. To make the peaceful establishment of society, we must avoid controversial special judgments about who is best suited to use what resources, and instead accept the general rule of current ownership, simply as a natural expediency with all the appeal custom. After the establishment of society, additional rules of occupation (i.e. first possession), precept (i.e. long possession), accession (e.g. the fruits of our garden) and succession (i.e. inheritance) are developed. These rules are largely a product of imagination, with property determined by the association of ideas. Secondly, since austerity will of course bring great disadvantages (resources have been allocated by a simple chance), we need a peaceful way to encourage change in ownership: thus, we adopt the obvious rule of consent. As for the associated delivery rule (the physical transfer of an object or some symbolic marker from it), it is simply a useful technique for visualizing the mysterious transfer of property (property is an unthinkable quality, when it is mistaken for something real, without any reference to morality or sense of mind), just as Catholics use images to present unthinkable secrets of the Christian religion. Hume then considers the ultimate law of nature - fulfilling promises - by making a two-fold argument that keeping promises is an artificial virtue. First, the promises are, of course, incomprehensible, for there is no distinctive mental act for promises to express, no resolutions, no desires, no direct readiness for action. As for the voluntary commitment, it is too absurd to be plausible: given that changes in commitment require changes in human feelings, it is absolutely impossible to make a commitment. But secondly, even if the promises were naturally understandable, they could not create an obligation: that is, even if we were stupid enough to fulfill the obligation mentally, nothing would change, for no voluntary act could change human feelings. Hume also reprises the circle of argument, arguing that there is no motive to fulfill promises other than a sense of duty in doing so. How, then, does an artificial convention on the future take place? The first two laws of nature, for all their usefulness, leave many opportunities for mutual benefit unrealized (e.g., joint exchanges of labour), unable to overcome the meanness of human nature in the absence of mutual trust and security. But non-virtual people will soon learn to cooperate with each other simply out of the self-serving expectations of the benefits of future cooperation, and a special language is introduced to express their resolution to fulfill their part (to punish social distrust) - thus, the practice differs from the favor of true friends, and secured by taking its reputation to the right execution. The convention is then made moral just as before (public interests, education, and cunning of politicians), and a fictional act of mind (desire for obligation) is fabricated to understand moral obligation. Finally, Hume reinforces this explanation, Watching that promise obliges you, even if you mentally crossed your fingers, but does not oblige you if it was honestly unintentional or if you are obviously joking, and yet obliges you, if your insidious insincerity is obvious to astute observers, and yet does not oblige you if induced by force (only among all motives) These contradictions, says Hume, best of all, explained by his convention. He adds that the terrible Catholic doctrine of intent (e.g., that the sacrament is invalid if his minister is in the wrong state of mind) is actually more reasonable than the practice of perspective, since theology is less important than a promise, it can afford to sacrifice usefulness for consistency. Finally, Hume examines these laws of nature and offers three additional arguments in favor of their artificiality. (1) Justice is usually determined from the point of view of property, and yet it is impossible to understand property, except in terms of justice. But since there is no natural sense of approval for the practice of justice described in neutral language, abstraction from the notion of property (e.g., the restoration of an object to its first owner), justice is not a natural virtue. (2) Justice and injustice come in bright lines and sharp boundaries, while our natural moral feelings come in degrees. (3) Justice and injustice are universal and common, while our natural moral feelings are partial and special: for example, justice can decide in favor of a feathered and dirty rich bachelor instead of a one-headed man trying to support his disadvantaged family, putting aside as inappropriate all the circumstances that attract our affections in favor of the latter. Sections 7-12 In the following six sections, Hume completes his system of laws of nature and nations, a lengthy discussion of the government. He begins with a critique of moral rationalism, arguing that legitimate behavior is clearly in our interest, we are fascinated by the dangerous narrowness of the soul that makes us prefer to the remote control so that

violations of the rules become more frequent and therefore more strategically expedient. People are unable to overcome this weakness and change our nature, no matter how much we may regret it from a far-sighted long-term perspective, so we should instead change our situation and turn to the artificial expediency of government: giving rather unselfish public officials the power to enforce the laws of justice, to resolve impartial disputes, and even to ensure public good otherwise is not enough because of the free rider's problems. Hume criticizes the liberal theory of Whig rule as emerging from his power only with the consent of the governed, as goes back to the original contract between the ruler and the people. He agrees with the rudiments of the Whig theory: simple societies can exist for a long time without government, because it is a war between societies that first brings serious social unrest (from conflict over the trophies of war) and then the government, with military leaders becoming political leaders at a public meeting. But while the government usually originates in a social agreement, the promise may not be its only source of power. For, as Hume argued, the very promise originates in a social convention serving the public interest, so if the government serves the public interest by maintaining order and harmony in society, it gets its own authority, equivalent to the power of keeping promises. We have a parallel interest in both: the promise is the invention of man necessary for social cooperation, and the government is the invention of man, necessary (in large and developed societies) to ensure the reliable provision of such practices and thus maintain public order, and no invention serves a more general or greater interest than the other. And these two go hand in hand and morally: breaking promises and anti-government actions are not approved primarily out of a sense of general interest. So there is no point in founding one in another. Hume also appeals to the opinions of ordinary people (who, in matters of morality and other sentimental fields, carry with them a peculiar authority and, to a large extent, are infallible), who consider themselves born of obedience regardless of any promising, silent or otherwise authoritarian states - an understanding reflected in the legal codes of rebellion. But Hume agrees with the Vigi about the right of resistance when governments become tyrannical. Our interest in government lies in the security and protection that we enjoy in a political society and therefore disappears as soon as power becomes unbearably repressive. And we can expect that our moral obligation to allegiance will be stubbornly maintained due to the influence of common rules, our familiarity with human nature and the history of tyrants will give us additional additional a rule that denotes exceptions to the general rule. Therefore, public opinion (completely infallible in matters of morality) is not able to issue as any exception the rule of passive obedience, but is quite ready to make allowances for resistance in more egregious cases of tyranny and oppression. The next problem with fidelity is who exactly is the rightful ruler? And, according to Hume, such issues are often intractable for a reason, and it may be wise to simply go with the flow in the interest of peace and freedom. Again, Hume agrees that political society begins with a social agreement, promising loyalty to certain people. But once the government acquires its own power, serving the public interest, it is (paradoxically) in our interest to renounce our interests and simply abide by the powers that will ensure that we do not get into disagreement over the best ruler. Five somewhat arbitrary principles are then answered to questions about succession: (1) long-term ownership: the influence of custom favours long-established forms of government, although it takes longer to acquire the right to large States; (2) Current ownership: few governments have any better claim to power than successfully holding on to power; (3) Conquest: we stand for the glorious conquerors over the hideous usurpers; (4) Continuity: Along with the obvious benefits of hereditary management, Hume emphasizes our creative tendency to associate parents with children and pass things from one to the other; (5) Positive laws: legislators can change the form of government, although any sharp departure from tradition tends to diminish the loyalty of the people's power. And with so many different principles, the choice of ruler is sometimes surprisingly clear and sometimes hopelessly unclear. In the final discussion of the Glorious Revolution, Hume defends the preservation of the right to resist unverified and outside the legal code, and extending this right from cases of outright oppression to cases of inter-brotherly constitutional encroachment in mixed-d governments, adding two philosophical reflections: first, the powers of parliament to exclude the heirs of the rulers whom they overthrew, but not the heirs of the rulers who simply died, derived from simple creative inertia; secondly, a contested change of power could gain retroactive legitimacy from a stable line of successors. Hume then explores international law: similarities between individuals and entire nations give the same three laws of nature as before, but the special needs of nations require special rules (e.g. diplomatic immunity). But because cooperation between states is not as necessary and beneficial as between individuals, moral norms have much less force in the international context and may be legal to be broken out of a more trivial motive i.e. a weaker natural obligation brings a weaker moral obligation. Only practice can determine exactly how weaker the obligation is, and the fact that the rules are found to be weaker in practice shows that people have an implicit understanding of their artificiality. The final section examines the social rules governing women's sexual behavior (chastity and modesty), which Hume takes to beautifully illustrate how artificial virtues based only on social interests can nevertheless acquire universal power. It is obvious that these rules are not entirely natural, and yet they solve a natural problem: the child needs both parents, parents should know that they have the child, and fatherhood is subject to uncertainty. And since issues of sexual fidelity cannot be resolved in courtrooms, society needs informal norms (with weakened evidence standards and increased reputational importation), protecting women's loyalty. Indeed, Hume adds, given the female weakness in the face of sexual temptation, society needs women to feel strongly disgusted with something, even in a moment of infidelity. This decision may seem unrealistic in the abstract, but nature has made it a reality: those who are personally concerned about infidelity have swept through indifferent in their disapproval, shaped the minds of girls, and expanded the general rule into apparently irrational territory, with debauch'd men shocked by any female transgression and postmenopausal women condemned for utterly innocuous promiscuity. Instead, men stake their reputations on courage (partly natural virtue) and enjoy weaker sexual norms, fidelity in men (such as cooperation between countries) being less important to society. Part 3: Of the other virtues and vices. Section 1 Hume completes the treatise by studying natural virtues: these traits, affirmed independently of social conventions. In a general review of morality and passions, it reminds us that human psychology is driven by pain and pleasure, which are called direct passions, and then indirect passions that explain moral evaluation and which qualities or symbols are considered virtuous or not. And since indirect passions refer to actions only as pointing to something stable in the mind of the agent, moral feelings are also directed primarily at mental qualities and only derivatives of actions. After this review, Hume presents his central hypothesis on natural virtues and vices: the moral assessment of these traits is best explained in terms of empathy. The hypothesis is confirmed by three moments: empathy is so very powerful that simply observing the causes of emotions or consequences can inform emotions to us, the beauty we find in anything useful stems from empathy for the pleasure it bring to its users, and the moral beauty we find in artificial virtues stems from empathy with the public interest that these virtues serve. Given these three points, the moments Given that natural virtues and social utility often go together, stinginess dictates that we also explain natural virtues in terms of empathy. Hume finds the connection between virtue and utility quite obvious: the inspired Mendeville to misunderem about virtue as a fraudulent invention of pandering politicians, and indeed the connection is even stronger with natural virtues than with artificial virtues. For while artificial virtues can harm society in specific cases (encouraging public interest only through the mediation of a common pattern), natural virtues help society in any case, making it even more likely that empathy explains the moral assessment of natural virtues. Hume further develops his sympathy-based account of natural virtues by addressing two objections. First, variability and impartiality: how can something so variable as empathy explain a moral impartiality of this kind that recognizes virtue in both loved ones and complete strangers? Hume replies that, since variability in moral evaluation will lead to hopeless practical conflict, we correct our common judgments by fixing a common point of view: that is, we focus on people in someone's sphere of influence and evaluate its character by sympathetically considering how their character traits affect them. Indeed, we perform similar corrections for our feelings and our aesthetic judgments. Of course, our passions can resist correction, so only our language has changed; but we still know that our emotional favoritism of some over others will disappear if we are equally close to all of them, which may be enough to settle the general calm definition of passions. Second, moral luck: how can empathy explain cases where unusual external circumstances have prevented someone's inner character from having its usual consequences? Hume's answer is that imagination follows general rules by focusing more on something general than its actual effects, and that our moral feelings are influenced accordingly. Naturally, we will feel even stronger approval when the general trend is actually realized, but we intentionally postpone moral luck to correct our general moral judgments. This explains how we can manage such extensive sympathy in morality, despite our limited generosity in practice: it takes real consequences and specific cases to touch the heart and controul our passions, but the seeming tendencies and general tendencies are enough to influence our taste. He ends this general attitude to natural virtues by four times classification: each natural virtue is either (1) useful for (2) useful for the person himself, (3) immediately agrees with others, or (4) immediately agrees with the person himself. Of these four sources of moral differences the most important are the usefulness that pleases us even when only private interests are at stake: thus, we approve of prudence and frugality, and while the vice of laziness is sometimes betrayed (as an excuse for a failed or veiled boast of sophistication), agility in business wins the approval of pure sympathy for the personal interests of the individual. Two categories of useful virtues are often mixed with empathy: what hurts me eventually hurts others as they sympathize with me, and what hurts others ultimately hurts me, how I sympathize with them. And even here, empathy plays an important role: we approve of these virtues in large part because they bring pleasure to others or to the individual. Hume concludes with a general overview of this hypothesis - visas. that we evaluate a character, sympathetically considering its impact on the person and others in his sphere of influence, and a brief remark about how good or sick the desert is explained in terms of benevolence or anger that come with an assessment (i.e. to love or hate) another person. Section 2-3 Hume then applies his general system of morality to two kinds of virtue: the gross heroic virtue of the great and kind-hearted virtue of good. As for heroic virtue, it draws its merit from a suspicious source: pride. Pride has a bad name because the idea of someone above us can be so immediately unpleasant, but Hume distinguishes between a bad foundation and a well-founded pride. Undeish pride hurts us in comparison when someone else is overworked in their virtues, and this idea of the boss becomes more than an idle invention and reaches a medium level of strength. But someone's justified pride brings us the pleasure of empathy when the idea is so strong in us that we fully believe in their merits. Therefore, justified pride is a virtue, because of its usefulness and pleasure to the person himself. Now, since we are so prone to the vice of excessive pride, social harmony requires artificial rules (rules of good breeding) against the open expression of any pride at all. But people of honor are expected to still have a healthy inner sense of self-esteem, and those whose modesty goes too far are despised for their meanness or simplicity. Thus, heroic virtues - our fearlessness, ambition, love of fame, generosity and all other shining virtues of this kind - mostly admire the well-regulated pride they embody. Indeed, though excessive pride is harmful to oneself (even if politely hidden from others), and fame is often extremely harmful to others, yet there is something wonderful and dazzling dazzling the pride of the hero, thanks at once to the pleasant sublime and sublime feeling he feels. Hume adds that our disapproval of the open pride of even those who have never insulted us (such as historical figures) is associated with additional empathy for the people around them. As for the virtues of kindness and benevolence, Hume explains their merits primarily in terms of their positive impact on others. The section begins by reviewing Hume's account of moral evaluation from a general point of view, and sympathy for the sphere of human influence. Here gentle passions are not only good for society in themselves, they are necessary in order to direct other virtues for the public good. But there is also a more immediate endorsement, since we just touch'd with a gentle feeling or sympathizes with characters like our own - that's why even benevolent triva and excesses in love still win approval as love in their minds easily turns to love in our minds for them. As for contrasting evil passions, they are judged in comparison with humanity as a whole - such passions are justified when normal, sometimes despised when absent, and even applauded when impressively low, although they form the most proven of all vices when they rise to cruelly - and for its negative impact on others. Indeed, in general, your moral virtue is mostly determined by how much you are desired in different social relationships. Sections 4-5 Hume finishes by explaining how his system accommodates not only moral virtues but also the natural abilities of the mind, and downplaying the distinction as not very important and largely a matter of mere terminology. Virtues and abilities are the same, Hume argues, in their causes and consequences: they are mental qualities that produce pleasure and are encouraging, and we all care about both. On the objection that difference matters because the affirmation of abilities is different from the affirmation of virtues, Hume replies that our endorsement of different things always feels different (for example, with different virtues). On the objection that virtues are not like the ability to be voluntary and to engage free will, Hume replies that many virtues are involuntary (especially the virtues of the great), that volunteerism has no clear relationship to the moral evaluation process and that we have no free will other than mere volunteerism. But volunteering helps explain why moralists think that difference matters: in the context of moral exhortation, Hume explains, it's important to focus on the qualities that are most responsive to social pressure, rather than endorsing indiscriminately any mental perfection like ordinary people and ancient philosophers. These natural abilities of the mind are valued mainly for their usefulness to the person himself: for example, prudence, foresight, industry, patience. Sometimes sometimes pleasantness is the most important, whether for others (e.g. wit, eloquence, charisma, even purity) or the person himself (e.g. joie de vivre). Our judgments are influenced by empirical associations between a person's quality and age or lifestyle (e.g., disapproval of frivolity in the old). Natural abilities also affect our assessments, making a capable person more consistent in life, good or bad. The question of why we are less inclined to value a person according to the speed and accuracy of their memory, Hume explains that (unlike intelligence) memory is carried out without any sensations of pleasure or pain; and in all its middle degrees serves almost equally well in business and business. So far, Hume's account has dealt solely with mental qualities, but it goes some way to accommodate bodily benefits and the benefits of fate that are equally capable of eliciting love and approval. Thus, women love a strong man in liking to the usefulness of a lover he might expect to receive, everyone finds beauty in healthy and beneficial body parts, and immediate pleasure or anxiety arises from the perception of regular functions or painful air, respectively. Thus, we respect the rich with sympathy for the pleasure they are given by their wealth, reinforced by the fact that they are more consistent. Hume notes that while he can't explain why, the sense of approval is more defined by the type of object provided (e.g. an inanimate object, or person) than the kind of triggering approval mechanism (e.g., sympathy for utility, or immediate alignment). Section 6 of Book 3, and therefore the Treatise in general, summarizes the motives of Hume's thesis that empathy is the main source of moral differences. Indeed, most would agree that justice and the useful qualities of the mind are valued for their usefulness, and that other than empathy can explain why we care about the public good or the happiness of strangers? This ethics system is not only supported by a firm argument, Hume adds, but can also help moralists show dignity and happiness of virtue. First, it puts morality in a good light to see it derived from a so noble source as empathy: we end up affirming virtue, a sense of virtue, and even the psychological principles underlying a sense of virtue. And while the artificiality of justice may seem unattractive at first, it disappears when we recall that because the interests on which justice is based are the greatest conceivable and extend to all times and places, so the rules of justice are fast and immutable; at least as immutable as human nature. Second, life pays off pretty well, bringing immediate benefits, increased social reputation and inner satisfaction of the mind capable of carrying own polling. So while Hume presents himself as a theoretical anatomist who dissects human psychology into ugly bits, his work is well suited to a practical painter who styles morality into a beautiful and attractive ideal. See also The Hume Law of Human Sciences Links - the book appeared in many publications after the author's death. See Hume, David (1888). Selby Bigge, Los Angeles) Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press Archive.org. 1. London: Longmans, Green and Co; Hume, David (1882). Green, T.H.; Grose, T.H. (eds.). 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