


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The articles are organized in pairs, offering alternative perspectives on the most important aspects of diaspora theory today: Celebration or Melancholy?; Gender biases and the canon of diaspora literature; Diaspora violence and terror; Time, place and diaspora home; and border crossings. A number of articles are illustrated by discussions by specific authors such as Caryl Phillips, Salman Rushdie, and Michael Ondaatje, and the range of references found in this volume covers writing from many parts of the world, including contemporary art by Chicana, Asian diaspora writers, and black British, Afro-Caribbean, Indigenous North American and African writing. ForewordChapter 1 Prologue to The General EventChapter 2 Scene of Double TerritorialityChapter 3 Scene of Situational LateralityChapter 4 Scene archival specificitiesChapter 5 Three Pillars of the Diaspora CriticismChapter 6 Instead of epilogue. In an attempt to put itself as a genre of theoretical writing (Frow, 1997, 15), the diaspora critics accept as their object a thing called the diaspora. The viability of the critical genre, it follows, is based on the definition and delineation of the object of its request. This act put a new critical site through the writing parameters, paradoxically, at odds with the site breaking the effects of its main sign or object, since diaspeir is Greek for scattering (speir) and was originally used to explain the botanical phenomenon of seed scattering. In any case, this post is associated with an attempt by diaspora critics to mark themselves as a new theoretical area, focusing on an object called the diaspora, an enterprise in which the current writer is crookedly implicated. What he says or avoids talking about object, creates (after Foucault) Foucault) to create, delimitate, and co-or.com. So, first of all, the obvious question is, what is this thing called the diaspora? Khachig Tololian, one of the founding editors of the multidisciplinary magazine Diaspora (first issue, 1991), uses the term to refer to specific social entities that are exemplary communities of the transnational moment (Tololyan, 1991, 5). By limiting himself to transnational time, Toloyan means distinguishing between pre-media or classical ethnodiaspores - Jews, Greeks and Armenians - and the large-scale dispersal of significant ethnic clusters, or what Arjun Appadurai calls ethnopoiss (Appadurai, cit. Roberts, 1992, 234), witnessed the times of the advanced capital. While there have been protests in various quarters about the modern use of the ancient category, scientists in this field have largely endorsed the annexation. Ian Chambers, for example, argues that the chronicles of diaspora - the Black Atlantic, the capital's Jewry, mass displacement to rural areas - represent the soil of modernity (Chambers, 1994, 16). While this assertion correctly reinsures Jews into the narrative of modern diaspora, the Chamber's timing is too radical for any meaningful discussion of the specific historical causality of such social entities. Vijay Mishra, on the other hand, sees diaspora education as an exemplary state of late modernity (Mishra, 1996, 426), though his account of migrant workers retreating leads us to an earlier modernity, conditioned by colonialy managed plantation capitals. Mishra argues that the practice of issuing emigration permits has contributed to the entry of peasant workers into the regulatory history of the Empire (Mishra, 1996, 429), but, somewhat strangely, refuses to dwell on the additional function of the modern version formulated by the same actors in their formulation of girmite, a term collectively assigned to the atemporal ontology of suffering, deprivation and deception on plantations. The history of modernity, as the girmites were talking about, that is, those who survived the girth, significantly departs from the archives of the horde. A few years before Mishra, Paul Gilroy wrote in his book Black Atlantic. Double Consciousness and Modernity a study about another diaspora formation of classical modernity. In this study, Gilroy chronicles the sub-alternative history of the Black Atlantic - a phrase he coined to describe intersecting themes (politics, music and memory, for example) linking restraining descendants of plantation slavery - that intermittently haunts and radically infects, as well as inflects an unfinished project of modernity. The main statement of Gilroy is that Deportee blacks and their descendants were not only victims of modernity, but also producers of post-medium pass-through measurements of European American culture and history (Gilroy, 1993). Sorting through the general confusion regarding periodization, it seems that there are three different historical moments corresponding to the emergence of diaspora social formations: classical or pre-modern, (early) modern and late (post) modern. While the diaspora highlighted the last of these moments to record the types of socio-economic pressures that led to the emergence of late-modern diaspora, mapping this other historical vector occurred in connection with a diagram drawn from earlier diaspora social entities motivated by their specific historical circumstances. Mishra's account of the new border diaspora in his Indian example was made possible, for example, by his formulation of differentiated/definitional relations between him and the old exclusive diaspora of snow-covered labor, who share many characteristics of the so-called ideal type of Jewish diaspora (Mishra, 1996, 427). While one can see the historical disunity that supports Mishra's distinction, the exact relationship between the exclusive diaspora and plantation capital as a subspecies of the political economy, or the link between the border diaspora and late modernity, remains partially developed. The attempt of diasporists to tease out the complications that permeate the relationship between the diaspora of social entities on the historical horizon, i.e. the dichronic horizon in which different diaspora arise, and the synchronon connections (or ruptures) perceived in the triennial interaction between social entities, their cultural productions and the rough socio-economic processes that underlie them, often culminate in theoretical confusion. In addition, there is a tendency among diaspora to adopt a happy reflective model when discussing the above three points as they jostle on a synchronous scale. It is assumed that the transnational economy encourages the transnationalization of certain social entities and their cultural productions. This is opposed by the identification of Apsamurai fundamental disjunctures between economics, culture and politics (Appadurai, cit. Roberts, 1992, 233) in the global system, although it is also problematic if it licenses popular diaspora to engage with one of the categories in convenient isolation from the rest. Another pitfall is that very few diaspora take on the effort to investigate the actual work of transnational or what economist Samir Amin calls related capital (1997, 1). Are we really in the middle of a metamorphic stage in the history of the capital? Has a post-Ford speculative based on market forecasts and exchange rates - spectral economy - has finally replaced the everyday system of excess production and accumulation of value? Is it true that floating capital no longer relies on classically enshrined production methods for its daily distribution? Has the information age really brought a new way of production from 1000 years on, or does it generate (technological) effects or mediases (after Appalaray) that hide the old dialectic of value production? Obviously, the area of material production is no longer at the national level (German cars produced in India, Australian electric lamps made in China), but should this new agreement be adopted to allow an intimate seismic shift in the structure of the capital or just operational? Is transnational or global capital, in other words, just another way of describing the old game's new strategy for surplus value, with the difference that individual groups from former colonies have penetrated, perhaps for the first time in a modern-day scheme, at all levels, but to varying degrees the hierarchy of social relations created by the bourgeois political economy? When capital, in any case, is not transnational, if value is found, in one form or another, in every society? Without shying away from such basic-level issues, most diaspora prefer to go along with the idea that the transnationality of capitalism implies the disintegration of national economies and the creation of a more interconnected world economic system (Jusdanis, 1996, 141), but the statistics needed to support this assertion are generally lacking. It can be argued, for example, that workers from Kerala who flock to the Gulf States are lured there by auxiliary industries that rely on a relatively primitive way of producing (although the means used have certainly moved forward), namely the extraction of crude mineral oil from the bowels of the earth; it can also be argued that the 80,000 Indo-Fijians who left Fiji after the events of 1987 and 2000 have done so as scapegoats for the belated nationalism of indigenous peoples, rather than as ready-made actors in the hypermobile capital; and finally, as Milton Esman shows, large-scale labour migration, whether documented or undocumented, can be directly caused by vulgar demographics, because incomes and a growing economy, due to low fertility, have an insurmountable need for labour energy, while a high-growth economy generates large and chronic surplus labour (Esman). Too hastily, then, the transnational moment is called by diasporists as a mantra to prepare the ground for the creation of a model that defines the characteristics of a particular diaspora or expatriating on the hybrid texture of diaspora aesthetic productions. This lack of rigorous interaction with the inner workings of late capital is that diaspora of criticism of the genre of theoretical writing, rather than an economically sound analysis of such social entities. In short, criticism of the diaspora is linked to the social and aesthetic implications of transnational or global capital, which it accepts as a condition of late modernity, when it may be a condition of late capitalist ideology about economics. The fact is that, considering the global economy as a given rather than a place for in-depth research, the implied links between diaspora social entities and transnationality are based, at best, on appearance and, at worst, on hypotheses. Having said that, it is necessary to assess the innate criticism of the diaspora in relation to the discursive (literary, sociological, historical, philosophical, psychological, and so on) apparatuses that it deploys around what it perceives as unique types of social formations that generate specific types of cultural and aesthetic products. A common strategy among diaspora diaspora is to classify diaspora social entities by (1) to identify new structures of existence (identity) of uprooted ethnic groups, as it oscillates between the homeland (missing topos) and the host country (real topos), (2) by tabulation of the set of defining characteristics of this collective and (3) hinting at some kind of deviation manifested on the plane of consciousness manifested on the plane of consciousness. Safran points out that multi-world diaspora are not necessarily defined by a specific geopolitical boundary (Clifford, 1994, 304-5). Arguing against the teleologies of origin and return, he refers to the wording of Gilroy Afroroy Afro-Caribbean-British-American or Black Atlantic Network, where Africa is no longer the main reference, and to S.D. Goytein's account of the medieval world of Geniza (connecting the Mediterranean countries, North Africa, Arabia and coastal India), in which trade, travel, family, cultural and communication networks are defined by a side axis, symbolic or otherwise (Clifford, 1994, 315-27). Although Clifford does not put it in such terms, his comments on the world of Geniza end up describing the vast affiliate structures (Shapiro, 2000, 80) that governed ancient notions of citizenship. In any case, its central argument seems to be that, as border communities, diaspora are not always associated with or separated from the macro-space centres of the homeland and host countries; they can, as his example of the Geniza world show, create microcosmic alliances by visiting cultural forms, kinship and business or attaching themselves to religious institutions and cities (Clifford, 1994, 305). Admittedly, there is a lot of merit in Clifford's resistance with Safran's emphasis on solid and symbolic bipolar topography and his promotion of the (different, lateral) dimensions of the diaspora (although it can reasonably be argued that the border itself is the motive for centering in its scheme); despite this, his paradigm departs only slightly from Safran in his constant focus on identity formations, identification, defining traits and distinctive consciousness, in short, subjectivity and subjective constitution. Clifford repeatedly refers to transregional identities when discussing Roger Rouse's comments about spatially disaggregated agglais that support childbirth through phone schemes; he talks in detail about the consciousness of the diaspora because it is negative and positive - negatively, he argues, through discrimination and isolation and positively through identification with world historical/political forces such as Africa or China (Clifford, 1994, 311-12). One can suspect that the category of world historical cultural/political forces is not quite different from Safran's notion of a symbolic homeland, which, whether it is recognized or not, is politically and culturally a mythical reference point. Clifford notes that identification when attached to the negative experience of racial and economic marginalization can . . . lead to new coalitions: one thinks of the Maghreb diaspora of consciousness, uniting Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians living in France, where a shared history of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation contributes to new solidarities (Clifford, 1994, 312). Such coalition solidarity, based on short-term identification, can - citing yet another example of this kind of empathetic transfers - periodically combine Australia-based descendants of Indo-Fijian coulis with offspring of retreating or blackbirds sent to sugarcane plantations in nsw in the nineteenth century. Thus, Clifford, in fact, does not deviate significantly from the practice of taking into account the group subjectives of diaspora social formations, although he makes a significant intervention, tearing away from the territorial and ethnically based models. Instead, he praises (after Gilroy) the antibody history of displacement, suffering, adaptation or resistance (Clifford, 1994, 306) as a target for the inscription of definitions about diaspora peoples. In practice, this means that geopolitical formations of the homeland and host countries disappear as reference points in the analysis of diaspora formations. In short, the conceptual framework should not go beyond the dynamic situational narratives of the crackdown itself. It turns out that the history of the roots, based on the posit mapping of the homeland, is discarded in favor of the history of routes, based on travel routes, hybrid exchanges and displacement of settlements. And while the border paradigm can sometimes resemble a postmodern adrift of prefix and suffix, it has the power to stimulate a debate about the unstable relationship between classically autocratic and ideologically homogenized nation states and ethnic communities whose affiliations and preferences can be territorially and culturally disaggregated. In fact, the question of the bourgeois state-5 and its turbulent relations with diaspora groups and practices, often seen as a symptom of global capital, excites many diaspora. The debate seems to focus on the perceived divergence between the ideology that understates the nation state and the ideology that is disavowed - and it should not be and rarely is a deliberate act - of the presence and practice of diaspora actors and entities.6 So what is this ideology that dropped up the bourgeois nation state? Drawing on Habermas's work, Michael Shapiro writes that the fundamental understanding of the modern national segment of the nation is that the nation embodies a coherent culture united on the basis of common origin, or at least incorporating people with historically stable coherence. Because this is so transparently a myth, the symbolic preservation of a nation state requires the management of historical narratives as well as territorial space (Shapiro, 2000, 81). It is this activity of symbolic maintenance that makes the national state an imaginary political community (Anderson, 1991, 6). Indeed, subject citizens receive a double coding in that citizenship is both in legal, territorial education, which is associated with the privileges of sovereignty and the rights of individuals, and in the cultural community, where it is associated with the history of common ethnic and social characteristics (Shapiro, 2000, 81). Diaspora groups are inserted schizophranically into this ideological scheme, by integrationists, and by pluralistic nation states. As documented by the citizens of the subjects of the national state, diaspora clusters can enjoy the abstract rights and privileges of citizens-courts, manifesting themselves in a legal or constitutional sense. However, since they cannot share the common cultural ground with a hegemonic community whose specific values and objectives, at least ideologically, are mediated by a national state and subtly incorporated into its laws, the right to cultural practice may be denied to them. The discursive practices and economic ambitions of the founding communities. If a British-Pakistani entity had married more than one wife, this is possible in accordance with Islamic practice, his actions would be a direct violation of British marriage law based on the monogamous structures of its mythical founding communities. Communities. It would also be stated that the practice of polygamy was an anachronism in modern times and violated women's individual rights. If they document resident entities (not citizens) of a nation state, the diaspora may find certain rights and privileges withheld from them. Although the law requires paying taxes that make management possible, they cannot be allowed by the same law, as is clearly seen in the case of Australia, to participate in national elections or if they have re-arrived to qualify for social security benefits. Of course, diaspora actors can exercise the possibility of denying the right to citizenship (as is

the case with a significant number of North African citizens living in France),7 thus the aforementioned right is extended by their host country for (symbolic, spiritual, nostalgic or clearly material) rights of the homeland. By falling outside the purview of legally sanctioned subjects of the nation state, unregistered diaspora actors are the least happy of the three categories outlined above. Even when they manage to overcome the deadly obstacles associated with crossing borders (only in 2000, several Chinese illegals suffocated to death in the hold of a truck that crossed the English Channel by ferry to Dover), the vast majority live an underground life in the bourgeois state and earn low (unofficial) wages in manual or service (including sex) industries. Holston and Appadurai argue that this is the result of compromises between nation-states that are reaching for resources and global economic institutions that are in search of labor. The pact is manifested in new legal regimes designed to make significant segments of low-income transnational labour illegal, using the national border system to criminalize immigrants... (Holston and Appadurai, 1996, 1999). Illegality, in this view, is a tactic used by a national state to complicity with errant capital to produce an obedient, non-union workforce that can be used through new threats of deportation. Unable to impose direct taxes on this clandestine labour force, the national state will often levy consumer taxes (VAT and GST) on the goods needed for its existence. Reflecting on the tricky question of the disconnection between the non-pleasantly nationalized (Appadurai, Chu, 1996, 93) diaspora population and nation states, Vijay Mishra tries to come up with a theory of diaspora subjectivity (although he limits his analysis of a citizen subject type by visiting what he calls the semantics of the hyphen (Mishra, 1996, 433). He's building his theory, understanding that the subject's unresolved position in relation to the homeland and creates a torn/styist identity that can be conceived as the third space of time (Lavie and Swedenburg, 1996, 16). In a country-state, citizens are always unhyphenated, that is, if we want to believe what our passports say about us. In practice, a pure, unhyphenated general category applies only to those citizens whose bodies mean an unsalted identity of themselves with nations. For those of us who are outside of this identity politics whose bodily cracks break down the logic of non-problematic identification, plural/multicultural societies have built an impure hyphenated genre. (Mishra, 1996, 433) Mishra quotes Slava Sizak to justify his remark about the unproblemable identification of citizens who do not require special verification of this thing called The Nation. For this group, the nation is simply (beyond any symbolism) (Mishra, 1996, 423). This Lacan loss of self-awareness through absorption in the imaginary realm of the nation is a condition accessible only to those citizens who perceive themselves as belonging to the founding community ruled by the idea of a homogeneous, empty time (Anderson, 1991, 24), and not to those groups that carry in themselves (clothes, speech, culinary habits, etc.) and in mind (physically here, but neurologically elsewhere) markers of difference, creating a symbolic fracture. The theoretical difficulty arises from the aforementioned argument. How is it possible for a fundamental citizen to achieve imaginary identification with the thing of a nation in the space of the diaspora of others without experiencing a break with homogeneous, empty time imaginary? In other words: if the other is here, in the same imaginary space in which I live, where am I? (The very act of asking this question signals the loss of imaginary order.) Am I then outside of an imaginary space and so in a heterogeneous space, brimming being symbolic? Of course, it is a constant contradiction of nationalist appeals of racial homogeneity - that it should be based on its loss. Having stumbled upon Patels for their dinner at a family motel, the narrator Bharati Mukherjee in *Loose Ends*, a killer yearn for mythically pure America, malevolently acknowledges the loss of this imaginary order: They look at me. A bunch of aliens and they look like I'm a freak (Mukherjee, 1988, 52). One of the persistent dilemmas facing the diaspora's criticism is how to adjust diaspora subjectivity as hybrid, liminate, borderline and hyphenated, without resorting to a strategy of classifying non-historical groups as imaginary areas of non-liminality, non-hybridity, heterogeneity and so on. Again, if non-diosporous subjects are capable of a type of diaspora, then where does it leave the diaspora subject? For that matter, the whole enterprise of the diaspora is a critic? Attributing the diaspora to the third space of time, i.e. the boundary zone between identity as an entity and identity as a conjuncture (Lavie and Swedenburg, 1996, 17), the diaspora withholding from non-propaganda plots the experience of such critical themes in contextually conditioned moments of epiphany. If we take the threshold of diaspora enclaves (restaurants, video shops, cinemas, religious institutions, etc.) in a bourgeois state, as we experience the hyphen of the third space of time, then any entity inhabiting this zone will be receptive to the experience of the boundary flow, which is an identity as an entity on the one hand, and an identity as a conjuncture/disconnection on the other. To their credit, the diaspora know that while the border zone encourages democratic porosity and merging, it also facilitates reactionary identities of forma-tions, identification, dangerous disavowalisms (the anti-hybrid values of a Muslim patriarch married to an English woman, as depicted in the film *East*, comes to mind) and nostalgia for racially pure areas. Based on Amit S. Rai's research on the virtual network, Mishra points to six sites that indicate a desire to build India in purist terms (Mishra, 1996, 424). Thinking in the same vein, Stephen Vertovets argues that right-wing religious organizations in their homeland are known to receive great support from the foreign population: primarily Hindus, through the Hindu Parishad Of Vishwa (and therefore the Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP) in India, and Muslims through Jamaat-e-Islami, a prominent Islamic political party in Pakistan. These examples point to the danger of ignoring the principle of cognitive hardening in a conversation about an individual, under which a subject or collective can enter an identity station as an entity before a hybrid train can walk the path of identification as a conjuncture. Perhaps in a secret and implicit way this post stated that the emphasis on ethnic identity of entities allows the diaspora to pay lip service or blatantly ignore disjunctures, as well as the conjunctures that occur due, but also despite identification based on class, gender, sexuality, kinship, generation, profession and ideology. While digging for specifics can admittedly lead to the discovery of further layers of such features (or rosary piety about them) in an endless series, making it impossible to task theory, it is the business of the theory to develop a strict paradigm that you subs most parts of any particular complexity. For this reason, the primacy provided by diaspora to deter ethnic identity formations in relation to other types of constitution of identity and identity could theoretically be With some justification, they can be accused of playing an ideological manoeuvre when they should interrogate him. The orientation of racial identity formations among South Asians in the United States, Kamala Visweswaran, makes this point straight: Without additional attention . . . there is a danger about how the class defines the differential character and experience of racial formations... that the diaspora theory of neoliberals such as Joel Kotkin or conservatives such as Thomas Sowell will replace undeniable cultural history with capital accounts, helping to deploy cultural arguments against the economic failures of urban minorities. (Visvesvaran 1997, 5) Later she asked the most astute question: ... what does it mean when culture is more and more the foundation of the language of capital? (Visvesvaran, 1997, 11). The classic answer on the left is that instead of being a secondary effect of relationship production, this means that culture now acts as its primary agent. This is no longer a discursive area where social contradictions are played out, either subversively or symptomatically, but an autonomous value system that determines the success or failure of a capitalist enterprise. Culture has a certain degree of autonomy and agency, of course, but the growing tendency among cultural theorists to treat it somehow before or separated from the accumulation of surpluses, and at the same time able to encroach on it negatively or positively, is cause for concern. Visvesvaran notes that popular diaspora attributed the economic failures of black central residents to the successes of individual Asian immigrant groups; not by taking into account how Asians organize capital, but by taking into account the existence of basic cultural traits that blacks are considered to lack (Visweswaran, 1997, 7). Any paradigm that equates the varying degrees of causality associated with terms such as culture, race, gender and class, or assigns a surplus of causality to the wrong category (to culture, not to economics, race, not class), is bound to come with very dubious conclusions. Instead of riding the rough shoddy over them, the diaspora would not give a closer part in those elements of identity formation and identification that crack imaginary ethnic collectiveness and bring to light the social relationships that underlie it. Discussing the modern fate of what Hamza Alavi calls the subcontinental salariat, a middle-class comprador who stood in a subordinate attitude to the British colonizer but was the dominant class in his own cultural environment, Visveswaran, summing up Alavi, observes as in-creased competition for a limited number of positions at home combined with English education has led to a global mobilization of mobilization facilitated its fragmentation along ethnic or communal lines, which therefore prevents the consolidation of class interests (Visweswaran, 1997, 11). This type of ethnic or communal fragmentation is presumably followed by strategic class/ethnic/gender alliances with non-continental social entities in the host country. Class divisions in the same ethnic entity are also obviously vital for questioning. For example, if we were to consider the Chinese diaspora in its several locations, we would have to sort out, among other things, temporary, social and psychological agreements and differences between the steep stay ners of the nineteenth century Malaya, service and garment industry workers temporary in various global metropolitan centers and taikongren or astronaut professionals who leave their families in safe havens, between Australia and New ealand and the booming Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei, Guangzhou, Shanghai (Giese, 1997, 5). In addition, we would have to include in this chart those diaspora entities that have flexible citizenship '12, as well as diaspora entrepreneurs who, according to Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy (1996), rely on the guanxi (personal relationships) system to invest in their homeland, resulting in them having made more than three-quarters of foreign investment in China in terms of investment and export generation (Bolt, 1997, 216). The Guangxi study will also mean exploring how such personal networks promote social psychology based on commitments that lead to periodic transclassic coalitions, which are undoubtedly the cause of the enormous success made by the diaspora capital in this particular home territory. Generation and gender may be key factors for criticizing the diaspora. Generational changes can and do affect the nature of diaspora formations, and sometimes their very existence. Some diaspora disappear into the homogenization ideology of the nation state (one only needs to think of the Irish diaspora in Australia), while others go to the creation of their own nation states, such as the Chinese diaspora in Singapore, thereby shedding the status of a minority of expatriates, which is the defining feature of such entities. Gender, of course, is a common factor in determining the nature of the diaspora. The most striking example of this is the statistics on Filipino migrant workers in Europe. Of the 500,000 workers living legally and illegally in Europe (Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands) in 1995, the vast majority (95 per cent in some countries) were women employed as private domestic workers or employed in the services sector (restaurants and hotels), while how a significant increase was made up of the diaspora in Austria and worked as a nurse. What is the impact of this gender imbalance, coupled with low employment, on this diaspora education? Is this a diaspora education? Is gender imbalance simply defined by the sexual division of labour, or are other factors at stake? Do Filipino migrant women define themselves as displaced groups, have they demonstrated the characteristics listed by Safran? How do Filipino women weave into the ideology of these nation-states before and after their arrival in Europe? Such gender-oriented issues may open the way for Europe's relations with Asia, the links between patriarchy and capitalism, and for women as highly valuable goods in resource-poor third world countries. Loretta Ann Rosales notes that official bank transfers in 1997 from the migrant labour market in the Philippines amounted to \$6.2 billion. Another example of how gender plays an important historical role is the old labour diaspora of indentations. The gender breakdown for the steep ones sent to Fiji between 1879 and 1916 was forty women for every hundred men. Even at that historic juncture, the recruitment company acknowledged that gender ratio is an important cause of murder, suicide and work problems... (Gillion, 1962, 56). It is clear that gender disparity plays a less than minor sexual role in the psychopathology of the apostate men and women who make up the Indian diaspora in Fiji; however, more archival work needs to be done to determine the exact link between gender, violence and consciousness girmit (indenture). When they move away from the slippery field of transnational capital and develop common models for dispersed social entities to analyze the symptomatic presence of the above elements in specific cultural products and productions, diasporalists tend to be the most persuasive. They can also be at their most furiously simplistic. Discussing bhanga music, for example, Gayatri Gopinath writes that the diaspora web of belonging and influence (Gilroy, 1993, 16) that bhanga calls for being within and through various national contexts displaces the home country from its privileged position as a place of origin and relocates it as one of the many diaspora places. She continues: Similarly, the inclusion of bhanga in a nation in its transformed and transformative State to some extent transforms the very terms on which the nation is made. In this sense, the analysis of bhanga requires not only that the diaspora be seen as part of the nation, but also that the nation be rethought as part of the diaspora. (Gopinath, 1995, 304) You can see how the transnational spread of bhanga can change its form/content, for the genre, another place in the network network places and is no longer the main geocultural defining point, but it is very difficult to understand how, in its metamorphosis state, bhanga can be considered to create new conditions for the county's constitution. Of course, a minority of songs and dance forms, seemingly sundered by economic and political motives, may not have the kind of nation redefining the impact Gopinath has in mind. A more compelling account of diaspora cultural flows and formations is provided by Martin Roberts. Exploring emerging world music as a new kind of commodity in the global popular music industry market (Roberts 1992, 232-3). Roberts refutes the seductive argument that mass culture is simply territorially folk cultural forms, pointing to the complex process of indigenisation, resulting in the interaction of global mass culture with local cultures produces hybrid cultural forms that make simple opposition between the core and the periphery problematic (Roberts, 1992, 230). He goes on to demonstrate how Western musical forms have been assimilated into non-Western musical cultures or assimilated in the local language. To his credit, Roberts rarely loses sight of the raw material function of world music and refers to six multinational record companies (RCA, CBS, Time Warner, EMI, Polygram, MCA) and their subsidiaries that control the global music financier (Roberts, 1992, 236). By announcing the relevant data, it also shows how multinational and transnational corporations, whose working methods are governed by changing human settlements, are disrupting the economy at the national level, where raw materials (music) are disconnected from their cultural environment (community, national state, region) in the process of its reproduction (overseas recording studios) and consumption (Markets Of the First World). Roberts refuses, however, to see world music simply in terms of its commercial function; it recognizes the ambiguous energy in cultural artifacts that can turn power against itself: on the one hand... ideoscapes that world music articulates co-opted as just another marketing strategy. Recognizing the booming market sector, record companies and musicians have jumped into the global music bandwagon in recent years. The idea of an alternative, globally known public has been commodified: consumers are sold the idea that they are responsible, even participating in the form of cultural resistance, the very system against which they supposedly resist... On the other hand, the influence of world music in the system of global capitalism allows to turn this system against itself, using the mass cultural status of world music as a kind of Trojan horse to disrupt the system from within, as sales of records, concerts and touring goods are put to work, progressive political agendas, causes, and movements. (Roberts, (Roberts, 239) While the latter statement may be slightly utopian, given the actual power of the progressive corporate system struggling, the general point of how a cultural product can function antagonistically, despite its co-option tells us a lot about the elusive, anarchic nature of the sign, whether it's a musical sign, a movie sign or a literary sign. This, in turn, can make a big difference to the aesthetics of the influence, which, in the final calculation, evades the product function, but acts mysteriously on the consuming object. It is on this threshold of investigation that Roberts unfortunately terminates his incentive account. Source: Representing Critics in the 21st Century by Julian Wolfreys, Edinburgh University Press, 2002. Categories: Diaspora Criticism, Literary Criticism, Literary TheoryTags: Amit S. Rai, Arjun Appadurai, Bharati Mukherjee, Black Atlantic, Diaspora, Double Displacement, Ethnodiaspores, Exclusive Diaspora, Gayatri Gopinath, Geniza, Geography of Identity, Homeland, Host Home, Ian Chambers, Imaginary Homeland, James Clifford, Kamala Viselvaran, Kanak, Khachig Toloen , transnational, Vijay Mishra, Walker Connor, William Safran Safran diasporic literature and theory pdf, diasporic literature and theory where now, theory of diaspora and diasporic literature

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