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The flow of forced migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, Mali and other conflict-affected communities is a first-order human disaster, the expulsion of millions of families and the dangerous journeys that have killed thousands of people. It is also a crisis that has serious international consequences, from the risk of radicalization and political instability to the spread of infectious diseases and the risk of the collapse of the visa-free European Schengen zone under pressure from migrant flows and the inability to agree on an appropriate solution. Since crisis-causing conflicts are endemic and the vast majority of migrants are likely to return to their homes soon, the crisis may worsen before it gets better. As politicians and politicians try to understand the complex reality of a political environment that has become even more volatile in the wake of terrorist attacks, it is important to clarify the facts and understand some of the economic patterns associated with mass migration. What are the implications for the development and economic impact of the large flows of forced migrants? This is, after all, a phenomenon that the world has many examples and great experience, and which economists have extensively studied. This chapter deals mainly with refugees and asylum-seekers, internally displaced migrants crossing international borders rather than internally displaced persons. It draws extensive economic literature on voluntary and forced migration, as well as recent experience of the World Bank on the ground. UNHCR and other national and international agencies. It does the following: forced migrants tend to arrive in places where there are few jobs for them. The problem of finding a livelihood is much more serious in ten or so poor countries or regions that receive large numbers of forced migrants than in rich countries, which, with few exceptions, receive a small number of forced migrants compared to their populations. In poor countries or regions that receive large numbers of migrants, the depressing impact on the wages of local unskilled workers can be extremely severe. When forced migrants arrive in large numbers in a poor region, they put a huge strain on public services and infrastructure and on the public purse, and they can also seriously fray the social and political structure, leading to a worsening investment climate. Fears that the adoption of an increase in the number of forced migrants in developed countries would lead to job losses or falling wages, and place an undue burden on the public purse, were largely unjustified. In most cases in developed countries, the arrival of young people willing to work is likely to lead to increase in investment and production, and can accelerate the long-term growth rate of the economy. Teh Teh The benefits of forcible resettlement of migrants in the south - migrants, countries of origin (through remittances) and countries of destination - are much less than those of migrants settling in the North. While most countries in the south receive very few forced migrants when forced migrants arrive in large numbers in unstable states or regions, net loss of well-being can lead to. There was no ideal burden-sharing scheme, but in the absence of political solutions to conflicts, any scheme should include an increase in the number of refugees studying in the North, a doubling of efforts to integrate refugees into their country of asylum and increased development assistance for the countries of the southernmost number of refugees. Such a scheme is likely to materialize if it is based on voluntary rather than mandatory refugee reception and assistance, as well as the adoption of a new comprehensive framework for the fight against refugees. The starting point of the chapter is: what distinguishes forced migrants from voluntary migrants? The characteristics of forced migrants are largely related to the effects of voluntary migration, while economic literature on forced migration, while growing rapidly, remains very rare. Nevertheless, the literature on voluntary migration helps to shed some light on the phenomenon of mass forced migration, as there is overlap between the two areas of education. For example, analysts of the effects of voluntary migration often analyzed forced migration cases to determine the effects of the sudden exogenous arrival of large numbers of migrants1. However, there are a number of differences between forced and voluntary migrants, which have important economic and political consequences. Voluntary migrants move for economic gain or to a very much for their families, and so they go at the time and place of their choice, while forced migrants flee, often to the nearest shelter to avoid injury. Thus, forced migrants, unlike voluntary migrants, may lose most of their property and may find themselves in a place where employment opportunities for them are limited or completely absent and may be unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin, regardless of how they live in their accepted residence. Compared to voluntary migrants, their adaptation to the new environment may take longer and may require more support from the host community or others, or are not present to almost the same extent in the case of voluntary migration. In addition, the legal distinction between refugees who are defined as forced migrants who seek and and economic migrants who are voluntary migrants are important because, under the 1951 UN Convention, UN member states are obliged not to return refugees to their country of origin, where they may suffer (non-expulsion). However, this legal distinction is often difficult to draw into practice, and for economic analysis the distinction is even more blurred. In fact, many refugees, while indeed fleeing danger, do not leave their arms, but have some freedom in terms of their departure and destination. Faced with the threat, they will take into account the risk and cost of migration, as well as prospects in different directions. Like voluntary migrants, a family, fearing persecution or war, may decide to first send a young, able-bodied and enterprising member of the church to study. Conversely, some economic migrants may be forced to migrate in all order because of hunger and disease. From an economic point of view, over time, the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants or between refugees and economic migrants may be even less significant. Since for the vast majority of forced migrants the ability to work is the only asset, sooner or later they must settle down and find work. In many cases, this can be found in a region or country, not in the first arrival or, less often, in the country of origin to which the forced migrant may be ready and able to return. Thus, the migrant who was initially forced to migrate subsequently acts as a voluntary migrant, and an analysis of the economic consequences of voluntary migration may be even more useful for understanding the consequences of forced migration. Nevertheless, there are four economic problems that are unequivocally related to forced migration and which require concrete analysis. Short-term problems include the problem of labour market mismatch and the implications for the region of the first arrival of large numbers of forced migrants. Long-term problems relate to the area of the resettlement of the internally displaced migrant, and in particular the overwhelming nature of forced migration in the south and south, as well as the problems of international coordination caused by this phenomenon. All of these problems, which are very specific to forced migration and are related, are considered below. The mismatch of the labour market The typical forced migrant breadwinner must find a good job, and quickly to alleviate the plight of his family, and overcome the poverty, uncertainty and humiliation often associated with dependence on humanitarian assistance. Finding a job, even a bad job, is also key to making them productive members of their foster care. However, there are many obstacles to this, including cases, a direct denial of a work permit. Thus, the employment prospects of a forced migrant are a good place to start analyzing economic economic forced migration. While there is ample evidence that voluntary migrants are responding to demand for their services, and they are going where (and when) they can find work (Papademetriou, Sumption and Somerville, 2009), there is also strong evidence that forced migrants seeking work are more likely to find themselves in the wrong place, at least initially. If they are not allowed to work and are not allowed to move on, or are unable to cover the cost of another trip or simply do not want to risk moving, their standard of living, and their ability to contribute to society are severely undermined. Most countries, whether developed or developing, receive only a very small number of forced migrants compared to their populations during the year, and the impact on their labour market is negligible. In these cases, the likelihood that a forced migrant will eventually find a decent job is reasonable, even if they may not be as good as those of well-connected natives. This problem arises when the influx of forced migrants is greater than that of the receiving population. Technically, the problem of employment discrepancies faced by forced migrants can be defined as an oversupply of workers, which can only be corrected by falling wages or increased investment. Such a reduction in wages may not be tolerated because it is too large to be politically acceptable (which leads to the denial of a work permit) or because of other restrictions in the labour market that protect existing workers. At the same time, new investment may be too slow or constrained by an unsustainable investment climate or political instability, which is sometimes further worsened by the large influx of migrants. As a result, migrants are not absorbed by the labour force and become dependent on humanitarian assistance. Evidence suggests that the problem of labour market disparity faced by forced migrants is always serious at first glance, including for the relatively small number of refugees who find residence in the richest countries of the world, but it can be extreme and persistent for the far more forced migrants who find themselves concentrated in relatively poor regions and in unstable political environments. Where refugees are not allowed to work, many of them tend to become part of informal labour markets in any case, in an economy that is largely outside the tax network, is extremely low-wage and exploited and abused. Data on the problem of labour market inconsistencies and in developing countries are partial and spotted, but while in developing countries that receive large numbers of forced migrants, it is far from uniformly gloomy in developed countries. For example, Germans and Finns displaced after World War II, as well as displaced French and Portuguese after colonization, who returned to their country of origin, work pretty well according to available research (comp. De Lima and Carrington, 1996; Hunt, 1992). However, these groups are not representative of the current forced migration of people of different ethnic backgrounds. In recent decades, most refugees, who tend to be overwhelmingly unskilled, have arrived in developed countries without knowing the language and often unable to write in Latin. Some arrive illegally, but even those who come legally often have to wait many months or years before they are allowed to work. Refugees who have professional qualifications generally feel that they are not recognized and they must accept a lower status or pass new exams that take many years of preparation. Despite this, the latest figures show that despite the increase in the number of work permits issued to refugees in Germany - a country that accepted a large number of asylum seekers in 2015 - the country's unemployment rate continued to decline every month compared to the same month of the previous year (IAB 2015, 2). The OECD estimates that the growth of the eurozone workforce in 2016-2017 will barely reach 0.5% per year, with much of this growth due to large net migration to Germany. While the medium- and long-term effects will be determined by how well refugees are integrated into the labour market, the OECD believes that this influx could ease the pressure on wages in the relatively tight German labour market and also help ease demographic pressures due to an ageing population (OECD 2015c, p.16). Unfortunately, there has been little and much of the United States' systematic research on how modern refugees in developed countries are developed in the long term. These studies tend to weigh in with the fact that refugees find work within a few months of arrival, that they earn significantly less than natives with the same qualifications at first, and that knowledge of English - which is often scant - is an important determinant of their income. Most refugees arriving in the United States initially rely on government assistance, but very few still depend on aid within 2 or 3 years of arrival. A disproportionate number of refugees are small-scale entrepreneurs. Although refugee incomes have grown rapidly over time, there is insufficient evidence that their incomes are fully in the same way as those of indigenous people. It's worth noting that more abundant data on voluntary immigrants show that their incomes don't fully converge (Alcobendas and Rodriguez-Planas 2009; Cortez 2004; Map 2005) even after many years. Recent longitudinal study Cortez 2004 showed that refugees are being adjusted quickly and - surprisingly - that their income growth far outstrips the incomes of economic migrants. While refugees earned 6% less than economic migrants in the and worked 14% fewer hours, by 1990 they earned 20% more, worked 4% more hours, and improved their English skills by 11% more. It shows that refugees have invested more in education. Cortez believes that these results cannot be explained by differences in the ethnic composition of economic migrants and refugees, and suggests that they are due to the fact that refugees are more committed to remaining in the United States in the long term because they cannot return or do not want to return. There is also little research on the inclusion of forced migrants in developing countries, but, as mentioned, they provide a much less comforting picture. This is, as might be expected, since in the cases studied - unlike in the United States - the influx of refugees is very large compared to the domestic population, and migrants who are unskilled tend to be directly competitive with the local population, which is also predominantly unskilled. In addition, wages are low in the cases studied and the labour market situation is unstable. According to a recent World Bank study, the influx of Syrian refugees (in Lebanon) is expected to increase the supply of labour by 30 to 50 per cent, with the greatest impact on women, young people and unskilled workers. The overall unemployment rate and the share of informal employment in total employment may increase by 10 percentage points (Ianchovichina and Ivanic 2014). In a recent assessment of the well-being of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, the World Bank found high levels of poverty, and - surprisingly - access to the labour market is not a significant determinant of poverty (Verme 2015a), apparently because the only jobs available to refugees are at a level of wages that are extremely low. An ILO study on forced migrants in Lebanon, where they are estimated to account for more than 20 per cent of the local population, found that Syrians (many of whom are eligible to work in Lebanon) have an unemployment rate of 30 per cent and their average monthly wage is \$277, which is comparable to the statutory minimum wage of \$448. Syrian women earn just above one-third of the minimum wage (Masri s Srour 2014). By comparison, a similar ILO study on Syrian refugees in Jordan indicates a salary for unskilled and semi-skilled JD 4-JD 10 per day, not enough for livelihood (Aljuni and Kawar 2014, p. 21). According to this, the World Bank's assessment of Jordan's well-being showed that 69% of Syrian refugees in Jordan have poorly used the UNHCR poverty line (Aljuni and Kawar Verme 2015a). A recent study of internally displaced persons in Colombia, estimated at 4.7 million, equivalent to about 10 per cent of the country's population, concludes that wages have fallen sharply in the communities with the highest number of displaced persons, and on average across the country resulted in a 28.4 per cent reduction in wages in urban areas (Calderon-Mejia and Ibanez 2009, p. 25). While wages and employment have not been badly affected in the heavily regulated Colombian formal sector, which accounts for 60 per cent of the labour market (Calderon-Mejia and Ibanez 2015, p.6), the impact on the informal sector has been particularly severe, with wages falling more sharply than could be in the more common labour market and with a marked increase in informal employment (Calderon-Mejia 2015). The problem of labour market disparities, which are certainly much more serious in developing countries, absorbing large numbers of forced migrants relative to their populations than in developed or developing countries, absorbing a small number of migrants, is only one aspect of the impact on the region of first arrivals in question. The impact on the region of forced movement of first arrivals usually occurs in relatively short periods and involves a large number, as opposed to a more regular influx of voluntary migrants. As mentioned, the refugee crisis affects specific countries and regions disproportionately, while the vast majority of developed and developing countries receive very few refugees during a given year, this is the case when the initial conditions and the size of the shock matter and they are of great importance. In addition to the impact on the labour market mentioned above, forced displacement can represent a large demographic shock, causing a sudden mismatch between the supply and demand of public services and housing in the receiving community. In countries or regions where the investment climate is not conducive to a start and where the influx of foreigners disrupts established social and political uniform relations, business expectations may be negatively affected. This may delay or indefinitely hinder private investment in response to the growing demand for housing and services. Budgetary constraints may limit the necessary investment in public services, and in extreme cases balance-of-payments restrictions can lead to exchange rate devaluations and make imports of food, fuel and other essentials more expensive. The current media are highlighting the migrant crisis in European countries, most of which accept very few forced migrants towards their populations, diverting attention from a much more serious problem in a number of host communities in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. More than half of the world's refugees are from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, and more than two-thirds of the movements occur within the region of origin (UNHCR 2015), communities where social, economic and institutional capacity is low to begin with, and where financial space and borrowing opportunities are limited. How the problem of arrivals is addressed depends to a large extent on the specific context of the host community, as well as on the socio-economic situation of the displaced. cases of Germany, Italy, Jordan and Lebanon, countries that have recently attracted a large absolute number of internally displaced migrants, are compared in Table 1. Table 1: Copability: Economy and Refugees 2014 Germany Italy Jordan Lebanon Population (i) 80,889,505 61,336,387 6,607,000 4,546,774 Surface Area (sq. km) 357 170 301 340 89 320 10 450 GDP (current us dollars) 3,853,2144 36 46 average annual GDP growth rates (2010-2014%) 1.96 (0.52) 2.70 3.02 GNI per capita, PPP (current int. \$) 46 840 34 710 11 910 17 400 unemployment rate (% of the total workforce, 5.30 12.20 12.60 6.50 refugees (2014, UNHCR) 216 973 93 93 715 654 141 1 15 4,040 refugees (2014, UNHCR) 40 563 20 582 119 000 403 600 Estimated Net Annual Migration (2011-2022)015 United Nations Population Division, an average annual rate) 549,998,900,000 400 002 500 001 Refugees to accommodate the population (f. Refugees per 1000 inhabitants) 2.63 1.53 87.16 232.39 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Difference in per capita income between Germany and Italy and Jordan and Lebanon after purchasing power adjustment is approximately 3 or 4 to 1 in the case of Jordan and 2 or 3 to 1 in the case of Lebanon. Lebanon and Jordan are high among the countries hosting refugees. However, they are not among the top ten countries that include all forced migrants, including IDPs. As chart 1 shows, Syria, Colombia, Sudan and southern Sudan, which are much poorer countries, host far more displaced people. Chart 1: Major host countries, UNHCR's 2015 Germany database took in about 1 million asylum seekers in 2015, equivalent to 1.2% of its population, the largest annual influx of people seeking asylum in any OECD country ever registered (OECD 2015). However, even if most of these people were granted asylum, the number of refugees in Germany (less than 3 per thousand) would be tiny compared to Lebanon (232 per thousand) and Jordan (87 per thousand), as chart 2 shows. The number of refugees in Italy is now less than 2 per thousand. In the United States, where Congress has just voted against accepting additional refugees without a draconian vetting process, and only up to 10,000 Syrian refugees a year, the number of refugees is less than 1 per thousand. Refugees have also historically made up a small proportion of all migrants, about 7% compared to voluntary migrants. In order to put the current refugee flow in perspective, Spain has attracted about 4.3 million new, overwhelmingly young, during 2000-2008, equivalent to about 9% of its population. Chart 2: Refugee Morbidity, UNHCR Global Trends 2014 Flow of Large Number of Displaced Persons in a Short Time host community deeply. There are three aspects: public services, fiscal balance and political stability. Public services and infrastructure in developing countries' low incomes and budgetary constraints mean that the provision of health, education and social services barely meets the needs of indigenous people and excludes many of them even before the arrival of refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, the World Bank's assessment showed that restoring access and quality of these services in Lebanon to pre-arrival levels would cost US\$1.4-1.6 billion (World Bank 2013, p.3). Similarly, the restoration of Lebanon's infrastructure services prior to the arrival of refugees, defined as water and sanitation, utilities, electricity and transport, is estimated at \$1.1 billion. In total, social assessment and impact assessment estimates, stabilization will require an additional \$2.5 billion in costs, i.e. to restore access to public services and quality to Syrian crisis levels (World Bank 2013, p.1). This amount represents about 5.5% of Lebanon's GDP. Since the flow of migrants is relatively small and public services are better developed and funded to begin with, OECD countries have much greater potential to cope with the shock of direct demand for public services than poorer host countries, even though the concentration of refugees in some regions or cities can lead to uneven shocks, as in the case of some school districts hosting large numbers of immigrant children. As the population of host countries or regions increases, the demand for public services and housing in the receiving community. In countries or regions where the investment climate is not conducive to a start and where the influx of foreigners disrupts established social and political uniform relations, business expectations may be negatively affected. This may delay or indefinitely hinder private investment in response to the growing demand for housing and services. 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This amount represents about 5.5% of Lebanon's GDP. Since the flow of migrants is relatively small and public services are better developed and funded to begin with, OECD countries have much greater potential to cope with the shock of direct demand for public services than poorer host countries, even though the concentration of refugees in some regions or cities can lead to uneven shocks, as in the case of some school districts hosting large numbers of immigrant children. As the population of host countries or regions increases, the demand for public services and housing in the receiving community. In countries or regions where the investment climate is not conducive to a start and where the influx of foreigners disrupts established social and political uniform relations, business expectations may be negatively affected. This may delay or indefinitely hinder private investment in response to the growing demand for housing and services. Budgetary constraints may limit the necessary investment in public services, and in extreme cases balance-of-payments restrictions can lead to exchange rate devaluations and make imports of food, fuel and other essentials more expensive. The current media are highlighting the migrant crisis in European countries, most of which accept very few forced migrants towards their populations, diverting attention from a much more serious problem in a number of host communities in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. More than half of the world's refugees are from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, and more than two-thirds of the movements occur within the region of origin (UNHCR 2015), communities where social, economic and institutional capacity is low to begin with, and where financial space and borrowing opportunities are limited. How the problem of arrivals is addressed depends to a large extent on the specific context of the host community, as well as on the socio-economic situation of the displaced. cases of Germany, Italy, Jordan and Lebanon, countries that have recently attracted a large absolute number of internally displaced migrants, are compared in Table 1. Table 1: Copability: Economy and Refugees 2014 Germany Italy Jordan Lebanon Population (i) 80,889,505 61,336,387 6,607,000 4,546,774 Surface Area (sq. km) 357 170 301 340 89 320 10 450 GDP (current us dollars) 3,853,2144 36 46 average annual GDP growth rates (2010-2014%) 1.96 (0.52) 2.70 3.02 GNI per capita, PPP (current int. \$) 46 840 34 710 11 910 17 400 unemployment rate (% of the total workforce, 5.30 12.20 12.60 6.50 refugees (2014, UNHCR) 216 973 93 93 715 654 141 1 15 4,040 refugees (2014, UNHCR) 40 563 20 582 119 000 403 600 Estimated Net Annual Migration (2011-2022)015 United Nations Population Division, an average annual rate) 549,998,900,000 400 002 500 001 Refugees to accommodate the population (f. Refugees per 1000 inhabitants) 2.63 1.53 87.16 232.39 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Difference in per capita income between Germany and Italy and Jordan and Lebanon after purchasing power adjustment is approximately 3 or 4 to 1 in the case of Jordan and 2 or 3 to 1 in the case of Lebanon. Lebanon and Jordan are high among the countries hosting refugees. However, they are not among the top ten countries that include all forced migrants, including IDPs. As chart 1 shows, Syria, Colombia, Sudan and southern Sudan, which are much poorer countries, host far more displaced people. Chart 1: Major host countries, UNHCR's 2015 Germany database took in about 1 million asylum seekers in 2015, equivalent to 1.2% of its population, the largest annual influx of people seeking asylum in any OECD country ever registered (OECD 2015). 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