



Forces for Sustainability

Report of the first Peace and Sustainability Session



Peace Palace, The Hague

14 - 15 March 2007

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Institute for Environmental Security

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Introduction to the Conference

This conference, Forces for Sustainability, was intended to bring together decision makers, opinion leaders, professionals in peacekeeping operations, environmental scientists, the private sector, juridical experts as well as international and grass root organisations working in areas of armed conflict to find solutions for sustainable development challenges.

In many places of the world today the environment is under heavy pressure, affecting the security of man and the community of life. In some places environmental degradation has been a factor causing violent conflict and in other situations armed conflicts cause environmental disruption, thus prolonging and expanding the conflict. One of the greatest environmental security threats is posed by climate change. There is virtual consensus at the moment that it is happening, that it is in all probability man-made and that whatever we do to stop further change now, the impacts of a warmer atmosphere will be with us for many decades to come.

While the ultimate answer to addressing the security impacts of environmental degradation and achieving sustainability lies in diplomacy, international cooperation and the rule of law, there is a crucial role for the military to play.

This is especially the case in weak or failed states, where there is an absence of the rule of law, let alone international law. Often the situation is compounded by the extraction of

Peace and Sustainability Sessions

The Institute for Environmental Security has launched - in partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IUCN - World Conservation Union - the Peace and Sustainability Sessions. They will be held yearly in The Hague at the Peace Palace.

The Peace and Sustainability Sessions aim to bring together decision makers, opinion leaders, professionals in peacekeeping operations, environmental scientists, international and grass root organisations working in areas of armed conflict to find solutions for sustainable development challenges. The sessions are meant to mobilise knowledge for change by analysing experiences and formulating recommendations for various stakeholders.

The first of the Peace and Sustainability Sessions, entitled Forces for Sustainability, was organised in partnership with the IUCN Commission on Environment, Economic and Social Policy, on 14 and 15 March 2007.

minerals, the logging of timber and the traffic in endangered species, mostly illegal, accompanied by human rights violations and damage to the environment. If we accept the model of conflict cycle prediction, prevention, conflict management and post-conflict recovery, then military insights and intelligence could be used to identify where conflicts resulting from ecological degradation might erupt, and timely military intervention may be part of a preventative approach.

When violent conflicts do emerge, it is primarily the military that is charged with peacebuilding and creating the first conditions for lasting peace, such as: disarming; demobilisation; security sector reform; and the reintegration of former armed groups into civil society. Challenges to be addressed include:

- Setting up early warning systems for environmental and natural resource conflicts.
- Formulating scenarios for change towards transparent governance structures.
- Giving priority to supervision of the phasing out of illegal economic activities and to repair the damage of these activities.
- Retraining and employing (former) militias and rebels to restore environmental damage to forests, water sources, soils and to sustainably manage the ecosystems and natural resources on which they and their communities are dependent.
- Organising civil-military cooperation on both the strategic planning and operational levels throughout the cycle of prediction, prevention and management of conflicts and post-conflict recovery.

While the aim of the conference was to address these issues, the organisers were fully aware that this could not be done exhaustively, and that there were many additional issues that should be included in the debate. Therefore the Institute for Environmental Security intends this 'Forces for Sustainability' conference as the first of the 'Peace and Sustainability Sessions' to be held annually at the Peace Palace in The Hague, with the aim of continuing the debate on the role of the military as a partner in environmental security, increasing the accountability of the extractive industry, and empowering local communities to make them effective forces for sustainability.

The conference started with some opening remarks concerning the nature of environmental security, which served to frame the debate between these distinct but inter-related concepts. This allowed the participants to appreciate the various ways in which the environment can play a role in security, as well as highlighting the lack of progress that has occurred in this area.

Following these remarks, the conference began by setting the context for debate, and outlining what the main challenges for sustainability in areas of armed conflict are. This

included a discussion of the macro-economic forces that play a role in shaping this discussion, and how the concept of environmental security can be included in the defence community's analysis of threats to security.

The conference then continued with an in-depth case study of how armed conflict can have a direct impact on the environment in the form of the recent Lebanese oil-spill. This case study included an environmental impact assessment, as well as an overview of the various mechanisms of international law that may be applicable, and what the likely outcomes may be.

This case-study formed the basis for a further discussion of specific experiences with sustainability in post-conflict transition phases. With examples from the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Great Lakes region of Africa as a whole and Nepal, the environmental issues encountered in this delicate stage were analyzed, and solutions were offered. Furthermore, this debate closed with a thorough analysis of private military companies and the role they can play in this post-conflict stage.


Following a discussion during the conference dinner, about the role of NATO in Afghanistan, the conference moved on to an analysis of the environmental impact of conflict on local people and communities. This began with the case of the mining industry in the Philippines, and problems of accountability, transparency, and human rights violations. Following this, representatives from the West Papua region of Indonesia provided a detailed analysis of the damage caused by logging, and the rights of local communities.

The dangers of industrial activity to local communities were then further analysed with reference to the offshore extractive industries in Mauritania and the lack of local awareness of the potential environmental impact. A possible solution to this was presented in the form of citizen's councils operating in Alaska, which aim to provide a voice for local people.

Following some comments from the audience, the discussion shifted towards the role of the private sector in building sustainability. This began with an analysis of role of the banking sector in post-conflict environments, and continued by looking at the case of Afghanistan and some of the challenges faced there. This theme was developed further by looking at civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan from an NGO perspective.

Finally, a brief summary of the main ideas and possible solutions agreed upon at the conference was presented. This aimed to offer recommendations to donors, international organisations and peacekeeping missions, as well as providing an outline for next year's event.

|| Opening Remarks



Ton Boon von Ochssée, Ambassador for Sustainable Development, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr Boon von Ochssée, one of only three ambassadors for sustainable development worldwide, began the conference proceedings by outlining the nature of the Dutch government's commitment to the issue of environmental sustainability. He noted that a sustainable environment is important for promoting livelihoods, but also for avoiding conflicts in the first place. Scarcity can lead to conflict, and conflict prevention is therefore linked to the loss of ecosystems and environmental degradation. He stressed that the Dutch government recognises this link, particularly in the Middle East, Darfur, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, and the Congo region, where a lack of food, ecosystem damage, and property rights issues pose threats to, and are also the direct cause of, conflict. Furthermore, activities such as logging and illegal mining can not only cause environmental damage, but also directly fund conflicts. Therefore, he stated, preventing conflicts by combating environmental degradation was one of the Dutch government's goals.

Mr Boon von Ochssée continued by noting that in order to increase security as a basis for sustainability, it is important to focus on solutions that target the underlying causes. These causes are often regional rather than national, and a regional approach is therefore required, based around concepts like trans-border cooperation in river basins, and building legal networks. Peace and sustainability, he stated, are the essential conditions to promoting this cooperation and building legal networks, and this is where the role of the armed forces lies.

In closing, he stated that the security and sustainability agendas are complicated and evolving, and that he therefore hoped that the Peace and Sustainability Sessions would become an annual event, as this would allow the measurement of achievements on the ground.

Gabriel Lopez, Director Global Strategies, IUCN



“Peace and Sustainability: new issues, new partners on the road to WCC IV, Barcelona 2008”

Mr Lopez began his presentation by thanking the organisers for their efforts in making conceptual and practical links between the fields of conflict and sustainability, which have often operated on parallel tracks. He proceeded to note that there is no longer any doubt that peace, security, sound environmental management, and sustainability are all inextricably linked, and that the emphasis of the meeting should be on defining practical ways of mainstreaming these issues in the policies and practices of governments, international organisations, civil society and the private sector.

Humanity, he continued, faces unprecedented challenges today as environmental resources are rapidly depleted by unsustainable production and consumption. The impacts of climate change accelerate, social inequalities expand, and the intergovernmental system appears unable to adequately address these core challenges. These trends, in turn, dramatically heighten socio-political tension and insecurity, creating a potentially downward spiral of decline and degradation; a process that disproportionately affects the poor and marginalised.

However, Mr Lopez noted, natural resource-based conflicts do not only occur when there is competition for scarce resources, but also where there is competition for abundant resources, especially hydrocarbons and minerals: the so-called ‘natural resource curse’. Daily news reports are littered with cases of conflict in which natural resource and environmental factors play key roles: from Darfur; to the diamond-fuelled conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola; to the role of oil in both creating and sustaining separatist conflicts in the Niger Delta and Aceh Province. Though each particular crisis or conflict has its own unique dynamic based on local politics, economics and history, there are clearly parallels.

The speaker elucidated on this point by highlighting the corrupting influence of point source revenues, whether from natural resources, drugs, or weapons, as one of the most powerful causes of conflict, underdevelopment and failing economies. The World Bank estimates that over the last 40 years, developing countries without major natural resources have grown two to three times faster than those with high natural resource endowments. Furthermore, twelve of the world’s twenty most mineral-dependent states are classified as highly indebted countries, and five of these have experienced civil wars since the early 1990s. This is easy to explain he claimed, as geopolitical competition for fossil fuels and mineral resources has become the main source of tension and conflict in today’s world. Moreover, by empowering autocratic rulers against their people, this market demand creates the conditions for corruption, organised crime, and violent internal crises that destabilise governments and finance conflict.

Mr Lopez continued by noting that the connection between natural resource competition and conflict is becoming increasingly apparent as the world moves closer towards a tipping-point. The continuous increase in demand for natural resources, combined with the effects of heightened environmental degradation and increasingly disruptive climatic change, raises a number of key questions; is this downward spiral inevitable, or can political will and appropriate governance systems emerge to equitably address these challenges? What are the new tools, institutional and governance arrangements, and policy options needed to address these issues? And most importantly, where will the leadership come from?

He noted that despite a few high-profile exceptions, such as legislation and political action to control the trade of 'conflict diamonds', there has been a lack of concerted international effort to address the natural resource and environmental roots of instability. In a world of rising scarcity and competition a reactive approach will not work. Moreover, despite conceptual advances in identifying competition for key resources and climate change as the main drivers of political tension and conflict, practical action has remained muted. Mr Lopez went on to urge swift action towards addressing these pivotal challenges. He mentioned that currently a window of opportunity exists to accelerate the process of systemic reform, as well as greater coherence. But the key question remains: "who will lead this process"? If effective, systemic solutions are not implemented soon, the international community will face ongoing crises, and will be forced to rely on patchwork measures of increasingly costly humanitarian and military intervention, with little chance of sustainable success.

He continued by noting that part of the problem is governance paralysis and fragmented conceptual fields, and that consequently there is a critical need to accelerate systemic reforms and intergovernmental coherence. The post-Second World War intergovernmental architecture was designed to avoid further conflict. Today the challenges are of a different order (poverty, climate, health, security), but the system remains fragmented in the disciplinary and professional fields with limited clarity on common goals, and disjointed policies that often work at cross purposes. The challenge lies in making the various parts work together toward a shared vision of sustainability, which relies not just on government action, but also on a concerted effort to engage non-state actors from business and civil society. Many institutions, including the IUCN – The World Conservation Union, have addressed subsets of these sustainability issues, but narrow sectoral approaches cannot adequately address the magnitude of the challenges now faced, as all domains and sectors must become fully engaged in the creation of sustainable solutions.

He went on to invite the organisations represented at the conference to begin to forge a new global alliance for a sustainable future that bridges sectoral interests, and to envision a strategy that will lead to a sustainable, just and equitable future for all. In this context, the IUCN seeks to contribute to the development of a detailed vision and strategic plan for achieving the shared goal of sustainability. Furthermore, the IUCN and some of its key


partners have launched 'The Future of Sustainability Initiative, Shaping Sustainable Solutions', aimed at uniting leading thinkers, global institutions, members, and new constituencies to:

- (1) Coordinate an international consultative process to help rethink, articulate, and disseminate meaningful new concepts, trends, alliances, practices, policies and metrics for advancing sustainability that are relevant to the global challenges of the 21st century.
- (2) Coordinate the development of a 'challenge paper' that will be vetted and debated at the 2008 World Conservation Congress in Barcelona. This will be followed by a major text or film by 2010 (the United Nations Year of Biodiversity) on the scale of *Caring for the Earth* and *The Earth Charter*, addressing the new challenges of the 21st century.
- (3) Develop a comprehensive global public education, outreach, and communications strategy to help reach out to broader audiences and new constituencies, and to accelerate progress towards sustainability.
- (4) Help build the global partnerships and alliances required to mobilise and revitalise the sustainable development movement.

Furthermore, Mr Lopez noted that the biggest challenge to sustainability is systemic. The solution lies both in devising and promoting an alternative development vision and strategy, and in mobilizing broad political support for enacting the policy and governance changes required. This means going beyond narrowly defined fields and communities, and coordinating with complementary fields such as human rights, peace and security, education, health, development and finance. He stated that from his perspective, this implies putting the original concept of sustainability into practice, with the environmental component playing a fundamental role, rather than one of three equal pillars with social and economic elements. Economic and social systems are built within ecological limits, when these limits are exceeded, crisis and conflict result.

He continued by noting that a key element of this process involves questioning the often unquestioned assumptions of the current political and economic model that emphasises growth and expansion as principal objectives, and is based on metrics that continue to externalise social and environmental costs. This must be instigated by developing an economic and social system that is shaped by the recognition that the Earth's biosphere has limits. The speaker then proceeded to draw attention to the upcoming 'World Conservation Congress', to be held in Barcelona, Spain, in October 2008, and which will be a key milestone in the development of the 'Future of Sustainability' process. The Congress will bring together around 10,000 concerned global citizens to debate key sustainability issues, and begin to construct a broad global alliance for a sustainable future.

In conclusion, he stated that environmental issues can offer useful opportunities for building peace. An example of this is cross-border environmental cooperation, which may help enhance trust, establish cooperative habits, create shared identities around common resources, and establish mutually recognised rights and expectations. Furthermore, environmental peacemaking involves cooperative efforts such as peace parks, shared river basin management plans and joint environmental monitoring programmes to manage resources, which can transform insecurities and create cooperation among disputing parties. In closing, Mr Lopez highlighted four key points. Firstly, that the links between peace and security, human rights, the environment and sustainability have been conceptually established, with the challenge now to bring these communities together in practice. Secondly, in order to adequately address the magnitude of the challenges of the 21st century, governance structures must be formulated to include important roles for new actors, civil society, and the private sector, not simply governments. Thirdly, the 'Future of Sustainability Initiative', which provides an important vehicle to begin to address a number of these interlinked issues in a holistic manner. Finally, he noted the need to emphasise that environmental and resource management issues also provide an opportunity to foster dialogue and cooperation, and can serve to reduce tensions between conflicting parties.



Taghi Farvar – Chairman, IUCN CEESP

“History and Culture: the roots of sustainability”

Mr Farvar began his speech by highlighting the fact that the practice of conservation was originally founded by white hunters in the south, as a means to protect species for future hunts. He noted how Paul Ehrlich, who is regarded as one of the fathers of conservation, even advocated preserving the countries of the south rather than developing them as a glimpse into the past and a place for northerners to rest. Modern conservation is only around 100 years old, when places like Yellowstone and Yosemite National Park were founded, in part, to control the indigenous populations in the United States, with the military playing a strong role. Conservation has progressed a long way since then, as demonstrated by CEESP, which regards the relationship between the environment and communities.

He then highlighted that fact that governments and conservationists are relatively ignorant of the key issues of conservation due to their limited history and experience of the matter. They must therefore learn from local communities and nomadic peoples who have been practicing conservation for thousands of years and are the real experts. He discussed how in Iran in 1963, an American-led land-reform program required the nationalisation of natural resources as its first step, usurping them from local communities. These resources were initially in excellent shape due to the knowledge of these local indigenous communities, but

this situation quickly deteriorated. He also related a story of a nomad speaking at the World Parks Congress, who noted that indigenous communities are the main actors in the conservation movement as they daily rely on the environment for their livelihoods, and are therefore best placed to conserve it. The speaker also noted the etymology of the term stakeholder, which derives from settlers in the United States literally driving a stake into the ground to claim a piece of land, reflecting the fact that governments are merely claiming land, whereas communities who have lived there for centuries are the actual 'rights-holders'.

He closed by quoting Peter Kropotkin from his book 'Mutual Aid': *"Love sympathy and self-sacrifice play a progressive part in the development of our moral feelings, but it is not love or even sympathy on which society is based in mankind. It is the conscience - be it only at the stage of an instinct - of human solidarity. It is the unconscious recognition of the force that is borrowed by each man from the practice of mutual aid; of the close dependency of every one's happiness upon the happiness of all; and of the sense of justice, or equity, which brings the individual to consider the rights of every other individual as equal to his own."* Mr Farvar noted that Kropotkin stood for the community and solidarity of human beings, and had learnt these lessons from his study of natural history as a biologist and geologist in Siberia. He claimed that the fundamental force of evolution was not the struggle to survive as Darwin had claimed, but the mutual aid of species. Kropotkin lists many examples of this in the natural world, among which a species of gazelle in Siberia which migrate to Manchuria in order to avoid conflict. He noted that migration is a tool for conflict avoidance, and is also practiced in this manner by humans. The migration of local pygmy communities in forests is an example of this, as are pastoral nomads, which migrate seasonally. These principles, claimed Mr Farvar, lie at the root of sustainability.

Finally, Mr Farvar noted that he was involved in a conflict resolution project in Afghanistan regarding land rights, which was being solved with local elders and customary laws and practices rather than larger institutions. He closed by reiterating the value of local communities and their practices in solving problems and learning about sustainability and conservation.

||| Context Setting – the main Sustainability Challenges in areas of Armed Conflicts

Alejandro Nadal, Chairman, CEESP Theme on Economics, Markets, Trade and Investment

“Macro-Economic Forces, Conflict and the Environment”



The following speaker, Mr Alejandro Nadal, introduced the aim of his speech, which was to establish the linkages between macro-economic forces, conflict, and sustainability. He started by outlining the history of globalization, and in particular the collapse of the ‘Bretton Woods’ system in the late 1960s, a system of fixed parities linking the dollar to gold reserves (\$35 to each ounce), which formed the framework for post-Second World War capitalist expansion. However, falling rates of profit in some of the richest OECD countries and the twin problems of fiscal and trade deficits in the United States, led to the draining of gold reserves due to withdrawals by foreign banks, fearful of the Dollar’s slumping value. This in turn led President Nixon to suspend sales of gold, thereby halting the ‘Bretton Woods’ regime forever.

One consequence of this, the speaker continued, was the deregulation of the financial sector due to the new opportunities for financial capital trading that arose, thereby facilitating the flow of capital and creating new risks in the flexible exchange rate regime. This deregulation led to the rapid expansion of the financial sector, one indicator of which was the upsurge in daily trading in foreign exchange markets. In 1973 for example, approximately 20 billion dollars a day were exchanged in foreign markets, creating a ratio of 2:1 against the value of foreign trade flows. This can be contrasted with the equivalent ratio of 72:1 and 1,400 billion dollars worth of daily trading in 2005. Nadal noted that while this expansion in financial services is one of the main drivers of the global economy, it also helps to exert massive pressure on the natural resource base. Furthermore, their burgeoning value meant that monetary and fiscal policies were increasingly geared to benefit the international financial sector.

As a consequence of this, the forces of globalization have accelerated, which overall, he claimed, has a negative impact. Despite exceptions like China, where economic growth has led to whole different sets of problems, global growth has slowed. Furthermore, there is a tremendous concentration of trade and investment flows, inequality and poverty are still rife and are in some cases even increasing, and there is greater instability and propensity for more severe and unpredictable financial crises, as well as substantial macroeconomic imbalances and huge environmental degradation.


Mr Nadal continued by highlighting the destructive links between natural resources and macroeconomic forces, as trade liberalisation and current account imbalances have increased pressure to export natural resources. This is particularly acute in countries with plentiful resources, and leads to further deregulation and greater consumption of these resource bases. Conversely however, the prevailing narrative of globalisation relates to huge service sector expansion in areas like insurance, and is therefore portrayed as less resource intensive. This leads to the perception that an information-based rather than a resource-based economy is a benefit to the environment. Mr Nadal noted that this is a misleading perception, strengthened by technological gains and 'miniaturisation', material replacement, and more efficient products, which give the impression of progress through 'dematerialisation'.

He went on to describe this 'dematerialisation hypothesis', which assumes a direct link between higher income per capita and greater resource efficiency. The root of this lies in the perception that efficiency gains increase output per unit of natural resources through technological and economic advancements, and that there is a consequent decrease in demands on the resource base. Within this theory, 'weak dematerialisation' is linked to technology gains, which, if they persist, lead to 'strong dematerialisation', whereby there is an absolute reduction in resources used. Mr Nadal emphasised that this is a false perception, as there is no evidence of any retardation in the aggregate material consumption of the US, Europe, or Japan. Although there have been decreases in the usage of *some* materials in *certain* countries, these are counter-balanced by increases in other sectors. This material substitution provides a misleading image, as does international trade, which displaces resource intensity and material cost. It is an image which can lead to complacency. He conceded that the picture is not wholly negative as gains have been made, but global consumption has increased, as has pressure on resource bases. Furthermore, it will be harder to decouple prosperity from material usage rates than it was to decouple carbon energy profiles from affluence.

Mr Nadal then switched his discussion to the dangers of the so-called 'resource curse', whereby an endowment of natural resources can bring about more problems than solutions. A fitting example of this is the Netherlands and the so-called 'Dutch disease', where the discovery of oil led to overvalued exchange rates, which in turn decreased the value of exports and created trade imbalances. Such trends can have a snowball effect in less developed countries and lead to crisis, instability, and conflict. He also stressed that we must learn to ignore 'silver bullets' like carbon-trading schemes, which give the illusion that progress is being made, and the idea that falling back on to agreements made at Kyoto is all that the environmental community has to hold onto.

In closing, he commented that globalisation has shown that interdependence is important, due to the economic and security benefits it can bring. He stressed that this lesson of interdependence should be applied to security, and that unilateral security measures cannot

be pursued at the expense of others. Furthermore, international trade must be reorganised, dispelling the notion that international commodities that can be produced locally must be traded. Additionally, multinational corporations must be supervised and held accountable for their actions, and oligopoly structures of international markets must be tackled. He concluded by noting that the World Trade Organization relies on the assumption that market forces provide an efficient allocation of market resources, yet has no working group to tackle the 'cartelisation' of international markets, where multinational companies in some cases control 80-85% of trade flows. Oligopolies do not serve the market, and it is the duty of the richer countries to set an example in this regard.



Chris King, Dean of Academics, US Army Command and General Staff College

"Applying Environmental Security Concepts to enhance Peace and Stability"

Dr King began by establishing the theme of his discussion: finding a way to take the concept of environmental security and putting it into a strategic defence analogy process. He noted that any such approach has two fundamental requirements: firstly a predictive model about environmental security must be created, an area which is currently losing ground as the environmental community has failed to convince, and secondly; we must determine which courses of action are currently available and how they should be utilised. He noted that in any discussion of these models it was imperative to outline a strategic view of environmental security, in the same terms that the defence community outlines defence strategy.

The speaker firstly defined environmental security as a process that effectively responds to changing environmental conditions, with the intention of preventing the adverse reactions of these changes. He noted that the drafters of the Declaration of Independence had intended their list of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to be hierarchical. This corresponds with Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, which places life-sustaining needs as the foundation of his pyramid. The defence policy structure should be build to primarily defend the life sustaining essentials, which are the things the environment provides: the air, the water and the land. He noted that those without these basic conditions for life are left with two options: to migrate; or to enter conflict for access to these resources.

Defence strategy, he continued, must start by measuring its goals, which in the case of this discussion is a sustainable environment. Next, there must be a measurable requirement to sustain human existence, which relies on assumptions of the linkages between environmental parameters and security. Following this, a strategy can be defined, which

involves undertaking a cost-benefit analysis to measure whether environmental solutions are cheaper than conflict. Finally, he concluded, it can then be established that environmental security is part of a defence strategy.

Dr King then turned to the development of a predictive model using critical environmental variables. This must begin with an analysis of population growth, followed by factors like the loss of arable lands. Water scarcity is another good predictive indicator, with up to 17% of conflicts related to this problem, as are factors like deforestation and pollution index measurements. Once these factors have been identified, a correlation analysis between these environmental variables and security and stability in a region can then be conducted; in cases that demonstrate a strong correlation, a link between conflict and environmental factors exists. This gives us a predictive model relating security to environmental conditions. Dr King noted that it is important to use fairly standard and well-documented variables, as they must be mapped over time and provide as comprehensive a picture as possible. Furthermore, rates of change are far more important than holistic numbers, as is scale and differentiating the rate of deforestation regionally in a small area is very difficult and requires more detailed data.

Dr King noted that it is also important to use the rate of natural increase as the population measure, as this excludes immigration or emigration, whereby anything higher than 2-3% represents significant rates of growth. This data may then overlap with water scarcity data, or with high rates of deforestation. In such cases, the hypothesis is that multiple factors of environmental scarcity raise the likelihood of social and political conflict emerging, a process which can be repeated with as many variables as necessary. High correlations between social and environmental variables, whether good or bad, demonstrate a direct relationship between the two factors.

He concluded that we must view security as the presence of conditions that sustain people's lives, that environmental degradation is a direct threat to this, and consequently a security threat. The military can be used as a positive force due to manpower, logistic potential and monitoring capacity. It can be used as a guard of critical resources, and as an engineering resource. He concluded by reminding the participants that if environmental security is to be taken seriously in the defence community, the international "environmental community" should translate its needs and requirements into the language that is spoken in the defence and national security sector, trying to convince them of the correlations between environmental protection and (inter)national security and defence.

IV The Environment during Armed Conflict: the case of the Lebanese oil spill

Professor Richard Steiner, University of Alaska

“Environmental Impact”

Professor Steiner began by noting that the war between Israel and Hezbollah that began in late July 2006, had resulted in 400 miles of road, 92 bridges, 130,000 dwellings, airport, water facilities, schools and hospitals being destroyed. The biggest environmental impacts were shoreline damage from the oil spill, severe impacts on marine biodiversity, forest fires and the consequent quarrying that was needed for rebuilding the infrastructure. He then switched his focus to the oil spill, which was the result of an intentional attack on a fuel tank farm at a power station south of Beirut that released about 60,000 tonnes of oil. As a result there was atmospheric contamination, with oil raining down onto people’s property, and a further 15,000 tonnes spilled into the Mediterranean. Additionally, the fact that oil sinks when it burns meant that it fell to the sea bed, as well as contaminating extensive beaches and nature reserves right up to the Syrian border. There was also the added problem of air and sea blockades which further complicated the clean-up, and the lack of any Lebanese contingency plan.



As a result, Professor Steiner noted, only about 1,000 tonnes of oil were recovered. The impacts included damage to the high levels of marine biodiversity in the region, damage to the health of local people, and impacts on fishing. Possible solutions offered by the speaker include indirect restoration projects such as reducing marine debris, and reducing pollutants going into the ocean, which may help to offset the oil spill’s impacts. In conclusion, Professor Steiner drew attention to the question of who is responsible during war, and noted that the Israeli army had denied targeting the fuel tank farm intentionally, despite hitting it accurately twice. He also noted that causing severe and long-term environmental injury is a war crime and that something must change if international law cannot provide consequences for this attack.

Erik Koppe, expert on environmental law during armed conflict



“Legal addendum to Lebanese Oil Spill”

Following Professor Steiner’s environmental assessment of the spill, Mr Koppe proceeded to present the legal dimensions of the incident.

He began by defining state responsibility under international law as “a wrongful act in breach of an international obligation under public international law, which must be attributed to a state”. In the case of the oil spill it is easy to prove responsibility, as the air bombardments were caused by the air force, a clear element of the Israeli state’s apparatus. However, it is harder to prove whether Israel breached any international legal obligations; this requires an analysis of what rules protect the environment during international conflict, and consequently whether the bombardments were a wrongful act. He continued by explaining the three sets of rules protecting the environment during conflict: *ius in bello*, otherwise referred to as humanitarian law and laws of armed conflict; *ius ad bellum*, or laws concerned with the use of force and the extent to which a state may use force, which is only permitted in self-defence or when authorized by the Security Council; and *ius pacis*, meaning laws of peace, in this case international environmental law.

Mr Koppe then went on to explain each of these cases, starting with *ius in bello*. Like all forms of international law it may appear under two separate categories of rules, namely Treaty Law, which is written and binding for signatories, and Customary Law, which is unwritten and binding for all states. There are four applicable treaties protecting the environment in armed conflict: firstly the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention; secondly the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions; thirdly the Incendiary Weapons Protocol to the Chemical Weapons Convention; and finally the Rome Statute, which called for the creation of the International Criminal Court. Of these four, Koppe continued, only Additional Protocol I is relevant to the oil spill, as it prohibits ‘the use of methods that are intended, or expected to cause damage to the environment that is widespread, long-term and severe’. These provisions, ‘widespread, long-term, and severe’, were only intended to cover very extensive and long-term effects on the environment, not ordinary battlefield damage. However, statements regarding the definitions of these terms are preparatory comments and hence only subsidiary, meaning the measures of ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ environmental damage may be interpreted in the light of contemporary valuations of the environment. The problem in this case however, noted Mr Koppe, is that neither Israel nor Lebanon are signatories of the Additional Protocol, and therefore its terms are not binding upon them.

Mr Koppe then continued with his analysis by turning to *ius in bello* and customary international law, where he cited three potentially applicable elements, namely: the prohibition of wanton environmental destruction; the prohibition of excessive collateral

damage, and; the obligation to show due regard and consideration to the environment. Of these, the collateral damage principle may be applicable, but the environmental destruction incurred would have to be measured against the military gains as a result of the destruction of the fuel tanks. The principle of showing due regard could also be raised, as it may encompass the duty to conduct an environmental assessment prior to attack, as well as looking at alternative means, and an obligation to trying to contain any environmental effects.

The speaker continued his assessment by discussing the applicability of *ius ad bellum*, and started by highlighting the need to distinguish between the obligations of defending states, and the liabilities of aggressor states. Determining these delineations can be an extremely complex matter, no less so in this case, but the law requires a defending state to always comply with the principle of necessity and proportionality in its overall conduct. If a defending state uses unnecessary force to defend itself for example, it can be held accountable, even if its actions are legal under *ius in bello* principles. The obligations of an aggressor state meanwhile are more complicated, as it is sometimes claimed that an aggressor can be held accountable for all damage incurred. Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1991 for example, the Security Council held Iraq accountable for all damage, including environmental damage.

Finally, Mr Koppe turned his attention to laws of *ius pacis*. In this case, it is possible that non-belligerent states, such as Turkey, Syria and Cyprus could hold Israel responsible for a violation of peace-time norms, including the prohibition to cause cross-boundary pollution. Between belligerents these laws do not usually apply, although diplomatic relations, treaties, and fundamental human rights laws remain applicable.

He concluded that there was a case for holding Israel responsible under *ius in bello* laws, due to the principles regarding collateral damage and the obligation for the environment. It could also be held accountable under *ius ad bellum*, although determining whether it was the defending or aggressor state could be complex, as well as under *ius pacis* laws if non-belligerents such as Syria, Turkey and Cyprus chose to bring forward a claim. Potential remedies could take the form of requests for compensation via diplomatic means, arbitration, or the imposition of sanctions by affected states, although this is unlikely to occur in this instance. Following a question from the audience regarding the possibility of Lebanon requesting either a contentious or advisory case to be brought by the International Court of Justice, Mr Koppe added that a United Nations Development Programme post-conflict report had concluded that the only possible remedy is a United Nations Security Council resolution such as those brought against Iraq following the Gulf War. As for contentious cases in the International Court of Justice, neither state has met the requirement of agreeing to jurisdiction in advance. He concluded by noting that an advisory opinion, while entailing a recommendation by the General Assembly which would require extensive lobbying, has a precedent in the case of the Israeli fence/wall project.

V Case Studies – Experiences with Sustainability issues in Transition phases towards Peace

Captain Niels A. Woudstra, Counsellor of the General Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo

“Dealing with Malicious Militias and Reforming the Army in the DR Congo”



Captain Woudstra began by highlighting his part in the EUSEC mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which was a ‘Security Sector Reform’ (SSR) operation, a concept that encompasses defence, justice, policing, and potentially other governmental services like customs reform. In the DRC the EUSEC mission limited itself to dealing with the reform of the armed forces. He also noted that one of the underlying principles behind SSR, is that security is a prerequisite for structural environmental reform.

He continued by discussing the problems the EUSEC mission faced in the DRC. The country is extremely large and contains extensive ecology, fertile land, enormous agricultural potential, and natural resources such as gold, nickel, copper, and uranium. He noted that from an environmental perspective, the lack of industrial development has been a blessing, preventing environmental damage due to pollution. However, as a resource-rich country, there is an inherent tension between its economic potential and the environment. To further complicate matters, it is also extremely politically unstable, and is listed as the second most failed state in the world after Sudan. In practice, this means absence of good governance, extensive corruption, no postal system, hardly any public transport, and a distinct lack of infrastructure, with only 1,000 km of paved roads compared with 150,000km in the comparatively small Netherlands. Furthermore, he added that there are signs of regression, such as the collapse of the banking system, with the population subsisting on an average of \$2 a day - rather paradoxical for such a resource rich country.

Captain Woudstra noted that this also impacts the army, with payments usually extremely irregular as a result of poor tax collection systems, of which nearly 80% are embezzled. The typical soldier earns about \$22 a month, which is too little to live on given the high food prices due to low levels of domestic production. As a result, the army is ineffective and has failed to tackle the militias which are predominantly active in the East of the country, where the majority of resources and mines are situated. Consequently, these militias often have control of these resources, and conduct wide-scale illegal looting with little regard for the environmental impact. The absence of any state presence or legal order also means that government bodies engage in environmentally destructive acts, such as the poaching of large mammals.

Woudstra continued by offering potential solutions that international SSR missions could offer to the problems encountered in the DRC. Firstly, he highlighted the need for state actors, in particular local politicians, to 'own' the democratic reform process. The recent elections, which witnessed the re-election of President Kabila, represented a first step towards this reform process. Local people, who are competent, influential and willing, should certainly be involved in this reform process. It is also important that the international community stays involved in this reform process. Secondly, there is the benefit of the presence of MONUC (The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), the biggest UN mission in the world with 17,000 people deployed, and primarily concerned with peacekeeping, although it also deals with security sector reform. This presence has safeguarded the stability witnessed in the last few years. The speaker emphasised that security is a prerequisite to any environmental progress, as militias must be neutralised to stop the looting of mines and forests; this requires the reform of both the army and the police. This reform must ensure that the army and soldiers receive timely and adequate payment, appropriate training, and the reorganisation of the chain of command in the army as a whole.

During the discussion groups which occurred later, Mr Woudstra discussed the potential ecological footprint of peacekeeping forces. In these discussions with other conference participants, it was concluded that peacekeeping forces can contribute positively to environmental progress, of which the presence of MONUC in the DRC is a case in point. Their contribution towards environmental progress could also be translated across other forces, whether they are national, European Union, or United Nations. Naturally, such a sizeable force leaves an ecological footprint, but their contributions outweigh this, although this will not happen automatically and is highly dependent upon the mandate in place. However, if the Security Council agrees that MONUC, or any other UN force should include environmental issues in its mandate, then they could have a positive effect.

Mr Woudstra was also asked by a member of the audience what kind of transitional programs, activities, and presence from the international community, could facilitate the slow progress towards sustainable governance in a country like the DRC. He responded by highlighting the difficulty of seeing direct progress, but that the very presence of the international community contributes towards relative stability and economic growth. The DRC for example, has witnessed 4-5% growth over the last few years, half of which he claimed was thanks to the international community. This may be artificial, but if sustained, it can lead to the rise of an educated, rights-informed middle-class. He noted that the middle-class in Western countries operates as a stabilising factor, and its comparative rise over time in failed states can be hugely influential. He concluded by saying that facilitating the growth of a middle-class should allow citizens in the DRC to take on these challenges themselves; this should be the (long-term) route towards sustainable and lasting improvements.

Jelte van Wieren, Deputy-Head, Good Governance and Peace Building, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs



*“Environment and Security: which way around?
The case of DDR in the Great Lakes region”*

Mr van Wieren began his presentation by discussing his view of the relationship between the environment and security, which unites two quite separate worlds that usually speak very different languages. He therefore highlighted the development of a common language as an initial priority, and went on to read a quote by the Kenyan academic, environmentalist, and Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai: *“Many wars are fought over natural resources, which are becoming increasingly scarce across the earth. If we did a better job of managing our resources sustainably, conflicts over them would be reduced. Protecting the global environment is directly related to securing peace.”* He went on to list three ways in which security and the environment are linked.

Firstly, the environment can be a source of armed conflict, which can occur in a variety of ways: through the abuse of natural resources, that can frequently lead to internal conflict (not yet inter-state war), due to a scarcity of natural resources or their utilization which, when it is below capacity or when it surpasses capacity, can lead to conflict; and through a difference in the quality of environment between two areas, which may lead to a voluntary or involuntary movement of peoples. This difference in environmental quality is a difference in quality of life, and when people in the worse-off areas feel their life is at stake they will move, which can cause to conflict.

The second way in which the environment and security are linked is in situations where conflict is a source of environmental degradation. He noted that particular weapons and tactics used during conflict can severely disrupt the environment, such as landmines, ammunition, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and scorched earth tactics. The decay of resource management systems and the misuse of the environment to finance war can also contribute to environmental degradation.

Thirdly, armed conflict can indirectly cause damage. This can occur when resources which are used to fight wars cannot be used for socio-economic purposes. Generally, states in conflict regions invest far more heavily in the armed forces than peaceful societies, which in turn crowds out socio-economic investment.

Finally, conflict can be a blessing to the environment, as insecurity means a lack of industrial development and resource extraction, with logging firms in the DR Congo not operating until peace and stability returned for example. He added that environmental conflicts are often the recognised sources of conflict, but are not addressed or solved in post-conflict

situations. If these environmental root causes are not addressed, they continue to be a major source for renewed violence.

Following his analysis of these linkages, Mr Van Wieren switched his discussion to a specific element of 'Security Sector Reform', namely 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration' (DDR), which aims to incorporate ex-combatants back into civilian life. Often this process involves helping former soldiers settle into civilian life through financial compensation and repatriation, which occurs when fighters are across borders and must be returned to their country of origin. He went on to give the example of the 'Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme'; a complex and extensive DDR operation dealing with high numbers of combatants and operating in seven countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo and Uganda. The operation was co-funded by the World Bank, which donated \$200 million of the total \$500 million, the remainder coming from the European Commission, the African Union, and a variety of EU countries. The mission's target of demobilisation was 350,000 soldiers (of which 240,000 has been achieved so far) and a reintegration target of 330,000 people (approximately half of which has been realised now). Furthermore, he noted that the programme had 6 national DDR projects operating in the region, and a further ten special projects dealing with issues like child-soldiers and the role of women in armed conflict.

Mr van Wieren then discussed why the involvement of the international community is so important and what it can hope to achieve. Firstly, DDR programs can improve security by reducing the number of weapons in circulation, reducing the number of armed combatants, and reintegrating these combatants back into civilian life. DDR cannot, however, bring about peace, and must therefore be integrated into a broader programme of conflict prevention and resolution. Van Wieren stressed that DDR cannot solve the underlying conflicts and that political will for conflict resolution remains essential. He continued by noting that there are no direct linkages between DDR and the environment, but by improving security it may therefore indirectly improve environmental conditions.

In closing, Mr van Wieren gave the example of an integration and training camp in the DRC, where rebel soldiers were integrated with the formal national army. This camp, Nyaleke CBR (Centre de Brassage et de Recyclage), was set up by the 'Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme', with support from the Netherlands. The camp was accidentally established inside Virunga National Park. When it was found out that it was established within the boundaries of a protected area, it was too late to relocate the camp. Van Wieren explained that, consequently, steps were taken to prevent further environmental damage around the camp; health, sanitation, water and accommodation facilities were upgraded, food supply situation was improved which helped to stop poaching. Also, facilities were made mobile, as the intention was to move the camp as soon as the training and integration programme was finished. The camp's facilities can now be used to help guard Virunga

National Park and to train game wardens in the national park. This shows, he said, how both security and environmental concerns can be addressed simultaneously.

In response to issues raised in the discussion groups, Mr van Wieren highlighted the role of DDR programmes as a component rather than solution to conflicts. He continued by pointing out that there is often a separation between the disarmament and demobilisation aspects and the reintegration processes that rely far more heavily on NGOs. One of the solutions to this may be a greater role for the military in reintegration issues, by providing them with broader mandates at an earlier stage of the process, such as during peacekeeping operations. Other aspects that play a role in the success of DDR projects are the awareness, on a political level, of the processes involved, as well as multi-national cooperation and communication to spread awareness of DDR techniques. Another participant noted that the mandate of peacebuilding missions could include an element of control of natural resources during the reconstruction effort, although the temporary security focus of such actions must be highlighted. He noted that environmental security has only recently been included in the Dutch policy of development cooperation, although it is not very clearly specified. Furthermore, the budget rules of The Overseas Development Agency only allow for militia-reintegration in the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, and some EU countries, leaving a significant gap between the capacities of DDR missions and the mandates available to them.



Mangal Man Shakya, Wildlife Watch Group

“Turning Rebels into Conservationists: the case of Nepal”

Mr Shakya began his presentation by describing the armed conflict in Nepal, which started with the Maoist-rebels’ insurgency against government forces in 1996. Although this conflict was initially limited to rural areas, it gradually spread and began to have impact not only on the people, industries, economy and tourism of Nepal, but also on conservationist efforts. Following a large-scale counter-insurgency by the army in 2001 to topple the rebels, the conflict turned far more violent, and witnessed a rapid upswing in infrastructural destruction, including national park offices, guard posts and headquarters. He noted that national park staff began to abandon their posts, which in turn led to an increase in poaching and illegal raiding of medicinal plants. An example of this is the Royal Chitwan Park, which had 32 guard posts reduced to 7 over the course of the conflict, resulting in the decimation of rhino populations which fell from 610 to 75 in just two years time. The speaker noted that extensive field studies to cover all protected natural reservations in Nepal were initiated in order to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on conservation. However, since all conservation groups had withdrawn their presence, 35 journalists with good reputations amongst both the army and the guerrillas were recruited and sent to study the national park.

The speaker continued by citing an international conference that was consequently organised, where fifty participants representing eighteen countries convened to discuss the situation in Nepal, and where the study report documenting the impact of conflict on biodiversity was released. This was designed to share experiences of the impact of conflict on biodiversity, and to come up with resolutions to strengthen the international legal framework. The result of this was the Kathmandu Declaration, the first of its kind relating to conservation during conflict. All participants formed a coalition of conservation in conflict, designed as a support to conservationists working in armed conflict zones. At the national level, a number of programmes were designed, such as those working to incorporate biodiversity issues in to upcoming constitutional assembly discussions, and those pushing forward proposals that all national parks should be managed by local communities, with the aim of completing this transition in 10 years time.

Finally, Mr Shakya addressed some issues raised in the discussion groups, such as the question of turning rebels into conservationists in the case of Nepal. He noted that the UN has taken the lead in disarming the rebels, with approximately 10,000 armed rebels slowly being brought into camps where they and their arms are registered. It is important to try and initiate environmental impact assessments for these camps however, as many are formed in or near national parks. Actually turning rebels into conservationists, he continued, is another matter, and must start with the creation of a mechanism to document their knowledge of the natural world, followed by an assessment of how many or which former rebels would be interested in working in the biodiversity and national park fields. He concluded by stressing that in the process of peacebuilding, some rebels may enter the army, some may enter the political process, but some can also be brought into the world of conservation.



Thijs Kuipers, Reserve Major, Dutch Armed Forces

“Cooperation between the Military and Civilians in Post-Conflict Situations”

Major Kuipers began by presenting to the audience the case for combining civilian expertise into military applications, with environmental expertise being one potential element of this. He began by highlighting the lessons learned by NATO and the Dutch contingent there during the conflict in Bosnia, where there was an attempt to allow for civilian expertise within the military, and to expand the role of the military beyond traditional peacekeeping duties. Out of this experience the concept of ‘CIMIC’ or Civil and Military Cooperation, first used after the Second World War as Allied forces were given the task of building up civil government, arose. Within NATO the benefits of civilian cooperation are enshrined in their CIMIC doctrine, stating that CIMIC activities by military forces should

always support the mission, which serves not to distract the military from their objectives. The speaker continued by describing how CIMIC can operate on two levels: as an operational tool; and as part of the eventual exit-strategy. At the lower level, operational CIMIC activities include building schools and providing drinking water to the local population, which is largely concerned with winning hearts and minds in the surroundings of military compounds, for strategic advantage and to facilitate operations. As an exit strategy, particularly in areas where security is so bad that NGOs cannot do their work, it requires some form of rebuilding effort to be undertaken. He noted that prior to sending troops to Afghanistan, the Dutch government had extensive discussions regarding whether it was conducting a combat mission or a rebuilding mission and that it would not have supported the mission were it limited purely to fighting.

The speaker went on to provide examples of CIMIC in action, including Dutch armed forces sending civilian veterinarians to Iraq, giving vaccines to thousands of goats in an effort to contain epidemics. A further example is the case of tampered irrigation systems, where the Dutch government sent a planning expert who discussed a new canal and irrigation system with a local governor, and began installing the plan in 3 days. This system was then maintained with the help of local NGOs once the military left. Another example is the civilian personnel working with the Dutch government in Afghanistan, who have helped to set up a blood bank in Helmand province, develop an irrigation system, and conducted an in-depth security sector reform assessment in southern Afghanistan, an essential step in the reform of the security and justice systems.

Major Kuipers then discussed how this was achieved. He began by highlighting how each military CIMIC unit is split into two divisions: one with regular military personnel with experience in CIMIC activities, such as dealing with local populations and local government; and the other containing 400-450 reserve officers with normal civilian jobs, who can be called upon in cases where their knowledge may be beneficial. These CIMIC units are then split into a further five groups according to their expertise: civil administration; infrastructure; economy and employment; humanitarian affairs; and cultural affairs and education. Mr Kuipers conceded that from a military perspective, security and stability remain the top priorities, rather than environmental concerns. However, following these, there are a number of sub-aims, such as: good governance; security sector reform; infrastructural investments; economic development; and advancements in public health. He stressed that if environmental concerns are to be raised as an issue for the military to consider, it must be within this framework. In conclusion, he highlighted some of the dilemmas of the CIMIC approach; namely how to avoid opting for the easiest rather than best solutions, such as building a wall around a police station instead of investing in structural improvements, and how to strike a balance between the long-term stationing of military personnel, and the relatively short time-span that civilian experts can be recruited for.

In the discussion groups later on, civil-military relations were discussed, particularly whether it is wise to ask the armed forces to conduct development-oriented activities. The NGO world in particular, increasingly criticises the involvement of the military in development related activities, firstly because military forces are often not the best equipped to achieve development goals, and secondly, because these development activities endanger the impartiality of the NGOs, as the local population cannot distinguish between NGO and military personnel, harming their neutrality. Furthermore, development experts commonly conduct a thorough stakeholder analysis prior to undertaking such activities, but civil engineers in military forces may not take such a view. In principle there is no question that the military should engage in development activities, it is more a question of timing. In a post-conflict situation when the environment is still extremely dangerous, it can be difficult for NGOs to operate, putting the onus on the military to conduct basic development services such as building bridges, lest these are entirely neglected. In time however, NGOs must take over and become the primary development organisations.

Major Kuipers then proceeded to list four recommendations for improving cooperation between civilian NGOs and military organisations. Firstly, military personnel engaged in development activities must be conscious of the political and social dimensions of their actions. Building a bridge between two conflict zones, for example, may seem like a positive development, but could exacerbate existing problems. Secondly, communication between NGOs and military forces must be improved, even through simple measures such as the military providing radios to NGOs. Thirdly, military facilities could be made available to NGOs, in particular logistic capacities which are a huge military asset and could be both useful to NGOs and serve to foster trust between the two organisations. Finally, the most fundamental recommendation was that there is a need for greater integration between civil and military policy making. In Afghanistan for example, the Dutch task force has fully integrated the state department, Ministry of Development, and the Ministry of Defence, providing the commander with recommendations from a variety of perspectives.

These points were followed by a comment from a participant, who highlighted the case of SIDA, the bilateral development agency in Sweden, which has a policy of developing conflict-sensitive development policies in conflict-prone areas of the world, and works closely with the Ministry of Defence. Additionally, the British and Dutch governments develop conflict prevention pools of inter-ministerial experts from both within government and the NGO community, who provide a solid and comprehensive analysis of conflict factors, and an effective plan of action before entering a conflict zone. The British 'Conflict Prevention Pool' and the Dutch 'Stability Fund' are examples of an increasingly common approach towards inter-ministerial cooperation, often termed the '3D approach', integrating development, diplomacy and defence ministries. One of the participants continued by pointing out that the transition model from conflict to stability is a three-fold process, starting with the military during the conflict itself, and followed by the departments of state and diplomacy

channels who are charged with organising the international response. The responsibility is then passed on to the NGO sector, and although the military may stay to offer logistic support, it should organise the transition and withdraw.



Alastair Ross, University of Kent, formerly with the UK Ministry of Defence

“The Role of Private Military Companies in Environmental Protection”

Mr Ross began his presentation by posing the question of why private military companies (PMCs) are not used anymore. The answer, he stated, was quite simple: prejudice against an industry perceived as mercenaries; ignorance of their capabilities; and, above all, the absence of an international regulatory framework. There has been pronounced growth in private military companies from their roots as guards of commercial premises, but today they support national armies, conduct and train forces in the field, and even orchestrate some of the fighting. In Iraq, the second largest military force after the Americans are the PMCs, in what is an extremely lucrative business; Aegis defence services, for example, was awarded a three year contract in June 2004, valued at \$293 million. He claimed that this rise is due to the end of the Cold War, which led to Western and Soviet disengagement from many regions in the world, particularly in Africa. This left many of these countries in need of military support. Furthermore, the downsizing of many cold war armies, the so-called ‘peace dividend’, left a large pool of experienced military personnel on the open market. Between 1985 and 1994, approximately 5 million personnel were reduced from state armies, many of them having little other work prospects or experience. Additionally, to stave off economic collapse, former Soviet states disposed of vast amounts of military machinery and technology, in particular airlift and helicopter technologies. The combination of this surfeit supply and rising demand propelled PMCs into the centre stage, with many companies providing services similar to first-world armies.

He continued by noting that despite these changes, the image of PMCs is still associated with the bloody scenes during the Katanga succession, or the series of violent coups in the Comoros and Seychelles, leaving an impression of illegal violence, whereby ‘illegal’ refers to violence outside the control of the state. However, this has not always been the case; the private provision of military services has been a constant in military history, ranging from the hired mercenaries working with the Pharoes, to the Russian mercenaries engaged in the former Soviet Union. He noted that the term ‘freelance’ derives from the medieval mercenary, quite literally a ‘free lance’, or soldier not attached to any master. Furthermore, in the 13th century the Italian city-states engaged mercenaries who served to protect the most distinct citizens from the horrors of wars. This continued with the Dutch and English

East-India companies, which controlled large armed forces of hired soldiers. The speaker observed that a major shift occurred in the 19th century, as concepts of sovereignty and the state monopoly of violence were adopted, leaving the private military market focused on the individual rather than the formal commercial venture. The modern world, he continued, is governed by a Weberian conception of the nation-state as the only legitimate unit to bear arms. Such a perspective ignores history, as the 20th century is the exception to the historical provision of a private aspect to violence.

Mr Ross noted that this attitude is changing, but that the prejudice towards 'mercenaries' translates itself into the relationship between NGOs and PMCs. Since 2001 NGOs have increasingly come under physical attack, as noted by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's 2005 survey, 'No Relief', which claimed that one in five workers face serious security incidences, and are being actively prevented from assisting people in need. There are various reasons for this, ranging from the increasing economic value of supplies being delivered by NGOs, to the deliberate targeting of NGO workers for political reasons. He went on to say that following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, NGOs are increasingly seen as an instrument used by western states to impose peace and security, with the targeting of UN Special Envoy Sergio de Mello in Baghdad as a good case in point. As a result of this violence, 44% of NGOs in Afghanistan curtailed their operations, and a further 35% operated in fewer areas than originally intended. Prominent examples of this are Medecins Sans Frontières closing its operations in Afghanistan, while Care and World Vision suspended their work in Iraq.

The speaker continued by discussing how the 'No Relief' report had noted that NGOs are increasingly turning to private sector security forces for assistance. However, this has a clear downside in the consequent separation that occurs between NGOs and local populations and the effect this has on trust, thereby hampering their work. Although many organisations use PMCs for risk assessments and training, few have looked at hiring PMCs to undertake tasks on their behalf as contractors. These companies could be hired to deliver food and supplies instead of a complete withdrawal, but this possibility is ignored due to the image associated with PMCS and their potential to offend donors. He went on to give an example of this problem in practice, where the World Wildlife Fund's objections to hiring PMCs in the Democratic Republic of Congo to combat poaching, meant a contract was withheld, severely damaging White Rhino population prospects.

He continued by highlighting the principal objection to PMCs; namely the lack of international oversight or regulation and weak international legislation with regard to such organisations. International regulation relating to mercenaries has only been ratified by 13% of nations, and national legislation offers little else, despite the fact that PMCs are now formal organisations, operating as companies. He went on to note that military commercial ventures are in reality organised like any other competitive business, and are integrated into the global marketplace. They are largely structured along traditional lines, with a chain of

hierarchical command containing a board of directors and shareholders, creating an efficient business structure. Although profits are clearly a motive, the speaker stressed that they are driven by business and focus on the survival of their company. Furthermore, there is greater transparency in the hiring process as well, as companies use established data sets and screen potential employees, creating a corporate identity. He noted that today's industry is professional, offering a high quality service and employees who often have a financial stake in their company. The company in turn also fights for its reputation, with recent accusations against Aegis for example leading the company to hire legal professionals to conduct an independent enquiry following accusations of indiscriminate killings in Iraq.

Mr Ross continued by highlighting a number of initiatives that have tried to fill the void left by the lack of international and national legislation. Firstly, he mentioned an advocacy foundation for PMCs called 'The International Peace Operations Association', which has proposed a code of conduct to which all members adhere. The code is extensive, encompassing human rights law, the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the voluntary principles on human rights. They have their own standards committee which, although not sufficient by itself, can provide the underlying principles of something more solid, transparent and powerful. These rules, he continued, could be linked to an associated audit process of registration, possibly under a UN agency, which would act as a regulatory authority to evaluate a companies' compliance with an internationally defined and agreed set of operating practices, technical competence, adherence to the laws of armed conflict, and respect for international human rights. These private military companies could be held on a list, with the regulatory authority given the power to remove, suspend, or fine companies if there was evidence of a breach of obligations. To be effective it would also have to ensure that no national with a criminal record, or member of a company that did not recognise the International Criminal Court, was employed. The regulating authority would also be in a position to authorise contracts, and could ensure that the obligations of these contracts are clearly defined, whereby the success of operations takes into account activities undertaken by the enemy.

In conclusion, the speaker noted that the extensive use of PMCs by the US army shows that this trend is likely to continue, necessitating some form of transparent regulation to ensure that weaker actors can make use of their services. He went on to note the use of PMCs by environmental NGOs like Wildaid, which has used PMCs to help save the Siberian tiger and to assist maritime rangers in the Galapagos to interdict supplies of Shark Fins. The lack of effective ecological legislation and governments' failures to respond to ecological disasters means NGOs like Wildaid have to take independent action.

Later on, in summarising the outcome of the discussion groups, the speaker noted a few key points of clarification. The speaker drew attention to the differing interpretations of what is meant by a 'PMC' owing to the variety of services that they offer. Firstly, there are military provider firms, which include armed guards to physically protect convoys and pipelines in

Iraq for example. However, there are also military consultancy firms which train individuals in either law enforcement or military tasks, with this training occurring inside or outside the country. Furthermore there are support firms, which provide basic needs like cooks, satellite images, toilets, and logistical support for soldiers in the field.

Mr Ross continued by highlighting the issue of trust between private and public organisations, but noted that in reality, the individual circumstances need to be assessed to provide a balanced view of where each sector may be more effective. Additionally, the discussion group recommended the implementation of regulatory frameworks that restrict a firm's actions, and provide a degree of transparency and accountability. Another participant noted the importance of communities as stakeholders in military conflicts and the need to include them in decision making processes. This is especially important in cases where gaining trust and working with local politicians and communities requires an absence of military presence, whether public or private.

Finally, one of the participants highlighted the case of Guantanamo Bay, and how its flagrant disregard of constitutional and criminal law principles demonstrate problems of the military's approach to detention and dealing with suspects. Consequently, the participant asked, what safeguards should exist for private military companies? Are voluntary codes of conduct a sufficient measure given the high level of controversy surrounding this issue? In response to this, Mr Ross pointed out that whenever a PMC operates it is contracted to do so, usually by a state government. The American government contracted firms to work at Guantanamo, and measures are currently being taken to bring the contractors under the military code of justice, making them as responsible, and potentially subject to the same prosecution mechanisms, as servicemen. The ultimate responsibility lies in the hands of the state party that hires the PMCs, but it is essential that the contractors are under the same codes of conduct (this was not the case in Abu Ghraib where contractors could not be prosecuted, a situation which is now being rectified). Lastly, another participant added that the big difference between public and private military forces lies in the fact that public bodies are subject to democratic checks and balances, whereas private companies are profit driven. Mr. Ross responded to this by noting that in some countries, particularly those with less developed democratic systems, the public sector may have ulterior motives for helping or hindering environmental efforts, and that these projects may be subject to political interference. In such cases, the private sector may play a more independent professional role.

VI Balancing forces: NATO's perspective



Jamie Shea, Director Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Mr Shea began by stating that NATO is first and foremost an organisation that projects military power, and continued by noting what it is that makes NATO different from other organisations; namely its ability to combine military power in the service of a multinational political concept. NATO, he said, embodies Frederick the Great's famous dictum: 'diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments'. Its credibility in the 21st century will be based on its capacity to provide multinational military operations based on the inter-operability of its forces, and the common doctrine of these forces, notably the ability to interact together and apply those assets in the new world.

What, Mr Shea asked, do we take as our starting point when we look at the utility of force? The role of armed forces is no longer to win military victories as such, or in other words to fight and then withdraw; the role has changed towards handing over power to someone else in order to establish peace. Military forces are now far more involved in reconstruction and stabilisation projects, which can be far more costly in terms of casualties and finance than the kinetic aspects of fighting. He went on to note that NATO no longer operates against a single adversary, and now deals not only with those that are armed, but also with those that are hostile and non-cooperative. Furthermore, it is no longer sufficient to merely deploy force, as the United Nations discovered in Bosnia and Lebanon. Simply deploying soldiers to an area without giving them a concrete task does not achieve the desired result, and often you can win the war, but still experience political failure. He noted that there were several examples of very successful wars which have produced subsequent political stalemates, and even political and humanitarian disasters.

The role of the military, argued Mr Shea, is increasingly about making the transition from a successful kinetic operation to a successful reconstruction mission. If the two are not in balance, the risk of failure increases. In Afghanistan, for instance, approximately 82 billion dollars has been spent on the deployment of kinetic forces and the rotation of forces with regard to the operations in the South. In contrast, NATO has calculated that about 5 billion dollars has been spent on reconstruction so far. He stressed that when the funding of these two aspects is so different, one cannot expect to have success.

He continued by stating that the military is just one of the ways that the strategic objective can be influenced, and that getting rid of the 'bad guys' does not guarantee that the 'good

guys' will emerge to run the show. Therefore the military is a necessary, but in itself insufficient, part of the equation. Just as there is little hope for development without security, security cannot exist without development either.

Mr Shea pointed out that NATO is discovering that it is now part of a network in the field, rather than a sole military institution, and that its strength therefore increasingly relies on its ability to leverage the efforts of others. Military operations need to be synchronised with development strategies, such as demining activities and infrastructure and agriculture development. Otherwise, as is the case in Afghanistan, when NATO moves on to a different area after the military operation, the 'bad guys' - in this case the Taliban - move back in. As a result, the local population's disappointment at the lack of reconstruction after the military operation means that they are even more receptive to the Taliban. They associate NATO with *deconstruction* rather than *construction*.

He noted that the 'comprehensive' approach now referred to by every NATO Ambassador, is the term used to define the practice of cooperating with other agencies, whereby development goals are synchronised with the military. Military operations today are not primarily about killing people or building roads, they are about changing mindsets. Thus, the psychological battle has become far more important than the actual military battle. All military operations today, he said, are designed to take into account what kind of dominant image will be left with the population of the day. The problem with coordination in the field is more complex, since it is not always clear which actors and structures will already be in place, what their plan is, and what kind of resources they have. Therefore, he said, we tend to waste several precious years sorting out cooperation between the egos of the different actors. What we need to is to be able to move cooperation in the field up to the strategic command level; we need to be able to plan in advance.

One of the key challenges that NATO faces, according to Mr Shea, is to convince the other major international organisations and civilian agencies to work with it. In a few weeks time, NATO and the EU assume joint responsibility for Kosovo; with the EU providing the civil administration and policing, and NATO doing the security sector reform and providing the military security. This will obviously make NATO and the EU cooperate together, but this comprehensive approach is going to require a far more imaginative posture from all of these organisations. The alliance greatly supports the UN, by helping to provide humanitarian assistance after the earthquake in Pakistan, as well as by providing helicopters in Iraq and logistics and transport assistance in Darfur. However, when Ban Ki Moon visited Brussels recently he spent three hours at EU headquarters (which contributes very few soldiers in blue helmets) and barely an hour at NATO headquarters (which contributes 50,000 around the world). The problem is not that the comprehensive approach will not work; the problem is that the physical reality is not reflected in the political theory. With the cold war now at an end, stated Mr Shea, a much more mature relationship with the other international organisations is needed.

NATO cannot afford to have only peacekeeping armies that are not prepared to do counter-insurgency. But neither can it afford to have counter-insurgency armies if they are not prepared to do peacekeeping and stabilisation tasks. NATO, argued Mr Shea, cannot afford to be a two tier alliance. In Afghanistan instead of one concept being applied throughout there are different national command structures, implying different logistics and intelligence gathering demands. Not only is this a strategic problem, it is also inefficient.

We need, he continued, to start listening to the military before we commence operations in terms of what forces are available. If this does not occur, we will find ourselves with a mandate which is under-fulfilled in terms of the forces it can deploy. This problem was clear in the case of Afghanistan with frequent shortages of soldiers and vital enablers such as helicopters, engineering units, mobile communications and armoured vehicles.

In the future, argued Mr Shea, we need to look at all the realistic options available, namely what can actually be achieved with for example 20,000 or 100,000 forces. Better cultural understanding of the countries in which engagement is occurring is also needed, as is a thorough analysis of what is and is not possible.

He mentioned that with regard to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan there are two different views about how the international community should act. Many say it should focus on long-term reconstruction, through building state capacity by instituting judicial reform, police and military training, anti-corruption, the formation of government ministries and economic planning. The theory of this long-term type of reconstruction is that once you get the "software" right, namely a strong central government able to deliver key policies and services, a trickle-down effect into the provinces of the country will develop. The other view is that we should stop worrying about this and that the international community should focus on stopping people joining the Taliban. Mr Shea mentioned that there are 3,000 hard-line and 9,000 occasional Taliban. The 9,000 do it because they are paid \$500 a month compared to \$5 in the police force; a primarily economic motive. If 3,000,000 jobs can be created, he said, then there will be no Taliban. The alternative camp wants to go along the route of immediate job creation strategies through infrastructure and services development, where the people will see an immediate benefit to themselves and generate further opportunities for income earning.

So, he asked, do we help the central government, or do we bypass it and go directly to the tribal chiefs and provincial leaders? Is a tribal chief, even if he is far from perfect, better able to help us in his province than a remote Minister in Kabul? He pointed out that we need a far better understanding of the local and regional situation in Afghanistan before we start defining our strategy.

What, he asked, can the military achieve in a stabilisation mission? Firstly, an environment of security must be created. In Afghanistan, this means disrupting Taliban sanctuaries, concentrating on specific areas, and dealing with the border of Pakistan. We cannot, he said,

give the psychological advantage to the opposition that comes from the idea that we are not staying, which prevents the population from being cooperative. Secondly we can protect individuals and institutions. Both in Iraq and in Afghanistan friendly leaders are being assassinated. If government institutions are vulnerable, he said, central government will never gain control.

Mr Shea pointed out that there is also a need to protect NGOs. Increasingly NATO is involved in training, as an exit strategy. This involves building capacity for a handover once the occupying forces leave the host nation. In one operation, called 'Achilles' for example, there were 1,000 local Afghan troops involved, thereby taking ownership of the societal change. Increasingly, he said, NATO is expending resources on these training missions.

There also need to be operations in support of the police, public order and public safety without the military getting involved. In NATO, he said, information and psychology operations are increasingly used to inform the population of our purpose, which involves: running weapons handover programmes; explaining operations; and using the appropriate media to bring this message to the population. He pointed out that terrorists are adept at using media operations, and that therefore NATO should be equally astute.

Mr Shea then outlined to the audience his conclusions on operations. The military, he said, understands the need for a better understanding of the relationship with non-military forces. Today, NATO military officers go on training courses run by NGOs about resettling refugees, empowering women, and disarmament and reintegration programmes. However, he said, this is a two way street; there is a difference in incentives for cooperation between the on-the-ground NGOs who value this opportunity, and the often anti-military headquarters staff.

Furthermore he continued, operations today, and all missions in the future, are hybrid in nature. The UN in Sierra Leone for example, was only effective when the British sent a battle group. The African Union in Darfur will only be effective if a hybrid mission of the UN and AU is created. Furthermore, the UN is on the ground in Lebanon but needs to be beefed up by troops from the EU countries. It is no good, he said, promoting this comprehensive approach unless ministries within states cooperate in a more cohesive manner.

In most operations around the world, NATO has good staffing. He pointed out however that there is a difficulty in filling civilian slots (the staffing in the development side, such as doctors, judges, policemen etc). The EU has at least come up with a way forward in this in the development of a civilian and police capability. Citing James Dobbins of the Rand Corporation, he highlighted the need to look at what can be reasonably expected of the military to achieve security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic sustainability, liberalisation, democratisation and development, in that order. If higher order priorities are not invested in, the lower order priorities will be wasted, and conversely, if most of the money is spent in the lower orders of priority, the higher orders will be compromised.

Whenever we look at the issue of long-term sustainability, there is a crucial choice between co-option and deconstruction: co-option means going with the status quo, deconstruction is like Iraq. Totally rebuilding the society from within, is far more difficult, and entails stronger opposition from entrenched elites. There is something, said Mr Shea, called the 'golden moment', when the local population remembers the bad times under the Taliban for instance. At this point, the opposition is fleeing and there is a good opportunity for change, but this opportunity is often wasted through inadequate planning. This 'golden moment' all too quickly passes, during which time the opposition regroups and the population becomes disaffected at the lack of progress.

Mr Shea continued by stating that the future of reconstruction and stabilisation will still rely very much on the military, as the military is far more willing to enter a region than any other agency. Additionally, militaries also work very well with each other. In Afghanistan there are 11 partner countries and NATO has 18 partners in all its missions. Singapore, he noted, is now with NATO in Afghanistan, together with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, and a further 10% of all NATO forces are from partner countries. Increasingly the military are becoming very adept at knowing how to act with other international agencies and other civilian agencies.

Mr Shea stated that one of the areas to which NATO will be turning in the years to come is consequence management. It should increasingly focus on the question how the military can be used in the wake of major disasters or terrorist attacks for the cleanup and decontamination, site protection for handling people, restoring roads and essential services, as well as for communications and air traffic management. The challenge, he said, will be for the military to plan effective cooperation with civilian authorities in urban areas for an efficient response.

Mr Shea continued by highlighting one lesson learned from Afghanistan: when military force is deployed, legal advisors must be deployed first. When rapid reaction forces were sent to Pakistan for example, to help with the earthquake in Kashmir, they could not be deployed because there was no status of forces agreement when NATO arrived. Secondly, Pakistani law did not allow them to carry guns. Although this initially seemed like an odd bureaucratic restriction, it was in fact a very important issue for the Pakistanis.

In Pakistan, he said, NATO soldiers were paid several thousand dollars a month to clear Pakistani roads of rubble, when soldiers of the Pakistani army would only have asked for 10 dollars a day. The use of western rather than local troops may have looked good on CNN, he said, but it is not always the most cost-effective response.

He went on to note another important area to be addressed, namely energy security. He stated that we live in a world where more and more oil is transported by sea, and oil is increasingly being discovered and produced offshore, where drilling platforms are

vulnerable to terrorist attack and disruption. Clearly, he said, keeping the sea lanes open will require a multinational approach as no state can do this single-handed.

In NATO there is also an increasing intellectual awareness of the possible security implications of global warming, environmental disasters and sudden shifts in climate. Bangladesh is the classic model, where a rise in world temperature could cause sea levels to go rise by a meter, submerging 50% of the country and producing millions of refugees. The speaker also gave the example of environmental refugees, pushed off their lands due to desertification and land degradation, leading to migration flows of people into Spain and Italy. Despite recognising that environmental degradation and climate change are already leading to security problems, Mr Shea pointed out that these environmental security issues have not yet percolated up to the political level, and that not enough serious thinking regarding military forces engaged in addressing these scenarios is taking place. Potentially, he said, the military could have a significant role in mitigating some of the shocks to come from climate change and global warming.

In closing, Mr Shea urged the Institute for Environmental Security and all participants of the conference to prompt the NATO (and other military organisations) about how the military could be a useful adjunct to efforts in this field. He concluded by saying that the military looks forward to cooperating with the Institute for Environmental Security in the future.

VII Experiences with Conflict, Peace, and Sustainability: roles and responsibilities of communities and the private sector

Clive Wicks, Co-chair, CEESP Working Group on Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector



“The Resource Curse: How the Extractive Industry violates Human Rights and Ecological Integrity in Nigeria and the Philippines”

Mr Wicks began by informing the audience of his recent trip to the Philippines with Clare Short (the former British International Development Minister) at the request of the Catholic Church to help with the problems experienced there as a result of mining. In response to the appalling conditions witnessed there, Ms Short stated; *“I have never seen anything so systematically destructive as the mining program in the Philippines. The environmental effects are catastrophic, as are the effects on people’s livelihoods.”*

The history of mining in the Philippines has left 800 abandoned mines, caused severe damage to river systems and streams, and destroyed water catchment areas. There are currently proposals to massively expand mining operations, and the population of the Philippines is expected to rise from 80 to 150 million by the year 2036. There have also been more than 800 extra-judicial killings of opponents of the government’s mining policy, as well as killings of human rights protestors, members of the church and innocent civilians.

The speaker noted that the Philippines is one of the most biologically diverse countries in the world. It consists of hundreds of islands, many of them very small, which are often completely destroyed when mining operations are undertaken there. One of the biggest problems relates to the removal of forest cover, which has been significantly reduced as a result of mining. There is also the exacerbating effect of mining on seismic activity. Of the 117 biodiversity areas classified as important, 18 are already threatened by existing mining operations, 17 by timber licenses, and a further 82 have come under threat by the revitalisation of the mining industry. Furthermore, he claimed, mining often requires the removal of mountains, which operate as water catchment areas and provide water for the irrigated fields, but the mountains are knocked down and discarded on the fertile farmland beneath. These problems are caused by the fact that, although the environmental and human rights laws in the Philippines are generally very good, these rules are rarely enforced.

Mr Wicks went on to provide an example of a mine which caused a huge landslide that proceeded to wipe out houses and crops and filled the river with debris, after the dams built

in the mountains succumbed to high rainfall and seismic activity and consequently collapsed. Another example of a new mine demonstrated how proposals split and divided communities, with those refusing to leave their land often the subject of indiscriminate beatings and forced evacuations. The speaker noted that 'Tailings dam' failures have been an endemic problem, due to an absence of resources or responsibility to maintain dams once mining firms leave. With so many rivers flowing into these dams, the build up, combined with seismic activity and the lack of upkeep, can lead to collapse. Furthermore the Philippines is highly dependent on marine resources which are damaged as the debris caused by waste disposal and mine collapse flow down rivers into the sea. He noted that mining companies have informed the Philippine government that the four million tonnes of waste being disposed into the sea cause no damage, despite collapsed mines smothering the coral and negatively affecting deep-sea marine life. Other potential problems caused by mining include: displacement of long-term employment in agriculture and fisheries; reduction of sustainable agriculture and tourism industries; destabilisation of indigenous communities; intensification of existing conflicts; damage to bases of livelihood; and displacement of smaller mining communities. Additionally, these mines are often placed in existing conflict zones, necessitating the use of private armies which can, in turn, cause human rights abuses.

Mr Wicks continued by detailing his organisation's request to the Philippine government that they adhere to the extractive industries review, and to withdraw the applications for new mines in water catchment areas. Among the recommendations was the need to stop the human rights violations in the form of extrajudicial killings associated with mining. The UN Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Killings was clear about this in his latest report on the issue, referring to one of the generals involved in this as 'The Butcher'. Mr Wicks went on to express his dissatisfaction with the actions of the World Bank, which supports the expansion of mining despite the history. He felt that the World Bank had a duty to call for a review of the mining sector, to help enforce the existing laws, as well as calling on the mining companies to act in a transparent manner and in adherence to international standards.

In response to Mr Wicks' speech, Bert Fokkema, Issues Manager at Shell, addressed some of the topics he had raised. Mr Fokkema stated that it was short-sighted to label all industry as having a negative impact, with many groups within, as well of outside of companies, pushing for greater accountability. Companies would welcome clearer legislation he continued, particularly in developing countries as it would make their job easier, but it is not the place of companies to do this. There are examples of this happening, such as the case of Bolivia, where the Dutch government is helping them compile clear gas legislation. Mr Fokkema noted that Shell, which has experience in the Philippines, found that stakeholder-input and good economic prospects for local inhabitants were always beneficial. Some of Shell's operations provide health and education services for local people, as well as giving them a say in what is happening. With reference to the Niger Delta region, he pointed out that

there was no wilful spilling of oil-spills in the delta, and that these spills were a symptom rather than cause, with poverty and other social issues leading to sabotage among other things.

Another participant, Richard Cellarius, noted that in his meetings with mining associations, it had become clear that mining companies themselves were also looking for better guidance with regard to biodiversity and reducing their ecological footprint. Mining associations however seem to be unwilling to apply adequate pressure on the companies they represent when environmental codes of practice are ignored. Mr Wicks followed this up, by noting that the International Council for Mining and Minerals had supported his recommendation following a presentation regarding the negative effects of mining operations, and agreed that something had to be done. In reality, many smaller 'minnow' mining firms often conduct campaigns to achieve prior and informed consent from stakeholders through threats, coercion, and other surreptitious methods, in a rush to obtain the necessary signatures. These operations are then taken over by larger corporate bodies, which go on to dump upwards of 300,000 tonnes a day into rivers at each mining site, in the belief that prior consent has been achieved.



Leo Imbiri, Papua Customary Council

*"Mining the forests, the Military and the Communities:
from Plunder to Protection in Papua"*

Mr Imbiri, representing the Papua Customary Council, began his presentation by reminding the conference of the abundant natural resources available in Papua, namely gold, oil, copper, and forests. He stated that in his view these resources are interdependent and belong to the people of Papua. Furthermore, he described how the indigenous people of Papua have formed institutions for the promotion and protection of basic rights, how they have expressed their political position in a manifesto, and how they are strengthening their capacity by forming village foundations with political voice. This was necessitated by the variety of threats to these resources from multinational companies and security forces, and from natural resource exploitation by local districts for the purpose of income generation. The situation is further complicated by weak and incongruous laws, such as the contradiction between Law 41 regarding forestry, and Law 21 regarding autonomy, which promotes conflict and victimizes both indigenous populations and the natural resources. There are also cases of collaboration between companies, the government and security forces, which under the pretext of separatism destroy Papuan villages, cultural rights, and economic resources.

The speaker proceeded to explain how they proposed to combat these destructive effects on Papuan peoples and natural resources. They would do this by: inviting representatives of the international community to assist in protecting the tropical rainforests; promoting the region as a world heritage site; promoting the sustainability of programmes working with indigenous populations, and by dealing with Indonesian as well as local NGOs. The speaker stressed the benefits of Indonesian and foreign NGOs, particularly with regard to training local civil society in areas such as accountancy and reporting. Local groups, he said, lacked this expertise. He also highlighted the role of Indonesian security forces in natural resource exploitation, which damaged the livelihoods and the further development of indigenous communities. He requested assistance from the international community in putting a halt to these acts by pressuring the Indonesian government.

The speaker also drew attention to the problem of logging licenses which, he stressed, should be dealt with through local provincial governments that recognise the rights of local landowners, rather than by the Ministry of Forestry in Jakarta. Furthermore, projects dealing with the use of sustainable resources should take into account local capacities and needs for durable and sustainable production, and should seek to empower local and indigenous institutions. The speaker then issued an invitation to the IUCN, the World Conservation Union, and the United Nations Development Programme, to cooperate with the Papua Indigenous People organisation in promoting sustainable forest management based upon traditional knowledge and needs. Finally, he recommended that donors such as the European Union and United Nations Development Programme should carefully consider the fate of the forest and its ecosystems in their promotion and support of new development districts, and include measures of deforestation in their aid negotiations.

Agus Sumule, Adviser, Papua Provincial Government

"Recognition of Customary Rights in Papua: creating the basis for poverty reduction and growth in the forest sector"



Mr Sumule, representing the Papua Provincial Government, began by highlighting the previous speaker's emphasis on the need for local communities to be recognised, with regard to rights to the management of Papua's 42 million hectares of protected forest. Relatively little of the profits from timber industries transfer to the local communities he said, due to weak transparency with regard to revenues, leaving many communities disappointed. This is particularly important as the forestry sector is responsible for a sizeable portion of total export values; yet 90% of villages in forest areas are categorised as poor with regard to infrastructure, health services and education, in comparison to 76% of villages outside forested areas. Furthermore, local people are often kept out of forest sector

development, fuelling violent conflict, and often leading to the early termination of such projects. Without recognition of the customary rights of local communities from companies it is hard to reach agreements, particularly as communities always suffer more due to environmental degradation and the loss of long-term income generating activities.

Mr Sumule continued by noting that there are currently no mechanisms for negotiating land-use allocation with customary rights holders. The basic laws dating from 1960 and a resolution in the upper house of parliament in 1999 provide for communal titling of customary lands, but this has never been implemented. Furthermore, Law 41 regarding forestry, makes no distinction between different kinds of forests, and only recognises private forests as those with individual title holders. He noted that Article 67 of Law 41 mandates a regulation on other forest types to be passed, but this has also never been implemented. In 2001 however, as part of a series of political reforms, a law of special autonomy was passed, with articles mandating the protection and economic empowerment of customary law communities. It also requires national resource management to be regulated through provincial special legislation, but this has been upheld due to delays in the formation of the necessary decision-making body: the Papuan People's Council.

He continued by noting that in 2002 the government began issuing 1,000 hectare logging licenses with the aim of tackling conflict and allowing communities to deal directly with the private sector. However, the regulatory body, the IPKMA, was designed without proper legal analysis or environmental and social safeguards. Since 1,000 hectares is beyond the capacity of local communities to manage, these licenses were snatched up by private syndicates, once again bypassing local communities. In response to this, an international environmental investigation agency exposed the abuses of these licenses by illegal logging syndicates and, in March 2005, the Industry of Forestry was forced to declare the licenses void. However, the consequent crackdown on licenses targeted both logging syndicates and local communities, and the Ministry of Forestry once again failed to make any provisions or offer alternatives to these communities. This left them in a legal vacuum and without access to timber markets which, in areas where the dependence on forest resources was high, had serious implications for the livelihood situation of these communities.

The speaker went on to offer solutions to this problem, stating that since 2005 the government has been working hard to find new approaches for the recognition of customary rights to manage forest resources. The provincial government is now developing a special provincial law on sustainable forest management with these communities, thereby providing a more sustainable and secure basis for forest management. This law adapts the national legal framework on forests (141, 1999 and governmental regulation 6, 2007), to the requirements of special autonomy. It mandates the recognition of customary land rights for long-term investment security, and designates a fair-share for customary peoples. It also regards customary people as long-term forest managers with rights and responsibilities to

plan, implement, and monitor forest management. The key aspects of this are: participatory mapping to determine ownership and land-use negotiations; community forestry management units using the eco-forestry approach developed in Papua New Guinea to replace the old license system; fewer designations for commercial organisations in line with customary land-use to tackle long-term conflict; the development of home-industries for customary forest managers; and public control mechanisms, including access to an external information ombudsman, third-party auditors, and the involvement of customary communities in monitoring the Papuan Forestry Council.

He continued by stating that the local government is not only doing this for community livelihood protection, but also to mitigate the ecological impact of biofuels development in light of the experience learned from illegal logging. With the timber sector is increasingly viewed as high-risk, investors are shifting their focus to biofuels, and developing large-scale land conversion plans of over 1 million hectares planned for oil palms, cassava, and other biofuel crops. However, these investors will be forced to consider customary land rights, negotiate the use and allocation of land with customary owners, and enhance due diligence. He concluded by stressing the urgent need to begin the implementation of this new provincial forest law, which has begun by the identification of five key sites including those affected by biofuels development. Furthermore, Mr Sumule pointed out that the success of this project depends upon the support from central government, and the international donor community. Without genuine political will, customary communities will remain poor and marginalised. The Chairman of the meeting also highlighted the need to consider the adverse side-effects in areas like West Papua of European Union directives aimed at increasing reliance on biofuels to meet ecological targets.

Finally, in response to a question from the audience regarding the importance of *cultural* as well as *bio*-diversity, the Papuan representative mentioned that there had been dialogue between companies and indigenous communities in the Office of the High Commission of Human Rights in Geneva, and that the extractive industries have explicitly endorsed the need for prior and informed consultation. Furthermore, he highlighted the United Nations Forum for Indigenous Peoples, whose theme at this year's meeting in New York was land rights and sovereignty over natural resources. This meeting is currently only being attended by UN agencies however, and the speaker formally invited the private-sector to continue their dialogue on development processes. Additionally, the speaker noted that the World Bank has endorsed free prior and informed *consultation* of local communities, although they have not yet agreed on the principle of *consent*.

Sandra Kloff, Co-chair, CEESP Working Group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector



“Extractive Industries: conflict prevention through empowering stakeholders”

Ms Kloff began her presentation by introducing a model of how conflicts between various stakeholders in extractive industry projects can be solved by the sharing of information and mutual aid. The model, originally designed by Geert van Vliet for use on dam-building and controlled watershed management projects, has been adapted to extractive industries. It demonstrates how a company’s propensity to listen to demands is greatest at the outset of each project, as no investment decisions have been made, providing the greatest flexibility to implement strategies that may mitigate the environmental and social impacts of their activities. In contrast, at the outset, stakeholder’s awareness of the project and knowledge of its potential impacts is lowest, leaving them little chance to negotiate adequate standards. Over time, this awareness grows as impacts become apparent, but by then a company’s willingness to listen has decreased as the costs of environmental considerations have conversely skyrocketed. Companies are therefore not pressured by external forces to implement often costly environmental measures, and stakeholders are unable to secure adequate compensation for pollution incurred as a result of the company’s activities. She gave the example of oil companies operating in Africa, which often have 200 million US dollar civil liabilities funds, fully aware that if oil spills occur, costs and damages are likely to be far higher; this disparity results in conflict. Consequently, problems are delegated to the state, the insufficient funds which were initially allocated are paid, and as conflicts arise private military companies are hired to protect the interests of the oil companies from vengeful stakeholders.

Ms Kloff then went on to explain CEESP’s role in mediating and, if possible, avoiding these conflict situations by trying to intervene in the early planning process. Such interventions take the form of raising awareness among stakeholders of potential pitfalls, and helping them to negotiate their demands at this early stage when companies are most willing to listen, thereby preventing or lessening conflict. In practice, this has led to interventions in the West African eco-region, East Africa, Madagascar, India, and the earlier example of the Philippines. The speaker then provided an example of this mutual aid process in practice by discussing the case of offshore oil development in the ‘Western-Marine’ eco-region of Mauritania.

This area has no experience of dealing with offshore developments as oil was only discovered in 2001, but the area has since been divided into a multitude of offshore blocks that have been sold off to a variety of companies. Additionally, she noted, the area is an

important ecological region, with rich coastal marine wetlands containing a wide range of plants and animals. Furthermore, there are also external ecological pressures on the coastline, with approximately 10 million people living in the region, 600,000 of which are employed in small-scale fisheries, and a fishing fleet responsible for roughly 500 million euro worth of profits each year, as well as the gradual development of coastal tourism. Consequently the industrial development of offshore oil ventures has a high potential for conflict, due to low awareness on the part of the stakeholders, a weak civil society, and the absence of an adequate legal framework. This is further complicated by the absence of any international regulatory legislation with regard to offshore drilling, leaving the local and regional governments to fend for themselves.


As a result, Ms Kloff explained, it was her organisation's mission to raise awareness amongst stakeholders. The first step was to arrange a knowledge-sharing meeting with their more experienced counterparts in Nigeria, allowing local stakeholders to exchange ideas with people who had been in similar situations. Government officials, representatives of the fisheries industry, and representatives of the indigenous people that depend on coastal resources for their livelihoods, met with local villagers in the Niger Delta. They also exchanged ideas with local NGOs, as well as coming face-to-face with the effects of pollution, and travelling to Abuja, where government officials met with Ministry representatives and offered advice regarding the kinds of measures that could be undertaken to prevent the conflicts which transpired in Nigeria.

Another method of raising awareness, she continued, involved organising a workshop on the environmental and social impact of offshore oil in the region, to which government representatives, NGOs, journalists, and indigenous rights holders were all invited. Furthermore, CEESP provided concrete tools designed to improve decision making, such as a guide to the economic and social impacts of offshore oil, an analysis of international legal loopholes and how this can be combated on a national level, and maps detailing where the local fishing grounds and nature parks actually were. The importance of these maps was highlighted by the fact that a director in the Ministry of Oil in Mauritania was unaware of where the nature parks actually were and had already allocated some of these areas to a Chinese oil company. Additionally, they provided environmental feedback on plans provided by oil companies to local governments, with environmental assessments being conducted on projects in Mauritania and Guinea Bissau. Finally, they introduced civil society organisations to international networks that can help in raising awareness on issues that are difficult to discuss within their own countries. For this, Ms Kloff cited the absence of freedom of the press, whereby international networks allow civil society to raise awareness in the press of the oil company's country of origin.

In summary, the speaker listed some achievements, including; heightened awareness regarding the impacts of the oil industry and the capacity to negotiate with them;

Mauritania's voluntary signature of the extractive industry's transparency initiative, which commits them to transparency regarding money earned by deals with the offshore oil industry and how this money is spent; the establishment of a local "publish what you pay" coalition by local civil society organisations which provides oversight of adherence to the extractive industry's transparency initiative; the commitment by an oil company to conduct a feasibility study on the reinjection of 'production water', an important waste treatment measure which impacts fish fertility levels; and heightened insurance cover for the oil industries in the case of an oil spill of up to \$1 billion, far exceeding previous levels.

Ms Kloff went on to list some obstacles to success. Firstly, the fact that they came too late in the planning process was unfortunate, as some environmentally damaging products had already been ordered. Secondly, there was inadequate funding available for the information exchanges and information packs provided to the stakeholders. Finally, marine boundaries are poorly defined which increases the potential for conflicts, and communication limitations make face-to-face exchanges essential.



Professor Richard Steiner, University of Alaska, member of CEESP Working Group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector

"The Role of Citizen Advisory Councils and the 1% Earth Profits Fund in Promoting the Accountability of the Private Sector"

Professor Steiner started by emphasising the fact that there are specific solutions that have been shown to work in extractive industry conflicts, such as those discussed in the Philippines, Papua, and off the coast of Mauritania. One of these solutions is the 'Citizens Advisory Council' in Alaska, that has served to resolve conflict around oil and gas projects, even after extremely contentious cases like the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

The Citizens Advisory Council was designed to fill the vacuum left by the close relationship between oil companies and the government, and the lack of voice for the public interest, which was apparent even before the Exxon Valdez disaster. It receives 3 million dollar a year in funding from the council, employs 18 people with a board of directors, and is aimed at levelling out the playing field to engage public opinions. Despite extensive lobbying and widespread awareness of potential failings however, the council was only able to form and receive funding from the oil industry after the event. Mr Steiner was of the opinion that organisations like the World Bank which provide funding for extractive industry projects, should require companies to establish independent, democratically-elected councils of

representatives for potentially affected parties and stakeholders as a condition of their loans. Such an organisation could provide oversight, and provide help to those people most affected, who often lack the skills, knowledge, time, and finances to conduct their own studies, and to challenge or refute claims by the government and industry. He went on to discuss his dealings with Shell in Russia, which was advised to form such a council but failed to do so. They consequently regretted the decision after they were stripped of a number of licenses consequently awarded to Gazprom. Had they put money into a citizens advisory process they would have had local eyes and ears, and potentially avoided such conflicts.

Steiner concluded his discussion by noting out that the United States has often failed to adequately evaluate risks by focusing excessively on incidences like 9/11, rather than the far higher death toll due to preventable causes. He highlighted the vast discrepancy in federal military funding in comparison to development aid, despite a recent 12% boost. Professor Steiner advocated the development of an Earth Profits Fund, whereby the top 'Fortune 500' firms could donate 1% of their collective \$1 trillion post-tax profits towards a fund targeting global sustainability.

Additional Comments from the Audience

Georg Frerks, a member of the audience, then addressed the participants, by highlighting the problems of working in failing states where local populations are largely ignored. Bottom-up initiatives, the practice by NGOs of naming and shaming, and global funds, are all possibilities, but working through the state should never be discounted. Sometimes NGOs lack teeth, he continued, and therefore it is useful to focus on compliance regimes that rely on government sanctions, rather than on sympathy and goodwill. Mr Wicks responded to this by pointing out that the government of Mauritania initially hired them, and that their conclusions were reported to the president, who lacked any information about where the oil developments were occurring. Furthermore, in Guinea Bissau, the Ministry of Fisheries asked them to review the documentation and present it to them. Professor Richard Steiner noted, however, that large-scale industries have so much finance that they can squeeze government regulators rather than the other way around. A fully funded citizen's council can partially offset this by providing oversight for both government and the corporate agendas.

Finally, another participant drew attention to the problems that can occur when companies enter post-conflict zones as soon as the conflict ends and deal with a transitional government. This represents an obscure stage, with the government frequently consisting of rivals and warring factions with questionable motivations in their dealings with companies. An example of this is Mittal Steel, which immediately entered Liberia following the cessation of hostilities and signed a 25-year mineral extraction agreement for iron ore,

which failed to provide the country with fair financial compensation. Fortunately, the newly-elected government decided to review contracts signed by the transitional government, and Global Witness produced a report analysing these contracts, providing a blueprint for discussions. As a result of this, Mittal Steel renegotiated the contract, resolving potential problem areas. Professor Steiner responded by confirming that similar problems had occurred in Mauritania and Russia, and that political solutions were the most potent form of resolution in these circumstances.

Clive Wicks, Co-chair, CEESP Working Group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector



Film: "Oil damage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria"

At the end of the coffee break Mr Wicks showed participants a short documentary film demonstrating the effects that pollution from oil refineries have had on communities in the Niger delta. The film explained that the most shocking discovery of their research was the old equipment, which should have been replaced years ago. They had also discovered practices that would be unacceptable in other countries; he gave the example of an oil refinery that had built a toxic pit near a river. When it rained the pit over-flowed affecting the lives of twenty four communities. It was noted that these refineries are owned by the state and not by Shell.

In the film, a member of the local community explained how there were no longer any fish available to catch and eat, and how pollution from the oil spill had caused diseases, including eye, bronchial and cardiac problems. The film also showed how sand-bags had ineffectually been used to hold in toxic waste, and how the whole river was covered in oil; Mr Wicks noted that this was very common in the Niger delta.

Furthermore, the film conveyed the sense of injustice of the locals, who claimed that both Shell and the federal government had done nothing to help them despite their inspections. However, Mr Wicks pointed out that damage to pipes and refineries was at times caused by sabotage, and that he himself had seen such sabotage in the Ogoni area. It was noted that Shell has not been allowed to enter Ogoni land to inspect its equipment since 1994.

The film argued that two things need to happen in order to make positive changes in the area: the oil companies must keep to international standards; and they must also help the local communities so that they feel they are benefiting, rather than suffering, from the oil industry.

The film showed a shocking example of a forty year old oil spill which had originally been caused by a bomb during wartime, but was still bleeding out of the soil. Mr Wicks pointed out that such examples destroyed the myth that oil evaporates and disintegrates after only a few months. There were other vivid images in the film, including one of oil being sprayed over the land like a sprinkler, and another of oil covering the skin of a fisherman fishing.

In the film's conclusion, its presenter summed up the main findings of their research. The Niger Delta, he said, was one of the top five most oil polluted areas in world. About 1.5 million tonnes of oil had been spilt in 4,000 different oil spills in the last fifty years. One of the biggest mistakes in the Delta, he said, had been the flaring of gas. He described how 86% of secondary gas was simply burnt off and as it burned, black smoke condensed causing oil droplets to fall as rain on to the local people, their homes and their land.

After the film had ended, Mr Wicks reported what the Minister for Petroleum had told the researchers. Initially, he said, the Minister, and others, had believed that oil would be the solution to the country's problems. In fact it had created vastly more problems, namely corruption, pollution, and a destabilised civil society. The Minister's recommendations to governments planning to extract oil were as follows: plan energy and transportation strategies first; promote transparency and combat corruption; use profits sensibly and encourage agriculture, forestry, fisheries, tourism which, according to Mr Wicks, had largely disappeared in the affected areas.

Mr Wicks pointed out that it would be impossible to fully explain to the conference the total damage done in Niger (this can be found in the team's report). He did, however, summarise some of the reports' key findings: 4,000 - 9,000 oil spills; oil not dispersed after fifty years, and 80% of fish now imported in, what was once, a prime fishing area. In conclusion, Mr Wicks reiterated how all oil companies, not just Shell, need to improve their standards. First and foremost, he said, old pipelines must be replaced, since they are the number one cause of spills.

VIII Building Sustainability through Private Sector Development in (Post-) Conflict Situations and Civil-Military Cooperation: the case of Afghanistan

Dick Scherjon, Business Development, Rabobank,
The Netherlands



“The role of the banking sector”

Mr Scherjon opened by explaining that he would address two areas in his talk: the role of business in post-conflict countries, and the dilemma of whether the military should involve itself in development activities in the aftermath of conflict. He pointed to how history, as well as recent experiences in countries such as Northern Ireland, showed that entrepreneurship plays a vital role in rebuilding a country, and in sustaining peace. In turn, he said, business has everything to gain from peace.

Mr Scherjon explained a little about himself and his employer. Rabobank is, he explained, a co-operative bank. Profits are shared and it engages in various kinds of social responsibility projects; in the inner cities, but also in developing countries. Mr Scherjon's own expertise is in small businesses, and he is involved part-time in the Dutch military.


Through this awkward combination Mr Scherjon epitomises a dilemma: is military involvement in post-conflict development ever acceptable? His answer is 'a qualified yes', as business and development have a 'shared history' of working together. His experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina had shown that business and post-conflict development go hand in hand. Economic development is usually neglected, as it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and still is in Afghanistan. But, he noted, it can be as important as schools, hospitals and other forms of assistance.

Mr Scherjon then turned to his recent experiences in Baghlan in the North of Afghanistan. The name of the project he works on is Integrated Development Entrepreneurial Activities, or IDEA. He and his colleagues help local businesses, train entrepreneurs and provide practical expertise and guidance. The most important aim of the project is to give the entrepreneurs the confidence to start again and to help rebuild their country.

There had, said Mr Scherjon, been much interest in the project, with around 300 entrepreneurs trained in one year in Baghlan. Addressing the dilemma of the military, Mr Scherjon said that ideally, the task of rebuilding should be given to civilian organisations. However, if the area is not safe, then that job should be given to reservists, bringing a combination of business expertise and military support to the task.

The projects in which Mr Scherjon was involved in Bosnia ran for two years and the Afghan project has been running for one and a half year. Mr Scherjon described his experiences in a positive light; the projects had, he said, produced some concrete results that aided the pacification process. He related how he and his colleagues had co-operated successfully with NGOs and IOs, and suggested that the experience of the Netherlands shows how businesses were prepared to lend their staff to such development projects. Mr Scherjon concluded by re-emphasising the importance of creating more local capacity to allow a handover to local NGOs who do the same work. He explained that the projects did not start unless they could eventually hand them over to locals.

Following his talk, Mr Scherjon was invited to give examples of the types of businesses he worked with in Afghanistan and he named shopkeepers, carpenters, metalworkers, and small manufacturing companies among them. He explained how the projects helped them to develop sound business planning, whilst ensuring that micro-credit facilities were in place to make the business experience a genuine one.



Taghi Farvar, Chairman, IUCN CEESP

“International Cooperation”

Mr Farvar commenced his talk by outlining some of the characteristics of present day Afghanistan so as to provide a context within which current attempts at conflict resolution can be understood. He stressed the diversity of Afghanistan. It was, he pointed out, a country made of many ethnic and tribal groupings, who speak a number of different languages. The Afghans have successfully resisted every attempt at colonisation by a foreign power and if we can generalise about one of their major characteristics then it is a hatred of, and resistance to, foreign hegemony. In this context, Mr Farvar noted, the US are merely the latest in a long line of invaders, no more or less popular than earlier invaders. The second characteristic of Afghans, he suggested, is one common to nearly all oppressed people: desperation. They would, he said, try to get whatever they need out of whoever they can, often to the detriment of more fundamental and sustainable long-term planning.

This has cost the Afghans heavily. Throughout the last twenty years of their turbulent history around 6 million Afghan refugees have taken shelter, or put down roots, in neighbouring countries. Those who have stayed have suffered war, insults and all manner of evils. As a result, Mr Farvar explained, the entire fabric of Afghan society is on the verge of breaking. Although customary law and tribal structures are still in place, invasive forces have caused severe dislocation, splitting families apart and generating cruelty, corruption and social conflict on a massive scale. New world views tend to crash with traditional patterns of common ownership; refugees return to demand land that they believe is rightfully theirs

only to find that it has been appropriated; warlords impose themselves on large territories and take its resources; and, tragically, water sources are no longer accessible to those who had previously held rights to them. Mr Farvar elucidated by giving an example. According to one estimate, he said, pastoral nomads have been excluded from all but 9% of the territories that they previously had access to.

How are the resultant conflicts to be resolved? Mr Farvar went on to describe the two traditional Afghan institutions that he and his colleagues are dealing with in order to help resolve disputes over private property: the Shuras and the Jergas. Whereas the Shuras are characterised by a council of elders working with other representatives to arrive at a consensus, the Jergas make decisions that are at once binding. In Afghan law these two types of decision cannot be appealed against. If these routes are exhausted, then the decision goes to the courts, which are riddled with corruption.

If, however, property disputes arise over common lands then there is an alternative system of conflict resolution that the Afghan people use. If the conflict is within a community system then the resolution is a community managed process. If, however, other stakeholders are involved, then a process of co-management attempts to arrive at a solution.

Mr Farvar called the numerous foreign attempts to direct development a way of 'sweetening' the violence of the occupation. In contrast to the position of Mr Scherjon, Mr Farvar was highly sceptical towards any military involvement in development activities. Such involvement, he claimed, could do significant damage, since it led the occupied population to perceive development activities not as a legitimate and disinterested good, but as a tool of the military, or war by other means.



Willem van de Put, Director, Health Net International

"Civil-Military Cooperation: an NGO perspective"

Mr van de Put spoke at the conference, having just arrived from Afghanistan. He opened by describing his work for Health Net International, an NGO which builds opportunities for sustainable health care systems in conflict areas. Health care, he said, as the least contested and controversial aspect of development, provides an opportunity to promote engagement and consensus amongst all aspects of society. In turn the sense of empowerment given to local populations through ownership of their health care system can make a major contribution towards peace.

Health Net had had some important successes in Afghanistan. Following the US-led invasion of 2001 and the departure of Health Net workers, the systems that they left in place were kept functioning by the Afghans, helping to prevent a refugee crisis in the area.

Mr van de Put turned to the current situation and their relationship with the military. In the Eastern province of Nangarhar, they have agreed with the Dutch military that, although they are working towards the same goals, they should keep separate for the time being. It was, said Mr van de Put, a decision vindicated by a recent incident which perfectly illustrates the problems faced by development workers in areas occupied by international forces.

He related this story, explaining that there had been many conflicting versions of what exactly had taken place. An incident, possibly an explosion, had led US troops to indiscriminately open fire, killing sixteen people and seriously wounding thirty. They, as development workers, were unsure whose version of events to believe, the locals, or the US military, and although they were working to help the Afghan casualties, they were greeted with suspicion and hostility thanks to their association with the foreign forces. The incident with US troops in Nangarhar, he said, applies to the whole of Afghanistan. It proves that development cannot be carried out with a foreign troop presence since it is impossible for locals to see the foreign troops as a guarantee of security if there are daily incidents of people being killed by them. But, he noted, Afghanistan was not necessarily representative of other countries.

He described how amongst local and international aid workers, fewer and fewer people wanted to work in Uruzgan. They complained that foreign troops obstructed their work and endangered their lives. Paradoxically, he said, the military safe 'zones' are unsafe for aid workers, who are endangered by their association with the occupiers. Mr van de Put was confident that they could achieve results, but not with the international military presence that there was in Uruzgan.

The Dutch military contribution had been, he said, a complete waste of time and resources. Currently the Netherlands spends 360,000 euro per soldier over two years in Uruzgan, but only 34 euro per head on the Afghan population. There would, he continued, need to be important changes before foreign intervention achieved any results. Afghans must be put in charge of their own security, alongside a different use of foreign troops. He suggested a system whereby Afghan forces were supported by back-up foreign forces in a far less threatening capacity than they are in now.

Mr van de Put expanded on the errors that had been made in managing Afghanistan's post-conflict development. Too much money has been put into large central national projects that build up huge offices and agencies. Kabul is transforming rapidly, but it bears little resemblance to the rest of Afghanistan and brings little benefit to it. Populations in the provinces feel alienated from what is taking place in the capital: the large-scale human rights and gender programmes stay in Kabul. What is needed is a bottom up approach from

villages. The gains that they have achieved in health care proves that attempts to use existing societal structures builds trust with the locals, allowing for the effective organisation and delivery of development.

Wishing to conclude on a note of optimism, Mr van de Put said that, although Afghanistan is currently on the wrong path, there was still an opportunity to realise this and to make changes. The way an army works would always be different to that of an NGO, and it would be naïve if, in embracing collaboration, we ignored this reality. Yet, although collaboration could never be effective under the circumstances in which it has taken place in Afghanistan, this did not mean that it would always be useless.

Additional Comments from the Audience

The floor was then opened to questions and comments with the majority of questions directed at Mr Scherjon, and concerning the legitimacy of the approach he embodied. Dr Borrini-Feyerabend asked how aware the military are of the difficulties and complexities of development? In particular, will they be in it for the long duration that is needed for serious development work to be done? It was pointed out that development assistance is not neutral, that it necessarily helps certain aspects of society and not others. Development overseen by the military is least neutral of all, and is often treated by them as a continuation of military work by other means.

In response, Mr Scherjon offered some clarification, explaining that his project is, essentially, a military project that uses civilian expertise in the form of reservists. However it is not completely funded by the military since Dutch companies lend their staff to the project. He stressed that the business community are indeed aware of the cultural differences that exist from place to place, and of the need to continue development in the long-term. Most important, he reiterated, was the need to train locals to take over the work as soon as possible.

Mr Farvar stated his belief that the approach, represented by Mr Scherjon of combining Dutch business and the military, was doing fundamental damage to Afghanistan. Both would be viewed as hostile and a threat by the Afghans. He questioned the usefulness of the skills that Mr Scherjon and the business community are bringing to Afghanistan. Many displaced Afghans have learned these things abroad; the returnees have brought back many entrepreneurial skills and spirit to their home country. The focus should be on applying these skills. He then picked up on a theme, claiming that the Afghans, with their hatred of invaders, took what they could, seeing it as only a temporary benefit. There is, he said, widespread disillusionment concerning the current political and security situation, and even nostalgia for the Taliban.

Mr Scherjon responded. He accepted much of Mr Farvar's analysis of the problems that exist in Afghanistan and agreed that the West can learn from the business practices of the Afghans. But he also defended his position, warning that it would be a mistake for foreign forces to leave, and arguing that entrepreneurship can provide a real solution to Afghanistan's problems.

Mr van de Put agreed with the initial analysis that NGOs rarely stay long enough to do the work necessary. Although development is not neutral, he pointed out that it could be directed towards those who need it most. The military, on the other hand, is by definition not neutral.

One questioner stressed the need to consider the different political and ethnic constellations of Afghanistan, along with their differing reactions to the systems imposed. We need to consider the broader picture. Namely, what assistance structures would be required, if any, for Afghans to take charge of their own development and, given the corruption and inefficiency of central government, what kind of overarching coordinating structure should be put in place? Mr van de Put expanded on the theme of diversity. There are, he pointed out, at least two Afghans: male and female. This is an obstacle to development since they have conflicting aspirations and communicate different messages.

It was suggested that there needs to be a debate within the Netherlands about the approach of the military coalition in Afghanistan. It was pointed out that the Afghans hate the US and that they often ask why Europeans do not speak out more. Resultantly there is a real opportunity for Europe to provide an alternative to the US approach.

Mr Farvar argued that with the multiplicity of different international organisations and groupings in Afghanistan acting alongside the central government, it would be much more legitimate to turn over development operations to existing Afghan civil society organisations from the start, and to work on strengthening them. Local villages are still strong despite all the damage done to them. They are, he said, one of the only sources of hope for Afghanistan, and external forces should make use of them.

IX Concluding Remarks



To review the main points of the conference and recommendations for follow-up action, the participants came together in working groups. Then two rapporteurs and a number of participants summarised the most important points that had been raised in the discussions, and proposed possible topics and approaches for next year's event.

The first rapporteur, Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, began by highlighting that all participants found the event successful and that more events of this nature were required, whereby representatives from different sectors came together to develop a common language. She continued to note that participants felt the conference should have been more specific with regard to the topic under discussion, and that the broad variety of topics limited the possibilities of an in-depth analysis of certain key issues. For instance, the conference could focus on one specific industry area, such as liquefied natural gas, or one specific region where commonalities such as historical and cultural background existed. She went on to highlight two main recommendations for future discussions. Firstly; the concept of security must be redefined to include a broader variety of components, including primarily the environment, but also health, social sustainability, equity, and development. Secondly; with such a broad definition of security, new mechanisms must be developed to respond to this.

Examples of such mechanisms include the concept of 'citizens councils' as discussed by Richard Steiner, whereby industry and civil society groups unite to develop solutions and safeguards to industrial activities that may damage the environment, and the need for governments to imbed these new security concepts into their policy processes. Another important mechanism is the need for international law regarding conflicts to better recognise the environmental dimension of security, with gross environmental violations recognised as violations of collective security for example. This idea has already been put forward by Global Witness, which is lobbying for a definition of 'conflict resources' to become internationally recognised, and potentially acted upon by the Security Council when violations occurred. This is framed within the concept of the *responsibility to protect*, which was endorsed by the Security Council in 2006, and requires the international community to act in cases where the state is unable or unwilling to halt human rights violations of its citizens. This could include the trade in conflict resources and threats to the environment, which could be associated with existing human rights standards like the right to development. Furthermore, the Belgian government, which assumes the rotating presidency of the Security Council in June 2007, has promised to initiate a debate on natural resources and conflict, and to debate the concept of environmental threats within the Council's mandate; namely as a threat to peace and security.

Another proposed mechanism mentioned by the speaker, drawing from the fact that, in cases of disaster or conflict, humanitarian groups are often one of the first on the scene, was the notion of a 'rapid assessment team'. This could be designed specifically to monitor potential environmental impact of violent conflict, and would have the task of detecting, preventing or mitigating developments that could cause environmental disaster. The responsibility to organise these teams could be designated to international coalitions like the IUCN or other groups. Another possibility would involve the presence of environmental advisers embedded in security forces, which has a precedent in the case of environmental advisers in operations designed to create camps for environmental refugees, and has been a subject of debate between the IUCN and UNHCR.

Finally, the rapporteur recommended topics for next year's conference. These could include the details of the mechanisms discussed above, but also the nature of regulations on public and private companies involved in environmentally damaging activities, nuclear weapons and the environment, depleted uranium in conflict situations, and the involvement of local people in security decisions. The speaker also recommended that the next meeting include more representatives of private industry, banks, IMF and other financial institutions.

The second rapporteur, Georg Frerks, continued the summary of the concluding discussions, and began by highlighting the importance of a conference on this topic. He also noted however, that the topics were often not explored in sufficient detail, and that the analytical and policy inter-relationships between the nexus of conflict, security, and the environment could have been strengthened. He conceded the ambitious nature of establishing such inter-relationships in one conference, and therefore welcomed the potential to continue this analytical process in further meetings. He also mentioned that the speakers had often taken different approaches to the topic, and that this had produced tensions between different perspectives, such as; short-term instead of long-term solutions, practical methodologies instead of principled, politicised 'ideal' approaches; and accepting certain 'costs' as necessary or rejecting them out of hand. In future, he hoped the conference could resolve these tensions by taking a more strategic, structural and long-term approach, and clarifying the inter-relationships between the various actors on an academic and policy level.

He continued by highlighting the value of specific models and case studies, which serve to highlight these conceptual links and how they manifest themselves in reality. This in turn provides a blueprint from which to work from, but it is important to remember the difference in circumstances, as civil-military cooperation may be effective in Liberia but not in Afghanistan for example. This can conflict with the tendency of policy-makers to seek straightforward solutions, and Mr Frerks highlighted the challenge of consolidating complex and diffuse recommendations into workable policy goals. In discussing Afghanistan for example, he noted that problems with respect to birth rates, arable land, nomads, mines,

and the effects of climate change on water supplies were all relevant and inter-related topics that had to be included in any recommendations.

Finally, he offered recommendations for future discussions, alongside the prevalent use of models and case studies. He noted that it had not been clear during the conference which stage of conflict was being addressed. He noted the importance of developing a strategy of environment and security, which takes into account all phases of the conflict, beginning in the pre-conflict phase, by focusing on conflict prevention through f.e. early-warning prevention systems, continuing with intervention and rapid response through to post-conflict phases, by concentrating on longer-term stability with regard to natural resources. Such a chronological differentiation is necessary due to the different approaches, actors, expertise, and capabilities that are needed during each phase. Furthermore, he highlighted the need for a better analysis of the various actors involved, and consequently the need for more representation from the private, and in particular the banking sphere. He also cited the importance of international law and applauded the previous speaker's discussion of the 'responsibility to protect'. He felt that such juridical tools were extremely relevant for raising awareness of existing compliance mechanisms, and the relevant aspects of this, as raised in the speech by Erik Koppe, warranted further discussion, at both an international and national level.

In conclusion he noted the importance of macro-economic forces in determining the fiscal options available to policy makers. The deregulatory measures enacted under the second-round of the Basel Accords (so-called 'Basel II') for example, demonstrate a tendency towards the deregulation of the financial sector, which in turn limits the way some of the challenges presented may be dealt with. Alejandro Nadal consequently emphasised this point regarding deregulation, and noted that achieving many of the goals discussed in the conference requires enacting specific regulatory measures on companies. Such 're-regulation' conflicts with the current World Trade Organization agenda, and is not immediately attractive to developing countries seeking investment. Moreover, installing new regulations regarding the environment are often not permitted under existing trade agreements. Chapter 11 of NAFTA (The North American Free Trade Association) regarding foreign direct investment, for example, supersedes national environmental regulations.

Finally, Wouter Veening closed the conference by summarising the main points of the conference;

- The importance of local solutions, such as the 'Citizens Council' in Alaska.
- The need to regulate international companies, in particular from China, which has a poor reputation for regulation and is heavily investing in Africa.
- The need for the private and public sector to invest in environmental security.

- The need for a discussion on how to properly define security.
- The importance of influencing companies, governments, and the military, to work towards a sustainable environment and the importance of developing a mechanism to promote this.
- The need to mandate the international community to protect the environment following conflict.

He added to this a list of considerations for next year's event;

- The need for more participants from the private sector and governments.
- The translation of key documents and conference proceedings into other languages.
- The importance of inviting representatives from areas prone to conflicts to share experience and gain insight.
- The need to focus on specific issues and to gain more tangible outcomes.
- The idea to keep the first day more general, and focus on individual themes on the second day.
- The requirement for the speakers to focus on both security and the environment, with a focus on the linkages between the two.

He further highlighted the fact that the event would be repeated next year around March/April, and that this meeting could focus on drafting proposals for the IUCN meeting in Barcelona in 2008 regarding the environment and sustainability. He noted that the participants could draft resolutions to shape the programme of this event, and prevent this to the IUCN congress. Furthermore, he stressed that they could push for the wider use of 'peace parks' in conflict zones, as well as drawing attention to the gap in legal recourse for (groups of) individuals whose lives have been damaged as a result of environmental degradation. Such crimes do not constitute 'war crimes' and can therefore not be taken to international bodies like the ICC, leaving them few options. Mr Veening also stated his desire for a discussion around the issue of water scarcity in the Middle East, and the potential for cooperation between conflicting parties.

Mr Veening concluded by stating that the Institute for Environmental Security looks forward to organising future Peace and Sustainability Sessions at the Peace Palace in The Hague, to continue the debate on bringing in the military as a partner in environmental security, to increase the accountability of the extractive industry and to empower the local communities, to make them all effective forces for sustainability.

Annex 1 - Programme of the Conference

Wednesday, 14 March

09:00- 09:30 *Arrival and Registration of Participants*

09:30-10:30 *Welcome and Introduction*

Chair: Wouter Veening, Director, Institute for Environmental Security

- * Welcome on behalf of organisers
- * Opening Remarks – by Ton Boon von Ochssée, Ambassador for Sustainable Development, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- * Peace and Sustainability: new issues and new partners on the road to WCC IV, Barcelona 2008 – by Gabriel Lopez, Director, Global Strategies, IUCN
- * History and Culture: the roots of sustainability – by Taghi Farvar, Chairman, IUCN CEESP

10:30-10:45 *Introduction of Participants*

10:45-11:15 *Coffee Break*

11:15-12:00 *Context Setting – Forces for Sustainability: what are the main sustainability challenges in areas of armed conflicts?*

- * Macro-Economic Forces, Conflict and the Environment – by Alejandro Nadal, Chairman, CEESP Theme on Economics, Markets, Trade and Investment
- * Applying Environmental Security Concepts to enhance Peace and Stability – by BG (Ret) W. Chris King, P.E. Dean of Academics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

12:00-12.30 *The Environment during Armed Conflict: the Case of the Lebanese Oil Spill, July-August 2006*

- * Environmental Impact – by Professor Richard Steiner, University of Alaska
- * Legal Addendum to Lebanese Oil Spill – by Erik Koppe, expert environmental law and armed conflict

- 12.30 -13.00 *Questions to the Morning Session Speakers*
- 13:00-14:00 *Lunch*
- 14:00-15:30 *Case Studies: experiences with sustainability issues in transition phases towards peace*
- Moderator: Professor Georg Frerks, Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University
- * Dealing with Malicious Militias and Reforming the Army in the DR Congo – by Captain/Navy Niels A. Woudstra, Counsellor, General Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of DRC Congo 2006-2007
 - * Environment and Security: which way around? The case of DDR in the Great Lakes region – by Jelte van Wieren, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - * Turning Rebels into Conservationists: the case of Nepal – by Mangal Man Shakya, Wildlife Watch/Kathmandu Declaration
 - * Cooperation between the Military and Civilians in Post-Conflict Situations – by Thijs Kuipers, Reserve Major Dutch Armed Forces, CIMIC
 - * The Role of Private Military Companies in Environmental Protection – by Alastair Ross, University of Kent, formerly with UK Ministry of Defence
- 15:30-16:15 *Break Out Groups with Speakers*
- 16:15-16:30 *Refreshments*
- 16:30-17:15 *Panel Discussion with Speakers: what are most meaningful lessons learned from break out groups?*
- 17:15 *Closure*
- 18:30 *Drinks and Dinner*
- Dinner speech – by Jamie Shea, Director Policy Planning, NATO

Thursday, 15 March

09:00-09:30 *Arrival of Participants*

09:30-09:45 *Overview of Yesterdays Discussions*

09:45-11:00 *Experiences with Conflict, Peace and Sustainability: roles and responsibilities of communities and the private sector*


- * The Resource Curse: how the extractive industry violates human rights and ecological integrity in Nigeria and the Philippines – by Clive Wicks, Co-chair, CEESP Working Group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector
- * Mining the Forests, the Military and the Communities: from plunder to protection in Papua – by Leo Imbiri, Dewan Adat Papua (Papua Customary Council)
- * Recognition of Customary Rights in Papua: creating the basis for poverty reduction and growth in the forest sector – by Agus Sumule, Adviser, Papua Provincial Government
- * Extractive Industries: conflict prevention through empowering stakeholders – by Sandra Kloff, Co-chair, CEESP Working Group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private sector
- * The Role of Citizen Advisory Councils and of the 1% Earth Profits Fund in Promoting the Accountability of the Private Sector – by Professor Richard Steiner, University of Alaska, member of the CEESP Working Group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector


11:00-11:15 *Questions from the Floor to Speakers: what are the main sustainability issues in areas of armed conflicts?*
Moderator: Wouter Veening, Director, IES

11:15-11:45 *Coffee Break*

- 11:45-12:00 Film: Oil damage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria - moderated by Clive Wicks, Co-chair, CEESP Working Group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector
- 12:00-13:15 *Break Out Groups with Speakers: what are the main sustainability issues in post-conflict areas for communities and the private sector?*
- 13:15-14:10 *Lunch*
- 14:10-15:15 *Building Sustainability through Private Sector Development in (Post-) Conflict Situations and Civil-Military Cooperation: the case of Afghanistan*
- * The role of the banking sector – by Dick Scherjon, Business Development, Rabobank, The Netherlands
 - * International Cooperation – by Taghi Farvar, Chairman, IUCN CEESP
 - * Civil-Military Cooperation: an NGO perspective – by Willem van de Put, Director, Health Net International
- 15.15 -16.15 *Working Groups on Conclusions and Recommendations to:*
- * Donors & International Organisations
 - * Peace Keeping Missions & Relief Organisations
 - * IUCN and CEESP
- 16.15-16:30 *Refreshments*
- 16:30-17:30 *Plenary Presentations of Conclusions and Recommendations from Working Groups: feedback from panel with selected speakers*
- 17:30-18:30 *Closure and Reception*

Annex 2 - Photographs





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Annex 3 - Speakers

Taghi Farvar

Taghi Farvar (1948) holds a PhD in environmental sciences (including tropical ecology and ecotoxicology) and social sciences (including development studies). He is an action leader with deep commitment towards helping rural communities in their own defined paths towards sustainable development and conservation.

He has done ground breaking work on environmental and social impact of modern agriculture in Central America and was the co-editor of *The Careless Technology—Ecology and International Development* (1972). He helped set up the Department of the Environment in Iran and was Vice Rector of Avicenna University. He has worked in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe and North America. He is Chairperson of the Centre for Sustainable Development (CENESTA) in Iran.

Under his leadership, the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (CEESP) has substantially contributed to international policy (Convention on Biological Diversity, the World Parks Congress, World Food Summit, WTO, WSSD). His key professional interests are community livelihoods and poverty eradication, including the relationship with sound natural resource management and species conservation while maintaining community cohesiveness.

Georg E. Frerks

Georg E. Frerks (1954) is Professor of Professor of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University. Within the field of conflict studies he focuses on conflict management, resolution and mediation and development-related conflict and emergencies in developing countries. He has over twenty years of experience in development and foreign policy issues. He holds a joint appointment as Professor of Disaster Studies at Wageningen University.

Frerks' recent (co-)publications are the books 'Human Security and International Insecurity' (2007), 'Principles and Pragmatism: Civil-Military Action in Afghanistan and Liberia' (2006) and 'Dealing with Diversity, Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict' (2005)

Leo Imbiri

Leo Imbiri (1967) will participate at this conference as General-Secretary of Dewan Adat Papua - Papua Customary Council, a position he holds since February 2002. At present he also holds the functions of Chairman of Yadupa - Papua Youth Village Foundation (since August 2002) and Member of Papua Presidium Council (since June 2000). Mr Imbiri was a member of the team of National Dialogue that in February 1999 presented then President Habibie with the Papuan wish for independence. At the Second Papua People's Congress in June 2000, he became member of the Presidium of the Papua Council (PDP).

Leo Imbiri became the secretary-general of the Dewan Adat Papua (DAP - the Papua Customary Council), which was established in February 2002 as one of the results of the second Papua Peoples' Congress. DAP's mission is to struggle peacefully and democratically on the basis of Papuan identity, honour and the right to life. As Secretary General of DAP, Imbiri has been able to further develop his international experiences and represent his people within the processes of the United Nations, notably the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Geneva, 2005 and 2006), the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (New York, 2005) and the UN Forum on Forests (New York, 2005) and the Global Conference on Conflict and Prevention (New York, 2005).

Wendell Christopher King

Dr. King (1949) received his Ph.D. in environmental engineering in 1988 and currently serves as the chief academic officer for the United States Army's Command and General Staff College. The College has a 125 year tradition of educating military officers on national security and the art of war. After many environmental engineering assignments with the U.S. Army domestically and in Europe, in 1991 he deployed as the Officer in Charge of the Southwest Asia Health Risk Assessment Team to determine health risks to US troops exposed to the smoke from the Kuwait oil fires and to support the restoration of Kuwait. For this he won the American Academy of Environmental Engineering Honor Award.

In 1994 Dr. King was assigned to the Army Chief of Staff's crisis action team for the Rwanda relief mission as the medical operations planner and assigned to the deploying headquarters for Operation Support Hope assisting the humanitarian and relief work for the refugees in Rwanda and the neighbouring countries. In 2005 he helped develop the new Afghanistan Military Academy.

As a specialist in hazardous waste management he advises NATO on the cleanup of military hazardous wastes and the restoration of closed military facilities in East Europe.

Dr. King has authored many articles and reports and two books, the most recent being *Understanding International Environmental Security: A Strategic Military Perspective*. He retired in 2006 after 32 years of active service at the rank of brigadier general, having received as highest military award the Distinguished Service Medal.

Sandra Kloff

Sandra Kloff (1969) is a marine biologist and studied the role of Antarctic micro algae in global warming processes and researched the impact of marine pollution on species composition of micro algae in coral reef ecosystems. In 1995 she initiated a research programme for the Dutch Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) on the proliferation of aquatic vegetation in the lower Senegal River Basin. From 1998 until 2000 she worked for the IUCN in Mauritania as a programme manager on the conservation of coastal wetlands. She currently works as a consultant on various environmental issues. She provided technical advice on aquatic weed management in Nigeria (UK Department for International Development – DFID), Senegal (KIT; Direction of National Parks) and Mauritania (KIT; Diawling National Park). She currently works in Spain and Gibraltar together with environmental

grass root groups on coastal zone planning, offshore oil development and atmospheric pollution arising from heavy industries. Since 2001 she also provides technical advice to stakeholders in Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar and India on offshore oil development.

Erik Koppe

Erik Koppe (1976) studied International and European Law (1994-1998) and Dutch Law (1999-2005) at the University of Groningen. In 1999 he started his Phd research about the use of nuclear weapons and environmental protection during violent conflicts. In 2006 he promoted on his dissertation "The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment during International Armed Conflict" at the University of Groningen.

Thijs Kuipers

Thijs Kuipers (1972) is a reserve major in the Dutch Armed Forces. After two years at the naval academy and a Masters in public administration, he worked several years in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a grass root NGO. Here he got involved in the questions of public security and justice. Back in the Netherlands he advised top-level organisation in the field of national security and crisis management. In 2006 Kuipers was appointed director of a large regional library organisation in a rural region in the Netherlands. Alongside his regular jobs, Kuipers joined the unit for Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as a reserve major in 2002. Here he is manager of the network of civil administration. The CIMIC networks consist in total of 300 reserve-officers who can be called upon to strengthen military peace support operations with specific civilian expertise in the field of public administration, commerce, infrastructure, humanitarian affairs and culture. Kuipers also works as a trainer in human rights for the Netherlands Defence Academy.

José Gabriel Lopez

Dr. J. Gabriel Lopez (1954) is IUCN Director of Global Strategies with lead responsibility for providing key analysis as to the future roles and functions of IUCN as a global leader of conservation and sustainable development. Based at IUCN headquarters, he manages the Global Communications, Membership and Governance, Conservation Finance and Donor Relations units as well as the Future of Sustainability Initiative. Dr. Lopez holds a Ph.D. in social anthropology and development studies. During his fifteen-year tenure with the Ford Foundation as program officer and resident representative, Dr. Lopez formulated and managed interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral programs on environment and sustainable development in Ford's Mexico, Southern Africa and Brazil offices, as well as helped develop comprehensive regional and global strategies for the institution as a whole. Prior to joining the IUCN in July 2005, he was senior research fellow with the Tropical Conservation and Development Program, Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. There he worked on a book on the changing context for promoting sustainable development highlighting social movements, environmental sustainability, and the policy frameworks and institutional arrangements necessary to advance this vital mission.

Alejandro Nadal

Alejandro Nadal (1945) is a full professor at El Colegio de México, where he directs the research Program on Science, Technology and Development. He has carried out research on macroeconomics, general equilibrium theory, technical change and sustainable resource management. Recent publications include (with Frank Ackerman) *The Flawed Foundations of General Equilibrium* (Routledge 2005) and "Coasean Fictions: Law and Economics Revisited" (*Seattle Journal of Social Justice*, forthcoming). He writes a weekly column on economics and sustainability in *La Jornada*, one of Mexico's leading national newspapers.

Willem van de Put

Willem van de Put (1959) studies history, philosophy and cultural anthropology at the University of Amsterdam. He specialised in medical anthropology and currently carries out a research on collective trauma and rehabilitation in Cambodia. In the early 1990's Van de Put joined the medical staff of Doctors without Borders. In 1994 he became programme director at Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO) in Cambodia where he set up a project for the mental health care throughout Cambodia. There he was elected as chair of the board of MEDICAM, a platform for 90 NGO's with regard to health care service.

Back in The Netherlands Van de Put became director of HealthNet-TPO, an independent non-governmental organisation with the objective of rebuilding the health care sector in situations of continuous conflicts and post-war situations. Van de Put is co-author of the documentary 'Deacon of Death', about the search for justice in Cambodia. Furthermore, he is a member of the World Health Organisation Eastern Mediterranean Advisory Committee for Health Research and of the Scientific Advisory Council of the War Trauma Foundation.

Alastair Ross

Alastair Ross (1964) is Head of Administration of the University of Kent at Brussels and is reading for a PhD in International Relations. He retired recently from the British Army having served on operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Kuwait, East Timor, Albania, Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique, Indonesia, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone. A graduate of the French Staff College, where he was awarded the prize for Political and Defence Strategy, he was a key member of the UK's deployable Crisis Management team in Northwood before moving to command a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks. His final appointment was in the Directorate of Military Operations, in the Ministry of Defence, where he was responsible for managing the directorate's commitments as well as being personally responsible for the military contribution to the search for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq and the restructuring of Resistance to Interrogation training with the British Armed Forces. His research interest and the focus of his PhD is on the Private Military Industry and in particular on its effect on Democratic Peace Theory.

Dick Scherjon

Dick Scherjon (1955) is a small business expert, working at Rabobank, the main small business bank in the Netherlands. He is also (part-time) professor of small business at INHolland University, Rotterdam. He has specialized in management development of entrepreneurs, innovative projects for banks and accountants, marketing of small business services and training of students.

During a "sabbatical" period at the Dutch Employers Federation VNO-NCW he developed an economic rebuilding programme intended for post-conflict countries. Dutch small business experts assist local business people in these countries in (re-) starting their companies. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan these experts were called on active duty for the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Dick Scherjon has been promoted to Colonel (R) of the Netherlands Royal Army.

Mr. Scherjon is on the board of the War Trauma Foundation, the Netherlands-Afghan Business Council and the Alumni Association of the University of Groningen.

Mangal Man Shakya

Mangal Man Shakya (1969) is an environmental journalist by profession. He holds a Bachelors Degree in Management. Since receiving the Environmental Journalism Award in 1993, he has devoted himself to this field undertaking research and writing about topics on Environment and Wildlife Conservation. Over the past years, he has written hundreds of news articles related to wildlife and nature conservation based on his rich travel experiences in the protected areas of Nepal.

Mr Shakya is chairman of Wildlife Watch Group (WWG) whose main objective is to monitor wildlife trade for public information and promote wildlife journalism. Through WWG, Mr. Shakya has encouraged Nepalese journalists to write articles on environment and wildlife issues thus enabling such issues to become a major concern of Nepali newspapers and media managers in the country. In 2000-01, Mr. Shakya was the Chairman of Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists (NEFFJ) and Radio Sagarmatha. Under his leadership, NEFEJ observed a phenomenal growth in terms of programme diversity and fund raising and established it as a most resourceful media organisation in the country. Besides this, he is also the Chairman of Kathmandu Environment Education Project (KEEP).

Mr. Shakya has also held many prominent positions in many international organisations including the position of Administrative Council Member of the International Federation of Environmental Journalists (IFEJ). He was - until 2006 - Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Forum of Environmental Journalists (APFEJ) and he has been project coordinator for the Environment Support Fund (ESF) for Nepal. For his outstanding contribution to environmental journalism, Mr. Shakya was duly awarded the International Green Pen Award in 2002 in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Jamie Shea

Dr. Jamie Shea (1953) received his doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University in 1981 and currently serves as Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General of NATO, responsible for advising and assisting the Secretary General, senior NATO management, and the NATO Council in addressing strategic issues facing the Alliance.

He has worked for NATO since 1980 in various positions, as Head of Youth Programs, speechwriter for the Secretary General (SG) and from 1993-2000 he was spokesman of NATO. After serving as Director of Information and Press from 2000-2003 he became Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, before assuming his current position in 2005.

Jamie Shea fulfills several academic positions, amongst them Professor at the Collège d'Europe (Bruges), Lecturer at the Brussels School of International Studies of the University of Kent and Associate Professor of International Relations, American University, Washington DC.

He regularly lectures on NATO and European security affairs at, amongst others, the J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, the Netherlands' Institute of International Relations Clingendael and the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, University of London, where he also serves as external examiner for the PhD degree candidates of the Department of War Studies.

Richard Steiner

Richard Steiner (1953) is a Professor and Conservation Specialist for the University of Alaska Marine Advisory Program, based in Anchorage, Alaska. He has been a faculty member at the University since 1980, stationed primarily in remote areas of Alaska. Today, he is the only University of Alaska faculty member with primary responsibility for providing conservation and sustainability extension outreach. His specialty is ecological conservation, and he has worked internationally on conservation and sustainable development issues - including in Russia, central Asia, south Asia, Japan, Korea, Europe, South America, Central America, Africa, the Middle East, and Indonesia.

As the University of Alaska's marine advisor for the Prince William Sound region of Alaska from 1983 - 1997, he was directly involved in oil / environment issues, and provided leadership in response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in 1989. His work regarding the Exxon Valdez spill - leadership in emergency response, proposing establishment of the *Regional Citizens Advisory Councils*, helping to craft the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and his proposal that the governments and Exxon settle their damage claims that lead to the \$1 billion settlement used largely to protect coastal habitat - received international recognition. He has been producer/host of the *Alaska Resource Issues Forum* public television series since its inception in 1986, and is co-founder of The Coastal Coalition, an environmental NGO in Alaska. His work centres on science-based conservation outreach in Alaska, the U.S., Pacific Rim nations, and the world, by connecting lessons and experiences.

He has published on a broad array of conservation topics – oceans, fisheries, forests, macro-economic policy, endangered species conservation, maritime issues, oil revenues, citizen involvement/environmental democracy, war and environment, global warming, the global environmental crisis, oil spill prevention, etc. He has received a number of awards, including the

Alaska Conservation Foundation's 1993 "Olaus Murie Award" for outstanding professional contribution to environmental conservation, National Fishermen Magazine's 1991 "Highliner Award" for ocean conservation work, National Wildlife Federation's 1993 "Trudy Farrand / John Strohm Magazine Writer's Award" for his article "Probing an Oil Stained Legacy", is an honorary member of the Eyak Tribe in Alaska, listed in the 2004/2005 "International Who's Who of Professionals", and his conservation work has been featured in several books, print and broadcast news media around the world.

Agus Sumule

Agus Sumule, special adviser of governor Bas Suebu of Papua, was member of the Assistance Team to the Governor in the drafting of the Special Autonomy Law. He is Senior Lecturer at the State University of Papua.

Wouter J. Veening

Wouter Veening (1942) studied political science, economics and social psychology at the University of Amsterdam. After working as policy adviser at the Dutch Ministry of the Environment, he became policy director at the Netherlands Committee for IUCN / World Conservation Union, where he dealt with the environmental policies of multilateral finance and donor institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, the Global Environment Facility and the European Union.

As co-founder and director of the Institute for Environmental Security (2003) in The Hague (located opposite the Peace Palace) he now focuses on the policy and legal responses to security risks emanating from environmental degradation in key regions of the world.

Clive Montgomery Wicks

Clive Wicks (1936) is a Conservation and Development Consultant, specialising in the impact of oil, gas and mining Industries. He is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Management UK. With 48 years of experience of working in engineering, agriculture and on environmental affairs, Wicks is a member of the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (CEESP) and Co-Chair of SEAPRISE the CEESP Working group on the Social and Environmental Accountability of the Private Sector.

Clive Wicks has worked in the environmental movement, mainly for WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature), for the last 23 years. In WWF UK he was Head of the International Programme covering Africa, Asia/Pacific and Latin America. He represented WWF at G8, World Bank, IFC (International Finance Corporation), UNEP and UNDP meetings on extractive Industries. Prior to that, he had 25 years experience, of working in agriculture mainly in Africa. This included 14 years in Nigeria, 8 in Kenya and 3 in Zaire/DMC with an International company latterly as a Company Director.

He has worked on oil, gas and mining industries in many countries including Alaska, Bolivia, Cameroon, Georgia, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia etc. He co-authored with Sandra Kloff a book entitled "Gestion environnementale de l'exploitation de pétrole offshore et du transport maritime pétrolier". This book was written to help Mauritania and other Countries in which oil has just been found.

Jelte van Wieren

At the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jelte van Wieren is currently Deputy Head of the Peace Building and Good Governance Division, within the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department. In this respect he is involved, among other things, with the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes in the African Great Lakes region.

Niels A. Woudstra

Captain (Navy) Niels Woudstra (1963) entered the Naval Academy in 1981. On graduating he fulfilled several posts as watch keeping officer on frigates, before becoming Air Defence Officer on board HNLMS Tromp from 1990 to 1992. He went to the Naval Academy as midshipmen's divisional officer from 1992 to 1995 and on promotion to lieutenant commander he was appointed Head of Operations Department on board HNLMS Witte de With in July 1995. From 1997 to 1998 he participated in the Naval Staff Course and after graduation he worked several months in the Joint Operations Centre in the Hague, before his appointment as Second in Command of HNLMS Witte de With. From January 2000 until mid 2001 he was Deputy Head of the Netherlands Maritime Tactical Warfare Centre. Promoted commander in July 2001 he spent three years in the NATO Headquarters in Northwood, UK, as Staff officer Plans. Back in The Netherlands he assumed the post of Second in Command of the Naval Academy in January 2005.

Promoted Captain (N) in July 2006 he became Counsellor of the General Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of the European mission EUSEC DRC. EUSEC DRC is the first European mission which deals with Security Sector Reform (SSR). Even though SSR also encompasses the reform of justice and the police, the EUSEC DRC mission is restricted to the reform of the armed forces, which are in a transitional phase. After the Congolese wars, the former fighting factions were integrated in the regular forces, as a political measure in order to reach unified command. Today a reform process is going on, as the armed forces are in a deplorable state and pose a threat to the own population.

Annex 4 - Participants

Mr Thaha Alhamid
Secretary General
Presidium Dewan Papua
Indonesia

Ms Johannah Bernstein
Consultant
Bernstein and Associates
Belgium

Mr Cas Besselink
Deputy Director
IUCN Netherlands Committee
The Netherlands

Mr Ton Boon von Ochssée
Ambassador for Sustainable Development
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Netherlands

Dr Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend
Chair, Theme on Governance, Equity and
Rights / IUCN Commission on Environmental,
Economic and Social Policy
Switzerland

Mrs Evelien van den Broek
Programme Officer
Ecosystem Grants Programme
IUCN Netherlands Committee
The Netherlands

Ms Eveline de Bruijn
Student International Law
Utrecht University
The Netherlands

Dr Richard Cellarius
International Vice President
Sierra Club
United States of America

Mr Joop Corijn
Special Adviser Sustainable Development
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Netherlands

Dr Ali Darwish
President
Green Line Association
Lebanon

Ms Lisa Eichler
Student
Duke University
The Netherlands

Mr Gabriel Eickhoff
Project Developer
Borneo Tropical Rainforest Foundation
Switzerland

Mr Taghi Farvar
Chairman
IUCN Commission on Environmental,
Economic and Social Policy
Iran

Ms Francesca Feller
Student Environment and Resource
Management
Vrije Universiteit
The Netherlands

Mr Bert Fokkema
Issue Manager
Shell Nederland B.V.
The Netherlands

Prof Dr Georg Frerks
Professor of Conflict Studies
Centre for Conflict Studies,
Utrecht University
The Netherlands

Mr Eric van de Giessen
Project leader African Great Lakes region
Institute for Environmental Security
The Netherlands

Mr Rob Glastra
Knowledge Manager
IUCN Netherlands Committee
The Netherlands

Dr Annemarie Goedmakers
President
CHIMBO
The Netherlands

Dr Sofia Goinhas
Policy Adviser
Global Witness
United Kingdom

Mr Geert Gompelman
Utrecht University / Cordaid
The Netherlands

Mr Fons Gribling
Senior Policy Advisor
Environment and Water Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
The Netherlands

Mrs Liu Haifang
Student
Institute of Social Studies
The Netherlands / China

Mr Frits Hesselink
Managing Director
HECT Consultancy
The Netherlands

Ms Jeanna Hyde Hecker
Project leader Colombia
Institute for Environmental Security
The Netherlands

Mr Leonard Imbiri
Secretary General
Dewan Adat Papua
Indonesia

Mr Thomas Jaarsma
Student Social Sciences
Wageningen University
The Netherlands

Mrs Caroline de Jong-Boon
Ecoloconsult
The Netherlands

Mr Viktor Kaisiëpo
International Representative
Dewan Adat Papua
The Netherlands

Ms Anna Karlsson
Desk Officer
Ministry of Defence
Sweden

Mr Marthen Kayoi
Head
Forestry Department Papua
Indonesia

Dr Chris W. King
Dean of Academics
Command and General Staff College
United States of America

Mr Rogier Klappe
Trainee Environment and Water Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
The Netherlands

Ms Sandra Kloff
SEAPRISE co-chair
IUCN Commission on Environmental,
Economic and Social Policy
The Netherlands

Mr Erik Koppe
Expert international environmental law and
armed conflict
T.M.C. Asser Institute
The Netherlands

Ms Dorien Korbee
Student International Development Studies
Wageningen University
The Netherlands

Mr Thijs Kuipers
Network Manager
CIMIC
The Netherlands

Mr Alex van der Laag
Cubic Engineering BV
The Netherlands

Mr Stefan van Laar
Project Officer / Researcher
Emergency Aid & Reconstruction
Cordaid
The Netherlands

Ms Barbara Lassen
Intern / Executive Officer
IUCN, Commission on Environmental,
Economic and Social Policy
Switzerland

Dr José Gabriel Lopez
Director Global Strategies
IUCN - the World Conservation Union
Switzerland

Ms Christa Meindersma
Director Conflict Management
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
The Netherlands

Mr Antoine Meyer
Project Co-ordinator
The Hague Process on Refugees
and Migration
The Netherlands

Mr Michael Penders
President
Environmental Security International
Washington, D.C.
United States of America

Mr Paul Rafferty
Editor-in-Chief
U.N. OBSERVER & International Report
The Netherlands

Dr Elizabeth Reichel
Co-Chair, Theme Culture & Conservation
IUCN, Commission on Environmental,
Economic and Social Policy
Switzerland

Mr Philip Reuchlin
Economic and Environmental Advisor
Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE)
Austria

Mr Alastair Ross
Head of Administration
University of Kent
United Kingdom / Belgium

Ms Tatiana Scheltema
Freelance journalist
The Netherlands

Mr Dick Scherjon
Business Development
Rabobank Nederland
The Netherlands

Mr Mangal Man Shakya
Chairman
Wildlife Watch Group (WWG)
Nepal

Mr Richard Steiner
Full Professor
University of Alaska
United States of America

Dr Agus Sumule
Special Assistant to Governor of Papua
Indonesia

Mr Gustaaf Tompoh
Papua Lobby / Dewan Adat Papua
The Netherlands

Mr Wouter Veening
Director
Institute for Environmental Security
The Netherlands

Mr Mark van der Wal
Coordinator Ecosystem Grants Programme SE
Asia / Central Africa
IUCN Netherlands Committee
The Netherlands

Mr Heinz J.D. Wanders
Commodore
Royal Air Force bd
The Netherlands

Mr Frank van Weert
Consultant
Resilience
The Netherlands

Annex 5 - Organisers and Sponsors



Institute for Environmental Security

The Institute for Environmental Security (IES) is an international non-profit non-governmental organisation established in 2002 in The Hague, The Netherlands with a liaison officer in London and liaison offices in Brussels and Washington D.C. The Institute's mission is: *"To advance global environmental security by promoting the maintenance of the regenerative capacity of life-supporting eco-systems."*

Our multidisciplinary work programme - *Horizon 21* - integrates the fields of science, diplomacy, law, finance and education and is designed to provide policy-makers with information and a methodology to tackle environmental security risks in time, in order to safeguard essential conditions for sustainable development. Key objectives of the Horizon 21 programme are:

- Science: Create enhanced decision tools for foreign policy makers, donors and their target groups on regional, national and local levels;
- Diplomacy: Promote effective linkages between environment, security and sustainable development policies.
- Law: Contribute to the development of a more effective system of international law and governance.
- Finance: Introduce new and innovative financial mechanisms for the maintenance of the globe's life supporting ecosystems; and
- Education: Build the environmental knowledge capital of people and organisations.

Our mission and programme should be seen in the context of promoting international sustainable development goals and as a contribution toward long-term poverty alleviation.

IUCN - The World Conservation Union

IUCN - The World Conservation Union is the world's largest and most important conservation network. The Union brings together 82 States, 111 government agencies, more than 800 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and some 10,000 scientists and experts from 181 countries in a unique worldwide partnership. The Union's mission is to influence, encourage, and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable.



IUCN - The World Conservation Union supports and develops cutting-edge conservation science; implements this research in field projects around the world; and then links both research and results to local, national, regional and global policy by convening dialogues between governments, civil society and the private sector. The priority of the Union's current Programme (2005–2008) is to build recognition of the many ways in which human lives and livelihoods, especially of the poor, depend on the sustainable management of natural resources. The IUCN's databases, assessments, guidelines and case studies are among the world's most respected and frequently cited sources of information and reference on the environment. The Union has helped over 75 countries to prepare and implement national conservation and biodiversity strategies.

CEESP - The IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy

The IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy is an inter-disciplinary network of professionals whose mission is to act as a source of advice on the environmental, economic, social and cultural factors that affect natural resources and biological diversity and to provide guidance and support towards effective policies and practices in environmental conservation and sustainable development. Its objectives are:



- To identify, articulate and learn from policy and practice that reconcile biodiversity conservation with the crucial socio-economic and cultural concerns of human communities, including mobile and other indigenous peoples.
- To foster a holistic approach to conservation, embracing complexities and promoting dialogue within IUCN among perspectives and disciplines based on different kinds of values, knowledge and achievements and on the experiences of different societies and communities.
- To enhance the capacity of IUCN and its members and partners to influence values, institutions, policies, practices, development approaches and socio-economic activities towards biodiversity conservation and the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources.
- To provide effective advice in support of IUCN's efforts towards policy and practice that reconcile biodiversity conservation with the crucial socio-economic and cultural concerns of human communities.



The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the channel through which the Dutch Government communicates with foreign governments and international organisations. It coordinates and carries out Dutch foreign policy. The Ministry has two halves: its headquarters in The Hague and its missions abroad (embassies, consulates, and permanent representations).

The five key objectives of Dutch foreign policy are:

- To promote the international order
- To promote international peace, security and stability
- To promote European integration
- To promote sustainable poverty reduction
- To maintain and promote bilateral relations

The Ministry has made this event possible by their very kind organisational cooperation and financial support.

PEACE, CONFLICT AND THE ENVIRONMENT

"In regions such as the Middle East, Darfur, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and the Congo region, destruction of forest and ecosystems, lack of food, clean water, property rights and illegal logging and mining not only pose threats, they are also the direct cause of conflicts".

Ton Boon von Ochssée,
Ambassador for Sustainable Development, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

"... There has been a lack of concerted international effort to address the natural resource and environmental roots of conflict and instability. In a world of rising scarcity and competition, a reactive approach will not work. (...) We have a window of opportunity in the coming years to accelerate the process of systemic reform and greater coherence, but the key question is: who will lead? Who will lead this process?"

Gabriel Lopez,
Director, Global Strategies, IUCN-World Conservation Union

Peace is not the absence of war, but the existence of stable communities of people who have the basic human needs satisfied. "Until you have the life sustaining and the safety aspects of human needs, all the rest of it is irrelevant. You will have to establish those first. We know what those life sustaining essentials are; they are the things the environment provides: the air, the water and the land".

BG (Ret) W. Chris King,
P.E. Dean of Academics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

"What we need is chemistry between the military and the environmentalists in order to create the conditions for structural environmental progress."

Captain Niels A. Woudstra,
Counsellor, General Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of DR Congo 2006-2007

"In many situations of armed conflict, environmental problems are among the root-causes of the conflict." Now, if in a post-conflict situation these environmental problems "are not addressed and not solved they continue to be a major source and a major threat for renewed violence."

Jelte van Wieren,
Deputy-Head of Good Governance and Peace Building, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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